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· Introduction · 
 
On February 8, 1980, a short biting letter was published in the Dutch medical weekly 
Medisch Contact. The epistle, written by a Leiden surgeon, contained over little more 
than 200 words and opened with an ominous warning: 
 
After years of silence about Him, there he is, God, the Father, with his watchful 
eye also in the Academic Hospital of Leiden. Finally in the hospital ‘for advanced 
medicine’ of the Praesidium Libertatis, while the confessional universities are ar-
duously trying to get rid of Him. His name: CME.1  
  
Leiden, the oldest university of the Netherlands (1575), had adopted the motto ‘Basti-
on of Liberty’—Libertatis praesidium—in the late nineteenth century to advertise its 
status as an independent university where scientific study could progress free from 
ideological and religious influences.2 Yet, by 1980, Leiden had also become the first 
Dutch university to allow a mysterious new authority passage into its medical faculty 
and academic hospital. Who was this ‘God, the Father’, whose watchful eye now over-
saw the activities in the Leiden hospital ‘for advanced medicine’? ‘He’ was the Com-
mittee Medical Ethics, installed in 1976 to advise on various issues of ethical concern, 
but mostly on medical experiments with human beings. It was the first committee of 
its kind in the Netherlands, but would soon be followed by the instalment of compa-
rable boards throughout the country. By the close of the twentieth century, dozens of 
watchful eyes were active in Dutch hospitals, general practice clinics, and private re-
search institutes, to oversee the conduct of medical research studies on human sub-
jects. They followed a practice that had taken hold worldwide in the second half of the 
twentieth century in the governance of human experimentation, and that was histori-
cally without precedent. This was the practice of ethics by committee. 
 
*** 
 
Today, when a medical researcher wants to determine the efficacy of a new medici-
nal product or surgical procedure, she first has to pay an ethics review board like the 
Leiden CME a visit. Although this visit is usually digital rather than physical, the idea 
is that the researcher goes and requests her local research ethics committee, as these 
boards are generically referred to, for official permission to execute the protocol she 
has designed for a research study involving human subjects. Whether the researcher 
legally has to await the verdict of this review board depends on the country in which 
she is located. Nonetheless, in most countries around the world, it has become stand-
ard practice not to start a research study on human subjects before a research ethics 
committee has granted its permission. Plus, once our researcher would try to publish 
the results of the study, she would be hard pressed to find a respectable journal will-
ing to print her paper without proof that an ethics board had first authorized the ex-
                                                 
1 M.A. van Dongen, ‘Experimenten op Mensen’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 35 (1980), p. 170. 
2 For a history of Leiden University, see: Willem Otterspeer, The Bastion of Liberty. Leiden University 
Today and Yesterday (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008). 
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periment. The same goes for grants from most funding agencies and, depending on 
the type of research study, for market approval for medicinal products by regulatory 
agencies like the United States Food and Drug Administration and European Medi-
cines Agency as well. This is true not just for biomedical research but also for behav-
ioural research, and is becoming increasingly common for the social sciences and the 
humanities. Academics conducting studies involving oral history in the United States, 
for instance, will be familiar with the routine to first acquire permission for any inter-
views from an Institutional Review Board—the American version of a research ethics 
committee. Committees like the Leiden CME, in short, have come to operate as ob-
ligatory passage points in the twenty-first century infrastructure of science: locus of 
control that scientists hoping to conduct research involving humans first successfully 
have to pass through before they can participate in its practice.3 
 Research ethics committees are nowadays such firmly fixed bodies in the oversight 
of human research studies that it is easy to forget how novel they really are. After all, 
the scientific use of living human bodies is an age-old practice, going back in recorded 
history to at least 280 BCE, when Greek physicians Herophilus and Erasistratus were 
granted permission to vivisect a condemned criminal to observe his inner workings.4 
From about the seventeenth century onwards, human experiments in science became 
increasingly popular, and with the rise of academic hospitals and laboratory medicine 
in the nineteenth century, the practice positively flourished.5 What is more, the use of 
humans in experiments was recognized already in the early modern period to consti-
tute a subject of ethical concern and, since the mid-nineteenth century, human exper-
imentation in medicine regularly resulted in social protests and informal moral tradi-
tions to seek patients’ consent.6 Yet, the actual decision to go forward with a human 
experiment, also when it was expected to have few benefits for the subjects involved, 
remained the preserve of individual researchers until well into the twentieth century. 
Until at least the 1960s, hardly any formal checks and balances existed in most coun-
tries around the world for the communal oversight of human research.7 
                                                 
3 For ‘obligatory passage points’, see: M. Callon, ‘Elements of a sociology of translation: Domestica-
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 Small wonder, then, that the Leiden surgeon in 1980 invoked the grandeur of ‘God, 
the Father’ in his aggrieved letter to Medisch Contact. Suddenly, within a timespan of 
merely a few decades, a practice that had existed for centuries was brought under the 
control of official review boards that were to decide if human research studies could 
proceed. In the Netherlands, dozens of these committees sprang up in the 1980s, and 
in 1998, Dutch parliament passed the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 
Act (WMO), regulating that no medical research studies on humans can take place on 
Dutch soil without prior permission of a formally recognized Medical Ethics Review 
Committee (METC)—the Dutch term for research ethics committees. Furthermore, if 
certain types of studies are at stake, like cell or gene therapy, research with gametes 
or embryos, or non-therapeutic intervention studies with legally incapacitated indi-
viduals, only one Central Committee may give its permission.8  
In the current Dutch research landscape, in other words, research ethics commit-
tees have acquired the hard power of the state to influence scientific research.9 They 
have, as historian of science Laura Stark points out, come to function as “declarative 
bodies” in science: like a priest who declares the groom and bride to be husband and 
wife, research ethics committees today are legally empowered “to turn a hypothetical 
situation (this study may be acceptable) into shared reality (this study is acceptable)”, 
and thus bless certain ways of probing into the world and not others. “In so doing”, 
Stark points out, “they change what is knowable”.10 Only few control mechanisms in 
the present-day governance of science can lay claim to this sort of power. But why did 
research ethics committees spring up in the 1960s and 1970s? And what type of con-
trol mechanism were they to meant to be in the governance of human experiments? 
This PhD-thesis seeks to answer these questions for the Netherlands, with the goal to 
gain a better understanding of the changing role and position of medicine and medi-
cal science in Dutch society in the second half of the twentieth century. 
In this period, the professional role of physicians and medical researchers changed 
radically, both in the Netherlands and internationally.11 Whereas they had up until 
the 1950s enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in deciding what type of interventions 
were permitted in their research and practice, they were increasingly called upon in 
the years thereafter to justify and request permission for their conduct in formally 
arranged settings—such as the research ethics committee. This change in governance 
was certainly not limited to the conduct of human experiments in medicine, or even 
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to medical science alone. In a wide variety of professional domains, the latter half of 
the twentieth century saw the rise of what anthropologists have termed “a culture of 
accountability”, i.e., the realization of oversight regimes designed to subject the per-
formance of professionals to regular inspection and to oblige them to account for 
their activities in organized settings.12 Yet, in the governance of human experimenta-
tion, this shift is often argued to have been especially drastic and disruptive—an aber-
ration from the old status quo that was historically without precedent.  
And thus, how could it be, the Leiden surgeon charged in 1980, that in times when 
even the Royal Dutch Association for the Advancement of Medicine admitted to be no 
longer capable of “adopting in writing generally accepted rules of conduct”, a small 
group of reviewers could be anointed to tell right from wrong within the walls of an 
academic hospital? Why was it that in an age in which traditional moral authorities 
were withering away, ‘a new God’ could be inaugurated to watch over the conduct of 
medical researchers? And on what grounds exactly were reviewers deemed eligible to 
take part in the meetings of a research ethics committee? “Are we jubilant when first 
a philosopher is added to the little club of moderators?”, the surgeon snarled in Me-
disch Contact, “Are we then later put at ease when the philosopher turns out to be an 
ethicist?” Really, what sort of expertise did these scholars possess that granted them a 
seat at a committee table talking about medical ethics? This PhD-thesis answers the 
Leiden surgeon, by tracing how research ethics committees emerged as watchful eyes 
in the Dutch oversight of medical experiments with humans in the second half of the 
twentieth century, and by exploring what type of control mechanism they became in 
the public governance of a historically controversial scientific practice. 
 
The importance of careful historical research 
 
Despite the dominance of research ethics committees in the contemporary biomed-
ical research landscape, their study has not been very popular among medical histori-
ans. In a 2009 issue of Medical History, in fact, this lack of scholarship was noted by 
the British sociologist Adam Hedgecoe, who remarked that he hardly had been able to 
find any serious historical studies on the origins of research ethics committees that he 
could use for his work.13 As a sociologist, Hedgecoe investigates the present-day prac-
tice of ethics review in human research governance: e.g. how committees assess pub-
lications, how researchers negotiate trust with reviewers, and how ethics boards func-
tion differently depending on their national context.14 Still, what he found wanting in 
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2009 was “a full explanation for how these bodies developed the way they did”; his-
torical context for why they arose in the 1960s and 1970s. In Medical History, there-
fore, the sociologist called on historians to carry out a “nuanced, empirically detailed 
analysis” of the origins and development of research ethics committees.15 
 Since Hedgecoe’s 2009 article, two monographs have appeared about the history of 
United States research ethics committees—called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). 
One is by Stark, who traces the invention of the practice of ‘ethics by committee’ in 
medical research to the boardrooms of the National Institutes of Health in the early 
1950s.16 The other is by historian Zachary Schrag, who investigates why federal regu-
lations originally designed for biomedical and behavioural research came to regulate 
research in the social sciences and humanities as well toward the end of the twentieth 
century.17 Combined, these two books offer detailed insights into the origins and de-
velopment of research ethics committees in the United States in the second half of the 
twentieth century. For most other national contexts, however, Hedgecoe’s words still 
apply. For the Netherlands, only a research article by social scientist Patricia Jaspers 
exists, in addition to a few witness accounts printed in the Festschrifts of those who 
stood at the cradle of the first Dutch research ethics committees.18 
 Of course, a gap in historical literature is not a problem in and of itself. Nor does a 
historical perspective automatically help to understand the contemporary practice of 
ethics by committee. Rather, nuanced historical research is needed, because history 
itself fulfils a central role in the present-day governance of human experimentation. 
Take the current Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, for instance, published 
in 2008 to provide ‘useful educational materials’ for researchers and members of eth-
ics committees.19 Of its impressive 73 contributions, the first ten detail case histories 
of human experimentation. These range from the famous yellow fever experiments by 
the U.S. army in Cuba in the early twentieth century (when the first written consent 
forms were supposedly used) to the gruesome experiments on prisoners in the Japa-
nese and Nazi concentration camps during World War II; and from the first random-
ized controlled trial in 1948 to the exposé of the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study in 
1972, when it was revealed that the U.S. Public Health Service had been monitoring 
the progression of untreated syphilis in impoverished Afro-American men since 1932, 
even though penicillin had been available as an effective cure for the disease since the 
1940s and other remedies had commonly been used before.20 History, in this context, 
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is used to teach by example: awareness of key moments in the history of human ex-
perimentation is meant to instil researchers and reviewers with a sense of right and 
wrong about the practice, in the hope of preventing unethical behaviour in the future. 
The past, in this sense, is used to encircle the present-day governance of human re-
search studies with a number of moral signposts that are to nudge researchers and 
reviewers in certain directions and to stay clear of others.21 
 In a similar manner, history is also used to justify the existence of strict oversight 
mechanisms for human experimentation. Against those who complain about the sup-
posedly excessive bureaucracy that ethics review would bring with it (of which there 
are many), defenders of the status quo can charge that at some point no research eth-
ics committees existed, and look what happened then: the Nazi atrocities happened, 
Tuskegee happened, not to mention the numerous dubious studies that were regular-
ly conducted on institutionalized groups, such as inmates or psychiatric patients, be-
fore the current review system was put in place. History, here, offers a rationalization 
for the often lamented fact that human experimentation is now surrounded with an 
elaborate set of formal checks and balances. These would be necessary, because histo-
ry has proven that researchers just cannot be left to their own devices. 
 Thirdly, and most importantly in the context of this PhD-thesis, history is regularly 
brought to bear to frame the political function that research ethics committees have 
come to fulfil in the public oversight of science. Present-day textbooks and policy re-
ports on research ethics governance, for instance, often begin with a backstory about 
why research ethics committees emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, that typically claims 
that their rise was part of a larger cultural trend in the second half of the twentieth 
century to bring the professional conduct of medical researchers and practitioners 
under much needed public control. Thus, in relevant Dutch policy reports it has be-
come commonplace since the 1990s to narrate how “since the end of the sixties the 
attention for the social relevance of scientific research increased significantly”, result-
ing in “a more critical attitude with regard to the way in which research data are ob-
tained and the costs that are involved”. “In essence”, the next lines then read, “this 
development is a part of society-wide discernible emancipation trend. […] The reali-
zation has grown that dependence obstructs a vocal attitude”.22 Review committees, 
the implication is, arose as part of an emancipatory movement to give research sub-
jects a bigger voice in decision-making about human research studies and to enable 
them to give direction to their own lives. Put this way, history gives body to the idea 
that research ethics committees first arose to assert democratic control over human 
experimentation and still exist to hold researchers publicly accountable. 
The fact that history fulfils such an important role in the contemporary governance 
of human experimentation is a crucial reason why histories of this practice need to be 
subjected to careful scrutiny. After all, depending on the histories that are provided, 
different signposts, justifications, and frames will be offered for the present-day prac-
tice of ethics by committee. For this reason, historians are often wary when they en-
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Syphilis Study and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
21 The notion of signposts is derived from: Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science. Credi-
bility on the line (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
22 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 1991-1992, kamerstuknummer 22588, nr. 3, p. 2. 
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counter historical narratives in textbooks and policy reports in which the past offers a 
neat frame of reference for the correct interpretation of, in this case, the governing 
role of research ethics committees. As Thomas Kuhn famously argues in The Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions, history in textbooks functions to initiate students into 
the paradigm for which that textbook is a pedagogical vehicle, and thus primarily 
serves to support that paradigm.23 According to Patricia Jaspers, the same logic holds 
true for Dutch policy reports on the regulation of human research studies, which tend 
to attribute an inevitable historical logic to the rise of research ethics committees in 
the Netherlands and ignore that “things could have been otherwise”. While Jaspers 
does not use the term Whig history, the implication is clear: historical events are ex-
plained in such a way that they “seem to form a progressive path to the future”, which 
is not coincidently the regulatory framework for human experimentation defended in 
these policy reports.24 History tends to be written backwards in such publications, in 
short, to present the policies they favour as the only logical outcome of past events. If 
that holds true, then careful historical research is itself an important check on the 
current system of research ethics governance to ensure that certain historical events 
and their political implications are not misunderstood—or, worse, misused by calcu-
lating political actors to push through their desired policy measures. 
 
Histories of ‘outsider’ versus ‘insider’ control 
 
 In her article, Jaspers stresses the need for “a more balanced history of ethics gov-
ernance”, since “a narrow historical view might prohibit a thorough understanding of 
current ethical review practice”. She therefore focuses on controversies in Dutch poli-
cy debates about the governance of human experimentation in the second half of the 
twentieth century, to make clear that the outcome of these debates was not inevitable. 
Careful historical analysis, Jaspers argues, proves that other choices could have been 
made and recovers paths not taken, which may offer valuable input for current policy 
debates on human experimentation. Still, despite this emphasis on historical contin-
gency, her narrative does not deviate substantially from those offered in most Dutch 
policy documents to explain why research ethics committees first arose in the 1970s 
in the Netherlands—Jaspers similarly argues that their rise should be understood “as 
part of this effort to break the monopoly of doctors on medical decisions”. Although 
Dutch physicians had traditionally enjoyed much professional autonomy, the narra-
tive goes, they lost the “unquestioned authority that had allowed them to make all the 
decisions about medical research and practice” in the 1960s due to unrest over prac-
tices like abortion and euthanasia, and new medical technologies. Hence, by the early 
1970s, “it was no longer assumed that physicians in science always do good. No, the 
professional community and lay persons should judge about that”.25 
                                                 
23 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (4th ed.) (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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25 The quotes in this paragraph are from: Ibid., pp. 79-80. The last quote is a translation of Jaspers from 
a lecture given by the first chairman of the Leiden CME in 1999: E.L. Noach, “Verschuivende normen 
in de Medische Ethiek”, Lecture HOVO Courses 1989-99, University of Leiden, p. 3. 
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 This historical frame of growing outsider involvement with the practice of medicine 
in the 1960s and 1970s has for a long time been popular to explain the rise of research 
ethics committees internationally, most notably the United States. Yet it is also a nar-
rative structure which has been subject to growing criticism in the last fifteen years or 
so, for the same reason why Jaspers is critical of the use of history in policy: it would 
read history backwards in an attempt to legitimize the current position of another 
form of external involvement with the practice of medicine, i.e., the field of bioethics. 
Historians of bioethics often claim that the installation of research ethics committees 
in many countries during the 1960s and 1970s was one of the first material effects of 
a broad social movement that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century in 
response to public concerns over the unchecked powers of physicians and researchers 
over patients and research subjects, and that would coalesce in the 1960s as this new 
field of academic reflection and social action. In his 1991 classic Strangers at the Bed-
side, for instance, historian David Rothman outlines how the traditional authority of 
the physician at the bedside was replaced during this decade by formal mechanisms 
of collective decision-making due to a widespread loss of trust in the self-regulatory 
capacities of the American medical profession. After the mid-1960s, in reaction to a 
number of exposés of unethical human experiments, an array of “medical outsiders” 
joined forces to bring medical research and practice under public control. After all, 
“when one could no longer assume that the physician shared the same set of values as 
the patient, it seemed vital to devise and implement new mechanisms, preferably 
formal or even rigid, to further patients’ particular wishes”.26 The first of these new 
mechanisms “was an entirely new system of governance for human experimentation”: 
i.e. federal regulations requiring the practice of ethics by committee.27 
 Others, such as bioethicist and historian of medical ethics Robert Baker, similarly 
claim that the field emerged in the United States as a result of a laissez-faire attitude 
towards ethical issues in the ranks of the American medical profession in this period, 
particularly in the oversight of human experimentation. In effect, when new medical 
technologies and human research scandals confronted the wider American public in 
the 1960s and 1970s, this “vacuum of authoritative moral leadership created a need 
for action in the public sphere”.28 And thus the field of bioethics emerged as an alter-
native voice of moral authority “to meet this need, to fill that space left empty by or-
ganized medicine”.29 Also ethicist Albert Jonsen, one of the founding fathers of the 
American bioethics movement, argues in his book The Birth of Bioethics that the field 
emerged as part of the civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s to rally against 
traditional authorities and power relations.30 Medicine had come to be considered an 
institute of social control, with medical ethics a tool to privilege the interests of an 
                                                 
26 David J. Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside. A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Med-
ical Decision Making (3rd ed.) (New Brunswick: AldineTransaction, 1991/2003), p. 11. 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
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29 Ibid., p. 317. 
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Singer, ‘Introduction’, in Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 
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elite social class. Hence, the set-up of a nationwide IRB-system in the early 1970s was 
a historic moment for the American bioethics field, as it meant a “transformation of 
the debate on the ethics of experimentation from a private argument within the world 
of medicine into broad, public discourse”.31 After all, in a democratic society, even (or 
especially) medical ethics could be nothing else than a sub-domain of a nation’s mor-
al code that was accessible to all citizens. As the ethicist Robert Veatch puts it in his 
own participatory account of ‘the birth of bioethics’ in the United States: 
 
I suddenly saw that explicitly in the text of the [Hippocratic] Oath would-be phy-
sicians pledged they would not reveal the precepts of the profession to anyone 
outside the group. […] Nothing could be in greater conflict with the ways of 
knowing morality in the secular world where reason, empirical observation, or 
metaphorical social contract involving all reasonable people provided a basis for 
knowing the moral norms”.32 
 
Still, despite its evident popularity, this historical frame that bioethics and research 
ethics committees emerged as “part of this effort to break the monopoly of doctors on 
medical decisions” has received a fair amount of scholarly criticism in the last fifteen 
years or so. Already in 1991, sociologist Charles Bosk remarked somewhat sceptically 
in review of Strangers at the Bedside that “there is reason to believe that the changes 
that have taken place have done more to protect hospitals from liability than to actu-
ally change practice”.33 Likewise, in her 2000 book Bioethics in America, historian 
Tina Stevens claims that the field did not win institutional legitimacy because it gave 
outsiders a mouthpiece, but “because it had proved far less threatening to existing 
social arrangements than the changes demanded by more radical, and more popular, 
social critics of the sixties”.34 Putting forward a somewhat different argument, sociol-
ogist John Evans suggests in his 2012 book The History and Future of Bioethics that 
the field flourished in the late twentieth century because it “met the needs of the bu-
reaucratic state” in a secularizing political climate: i.e. instead of traditionally thick 
approaches to morality in theology, bioethics offered thin principles of morality (au-
tonomy, beneficence, justice) that could easily be translated into liberal policies and 
regulations focused on patients’ rights.35 In various reviews of books of Rothman and 
Baker, historian Roger Cooter even charges that “bioethics has a history of opportun-
ism” because it served to secure the professional interests of “clapped-out philosophy 
departments” in the 1970s.36 Public concerns over medicine became a timely source 
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of funding for struggling humanities scholars, who willingly helped to legitimize med-
ical research and practice by protecting it from social critiques that reached beyond 
the importance of informed consent in medical decision-making. 
 In her 2012 book Behind Closed Doors, Stark applies this counter-narrative to the 
emergence of Institutional Review Boards as well. The model of group review for the 
evaluation of human experiments, she argues, was “invented, justified, and expanded 
less by ‘outsiders’ like bioethicists and activists than by the researchers themselves”.37 
Stark traces the origin of communal review of human research studies to the National 
Institutes of Health in 1953, when a hospital opened on their premises in Bethesda, 
Maryland, in which research studies with healthy human subjects took place. While 
scientific experiments had in the past often been conducted on institutionalized pop-
ulations like prisoners, orphans, and the mentally ill, the routine hospitalization of 
healthy citizens, by a government agency no less, was a new development in the Unit-
ed States in the 1950s. Ethics review, Stark argues, was invented to manage this prac-
tice. Clinical directors met regularly to discuss study protocols, a procedure that al-
lowed them to deal with issues like study design or the interaction between research-
ers and subjects. In this context, the communal review of protocols came to function 
as a new method for making moral decisions in research, but also as a technique for 
solving legal problems. Meetings served to determine if all studies proceeded accord-
ing to official guidelines, and whether any patients displayed alarming behaviour that 
had to be dealt with before it might escalate. Moreover, when widespread public un-
rest followed the Tuskegee-exposé in 1972, ethics review “helped researchers to man-
age a legal crisis that threatened their share of the federal budget and the reputation 
of medical researchers”. In short, Stark concludes, the histories of bioethics and IRBs 
should be read as “two parallel stories with one common cause: medical researchers’ 
concerns over their legal liability in clinical studies and clinical care”.38 
 This shift of historical frame, from an emphasis on outsiders to insiders, and from 
democratic control to legal protection and political legitimization, does not limit itself 
to the United States alone. Historian Duncan Wilson, for example, states in his recent 
book The making of British bioethics that the origins of research ethics committees in 
the United Kingdom have little to do with a supposed “backlash against professional 
society” in the 1960s, and should be disentangled from the rise of bioethics as an out-
sider critique on medicine.39 Instead, their rise served as an enduring form of “club 
regulation”: a form of self-regulation by members of the medical profession for mem-
bers of the medical profession that ignored calls for lay involvement in the oversight 
of human research studies.40 Wilson follows Hedgecoe in this analysis, who equally 
argues that research ethics committees did not emerge in the United Kingdom due to 
calls for public control over human experimentation, but because of changing grant 
policies by the U.S. Public Health Service in 1967, requiring ethics review for all study 
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protocols that it would decide to fund. While that does not negate that this policy was 
very much developed in response to growing concern over the practice of human ex-
perimentation in the United States, Hedgecoe claims it would be a mistake to think of 
this development as growing outsider control over medical research in Great Britain. 
For also when the British Ministry of Health became involved in the nationwide set-
up of research ethics committees in the late 1960s, the idea was actively preserved 
that ethics review had to function as a form of self-regulation. In other words, the rise 
of the practice of ethics by committee as a control mechanism for human experimen-
tation should be understood as a continued form of club regulation, not as a new in-
clusive method for ensuring democratic control over medical science.41 
  
A cultural history of changing political control 
 
 At stake in these histories is an assessment and positioning of the political function 
that research ethics committees fulfil in the governance of research studies involving 
human subjects. According to Rothman et al., research ethics committees emerged as 
a tool of external control over the conduct of individual medical researchers, i.e., an 
instrument to take the medical profession out of its social isolation and to subject it to 
“a nation’s moral code” approved and applied by all citizens, including ethicists, lay-
people, and even “society-representatives” (see chapter 4). According to authors such 
as Stark and Hedgecoe, however, this historically unwarranted emphasis on outsider 
control belies the emergence of research ethics committees as a tool of internal con-
trol over the conduct of individual medical researchers, i.e., an instrument that had to 
be yielded by medical researchers and practitioners; that preserved the idea that the 
medical profession constituted a separate social class subject to its own mores and 
traditions; and that ultimately served to ward off all too invasive outsider control by 
serving “as a technique of promoting research and preventing lawsuits”.42 Which 
origin story is accepted as authoritative matters, for depending on the reasons behind 
the establishment of past research ethics committees, their current function in the 
governance of human subjects research is viewed in a different light. Likewise, also 
this PhD-thesis argues that, despite the dominant historical narrative that research 
ethics committees first emerged in the Netherlands “to break the monopoly of doc-
tors on medical decisions”, their rise originally served to give ‘elite’ physicians more 
internal control over human research, to intensify its conduct in the Netherlands, and 
to protect this scientific practice from all too critical societal voices. 
 At the same time, however, despite their young age, it would be incomplete to limit 
the history of research ethics committees to their origins, and to present a narrative 
of political control frozen in time. Public concerns over the professional autonomy of 
medical researchers did influence the development of Dutch thinking about the polit-
ical functioning of research ethics committees in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, and certainly changed the way they were originally conceived of in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, decades in which calls for democratic 
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oversight over medicine reached a peak in the Netherlands, the notion that research 
ethics committees were needed to increase external control over human experimenta-
tion arose alongside the original idea of ethics by committee as an instrument of in-
ternal control. The next chapters therefore chart both governance ideals as they were 
proposed in the Netherlands in the latter half of the twentieth century, and study how 
tensions between them were eventually resolved in Dutch political circles tasked with 
the regulation of human subjects research. In all chapters, the reasons advocating one 
form of governance over another take centre stage, with the goal to tease out underly-
ing cultural conceptions of the appropriate role and position of medicine and medical 
science in Dutch society, and how these changed through time. 
 With this approach, this PhD-thesis hopes to move away from the strong juxtaposi-
tion between outsiders and insiders in the realization of research ethics committees, 
and to focus instead on the political functions that the practice of ethics by committee 
historically has been imagined to fulfil in the governance of human experimentation. 
For while the ebb and flow of specific interest groups is an important question in the 
history of research ethics governance, the sizable attention to the position of relevant 
historical actors tends to direct attention away from the fact that, irrespective of who 
was at the helm, the success of research ethics committees in the second half of the 
twentieth century entailed a monumental change in the governance of human exper-
imentation, and of the sciences more generally. What we need to understand, there-
fore, is not so much whether outsiders or insiders were responsible for this profound 
shift in governance, but rather, as Wilson has argued for the history of bioethics, “the 
mechanisms that underpin the emergence of [research ethics committees] in specific 
times and places”.43 What problems was the practice of ethics by committee perceived 
to solve, and by whom? What solutions did it present for the governance of human 
experimentation, and for whom? And, crucially, how did this linkage of problems and 
solutions change through time? Also, what underlying cultural conceptions of the role 
of medicine and medical science in society gave rise to the first Dutch research ethics 
committees, and how did growing concerns about the autonomy of the Dutch medical 
profession influence these conceptions? And, finally, how did these configurations 
frame the ethical concerns at stake in human experimentation, and who or what ben-
efited from the policy solutions that were eventually chosen? 
 Of course, this type of historical questions does not preclude attention to the role of 
outsiders or insiders in the governance of human experimentation, nor to their politi-
cal interests. As sociologist Joseph Gusfield already pointed out in his canonical 1981 
book The Culture of Public Problems, “human problems do not spring up, full-blown 
and announced, into the consciousness of bystanders”.44 It involves work for an issue 
to be recognized as a problem in need of public governance and, even then, it matters 
a great deal who is appointed to come up with appropriate policy solutions. Why do 
governments allow laboratory animals to be bred for scientific research, for instance, 
while this would be considered absolutely deplorable for humans? It is not that ani-
mal rights’ activists have never rallied fiercely against such practices. Yet, such groups 
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have never been fully successful in convincing others, and particularly those in pow-
er, to consider the issue to be equally problematic. Instead, those in favour of animal 
experimentation have by and large been able to maintain that it is a scientific practice 
that should not only be allowed by law but should be advanced with streams of public 
funds as well. Likewise, this PhD-thesis will establish that those in favour of human 
experimentation have by and large been able to insulate the practice from more radi-
cal social critiques due to their privileged seats at Dutch policy tables. 
However, of primary interest is not that lobbyists were insiders or outsiders to the 
medical research establishment, but how they made sense of and gave direction to the 
issues at stake in the governance of human experimentation. Hence, the main goal of 
this PhD-thesis is to re-collect the dominant notions that once gave form to the Dutch 
practice of ethics by committee in the governance of human experimentation; to trace 
how these notions changed in conjunction with changing cultural conceptions of the 
place of medicine and medical science in Dutch society; and to hold up these reflec-
tions as a mirror for the present-day governance of human subjects research. “At 
root”, Cooter argues in 2010, “the history of bioethics is not about medicine and mo-
rality at all, nor about the activity of bioethicists, but rather, is a reconfiguration of 
what it is to be human”. With this often used expression in medical historiography, 
Cooter points out that historians should study how the notion of patients’ rights came 
to be celebrated as a capstone of ethical and legal decision-making in the latter half of 
the twentieth century, rather than to focus on whether “the authority of doctors was 
displaced by the would-be authority of (laity-minded) bioethicists”.45 It presents an 
approach to history that is not so much interested in that “things could be otherwise”, 
although it certainly does not deny this. However, it serves to recover what went into 
the configuration of the practice of ethics by committee as it did and, as such, make 
explicit which cultural conceptions of the role of (medical) science in society underlie 
the governance of human subjects research in the Netherlands today. 
 
The Netherlands as a reference culture 
 
Of course, research ethics committees may have arisen for very different reasons in 
the Netherlands than in the United States or United Kingdom. Judging from existing 
Dutch texts on the ethics of human experimentation, however, it is easy to forget that 
the Netherlands might have its own history of research ethics governance. Textbooks 
for Dutch medical students, for example, tend to follow the same genealogy, starting 
with the Nazi concentration camp experiments and the 1947 Nuremberg Code, a set 
of now world famous principles for human experimentation that were promulgated 
as part of the verdict of the Doctors’ Trial against 23 physicians accused of conducting 
experiments on prisoners in the Nazi concentration camps.46 Then, they move on to 
the 1964 Helsinki Declaration of the World Medical Association (WMA), another set 
of principles for human research studies that is now often called the cornerstone doc-
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ument of human research ethics worldwide.47 Subsequently, the seminal 1966 article 
‘Ethics and Clinical Research’ in the New England Journal of Medicine by the anaes-
thesiologist Henry K. Beecher is mentioned, which lists twenty-two research studies 
that had then recently appeared, and which Beecher believed to be flagrantly unethi-
cal.48 This ‘roll of dishonour’, as it came to be called, includes examples of withhold-
ing known treatments, of failure to obtain any form of consent, of conducting danger-
ous physiological experiments, of administering virulent strings of hepatitis to intel-
lectually disabled children, and of injecting live cancer cells into elderly patients of 
the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. To this, the 1967 book Human Guinea Pigs by 
British physician Maurice Pappworth is often added, listing numerous questionable 
experiments conducted on hospital patients, orphans, inmates, and other confined 
populations in the United Kingdom in this period.49 The 1972 exposé of the Tuskegee 
syphilis study typically concludes such segments, whereafter it is concluded that, to-
day, stringent legislation for human research studies exists worldwide.50 
 Such a placeless genealogy ignores, however, that these exposés hardly played any 
role of significance in the establishment of the first research ethics committees in the 
Netherlands. While Dutch news did report on scandals like Tuskegee and the exposés 
of ‘Mister Pappworth’, none of these ever led to much action from the Dutch govern-
ment. It also neglects that the Netherlands itself was not free from research scandals. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, multiple dubious human research studies were reported on, 
such as for instance experimental tests with a flu vaccine by pharmaceutical company 
Philips-Duphar in a Dutch psychiatric clinic in 1966 (see chapter 3). But although the 
responsible Dutch statespersons usually did issue a formal reply condemning these 
studies, they did not lead to much government action before the early 1980s. Hence, 
the famous research scandals that are typically invoked to explain the rise of research 
ethics committees in a country such as the United States cannot account for their 
emergence in a country such as the Netherlands. This is one of the main reasons why 
Wilson stresses the need for attention to national context. The singular focus on the 
United States overlooks how specific factors shape what is taken as ethical or prob-
lematic in different times and places, which Wilson suspects to be an important cause 
of the at times heated polemics over the past and present-day institutional function of 
bioethics: i.e. by reducing its history either to a need for action in the public sphere or 
to a strategy to protect the interests of scientists and physicians, one ignores that “bi-
oethics is a multi-sited and interdisciplinary set of activities” which cannot be traced 
back to a single historical event (Tuskegee) or figure (Beecher).51 
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The same holds true for the practice of ethics by committee. The history of research 
ethics committees in the Netherlands has a distinct trajectory from those of the Unit-
ed States and Great Britain, outlined above in broad strokes. While both countries did 
serve as key “reference cultures” in Dutch newspapers and policy reports to frame the 
issues under discussion, the concerns for which ethics by committee was envisioned 
as a policy solution were significantly different.52 Unethical human experimentation, 
for example, was for a long time taken to be a foreign problem, an epidemic that had 
not touched upon Dutch shores. Nor was the early Dutch ‘bioethics’ movement much 
concerned with human experimentation. The first monograph by a Dutch ethicist on 
the ethics of medical experiments with humans, for instance, was not published until 
1985, when most Dutch research ethics committees were already up and running.53 
Instead, as will become clear, those who pushed most ardently for more mechanisms 
of collective control in Dutch research ethics governance for a long time were ‘elite’ 
medical researchers, who were frustrated that their government seemed to care little 
for the safety of human subjects (in addition to, not coincidently, the swift progress of 
biomedical science and clinical experimentation in the Netherlands). 
Internationally, the history of Dutch research ethics governance in this PhD-thesis 
may serve two purposes. First, given its study of the changing conception of the prac-
tice of ethics by committee in the second half of the twentieth century and its accom-
panying focus on changing cultural notions of the position of medicine and medical 
science in Dutch society, it may provide useful starting points to further develop his-
tories of research ethics committees in other national contexts. According to historian 
Zachary Schrag, for instance, still more historical attention is needed for the changing 
function of ethics review in the United States in the years since it left the board rooms 
of the National Institutes of Health. Contemporary IRBs bare a family resemblance to 
their distant past, Schrag argues, but in many ways “the differences are as striking as 
the similarities”.54 Second, mapping the history of Dutch research ethics governance 
can help to tax the exemplary function that Dutch medical ethics, for good or for bad, 
fulfils internationally, due in large part to Dutch legislation for euthanasia and physi-
cian-assisted suicide (which permits the practice if certain criteria of due care have 
been met).55 In Baker’s work on the history of bioethics, for instance, the Netherlands 
functions as a reference culture for his thesis that bioethics arose in the United States 
due to a vacuum of moral leadership among American physicians. Thus, the laissez-
faire attitude of the American medical profession to moral issues is contrasted to the 
attitudes of the Dutch medical profession, which Baker claims to have retained juris-
diction over medical ethics, both in the past and the present: “The Royal Dutch Medi-
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ument of human research ethics worldwide.47 Subsequently, the seminal 1966 article 
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The same holds true for the practice of ethics by committee. The history of research 
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cal Association (founded in 1849) was able to negotiate physician-initiated euthana-
sia practices with Dutch legal authorities without involving ‘bioethicists’ in any major 
decision”.56 In histories he has written on the governance of human experimentation 
after World War II, Baker makes similar use of the Netherlands, which he argues was 
one of the first countries in the world to actively enforce the 1947 Nuremberg Code.57 
In this same fashion, he and other historians have claimed that the Netherlands was 
one of the first countries to try to install “local research councils (later to be called 
institutional review boards, or IRBs)”, and that the Dutch delegation to the WMA first 
put the ethics of human experimentation on the agenda of the international organiza-
tion, which eventually resulted in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.58 
It is true that, relatively speaking, an early awareness existed in the Netherlands 
about the need for more oversight in the practice of human experimentation. As 
chapter 1 will show, already in 1949 Dutch doctors voiced concerns that the recently 
established WMA did not have enough attention for the ethics of human experimen-
tation and, in 1955, the country’s national Health Council advised the Dutch govern-
ment to establish a national advisory board that could aid researchers in conducting 
clinical trials (a recommendation that has led some historians to claim that the Dutch 
were among the first to realize research ethics committees). Still, despite these ‘early’ 
activities, it would take until the close of the twentieth century until Dutch parliament 
passed the WMO, long after many other countries had realized legislation regulating 
human experimentation. This was not for lack of trying. From the 1950s onwards, the 
Dutch government requested reports from official advisory bodies on at least six oc-
casions to help decide whether legislation for human experimentation was desirable, 
and what this legal framework should look like. In Dutch parliament, the matter was 
discussed throughout the 1980s and 1990s and politicians complained regularly that 
the realization of an appropriate legal system for research ethics governance was long 
overdue. In the same period, both medical insiders and outsiders frequently ventilat-
ed frustrations about the inability of the Dutch government to realize proper legisla-
tion in journals such as Medisch Contact. “The Netherlands is becoming an interna-
tional testing ground for all sorts of experimental research”, commentators would 
write, “a Freistaat for experiments […] which are refused elsewhere”.59 
Hence, due to a reluctant government, conversations over the ideal governance of 
human experimentation spanned a period of more than 40 years in the Netherlands, 
revealing clear shifts in the conceptualization of the research ethics committee and its 
appropriate function in the governance of medical research and practice. Where Stark 
argues that the practice of ethics by committee in the United States already in the 
1960s became an “entrenched, routine way of doing things” that required “less justifi-
                                                 
56 Baker, Before Bioethics, p. 278. 
57 Robert Baker, 'Transcultural Medical Ethics and Human Rights', in Ulrich Tröhler & Stella Reiter-
Theil (eds.), Ethics Codes in Medicine. Foundations and achievements of codification since 1947 (Al-
dershot, 1998), pp. 312-331. 
58 Ibid., p. 320. See also: Ulrich Tröhler, 'The Long Road of Moral Concern: Doctors' Ethos and Statute 
Law Relating to Human Research in Europe', in History and Theory of Human Experimentation, pp. 
27-54, p. 34; Susan E. Lederer, 'Research Without Borders: The Origins of the Declaration of Helsinki', 
in History and Theory of Human Experimentation, pp. 145-164. 
59 H.D.C. Roscam Abbing, ‘Genetische experimenten met mensen. Wetgever quo vadis?’, in Medisch 
Contact Vol. 41 (1986), pp. 533-535, p. 533. 
· introduction · 
· 17 · 
cation and explanation over time”, in the Netherlands it remained an active subject of 
deliberation in expert advisory committees, parliamentary hearings, and discussion 
pages of scientific journals and mainstream newspapers until the late twentieth cen-
tury.60 For decades, the original blueprint for the practice of ethics by committee was 
tweaked and twisted in these outlets, until most parties involved deemed it ready to 
be cast into law. Consequently, an impressive paper trail has been left behind on the 
shelves of the Dutch National Archive and in the proceedings of Dutch parliament. 
These sources will be combined with a variety of published materials, including pam-
phlets, newspapers, journal articles, private correspondence, and broadcasts, to map 
in detail how the notion of ethics by committee travelled from the first Dutch policy 
report on the subject in 1955 to the eventual passing of the WMO in 1998. 
 
What and what not to expect 
 
The following chapters make clear that this journey did not follow a straight path. 
Between 1955 and 1998, the original Dutch blueprint for ethics review changed sub-
stantially in conjunction with changing cultural conceptions of the role and position 
of medicine and medical science in Dutch society. Chapters 1 and 2 map the original 
notion of ethics review by committee as a form of internal control over the practice of 
human experimentation. Chapter 1 first provides an overview of the longer history of 
human experimentation, the growing importance of this practice to medical decision-
making in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the impact that World War 
II and the Nazi concentration camp experiments had on human research practices in 
the Netherlands. Subsequently, it investigates the incentives behind the development 
of the first Dutch policy report on research ethics governance of 1955 and its provi-
sional notion of the practice of ethics by committee. Chapter 2 examines the next two 
policy reports that were developed by the Dutch Health Council between 1968 and 
1981 in response to parliamentary questions about the permissibility of a new form of 
human experimentation in medicine: the randomized controlled trial. The medical 
researchers behind these reports were convinced that legal measures were needed to 
bring this practice under control. However, these researchers were concerned not just 
about the rights and safety of human research subjects. The conduct of randomized 
controlled trials also had to be protected, they argued, and the Dutch government had 
a moral responsibility to heighten both the quality and quantity of this scientific prac-
tice. Ethics review had to ensure that this upsurge would be realized. 
Chapters 3 and 4 map the sudden enfolding of this original notion of ethics review 
into a movement pushing for more external control over medical research and prac-
tice towards the end of the 1970s. Chapter 3 first traces the emergence of this move-
ment in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the Royal Dutch Society for the Advancement 
of Medicine had proudly announced after World War II that the longstanding moral 
traditions of Dutch physicians had played a vital role in their resistance against the 
Nazi occupation, this proud independent identity crumbled in the decades thereafter. 
By 1970, the pages of Medisch Contact were filled with concern about a Dutch crisis 
of medical ethics, unease was voiced in Dutch parliament about the seeming inability 
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of the organized Dutch medical profession to regulate the conduct of its members, 
while an amalgam of social movements started advocating a need to codify patients’ 
rights. Chapter 4 traces how the rights of research subjects, which initially received 
minor attention in this changing cultural climate, became a central part of this dis-
course toward the end of the 1970s, in response to a number of unexpected research 
scandals. This outcry resulted in a policy advice on the governance of human experi-
mentation in the Netherlands from the Central Council for Public Health, which rec-
ommended the Dutch government in 1982 to include “society-representatives” in the 
oversight of human experimentation, as “seclusion and mystery have to make way for 
openness and transparency” in a modern democratic society.61 
Chapters 5 and 6, finally, study the sixteen years between the publication of this 
latter policy report and the 1998 WMO. In 1983, the Dutch government announced it 
fully agreed with the Central Council for Public Health and would develop appropri-
ate legislation soon. Yet in the years thereafter, successive cabinets found reasons to 
postpone the realization of a human research bill—inertia that gave rise to much frus-
tration in the Netherlands. Chapter 5 shows that lack of political action did not pre-
vent a plethora of Dutch research ethics committees to spring up in the 1980s. It did, 
however, ensure that the Dutch government had little influence on the way in which 
these practically came to manifest themselves. Consequently, when Dutch parliament 
in 1997 could for the first time deliberate on a bill for medical research involving hu-
man subjects, it was debating a practice of ethics by committee that had already con-
gealed around the ideas of those who had started to push in the 1980s for more ex-
pert control over human experimentation in the Netherlands. Chapter 6 investigates 
the policy solution that the so-called Purple administration eventually devised to me-
diate between the two ideals of expert and democratic governance in the public over-
sight of human research studies. It was a solution, chapter 6 argues, dependent on a 
specific configuration of ethical expertise that had emerged in the second half of the 
twentieth century in reaction to “the waning of traditional moral authority”—and that 
indeed favoured the new health or bio-ethics profession in the Netherlands. However, 
it was not a solution that was particularly congenial to ethicists or medical research-
ers above all else. Rather, it was a solution which enabled the Dutch government to 
claim, on the one hand, that it did not neglect the regulation of ethically contentious 
issues in fields of science, technology, and health, while, on the other, that it also did 
not unduly interfere with the beliefs of people in a pluralist society. 
Since this PhD-thesis focuses on policy debates about the governance of human ex-
perimentation in the Netherlands, the day-to-day dealings and decisions of the more 
than hundred Dutch research ethics committees that have existed since the 1970s 
receive only minor attention in the following pages. Instead, the emphasis lies with 
the language of political discourse in which their role and function has been imagined 
and not with their actual historical or current practice.62 For this reason, this PhD-
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thesis focuses on ‘committees thinking about committees’, i.e., the numerous adviso-
ry bodies that have been requested since the 1950s by the Dutch government to write 
reports on the topic and the two ‘committees’ ideally elected once every four years to 
represent the interests and concerns of Dutch citizens—the House of Representatives 
and the Senate (in Dutch called Tweede Kamer and Eerste Kamer).63  
According to sociologist Sheila Jasanoff, expert advisory committees are important 
resources for scholars interested in the boundary work that goes into framing conten-
tious issues as problems in need of public action.64 Outside of the limelight that dom-
inates parliamentary deliberations, they often establish the parameters within which 
subsequent policy discussions will be held. Relevant policy documents have therefore 
formed a central point of departure for identifying the source material on which this 
PhD-thesis rests. Drawing on these reports and the detailed minutes that have been 
preserved of committee meetings, additional sources such as the documentation ma-
terials used by committee members have been collected. In addition, as these bodies 
regularly drew on developments in scientific practice and public discourse, relevant 
academic journals and popular newspapers have been studied to gain a better picture 
of the changing cultural climate in which policy deliberations took place. All issues of 
the journal Medisch Contact (1945-present) have been studied, for instance, as have 
other relevant medical, philosophical, and legal journals. Such sources are often in-
cluded in the upcoming pages, albeit within margins. Discussions that hardly had an 
effect on the development of relevant policies, even if they were of high concern to 
those involved, receive only minor attention in the upcoming chapters. 
The following pages also do not address the role of research ethics committees in 
non-medical research contexts. Of course, depending on the definition given to con-
cepts such as experiment and research, the scope of a law regulating human research 
studies may differ widely. In fact, as this PhD-thesis will show, a big part of the policy 
discussions about the appropriate oversight of human experimentation was dedicated 
to deciding what precisely constitutes an experiment and how it differs from regular 
clinical interventions. In his 2010 book Ethical Imperialism, Schrag similarly shows 
how in the United States the legal definition of ‘research’ has over the years come to 
include most studies with human beings in the social sciences as well, a process that 
has gone hand in hand with a reconfiguration of the notion of ‘science’ in these schol-
arly fields.65 Nonetheless, also Schrag emphasizes that U.S. federal policies for human 
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thesis focuses on ‘committees thinking about committees’, i.e., the numerous adviso-
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and the Senate (in Dutch called Tweede Kamer and Eerste Kamer).63  
According to sociologist Sheila Jasanoff, expert advisory committees are important 
resources for scholars interested in the boundary work that goes into framing conten-
tious issues as problems in need of public action.64 Outside of the limelight that dom-
inates parliamentary deliberations, they often establish the parameters within which 
subsequent policy discussions will be held. Relevant policy documents have therefore 
formed a central point of departure for identifying the source material on which this 
PhD-thesis rests. Drawing on these reports and the detailed minutes that have been 
preserved of committee meetings, additional sources such as the documentation ma-
terials used by committee members have been collected. In addition, as these bodies 
regularly drew on developments in scientific practice and public discourse, relevant 
academic journals and popular newspapers have been studied to gain a better picture 
of the changing cultural climate in which policy deliberations took place. All issues of 
the journal Medisch Contact (1945-present) have been studied, for instance, as have 
other relevant medical, philosophical, and legal journals. Such sources are often in-
cluded in the upcoming pages, albeit within margins. Discussions that hardly had an 
effect on the development of relevant policies, even if they were of high concern to 
those involved, receive only minor attention in the upcoming chapters. 
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experimentation were originally designed for the biomedical and behavioural scienc-
es, and only later transposed to the social sciences and humanities. Likewise, in the 
Netherlands, policy deliberations mostly revolved exclusively around medical exper-
imentation, and the 1998 WMO only speaks of medical-scientific research, leaving it 
up to the administrative body responsible for the execution of the law to decide which 
types of other research studies fall within its scope.66 This PhD-thesis therefore pri-
marily focuses on the role of research ethics committees in the governance of medical 
research involving human subjects, and only includes other scientific fields when they 
presented an issue of concern in the sources under investigation. 
Finally, this PhD-thesis does not provide a definition of the term governance. Alt-
hough it is admittedly an elusive term that cannot be translated into all languages, it 
is a widely recognized concept to consider acts of organizing, managing and ruling, by 
a variety of entities and actors, through formal and informal channels, in a multitude 
of spheres. Governance, almighty Wikipedia says (as does Governance: A very short 
introduction), refers to “all of processes of governing, whether undertaken by a gov-
ernment, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal organi-
zation of territory and whether through the laws, norms, power or language”.67 Bruno 
Latour refers to concepts like governance as part of a scholar’s infra-language: “They 
don’t designate what is being mapped, but how it is possible to map anything from 
such a territory. They are part of the equipment on the geographer’s desk to allow 
him to project shapes on a sheet of paper”.68 And thus, in the upcoming pages, the 
term is equipped to bring into view two fundamental shifts in ‘governing’ human ex-
perimentation that this PhD-thesis wants to capture: (1) the transition of the locus of 
ethical decision-making from individual researchers to select groups of reviewers in 
the oversight of human research studies, and (2) from a tradition of self-governance 
in medical science to one of strict public control—as it occurred in the second half of 
the twentieth century, in a small country called the Netherlands. 
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· Chapter 1 · 
a moral obligation to medical progress 
 
“Both modern medications and modern medical practice carry risks. Hippocrates’ old 
theorem can therefore in this modern day and age no longer be maintained in its en-
tirety”.1 In 1954, Dutch internist Job Pannekoek laid this firm conclusion on the table 
of the committee ‘tests upon human beings’ of the Health Council of the Netherlands. 
Only a few months earlier, this ad hoc committee—consisting of sixteen eminent phy-
sicians—had been installed on government request to study the permissibility of hu-
man experimentation. For two years, this group gathered every few months to discuss 
under what circumstances this practice was acceptable in the Netherlands and which 
measures needed to be taken to keep it under control. Pannekoek and colleagues were 
worried about some of the experiments conducted in Dutch hospitals and expressed 
deep concern about stories that reached them from countries like the United States. 
Yet, they also felt that the existing medical ethics no longer befitted physicians who 
committed themselves to ‘the practice of modern medicine’: Primum non nocere, the 
old Hippocratic theorem to ‘first, do no harm’, could no longer be maintained by phy-
sicians who had an array of medicines and tools at their disposal to do good, and who 
carried a responsibility to benefit as many patients as possible. Hence, a new ethical 
framework was needed—to do justice to the position that science had acquired in the 
practice of medicine. Modern medicine required modern medical ethics. 
 
*** 
 
 This chapter explores the incentives behind the establishment of the Dutch Health 
Council committee ‘tests upon human beings’ in 1953. In 1955, its conclusions about 
the appropriate governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands were pub-
lished as a twelve-page policy advice to the Dutch government, which contained four-
teen guidelines for medical tests with humans and recommended to install a national 
advisory board to guide this practice.2 According to some historians, it was one of the 
first times that the need for institutional oversight over human experimentation was 
recognized in national policy circles.3 Still, why did a national advisory body to the 
Dutch government formulate ethical guidelines for the conduct of medical tests upon 
human subjects in the 1950s, a decade when only few precedents existed internation-
ally to suggest that the state rather than the medical profession was responsible for 
the governance of this practice? Why did it decide that the existing medical ethics had 
become obsolete for its governance in the mid-twentieth century? And what sort of 
oversight role did the Health Council imagine for a national advisory board in guiding 
the conduct of human experimentation in the Netherlands? 
                                                 
1 Dutch National Archive (hereafter: NL-HaNA), Gezondheidsraad 2.15.33, 548, Minutes committee 
‘tests upon human beings’ [proeven op mensen], 11 March 1954, p. 2. 
2 Advies van de voorzitter [J. Wester] van de Gezondheidsraad d.d. 10 oktober 1955, uitgebracht aan de 
Minister van Sociale Zaken en Volksgezondheid betreffende proeven op mensen. 
3 Baker, 'Transcultural Medical Ethics and Human Rights', pp. 312-331; Tröhler, 'The Long Road of 
Moral Concern: Doctors' Ethos and Statute Law Relating to Human Research in Europe', pp. 27-54. 
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To answer these questions, this chapter traces how and by whom human experi-
mentation was turned into a matter of public concern in the Netherlands in the first 
decade after World War II. In this period, revelations of the Nazi concentration camp 
experiments provoked radically different responses among different social groups in 
the Netherlands. Leaders of the medical profession vowed to never again let the cor-
rupting influences of political ideology and government bureaucracy take a hold over 
medicine. Others, however, found definitive proof in the concentration camp experi-
ments of the dangers of ‘modern medicine’ and its reductionist perspective on human 
(and animal) life. As a result, debates over the governance of human experimentation 
in the immediate post-war period came to revolve in the Netherlands both around the 
societal standing and epistemic authority of ‘modern medicine’. And consequently, 
when the Dutch Health Council in 1955 published a report on ‘tests upon human be-
ings’, it attempted not just to lay down the groundworks for the future governance of 
human experimentation in the Netherlands, but also to enforce a definitive statement 
about its rightful position in mainstream medicine and ‘modern society’. This chapter 
explores what this statement was—and who was responsible for it. 
As a background to these post-war developments and by way of introduction to the 
history of human experimentation more generally, section I of this chapter first ex-
plains why the conduct of medical experiments on human beings became increasingly 
common in the modern period. Section II shows how, in relation to this development, 
opposition arose to ‘modern medical science’ and its use of animal and human exper-
imentation in this period, a development that in the early twentieth century gave rise 
to the first requests to the Dutch government to bring the conduct of human experi-
mentation under public control. Sections III and IV detail how World War II influ-
enced these debates in the Netherlands during the 1940s and 1950s, and how ongoing 
complaints about “the horrors of modern medicine” led to the installation of no less 
than three Health Council committees between 1947 and 1953 to advise the Dutch 
government on how best to handle this phenomenon. The last of these three was the 
committee ‘tests upon human beings’. Section V, finally, explains the organization of 
this committee and shows which function its 1955 report was meant to serve in ongo-
ing Dutch debates on the rightful societal position of ‘modern medicine’. 
 
The growing importance of human experimentation 
 
 Human experimentation is an age-old practice, but it has not always been a central 
part of medical research and practice. Of course, as every new medicinal product and 
surgical procedure once had to be tried out on a human patient for the first time, it is 
possible to argue that medical experiments on humans are as old as medicine itself.4 
But experiments whereby an intervention on the human body is undertaken not pri-
marily to benefit the health of the individual under investigation but to obtain gener-
alizable scientific insights started to gain in popularity only during the Renaissance. 
In first instance, these experiments (or, to use the correct historical term, demonstra-
                                                 
4 Gert H. Brieger, ‘Human Experimentation. I. History’, in Warren T. Reich (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics Vol. 2 (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 684-692; Susan E. Lederer, ‘The Ethics of 
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tions) were mostly conducted on human corpses by anatomists in search of the struc-
ture of the human body.5 However, by the seventeenth century experiments with liv-
ing human bodies grew popular as well. According to historians Erika Dyck and Larry 
Stewart, the ethos of experiment set forth by the first learned societies from the 1650s 
onwards turned the human body into just another object that was to be manipulated, 
probed, and inspected to reveal intimate truths about nature.6 
 Many of these early experiments were conducted on the bodies of experimenters 
themselves. The philosophers of the Royal Society of London, the oldest learned soci-
ety in existence (1660), often willingly offered their bodies for the study of physical 
phenomena. Simon Schaffer describes how natural philosophers zealously “blinded 
themselves with sunlight, gassed themselves into states of ecstasy and insensibility, 
and electrified their limbs into paralysis or spasm”.7 Physicians used their own bodies 
to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of new medications. Their willingness to test a 
drug on themselves (or their children) before giving it to a patient was a sign they had 
trust in their remedies and did not hesitate to sacrifice themselves for their patients.8 
In the famous medical marketplace of the early modern period, at which university 
educated physicians competed with surgeons, apothecaries, and quacks for custom-
ers, the willingness ‘to go first’ had a distinct commercial advantage.9 
 But philosophers and physicians experimented on others as well. In the eighteenth 
century, experiments with new machineries like the Voltaic pile or apparatus for pro-
ducing factitious airs became parlour games and drew in crowds of volunteers quite 
willing to participate as research subjects in popular demonstrations.10 Many medical 
experiments were conducted on those who could not be considered volunteers. Londa 
Schiebinger describes how charity patients in England in the eighteenth century were 
likely to be subjected to all sorts of experimental treatments. Physicians used them to 
test cures and dosages until they deemed these ready to prescribe to paying patients. 
Prominent physicians in France and Germany promoted experimenting on prisoners 
and to submit them to extreme trials and surgeries for “the sake of humanity”.11 Indi-
viduals confined in closed institutions like workhouses, orphanages, and prisons were 
particularly vulnerable to human experimentation.12 Horded together and dependent 
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7 Simon Schaffer, ‘Self Evidence’, in Critical Inquiry Vol. 18 (1992), pp. 327-362, p. 329. 
8 Lawrence Altman, Who Goes First. The Story of Self-Experimentation in Medicine (New York: Ran-
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on the grace of others, they were often taken as “readily available material”. It did not 
help in this regard that ‘the institutionalized’ often came from vulnerable classes that 
were appraised as ‘lesser citizens’: the poor, deviant, and mad.13 
 
*** 
 
 In the (late) modern period, systematic medical experimentation with human be-
ings intensified. There are various reasons for this development. First, changes in the 
understanding of medical science itself played an important role. Already in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth century, a medical doctrine advantageous to the comparison 
of human bodies had developed. Doctors gradually abandoned the Galenic concep-
tion that illness depended on unique combinations of bodily constitution, age, gen-
der, and environment. Instead, a tradition of medical empiricism arose, in which dis-
eases rather than patients became the central category of analysis and disease specific 
treatments were developed that could be administered across patients to constant 
effect.14 As a result, the human body became a vessel for disease and thus compara-
ble, which, in turn, stimulated statistical approaches to medical efficacy. Physicians 
started to collect cases with the aim to increase observations of single instances be-
fore publishing their findings.15 In the nineteenth century, this approach became an 
important validation and impetus for human experimentation. In the 1830s, Parisian 
physician Pierre Louis (1787-1872) famously developed the ‘numerical method’ to 
medical practice, using calculus and probability theory to measure the risk and bene-
fits of clinical procedures.16 This numerical approach subjected individual experience 
to systematic comparison. Central was not whether medicines worked for one patient, 
but whether they produced significant effects on a population level. To establish this, 
repeated experimental tests were needed on higher numbers of patients.  
In addition, after the mid-nineteenth century, the growing popularity of the theory 
that miniscule organisms (germs) cause diseases had the effect that medical practice 
increasingly modelled itself after scientific practice.17 In and around hospitals, labora-
tories were built to examine fluid and tissue samples, to isolate ‘microorganisms’, and 
to study disease aetiology by means of animal and possibly even human experiments. 
In his 1865 Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, the famous French 
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physiologist Claude Bernard (1813-1878) explained: “So, among the experiments that 
may be tried on man, those that can only harm are forbidden, those that are innocent 
are permissible, and those that may do good are obligatory”.18 Hence, under the right 
circumstances, human experiments could even be a moral obligation for physicians.19 
Even though few of these experiments produced any distinct therapeutic advances for 
most of the nineteenth century, this faith that greater knowledge of disease would 
eventually reap its rewards was rarely doubted. Bernard, for one, was fully confident 
that ‘modern experimental medicine’ would eventually conquer all diseases. “We cure 
it always without any exception”, he declared in the Introduction, “when we place 
ourselves in the known experimental conditions for reaching this goal”.20 
This experimental tradition was facilitated in the nineteenth century by the rise of 
modern research hospitals. Already since the eighteenth century, hospitals had grown 
in both size and number throughout Europe.21 Under influence of the Age of Enlight-
enment, the authority of physicians within hospitals grew as well, a development that 
coincided with and stimulated human experimentation. After all, hospital walls con-
tained a reservoir of patients that could be compared for experimental purposes.22 In 
the early nineteenth century, the idea that hospitals were teaching and research cen-
tres as much as they were service institutes gained prominence. Emphasis in the hos-
pitals lay on diagnosis, not cure. Based on new theoretical insights in physiology, stu-
dents were trained in new diagnostic techniques to recognize which parts of the dis-
eased body were failing. After patients passed away, autopsies served to confirm these 
findings. In many cases, interventions served to demonstrate scientific insights and 
skill as much or even more than that they served to provide care. In this process, hos-
pital patients effectively came to function as research subjects.23 
In this period, still, hospital patients were often from the lower classes of society. 
Affluent patients preferred to be taken care of in their own homes, far away from the 
noise and filth of hospital wards. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, howev-
er, the growth of laboratory medicine in combination with the invention of invasive 
new medical technologies like stomach tubes and x-rays ensured that also well-to-do 
patients were increasingly taken care of in hospitals—where these technologies were 
more readily available. As a result, physicians’ careers grew less dependent on their 
patients’ preferences and more on the approval of hospital boards and medical peers. 
With that, their professional needs and interests changed too. Whereas the patronage 
of wealthy patients had been an important means to advance a medical career in the 
early modern period, allegiance to the experimental tradition in medicine became one 
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in the (late) modern hospital setting.24 Experimenting with humans, if successful and 
above moral suspicion, could greatly boost a curriculum vitae. 
A final, more remote, factor contributing to the intensification of experiments with 
human beings in the nineteenth century is the fact that the social power of physicians 
grew. In this period, states increasingly started to take an interest in public health. A 
healthy population could have distinct economic and military advantages and, more 
generally, was taken to be a sign of national superiority.25 To organize and streamline 
medical practice, therefore, states enacted licensing laws to regulate who got to prac-
tice medicine, with what diplomas, and under what conditions. Physicians were en-
listed to act as state officers and carry out health care programmes. These develop-
ments resulted in a more hierarchical organization of national health care systems.26 
In 1865, for instance, the Dutch government passed legislation that made it illegal to 
see patients without the right medical license, officially creating a “doctors’ monopo-
ly”.27 In turn, this contributed to a more corporate identity of the medical profession. 
In 1849, the Dutch Society for the Advancement of Medicine (NMG) was created to 
represent the interests of all orthodox physicians in the Netherlands, a development 
that took place in many other countries as well in the mid-nineteenth century.28 Such 
professional societies stimulated a rhetoric of communal responsibility: doctors did 
not just carry a responsibility to individual patients, they had a duty to take care of 
the body politic of a nation as a whole. In the late nineteenth and twentieth century, 
this utilitarian logic served to justify human experiments. After all, if physicians were 
responsible for “the wellbeing of the greatest number of people”, perhaps some risks 
could be taken with a few patients if these could benefit the many. 
Of course, the relevance and extent of these changes for the practice of human ex-
perimentation differed per region. The use of medical statistics, for instance, origi-
nated in England in the eighteenth century and was brought to fruition in Paris in the 
nineteenth century.29 Similarly, in the early nineteenth century, doctors from all over 
Europe and the United States flocked to Paris to watch their French colleagues make 
rounds and use the newest instruments in their bedside diagnoses.30 With the rise of 
‘laboratory medicine’ in the mid-nineteenth century, Germany took over this leading 
international position, whereas in the twentieth century the United States increasing-
ly assumed international leadership in the medical sciences.31 In the Netherlands, the 
pace of change was on average slower. Throughout the nineteenth century, promi-
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nent physicians expressed frustration at the fact that the national Dutch government 
seemed unwilling to invest similar sums of money in the nation’s hospital system or 
education programmes as their counterparts in France and Germany did.32 Likewise, 
to keep up with the latest insights in their field, students travelled to cities like Paris 
to receive medical training they felt was unavailable in the Netherlands. Until far into 
the twentieth century, such feelings of frustration would last. Systematic human ex-
perimentation was not possible in the Netherlands, the feeling was, because it lacked 
the infrastructure to bring together the know-how of academia, the “patient material” 
in hospitals, and the financial means of industry (also see chapter 2). 
Yet, also in the Netherlands, medical research and practice underwent substantial 
changes in the nineteenth century, which stimulated systematic human experimenta-
tion. Around the 1850s, the statistical method grew popular, the hospital system un-
derwent significant revisions, and diagnostic laboratories were established.33 The idea 
that poor hospital patients mainly served as “research material” became a trope in the 
Netherlands in this period.34 And by the turn of the century, members of Dutch par-
liament even started to wonder if measures had to be taken to bring the practice un-
der public control, as reports reached them, especially from countries east of the bor-
der, of all sorts of ungodly activities taking place in medical laboratories. Members of 
the Dutch medical profession vehemently opposed such accusations—In the Nether-
lands, doctors knew and respected the boundaries of human experimentation. None-
theless, within the ranks of the NMG too, some started to argue in the early twentieth 
century for additional safeguards to keep the practice within bounds. 
 
Moral traditions and social concerns 
 
 Sometimes, the history of human experimentation prior to the advent of research 
ethics committees in the second half of the twentieth century is presented as one that 
could proceed in any shape or form without public or professional scrutiny. Historical 
research has shown, however, that already in the early modern period the practice of 
human experimentation attracted moral discussion. Dyck and Stewart, who have ana-
lysed the use of humans in early modern science experiments, claim that “trials upon 
the ill-informed, the desperate, and the unreliable raised clear and serious alarm in 
the minds of the experimenters” in the early modern period.35 Similarly, historians 
who have investigated experimental blood transfusions in the seventeenth century, 
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and smallpox inoculations in the eighteenth century, have shown that these practices 
at the time engendered heated disputes among physicians and philosophers about 
their ethical permissibility.36 “The point is not that this was a matter of a drastic mo-
rality”, Dyck and Stewart explain, “but rather that the issue was then fairly acknowl-
edged and well considered”.37 Indeed, in his book Drugs on Trial on eighteenth cen-
tury pharmaceutical drug trials, also Andreas-Holger Maehle argues that awareness 
existed that patients in these experiments served as research subjects. In clinical lec-
tures, physicians emphasized the need for caution; experimenters were to proceed “as 
if one experimented on one’s friends or on oneself”. 38 In addition, most physicians 
either served themselves as subjects or demanded that their patients were to benefit 
from participation. Nor did they typically hide the dangers of participation. 
 In the nineteenth century, fledgling medical professions in Europe and the United 
States developed more pronounced views on the permissibility of human experimen-
tation. In her 2004 book Lesser Harms, Sydney Halpern argues that they developed 
moral traditions for handling the risks associated with untested remedies and surgi-
cal procedures.39 These traditions, she emphasizes, were largely informal and uncodi-
fied: few formal mechanisms (legislation, state inspections) existed to prevent or re-
press excesses by individual researchers. Nonetheless, many physicians treated these 
traditions as if they were self-evident, nor did they shy away from shaming colleagues 
whom they believed to have transgressed the boundaries of the permissible in human 
experimentation. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, Louis Pasteur (1822-
1895) sparked international debate amongst physicians when he inoculated the nine-
year-old boy Joseph Meister—who had been badly bitten by a rabid dog—with a ra-
bies vaccine that he had recently developed.40 Disagreement existed whether this ex-
perimental intervention had been justified. Had Pasteur conducted enough prior tests 
on animals, for instance, before moving on to humans? If not, many considered that 
the French scientist had violated a clear moral boundary. 
Other imperatives, Halpern shows, were the practice of prior self-experimentation 
and the “logic of lesser harms”, which stipulates that an intervention is only justified 
when the benefits are likely to outweigh the risks. Following Martin Pernick, Halpern 
traces this logic to the growing influence of statistical reasoning in medical practice in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Louis’ numerical method, Pernick argues, introduced “a 
calculus of suffering” to medicine. Judicious physicians were expected to leave behind 
medical theories and traditions and instead establish the safety and efficacy of medi-
cal interventions solely by counting.41 The introduction of anaesthesia in American 
surgical practice in 1846, for instance, was justified using this calculus of suffering. 
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Anaesthesia was not without risk. Patients could and did die from this purposefully 
induced deep sleep and strong opposition existed among surgeons and physicians to 
the use of a procedure that could kill patients. However, proponents collected numer-
ical evidence to prove that surgeries without anaesthetics killed a larger percentage of 
patients than surgeries with anaesthetics.42 Hence, on a population level, the calculus 
of suffering pointed in favour of anaesthesia. Although it was clear that some patients 
would never wake up due to the use of anaesthetics, more could be saved if the tech-
nology was used. According to Halpern, this utilitarian logic was increasingly used in 
the early twentieth century to justify experiments without a direct benefit for partici-
pating research subjects. Risks taken with individuals could be balanced “by the ex-
pectation of a contribution to the greater social good”.43 
 
*** 
 
In addition to the development of moral traditions within medical professions, the 
nineteenth century also saw growing social opposition to human experiments. In con-
junction with the growing popularity of experimental medicine in this period, efforts 
to restrict scientific experimentation in medical practice grew stronger as well. Many 
of these attempts revolved around the practice of animal experimentation rather than 
human experimentation. Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, also the 
use of humans in medical research increasingly became a topic of concern for organi-
zations dedicated to the prevention and abolition of animal research—typically called 
‘antivivisectionist societies’. Vivisection is a term that became popular in English and 
Germanic languages in the eighteenth century to denote the cutting of living bodies 
for scientific study.44 By the late nineteenth century, it was often used interchangea-
bly with experimentation. When American researchers spoke of human vivisection, 
for instance, they referred to tests undertaken on human beings not for the benefit of 
the humans involved but to increase scientific understanding.45 In the Netherlands, 
‘vivisectie’ mostly referred to animal experimentation, but could imply human exper-
imentation as well. Until the 1960s, it remained a commonly used term to reference 
invasive scientific experiments with living beings (mostly mammals). 
A fairly extensive body of literature exists that details the history of antivivisection 
movements in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. These 
histories show that these movements have distinctly national components. The first 
organized antivivisectionist groups originated in England during the 1870s, a country 
where the opposition to animal experimentation historically has been strong (this, in 
contrast to France, that had a strong tradition in experimental medicine in the nine-
teenth century, but experienced far less social opposition).46 Historians have also 
shown, however, that antivivisection societies were founded around roughly the same 
time in most parts of Europe and the United States and that debates about merits and 
                                                 
42 See also: Martin S. Pernick, ‘The Calculus of Suffering in Nineteenth-Century Surgery’, in The Has-
tings Center Report Vol. 13 (1983), pp. 26-36. 
43 Halpern, Lesser Harms, p. 5. 
44 Maehle & Tröhler, ‘Animal Experimentation from Antiquity’, p. 14. 
45 Lederer, Subjected to Science, p. xiv. 
46 Richard D. French, Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); N. Rupke, ‘Introduction’, in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, pp. 1-13. 
· chapter 1 · 
· 32 · 
and smallpox inoculations in the eighteenth century, have shown that these practices 
at the time engendered heated disputes among physicians and philosophers about 
their ethical permissibility.36 “The point is not that this was a matter of a drastic mo-
rality”, Dyck and Stewart explain, “but rather that the issue was then fairly acknowl-
edged and well considered”.37 Indeed, in his book Drugs on Trial on eighteenth cen-
tury pharmaceutical drug trials, also Andreas-Holger Maehle argues that awareness 
existed that patients in these experiments served as research subjects. In clinical lec-
tures, physicians emphasized the need for caution; experimenters were to proceed “as 
if one experimented on one’s friends or on oneself”. 38 In addition, most physicians 
either served themselves as subjects or demanded that their patients were to benefit 
from participation. Nor did they typically hide the dangers of participation. 
 In the nineteenth century, fledgling medical professions in Europe and the United 
States developed more pronounced views on the permissibility of human experimen-
tation. In her 2004 book Lesser Harms, Sydney Halpern argues that they developed 
moral traditions for handling the risks associated with untested remedies and surgi-
cal procedures.39 These traditions, she emphasizes, were largely informal and uncodi-
fied: few formal mechanisms (legislation, state inspections) existed to prevent or re-
press excesses by individual researchers. Nonetheless, many physicians treated these 
traditions as if they were self-evident, nor did they shy away from shaming colleagues 
whom they believed to have transgressed the boundaries of the permissible in human 
experimentation. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, Louis Pasteur (1822-
1895) sparked international debate amongst physicians when he inoculated the nine-
year-old boy Joseph Meister—who had been badly bitten by a rabid dog—with a ra-
bies vaccine that he had recently developed.40 Disagreement existed whether this ex-
perimental intervention had been justified. Had Pasteur conducted enough prior tests 
on animals, for instance, before moving on to humans? If not, many considered that 
the French scientist had violated a clear moral boundary. 
Other imperatives, Halpern shows, were the practice of prior self-experimentation 
and the “logic of lesser harms”, which stipulates that an intervention is only justified 
when the benefits are likely to outweigh the risks. Following Martin Pernick, Halpern 
traces this logic to the growing influence of statistical reasoning in medical practice in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Louis’ numerical method, Pernick argues, introduced “a 
calculus of suffering” to medicine. Judicious physicians were expected to leave behind 
medical theories and traditions and instead establish the safety and efficacy of medi-
cal interventions solely by counting.41 The introduction of anaesthesia in American 
surgical practice in 1846, for instance, was justified using this calculus of suffering. 
                                                 
36 See also: Simon Schaffer, ‘Regeneration. The Body of Natural Philosophers in Restoration England’, 
in C. Lawrence & S. Shapin (eds.), Science Incarnate. Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 83-120; Peter Moore, Blood and Justice. The seven-
teenth-century Parisian doctor who made blood transfusion history (London: John Wiley, 2003). 
37 ‘Introduction’, in The Uses of Humans, p. 15. 
38 Maehle, Drugs on Trial, p. 103. Maehle does point out that dangerous trials did take place in the 
eighteenth century, not only with patients but also with healthy research subjects who typically found 
themselves in a dependent position to the experimenting physician—as their house pupil for instance. 
39 Halpern, Lesser Harms.  
40 Also: Gerald L. Geison, ‘Pasteur’s Work on Rabies. Reexamining the Ethical Issues’, in Hastings 
Center Report Vol. 8 (1978), pp. 26-33. 
41 Pernick, A Calculus of Suffering. 
· a moral obligation to medical progress · 
· 33 · 
Anaesthesia was not without risk. Patients could and did die from this purposefully 
induced deep sleep and strong opposition existed among surgeons and physicians to 
the use of a procedure that could kill patients. However, proponents collected numer-
ical evidence to prove that surgeries without anaesthetics killed a larger percentage of 
patients than surgeries with anaesthetics.42 Hence, on a population level, the calculus 
of suffering pointed in favour of anaesthesia. Although it was clear that some patients 
would never wake up due to the use of anaesthetics, more could be saved if the tech-
nology was used. According to Halpern, this utilitarian logic was increasingly used in 
the early twentieth century to justify experiments without a direct benefit for partici-
pating research subjects. Risks taken with individuals could be balanced “by the ex-
pectation of a contribution to the greater social good”.43 
 
*** 
 
In addition to the development of moral traditions within medical professions, the 
nineteenth century also saw growing social opposition to human experiments. In con-
junction with the growing popularity of experimental medicine in this period, efforts 
to restrict scientific experimentation in medical practice grew stronger as well. Many 
of these attempts revolved around the practice of animal experimentation rather than 
human experimentation. Nonetheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, also the 
use of humans in medical research increasingly became a topic of concern for organi-
zations dedicated to the prevention and abolition of animal research—typically called 
‘antivivisectionist societies’. Vivisection is a term that became popular in English and 
Germanic languages in the eighteenth century to denote the cutting of living bodies 
for scientific study.44 By the late nineteenth century, it was often used interchangea-
bly with experimentation. When American researchers spoke of human vivisection, 
for instance, they referred to tests undertaken on human beings not for the benefit of 
the humans involved but to increase scientific understanding.45 In the Netherlands, 
‘vivisectie’ mostly referred to animal experimentation, but could imply human exper-
imentation as well. Until the 1960s, it remained a commonly used term to reference 
invasive scientific experiments with living beings (mostly mammals). 
A fairly extensive body of literature exists that details the history of antivivisection 
movements in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. These 
histories show that these movements have distinctly national components. The first 
organized antivivisectionist groups originated in England during the 1870s, a country 
where the opposition to animal experimentation historically has been strong (this, in 
contrast to France, that had a strong tradition in experimental medicine in the nine-
teenth century, but experienced far less social opposition).46 Historians have also 
shown, however, that antivivisection societies were founded around roughly the same 
time in most parts of Europe and the United States and that debates about merits and 
                                                 
42 See also: Martin S. Pernick, ‘The Calculus of Suffering in Nineteenth-Century Surgery’, in The Has-
tings Center Report Vol. 13 (1983), pp. 26-36. 
43 Halpern, Lesser Harms, p. 5. 
44 Maehle & Tröhler, ‘Animal Experimentation from Antiquity’, p. 14. 
45 Lederer, Subjected to Science, p. xiv. 
46 Richard D. French, Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1975); N. Rupke, ‘Introduction’, in Vivisection in Historical Perspective, pp. 1-13. 
· chapter 1 · 
· 34 · 
dangers of vivisection were strikingly similar.47 In the Netherlands, for instance, the 
English antivivisection movement was an important source of inspiration for the op-
ponents of animal experimentation. In 1890, the Nederlandsche Bond ter Bestrijding 
der Vivisectie (Dutch Association for Combatting Vivisection, NBBV) was established 
with support of both English and German antivivisectionists.48 
Of course, important differences existed among and within national antivivisection 
movements. Yet, on average, antivivisectionists expressed a few typical objections to 
animal experimentation. First of all, they argued it to be a cruel practice on par with 
other forms of animal violence. Early antivivisection societies were therefore often 
linked to animal protection groups. Secondly, they typically argued that torture in-
flicted on animals in the name of science blunted the minds and senses of scientists to 
the extent that they would inflict cruelty on humans as well. Once researchers had 
grown accustomed to causing suffering in animals, little would stop them from doing 
the same to children or the elderly. Hence, animal experimentation was nothing but a 
slippery slope towards human experimentation. Thirdly, for many antivivisectionists, 
a charge against vivisection included a charge against ‘the corrupting effects of mod-
ern medicine’. The experimental tradition, they argued, had reduced the traditional 
healing art to a cold mechanistic science that prioritized scientific knowledge above 
patient care and that ignored everything not made out of matter. The germ theory of 
disease, for instance, had reduced illness to single deterministic causes and neglected 
the crucial influence of environment and psyche. Likewise, the bewildering array of 
medical specialties that had sprung up in the nineteenth century was argued to have 
fuelled a harmful reductionist perspective on life. This subdivision ignored that living 
beings were more than the sum of their parts who could only be understood in rela-
tion to the world around them. Felix Ortt, for instance, a founding father of the Dutch 
antivivisection movement, believed an inconceivable order to exist in the world that 
operated on and through everything—from the electron, molecule and cell, to the or-
ganism, society and state. Vivisectionists literally cut the connection to this ordering 
principle and would thus never be able to produce any true knowledge.49 
Historians have often argued that the late nineteenth century debate over vivisec-
tion was, in fact, a debate over the cultural authority of modern medicine and science. 
Vivisectionists represented the “priorities and aspirations of science”, Nicolaas Rupke 
argues, “and scientists defended the practice, even if they had no direct contact with 
it”.50 In contrast, those who opposed the practice did so because they “saw their cul-
tural influence waning as that of science grew”.51 Antivivisectionists were typically 
members of the aristocracy, clergy and judiciary, who feared to lose their traditional 
authority to the new classes of scientists and doctors. Marxist historian Jan Romein 
                                                 
47 Ibid. See especially the contributions of: Guarnieri, ‘Moritz Schiff (1823-96). Experimental Physiol-
ogy and Noble Sentiment in Florence’, pp. 105-124; Tröhler & Maehle, ‘Anti-vivisection in Nine-
teenth-century Germany and Switzerland. Motives and Methods’, pp. 149-187; Bromander, ‘The Vivi-
section Debate in Sweden in the 1880s’, pp. 214-235; Lederer, ‘The Controversy over Animal Experi-
mentation in America, 1880-1914’, pp. 326-258. 
48 Amanda Kluveld, Reis door de hel der onschuldigen. De expressieve politiek van de Nederlandse 
anti-vivisectionisten, 1890-1940 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000), p. 49, p. 51. 
49 Amanda Kluveld, ‘Felix Ortt. De kleine geloven als brug tussen wetenschap en geloof‘, in De Negen-
tiende Eeuw Vol. 25 (2001), pp. 137-146. 
50 Rupke, ‘Introduction’, p. 8. 
51 Ibid., p. 8. 
· a moral obligation to medical progress · 
· 35 · 
describes antivivisectionism as one of the various petites religions that gained popu-
larity in the nineteenth century, a category in which he includes practices like mag-
netism, homeopathy, Buddhism, Christian-anarchism, and theosophy.52 All found 
their support among members of the bourgeoisie, who rallied against the demystified 
and materialistic existence of the modern industrialised world in which distant scien-
tific understanding had come to dictate the general pace of life.53 
Other historians take issue with this representation of the antivivisectionists. Su-
san Lederer, for instance, criticizes the equation of antivivisectionism to anti-science 
sentiments for the context of the United States in the early twentieth century. This 
dichotomy, she argues, fails to capture the multiple and fluid meanings that medical 
science itself embodied during this period.54 Likewise, in her history of Dutch antiviv-
isectionism, Amanda Kluveld points out that antivivisectionists did not so much de-
nounce ‘modern science’, but rather offered an alternative integration of elements of 
science, religion, and philosophy to the by then established scientific order.55 Ortt, for 
one, drew on Maxwell’s laws of thermodynamics in his ideas of an all-ordering prin-
ciple. Still, both historians agree that antivivisectionists did position their perspec-
tives as an alternative to ‘the evils of modern science’. In turn, they were typically 
denounced by their opponents as a mindless group of quacks. 
The practice of human experimentation fulfilled a specific role in these tugs of war. 
On the one hand, for many antivivisectionists, animal and human experiments were 
intimately related. Not unjustly, the impression existed that vulnerable social groups 
were more likely to fall victim to the vivisector’s knife than the well-to-do. Orphans, 
mental patients, prisoners—for antivivisectionists they were all powerless individuals 
in dire need of protection. As such, they were not so different from animals. A differ-
ence in degree existed, but not in kind. Yet, at the same time, antivivisectionists often 
instrumentally drew on cases of unethical human experiments to lobby for legislation 
restricting animal vivisection. In Dutch parliament in 1903, for instance, a member of 
the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) warned Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper against 
the dangers of human experiments to convince him that animal vivisection had to be 
brought under legal control: 
 
And, above all, Mister Chairman, a statutory regulation of vivisection would be 
necessary for the upcoming generation of professors and doctors, so that we can 
entrust to them with confidence the weak, the poor, amongst us. It is for the sake 
of them that I called vivisection a harrowing national distress.56 
 
He did not want to suggest that unethical experiments took place in Dutch hospitals, 
but it was well known that in “clinics abroad” the most terrible tests had been taken 
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on humans. Rumour went that even “children and chaste maidens” had deliberately 
been infected with syphilis for its scientific study! That was why legislation for animal 
vivisection was needed now in the Netherlands, before also the minds and senses of 
Dutch vivisectors had become so blunted that they would be unable to refrain them-
selves in conducting this type of godless practices on humans. 
 Hence, due to the vocal and well-organized social opposition to animal vivisection, 
the practice of human experimentation started to gain in attention in Dutch political 
circles around the turn of the twentieth century. Still, no political party actually called 
upon the Dutch government to take measures against the conduct of experiments on 
human beings as such. The antivivisectionist framework emphasized a need to bring 
the suffering of weak members of society to an end. As humans on average were more 
capable to defend themselves than animals, their plight took a backseat in the battle 
against “the dark sides of modern experimental medicine”. 
 
*** 
 
 Parliamentary discussions of human vivisection did have the effect that members 
of the Dutch medical profession started to pronounce more explicit views on its ap-
propriate governance around the turn of the twentieth century. In 1904, for instance, 
Editor of the Dutch Journal of Medicine Hendrik Burger reacted shocked to the in-
sinuation by a member of Dutch parliament that dubious human experiments might 
take place at the hands of Dutch doctors. Half of his reaction served to dismiss such 
unfounded accusations. Admittedly, in countries like Germany abuse had taken place, 
but little proof existed that Dutch physicians were equally guilty of unethical medical 
experiments on humans. Half of his reaction, however, also served to remind readers 
of the Dutch Journal of Medicine that “tests upon human beings which only satisfy 
our medical curiosity and that do not meet the distinct medical grounds of a specific 
case deserve absolute disapproval”.57 Physicians who wanted to conduct medical ex-
periments could only use their own bodies for doing so. 
 Burger also urged his readers to be vigilant. It was the duty of every physician to 
speak up when he suspected another colleague to cross the line. To suit the action to 
the word, he therefore proceeded to scold a member of the Dutch medical profession 
who had recently stated he was willing to give a homeopath access to his patients just 
to prove that the homeopathic doctrines were unfounded. If one was sure a therapy 
had no effect, Burger wrote sternly, it was deeply unethical to expose patients to such 
haughty experiments. This editorial comment led to a heated dispute in the Journal 
whether this naming and shaming was proper etiquette. Yet, Burger considered it his 
duty as an editor to condemn unethical research studies.58 Failure to do so, he stated, 
would undermine the public’s trust in the Dutch medical profession. 
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 Physicians like Burger with influential positions in the Dutch medical profession 
frequently used their authority to moralize the practice of medicine in the early twen-
tieth century. They did so, because they were convinced that medicine primarily had 
to be governed with processes of internal control. Until the rise of the patients’ rights 
movement in the 1970s (see chapter 3), it was common in the Dutch language to refer 
to the doctors’ collective as the artsenstand, i.e. “a class of physicians”. Membership 
was allotted only to those with a license to practice and who conducted themselves in 
a manner that could be expected from ‘gentlemen’, with dignity and prudence.59 As a 
class, physicians were part of Dutch society, but stood apart from it at the same time. 
Their conduct was regulated by mores specific to the medical profession. 
Hence, ethical guidelines and peer pressure served to regulate the conduct of prac-
titioners. While physicians were subject to the law like anyone else, ethical wisdom in 
medicine was understood to come with years of experience, i.e. , it required the lived 
experience of being a doctor to be able to judge what was right and wrong in medical 
practice (and science) and which measures had to be taken in case of misbehaviour. 
Right or wrong depended on context and could not be fixed by hard legislation. From 
this, it followed that the governance of medicine was first and foremost a professional 
affair. Members of the artsenstand had a duty to hold each other accountable, as only 
they could really understand what it meant to be a physician. Vice versa, the interfer-
ence of ‘medical outsiders’ with the practice of medicine was often treated with suspi-
cion, as laypeople did not possess the lived experience of a physician. 
This class ideology translated itself in various safeguards of internal control. First 
of all, seasoned practitioners had a responsibility to instil a sense of right and wrong 
on younger generations. They led by example, at the bedside and in classes. Secondly, 
physicians reminded each other of the ethics of their practice through both the writ-
ten and spoken word. Although it would take until 1936 in the Netherlands before the 
NMG published its first booklet on medical ethics, it was common since the founding 
of the Dutch Journal of Medicine in 1857 for physicians to discuss the ethics of medi-
cine in its pages or even to publish entire lectures on the subject.60 Thirdly, from 1905 
onwards, the NMG held disciplinary hearings to hold physicians responsible for any 
misbehaviour (in 1930, these internal organs were augmented by an official medical 
court in which colleagues and jurists had a seat). Finally, one of the most important 
safeguards was a physician’s professional identity: the moment someone adopted this 
identity, he no longer just represented himself but the artsenstand as a whole. Since a 
single physician’s misconduct reflected badly upon the entire profession, he carried a 
weighty responsibility towards his colleagues to constantly be on his best behaviour. 
Even more, he carried this responsibility to all of society, because if patients would 
lose faith in the artsenstand due to bad press, they would seek refuge in the arms of 
quacks, to their own detriment. Consequently, the duty “not to undermine trust in the 
medical profession” became one of the most reiterated sayings in publications like the 
Dutch Journal of Medicine in the early twentieth century.  
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 Human experimentation by no means figured prominently in most publications of 
Dutch physicians on medical ethics. More common were themes like medical confi-
dentiality (crucial) and commercial advertising (objectionable). Still, from the early 
twentieth century onwards, probably in response to growing antivivisectionist com-
plaints, members of the Dutch medical profession did start to discuss the appropriate 
stance of members of the Dutch artsenstand towards human experimentation more 
regularly, as Burger did in 1904. Yet, such considerations did not translate in explicit 
ethical guidelines for the practice in the early twentieth century. In the 1936 NMG 
ethics booklet, the topic was wholly neglected even. Its chapters addressed themes 
like ‘the general demeanour towards the public’, ‘poor care’, and ‘how to pass on one’s 
practice upon retirement’, but not human vivisection.61 This held true for most coun-
tries. Explicit guidelines—let alone official regulations—for medical tests upon human 
beings are for the most part a product of the post-1945 period.62 
Various reasons exist why formal regulations did develop in the second half of the 
twentieth century for the governance of human experimentation. One, which will be 
discussed in chapter 2, is the fact that World War II provided an enormous stimulus 
for the systematic conduct of medical experiments with human beings, leading some 
historians to conclude that human experimentation before World War II was in com-
parison nothing more than a “cottage industry”. Another, which will be discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4, is the fact that another type of societal opposition to ‘modern medi-
cine’ surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, which was much more successful in convincing 
governments that medical research and practice had to be brought under public con-
trol than the Dutch antivivisectionists had ever been. First, however, this chapter dis-
cusses the cultural impact which World War II and especially the Nazi concentration 
camp experiments had in this regard.63  
Today, the notion of ‘human experimentation’ is closely associated with the atroci-
ties committed in Nazi concentration camps in the name of medical science. Search-
ing it online, for instance, immediately brings up images of SS doctors submitting 
camp prisoners to gruesome experiments that often ended only in death. Likewise, in 
present-day textbooks and policy reports on the ethics of human subjects research, 
they often serve as a self-evident reminder why restrains just have to be imposed by 
public authorities on human research. This chapter shows, however, that in the im-
mediate post-war era, when the first foundations for the regulation of human exper-
imentation were laid in the Netherlands, Dutch physicians drew on their war experi-
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ences to rally against any form of state involvement with medicine. For them, the war 
had taught that only an artsenstand could safeguard ethical medicine.  
This chapter also shows how this was starkly different for groups who had rallied 
since the late nineteenth century against the hegemony of the medical profession and 
its support for experimental medicine. After the war, Dutch antivivisectionists found 
definitive proof in the Nazi concentration camp experiments of the debilitating effects 
of ‘modern medicine’. It had reached its pinnacle in the horror chambers of the Third 
Reich. Crucially, it was in the context of the political confrontation between these two 
camps in 1955, that the Dutch government was first advised to consider governing the 
practice of human experimentation with a system of ethics by committee. 
 
The Nazi experiments and the Dutch medical profession 
 
 From 9 December 1946 to 20 August 1947, 20 medical doctors and three Nazi offi-
cials were brought before the US military court in the Nuremberg Palace of Justice to 
stand trial for mass murder under the guise of euthanasia and involvement in a series 
of experiments that were executed on prisoners of the Nazi concentration camps.64 
This tribunal has become known as the Doctors’ Trial, which laid bare the gruesome 
atrocities committed by the Nazis in the name of medical science. Prisoners had been 
subjected to lethal sea-water, high-altitude, and freezing experiments; to tests meas-
uring the effects of poisonous bullets, mustard gas, and incendiary bombs; to sterili-
zation experiments which frequently resulted in severe debilitation; to name a few of 
the experiments. From 1945 to 1947, horrific descriptions of these studies found their 
way into the pages of Dutch newspapers.65 Dutch journalists discussed them in tones 
of disbelief and horror. The experiments demonstrated the absolute inhumanity of 
the Nazi regime: how camp prisoners had been brutally tortured, maimed, and killed 
without so much of a hint of compassion in those responsible for them.  
In the Dutch Journal of Medicine, the Nazi concentration camp experiments were 
condemned as the work of pure evil that were a far cry removed from civilized medi-
cal science. To emphasize this, words like ‘medical’ and ‘colleagues’ were put between 
brackets in journal descriptions of the Nazi experiments.66 Vice versa, in discussing 
‘regular human experiments’, any connection with the concentration camps was em-
phatically denied. “We have to get rid as soon as possible of the unpleasant associa-
tions linked to experiments due to the criminal actions of many Germans”, one physi-
cian wrote in Medisch Contact in 1949, “as they may form a hindrance in scientific 
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traffic”.67 Indeed, the Editor of the Dutch Journal of Medicine Joghem van Loghem 
stressed in 1953, “Those who tackle the permissibility of tests upon humans, need to 
dissociate the subject from its German past”.68  
Historians generally agree that in the first two decades after World War II, medical 
professions around the world evaluated the concentration camp experiments as ‘Nazi 
exceptionalism’.69 The Nuremberg Code, for this reason, was virtually ignored by the 
international medical community in the immediate post-war period.70 On August 19, 
1947, this Code had been promulgated by the four American judges presiding over the 
Doctors’ Trial as part of their verdict. The hope was that such a reminder would in the 
future prevent horrors in the conduct of human experiments. The Code consisted of 
ten principles, including the principle of informed consent, the absence of coercion, 
and the requirement of an appropriate risk-benefit ratio for participating research 
subjects. It was the first ever official international code of medical ethics and is now-
adays considered by many people as “the primary foundational document informing 
all ethics codes on research with humans”.71 Yet, in the immediate post-war decades, 
as ethicist Jay Katz has famously observed, many considered it “a good code for bar-
barians but an unnecessary code for ordinary physician-scientists”, i.e., Nuremberg 
would not pertain to the conduct of civilized medical researchers.72 
Indeed, also in the Netherlands between 1953 and 1955, the existence of the Code 
was never once acknowledged by the Health Council committee ‘tests upon human 
beings’. Equally, the Nazi concentration camp experiments were brought up only two 
times. Once, during its first meeting, when the President made clear that there was 
no need to discuss them.73 Once, when the committee was selecting possibly relevant 
literature for her reflections on the governance of human experimentation and a dis-
sertation on medicine in the German concentration camps was brought up.74 Also this 
work needed no discussion, the committee decided, as it described Nazi crimes and 
was therefore irrelevant for the topic under consideration.75 
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Still, Dutch physicians worried that the Doctors’ Trial had put a slur on the reputa-
tion of ‘scientific human experimentation’. In the Dutch Journal of Medicine, Van 
Loghem lamented that “the treatment of the subject [in the Trial] has apparently had 
the result that, more than before the war, people nourish distrust of the ethics of ex-
perimental research”.76 Not only had the revelations of the Nazi concentration camp 
experiments scared people, the defence had also dared to produce a list during the 
Trial with international literature published in the last century to prove that ethical 
transgressions in medicine were by no means a new phenomenon in the Third Reich. 
Van Loghem, who was appalled by the comparison of the Nazi crimes to regular med-
icine, worried that this social unrest still had not died down by 1953.77 
This strong dissociation with the concentration camp experiments certainly does 
not imply that Dutch physicians expressed no concern whatsoever about the conduct 
of human experimentation in those early years after World War II. Articles like those 
by Van Loghem, for instance, served to remind readers of the Dutch Journal of Medi-
cine of their moral responsibilities when experimenting on humans. “Every founded 
consideration of the subject will strengthen the awareness of our responsibility”, Van 
Loghem wrote in 1953.78 Yet, he considered the faulty association with the concentra-
tion camp experiments to be a knife to the heart for a scientific practice that, with the 
right safeguards, was essential for the practice of medicine to progress. 
For this reason, some Dutch physicians even felt that ethical concerns about medi-
cine should not be debated in public at all. Laypeople might get the wrong impression 
and call for outside interference with affairs that concerned the artsenstand only. In 
1949, for instance, editor of Medisch Contact Gerard Heringa wrote a stern reply to a 
philosophical paper that was published in his journal questioning the foundations of 
medical ethics and that dedicated a large segment to the question if therapeutic ex-
periments with humans were permissible and, if so, under what circumstances. “Per-
sonally I regard this publication with concern”, Heringa reproached, “because I fear it 
will cause confusion and shake trust in the artsenstand. I do not see much good in 
the public discussion which is bound to follow”.79 The paper’s author was convinced 
that Heringa exaggerated. “Surely, the layperson intelligent enough to read our arti-
cles is capable to set apart the mentality of a Nazi from that of a Dutch physician”, he 
wrote in reply.80 Heringa was adamant, however, that the subject had to be treated 
with the utmost care to prevent measures from being taken that could possibly shake 
the public’s trust in the Dutch medical profession. For that reason, he persuaded an-
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traffic”.67 Indeed, the Editor of the Dutch Journal of Medicine Joghem van Loghem 
stressed in 1953, “Those who tackle the permissibility of tests upon humans, need to 
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other colleague that year to withdraw a submission on the ethics of clinical research. 
In “times of turmoil”, the subject really was unfit for public discussion.81 
 
*** 
 
 That public unrest over the Nazi concentration camp experiments might result in 
outside interference with the practice of medicine, disturbed Dutch physicians. Part-
ly, they framed this concern in a familiar rhetoric of the importance of protecting the 
artsenstand. But, partly, the memory of the recent occupation of the Netherlands also 
fuelled a belief among Dutch physicians that their practice had to be defended against 
any form of political ideology and government bureaucracy.  
In 1946, this feeling was articulated with passion in Medisch Contact by the emi-
nent Dutch physician Jean Jacques Brutel de la Rivière. The journal Medisch Contact 
was not just any magazine and Brutel, as he was mostly called, not just any physician. 
During the war, a number of Dutch physicians had united themselves in a resistance 
group called Medisch Contact (‘medical contact’) which was much celebrated in later 
years. In May 1945, this group published its first Announcements and in 1946, this 
publication gained status as one of two official journals of the NMG (the other being 
the Dutch Journal of Medicine). Brutel had been one of the leaders of Medisch Con-
tact and had towards the end of the war led the ‘Large Advisory Committee of Illegali-
ty’, installed by Queen Wilhelmina to coordinate the activities of all Dutch resistance 
groups.82 In 1945, Brutel became President of the NMG, a position he traded in two 
years later for the joint Presidency of the Health Council and the Central Committee 
for Public Health.83 He was made an honorary member of the NMG in 1947, and was 
showered with other honorary titles and metal in the years thereafter (including the 
American Medal of Freedom that was awarded to 20 Dutch citizens in 1953 for their 
war efforts).84 Also, not entirely unimportant, from 1953 to 1955, Brutel chaired the 
Health Council committee ‘tests upon human beings’, a role in which he wrote most 
parts of the first ever Dutch policy document on human experimentation. 
 In his 1946 essay in Medisch Contact, Brutel reflected on the position of the Dutch 
medical profession in a country which he believed was at sea. Born in 1885, he wrote, 
he had witnessed the effects of urbanization, industrialization, and far-reaching ‘pil-
larization’ on Dutch society, and lived through a devastating economic crisis and two 
World Wars. As a result of these developments, Brutel concluded in 1946, the Nether-
lands had lost its internal social stability and moral anchors: 
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The notions of ‘morality’ and ‘immorality’ currently flow between anchorages lost 
and new ones yet unfound. Nobody knows exactly what they will mean and how 
they should be formulated, to help us understand human behaviour in an age of 
industry and city life. We are standing in between two worlds, one dead and the 
other barely born. It is our faith to live through a generation of chaos.85 
 
As long as Dutch society was in flux, physicians could not trust their milieu exterieur 
to sustain them with the necessary moral fibre to fulfil their professional duties. Now 
more than ever, therefore, a strong and independent organization of the Dutch medi-
cal profession had become essential for ethical medical practice. 
According to the primus inter pares Brutel, the NMG had an essential role to fulfil 
in this regard.86 The medical society had to cultivate a moral tradition among Dutch 
physicians to prevent abuse by actively spreading knowledge about its medical ethics 
and to repress abuse with its internal justice system (that, in turn, was likely to have a 
preventive effect). Brutel was worried, however. In the last half century, the profes-
sional function of the NMG had watered down due to a growing influence of health 
insurance funds and government policy on the organization of medical practice. More 
and more, physicians in the Netherlands worked in employment rather than as free 
agents, with the result that they increasingly valued company mores above profes-
sional traditions. Slowly but surely, this bureaucratization of medicine would erode 
the moral standards held high by the artsenstand and replace them with the norms of 
the state, which were formal and sterile, weak and capricious.  
Brutel claimed he had first noticed how the absence of a robust profession nega-
tively affected compliance with communal norms in the Dutch East Indies, where he 
had practiced medicine from 1916 to 1926. Yet, it was his war experience which had 
convinced him that medical practice did not mix with state interference. Twice in his 
letter, he pointed out that it had been physicians employed by the state who had felt 
least compelled to join the resistance during the war. Twice, he referred to them as 
“the weakest link”, who lacked the professional identity and awareness of the moral 
duties which defined the physician.87 “Any norms stipulated by the state or the health 
funds”, Brutel wrote in conclusion of his letter, “will inevitably carry a more formal 
character and will be bound to official rules and regulations. They will lose the char-
acter of living norms which have up until now kept patients safe or at least better pro-
tected than would have been possible any other way”.88 
 Hence, if it was up to Brutel, the government had to stay clear from any interfer-
ence with the organization of medicine, certainly if it concerned medical ethics. Only 
the artsenstand could cultivate a moral tradition which would guide and regulate the 
behaviour of physicians. To this end, the NMG announced plans in 1947 to ensure 
that the “spiritual unity” that had kept Dutch physicians strong during the war would 
not be lost. The organization admitted that, in the past, it had sometimes focused too 
much on material gain. “The complaint, that our Society was too much of a trade un-
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ion, has been voiced repeatedly, and certainly not by the least of us”.89 Accordingly, in 
an attempt to mitigate such concerns, the NMG would establish new departments 
that would deal with matters of medical ethics. In 1949, when the medical association 
celebrated its centennial birthday and was awarded the Royal prefix (Koninklijk—
KNMG), Brutel ended the festivities by calling for a work to be written that would 
“adapt our existing medical ethics to the radical changes that have taken place in the 
profession of medicine and in society at large”.90 That same year, the KNMG installed 
a Committee Professional Confidentiality, followed up in 1954 by a Committee Medi-
cal Ethics, with the task to write a booklet on medical ethics that could be presented 
ceremoniously to all Dutch medical students upon receiving their degree to symbolize 
the moral duties they assumed as full-fledged members of the Dutch artsenstand (see 
also chapter 3).91 The organization was confident that such initiatives would serve to 
cultivate the moral tradition which Brutel was convinced would provide the best safe-
guard against any professional misconduct by Dutch medical practitioners. 
 
*** 
 
 The governance of human experimentation held a central position in this renewed 
attention of the Dutch artsenstand for the ethics of their profession. Concerns existed 
among Dutch physicians in the immediate post-war period that the traditional moral 
standards were shifting for this practice. In many international journals, they argued, 
experiments that were frowned upon only yesterday, now filled up the pages without 
much sign of alarm. Towards the end of the 1940s, therefore, a few Dutch physicians 
started a lobby to bring the ethics of medical experiments on human beings under the 
attention of their colleagues. Notably, they did so on an international rather than na-
tional platform. Apparently, Dutch physicians had become convinced that especially 
their colleagues in other countries needed an explicit reminder of the ethics of human 
experimentation. With this, they did not so much have their ‘colleagues’ in Germany 
in mind, but their colleagues in countries such as the United States, who seemed to be 
willing to engage in human experimentation with evermore speed. 
The first request for more explicit international attention for the ethics of human 
experimentation came in 1949. That year, the General Assembly of the KNMG debat-
ed whether to adopt the Declaration of Geneva, which had been promulgated by the 
recently established World Medical Association (WMA) in 1948 to provide physicians 
around the world with a modern-day adaptation of the Hippocratic oath.92 The WMA 
hoped that, by ‘updating’ this traditional symbol of the worldwide medical profession, 
a global medical community could be sustained that could withstand the potentially 
debilitating effects of national political regimes.93 
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The idea was that all members of national medical organizations would take this 
new ‘physician’s oath’. However, when the Geneva Declaration was put to vote at the 
KNMG’s annual meeting in 1949, several members of the Dutch medical organization 
professed they were unimpressed by the principles set forth by it. Not only was this 
physician’s oath phrased as a “typically sentimental American promise”, it also failed 
to acknowledge a central element of modern medicine: the practice of human exper-
imentation.94 As representatives of the Alkmaar division argued:  
 
The fact is that more and more tests upon human beings are conducted for the 
purpose of medical-clinical or other scientific research. […] The Alkmaar division 
is of the opinion that our Society needs to raise her voice and combat this evil, 
against which we need to defend ourselves both morally and practically.95 
 
The Alkmaar division therefore urged the Central Board of the KNMG to request the 
WMA to have the Geneva Declaration explicitly mention the role and responsibilities 
of scientific researchers. Despite this passionate plea, the KNMG’s General Assembly 
voted in favour of the Declaration, albeit with a difference of only four votes.96 Unde-
terred, in 1951, the Alkmaar division tried again. In a letter sent to all local depart-
ments of the medical association, it raised the alarm about the increase of studies 
describing human experiments in international medical journals: “The mentality that 
speaks from the literature is an indicator that the ethical standards of doctors are in 
great danger”.97 Again, the Alkmaar division urged the Central Board to persuade the 
WMA to issue an official statement about the limits of human experimentation. What 
was more, it recommended to request editors of medical journals to take these into 
consideration in their refereeing process. After all, their institutional authority made 
them ideal safeguards against the conduct of unethical experiments. 
The Central Board responded by asking Roel Hamburger, head of the Alkmaar di-
vision to co-author a report on the subject that could be sent to the WMA for further 
consideration.98 In 1953, this position paper was discussed by the Committee Medical 
Ethics of the international medical association. It was the first time that the ethics of 
human research made the agenda of an international organization.99 In 1954, both 
authors were invited to present their position paper to the WMA’s General Assembly 
in Rome. Also Heringa, Editor of Medisch Contact, was invited to give a talk on the 
responsibilities of medical journals in the governance of human experimentation.100 
That year in Rome, the WMA adopted its Principles for those in Research and Exper-
imentation, the predecessor of the organization’s 1964 Helsinki Declaration—a set of 
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ethical principles for research with human subjects that has since acquired universal 
status. In Medisch Contact, Heringa lauded the KNMG as the national organization 
which had succeeded in bringing the ethical concerns over human experimentation to 
the attention of an international audience of physicians.101 
In 1955, Hamburger wrote a letter of concern to the Journal of the American Med-
ical Association (JAMA) after reading in its pages about an experiment with humans 
testing the effects of ultraviolet radiation. “I feel we must searchingly ask ourselves”, 
the Dutch physician penned, “if the margin between experiments such as these and 
those perpetrated in the German concentration camps, is so very wide”.102 Hamburg-
er acknowledged that medicine owed much to “the splendid work done in the United 
States” in recent years. However, this leading position was exactly why “we must ex-
pect that this country will also be one of the foremost in upholding the high ethical 
standards which are essential in the promotion of medical science for the benefit of 
mankind”. In Medisch Contact, this letter was reprinted with a statement that it was 
thanks to Hamburger that the ethics of human experimentation were since 1954 con-
sidered internationally (it was also one of the first times that a Dutch medical journal 
admitting a resemblance between the Nazi experiments and those of ‘civilized physi-
cians’). The artsenstand, the message was, worked hard to ensure that all patients, 
also in other countries, remained safe in the hands of physicians. Modern medicine 
presented difficult ethical issues, but the elite of the Dutch medical profession oper-
ated at the ethical frontier of these developments. In the Netherlands, everything was 
done to keep medical ethics in high regard to ensure it remained an effective mecha-
nism of internal control for the artsenstand—both at home and abroad. 
 
The Nazi experiments and the Dutch antivivisectionists 
 
Not everyone in the Netherlands was equally convinced, however, that the Dutch 
medical profession really had such honourable intentions in these matters. In 1946, 
for instance, the Anti-Vivisectie Stichting (Antivivisection Foundation, AVS) vowed 
to fight the corrupting influences of society with evermore strength: 
 
In the trials against the war criminals in Nuremberg it has become clear to which 
horrendous vivisection-tests the prisoners and internees in Germany have been 
exposed. This must be another reason for us to continue our actions with su-
preme efforts, so that such horrors will forever be brought to a halt.103 
 
In 1947, the AVS sent an urgent letter to Minister of Social Affairs Willem Drees, to 
warn “[his] Excellence that the notorious experiments on human beings in the con-
centration camps just take up a tiny part of the countless experiments which are fre-
quently conducted upon those of special means in normal times as well”.104 It was of 
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vital importance the Dutch government realized that, also in the Netherlands, “it is all 
which stands defenceless in life from which the scientific experimenter above all re-
cruits his material”, whether these were “the suckling in children’s clinics, small chil-
dren in orphanages, small or non-paying patients in hospitals, less wealthy women in 
childbed, or the tuberculosis patients and insane in sanatoriums”.105 
To substantiate these claims, the AVS presented Drees with nine Dutch research 
studies “of dubious ethical quality”, with the apology that a much longer list could 
have been compiled had the Foundation’s library not been destroyed in the war.106 
Most of these studies described the experimental use of invasive medical procedures, 
particularly on young children. A dissertation on digestion-leukopenia from 1923, for 
instance, recorded how a four month old baby—“the ill and nervous Johanna”—had 
been subjected to 56 blood tests in a period of two months.107 Most of the studies also 
suffered from a lack of permission by the participating research subjects. Thus, one of 
the reports on the possible exogenous causes to climate asthma made mention of the 
fact that most “outpatient material” that had been injected with active substances for 
experimental purposes had been “completely unaware of what they had been injected 
with”.108 This study had produced no satisfactory results, yet had caused severe nega-
tive side effects in the participating research subjects: “Once in a while a patient told 
us spontaneously that he had never felt this terrible in his life”.109 
The AVS also accused the Dutch medical profession of causing serious and some-
times lethal harm to innocent research subjects in their frenzy to conduct dangerous 
experiments. As evidence, it produced a Dutch study conducted in the late 1920s on 
the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine, which had been developed in the early 
twentieth century to prevent tuberculosis. The Dutch researchers, the AVS insisted, 
had experimented on sick children, meaning that children with an already weakened 
immune system had deliberately been exposed to additional active bacterial agents. 
The “young Dina K.”, for instance, had been experimentally inoculated with BCG in 
December 1928, whereafter she had quickly developed an abscess at the injection site 
in combination with a case of whooping cough.110 In the winter of 1929, the girl had 
begun suffering from bronchitis, whereafter she had died in early April of acute men-
ingitis. According to the AVS, such studies were comparable to the Lübeck disaster of 
1930, when 73 infants had died from contaminated BCG-vaccines.111 
Notwithstanding these serious accusations, the principal reason why the AVS had 
decided to write their alarming letter to Drees in 1947 was not to convince the Dutch 
government to bring the practice of human experimentation in the Netherlands to a 
halt. Instead, the organization hoped to persuade the Minister of Social Affairs to give 
his consent to the establishment of a professorial chair in vivisection-free medicine at 
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one of the Dutch universities. From the 1930s onwards, various Dutch antivivisection 
groups had raised funds to subsidize an endowed chair in this area. Yet, as professors 
could only be appointed at state universities by Royal Decree, a Dutch professorship 
in vivisection-free medicine could not be realized without government permission.112 
This chair was direly needed, the Dutch antivivisectionists argued, because it would 
allow students who wished to pursue a career in medicine to decide for themselves 
which scientific method they believed was convincing: one which tortured defenceless 
animals and neglected intuitive thinking—i.e. ‘regular medicine’—or one that appre-
ciated the complicated nature of disease without needing to resort to abuse and mur-
der—i.e. vivisection-free medicine. Plus, as the existing doctors’ monopoly made it 
illegal in the Netherlands to offer healing services without a medical diploma (and 
license), the lack of choice in Dutch medical curricula left the AVS forced to conclude 
that Dutch medicine currently really remained incomplete and dogmatic.113 
This opinion was carried forward by more social movements than the antivivisec-
tionists in the 1940s and 1950s. The letter to Drees was co-signed by multiple organi-
zations, such as the Dutch Society for Naturopathy, the Dutch Vegetarian Society, and 
the Dutch Society for Homoeopathic Healers. In parliament, the orthodox protestant 
party (SGP) actively lobbied for a chair in vivisection-free medicine as well.114 These 
various parties all had their own reasons for joining the antivivisectionist cause. The 
Association of Homeopathic Healers made it very clear, for instance, that it support-
ed the AVS only “from a business point of view”.115 In letters to the Dutch government 
and the KNMG, the homoeopaths emphasized that they did not believe a true under-
standing of medications could be realized without animal experiments, but that they 
hoped that the establishment of a chair in vivisection-free medicine would provide an 
institutional platform at Dutch universities for the teachings of Hahnemann. The SGP 
supported vivisection-free medicine because it opposed the vaccination programmes, 
which the orthodox protestants believed to stand in direct opposition to God’s provi-
dence.116 Regardless of their diverging incentives, these parties defended their coop-
eration on the basis of a communal anxiety over the technical nature of modern med-
icine, that “neglected medicine’s synthetic element and treated sickness instead of the 
sick”.117 All hoped a chair in vivisection-free medicine would dilute “an understanding 
of medicine that is solely based on the modern sciences of nature”.118 
Even though the SGP was the only political party in Dutch parliament to explicitly 
support the antivivisectionist cause, its political influence in the immediate post-war 
period should not underestimated. Between 1945 and 1955, Dutch ministers request-
ed the country’s national Health Council at no less than three occasions to investigate 
complaints made by antivivisectionists. The Dutch Health Council had been founded 
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in 1902 as an independent scientific advisory board to provide the Dutch government 
with “objective non-political advice on matters that may affect Dutch public health”, 
and by the 1940s, it had become common for the Council President to install ad hoc 
committees with relevant experts to write solicited and unsolicited reports for Dutch 
statespersons.119 In 1947, Drees requested advice whether it was desirable to realize a 
chair in vivisection-free medicine. Equally, in 1953, the Dutch government asked the 
Health Council for advice on the legality of animal and human vivisection, resulting 
in the instalment of two more ad hoc committees—one of them the committee ‘tests 
upon human beings’. In both instances, antivivisectionist complaints formed the di-
rect cause behind the creation of these committees (see below). 
 
*** 
 
In 1947, Brutel had just been installed as Council President. Although he resigned 
from his post in 1951, he was reinstated in 1954 after his successor became gravely ill. 
Hence, the physician who was convinced that only an artsenstand that was free from 
state interference could keep patients safe was largely responsible for the three Coun-
cil reports on medical vivisection in the mid-twentieth century. Perhaps for this rea-
son, Brutel’s dissertation was one of the studies which the AVS had decided to include 
in its 1947 list. In 1932, the physician had successfully defended a thesis on allergic 
skin reactions in non-allergic persons.120 According to the AVS, Brutel had injected a 
variety of substances, including a preparation of the pneumococcus bacterium caus-
ing pneumonia and a suspension of spirochetes “which may possibly cause syphilis” 
into human subjects.121 At first, the AVS stated, Brutel had mainly used mental pa-
tients, but a large number of positive test results had led him to question if these sub-
jects were suitable for his research studies. Thereafter, the physician had proceeded 
with patients of women’s clinics, most of whom were pregnant. 
No records have been preserved which suggest that Brutel was asked to step down 
as President of the Health Council after the accusations made by the AVS or to refrain 
from chairing the committee on a chair in vivisection-free medicine. On the contrary, 
Drees’ 1947 request for advice was addressed directly to Brutel, and the physician set 
out to organize a committee to investigate whether animal experimentation really had 
a coarsening effect on vivisectors and whether “vivisection-free medicine” was able to 
develop treatments that were on par with the prophylactics and therapeutics that had 
been realized with the established experimental methods.122  
Brutel asked two antivivisectionists to participate in the committee deliberations: 
a homoeopath and an osteopath who had been proposed by the AVS as suitable rep-
resentatives of the vivisection-free cause. The majority of seats, however, were taken 
up by physicians who were convinced that vivisection was indispensable for medicine 
to progress. The two antivivisectionists did try to convince their committee members 
of the value of vivisection-free medicine. They argued, for instance, that “the physico-
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analytical method” of modern science that had come to dominate medical practice fell 
short of including many essential elements that played a role in health and healing. 
As the homoeopath expounded during the first committee meeting:  
 
You talk about the necessity of causal thinking. There are many forms of think-
ing: intuitive thinking, symbolic thinking, technical thinking […]. Causal thinking 
is only applicable to the ‘reduced human being’ – an ontology essential for the 
physical method to establish its validity […]. I do not deny that we need the input 
of the natural sciences, but we should not forget about all that is psychic.123 
 
Yet, of course, all the other committee members disagreed. Intuition might provide a 
starting point for new investigations, they argued, but these always had to be experi-
mentally verified before they could serve in developing new medicines. Hence, vivi-
section was indispensable for medicine to move forward and help improve the health 
of the Dutch people.124 The two antivivisectionists then objected that the concentra-
tion camp experiments proved that vivisection blurred the minds and numbed the 
senses of physicians. Again, however, the rest of the committee dismissed this objec-
tion. If anything, naturopathy, a vivisection-free approach to healing, had been popu-
lar in Germany prior to World War II.125 Hence, if a connection was to exist between 
one way of knowing and the Nazi concentration camps experiments, perhaps a finger 
instead should be pointed in the direction of the holistic sciences. 
Unsurprisingly, in 1949, the majority of the committee decided to advise the Dutch 
government against the establishment of a professorial chair in vivisection-free medi-
cine. Since it was the privilege of the sitting Council President to decide who received 
an invitation to participate in the ad hoc committees, the outcome of the committee 
deliberations had been fixed in advance. Brutel let two antivivisectionists participate, 
but made sure that those in favour of vivisection found themselves in a safe majority 
of likeminded peers. The antivivisectionists were aware of their disadvantaged posi-
tion. Once they realized that there was little chance the Health Council would advise 
the Dutch government to authorize a professorial chair in vivisection-free medicine, 
they wrote a letter of complaint to Brutel about the way they were treated during the 
committee meetings. As both were graduates of a Dutch university, possessed an or-
derly service record, and had always been willing to defend their ideas in the estab-
lished circles of the Dutch medical profession, why, then, did the other committee 
members so easily brush aside their statements on the values of vivisection-free med-
icine? And since none of their ideas had ever been falsified on substantial grounds 
during committee meetings, the two antivivisectionists could only conclude that this 
derogatory attitude sprang forth from dogmatism—a limited state of mind they had 
never expected from “a group of professionals known to have fought heavily for the 
freedom of thought and speech under the infamous Nazi regime”.126 The artsenstand, 
they felt, misused its position of power to further its own interests. 
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True enough, even though the Dutch antivivisectionist movement was able to gen-
erate quite some political traction in the immediate post-war period, the typical deci-
sion of the Dutch government to request the national Health Council for policy advice 
in these matters made sure that the elite of the Dutch medical profession kept a firm 
grip on the outcome of policy deliberations. Still, despite this position of power, this 
elite was far from confident that the government would not decide to act against the 
‘solemn scientific advice’ of the Health Council. This concern was not without reason. 
In 1949, when the Health Council advice was debated in Dutch parliament, the SGP 
demanded an explanation from the government. How was it possible that the estab-
lishment of a single professorship was actively obstructed in a country that supposed-
ly stood for freedom of education?127 At first, the Minister of Education responsible 
for answering this question replied that the request could not be honoured because 
he had realized in conversations with the AVS that the organization did not just wish 
to add to the existing Dutch medical curricula, but to realize an entirely different sys-
tem of education. This, the Minister stated, was “practically unrealizable for the time 
being”.128 After some debate, however, he agreed that an academic climate should be 
open to multiple philosophies and promised once more to take the request for a prof-
essorial chair in vivisection-free medicine into consideration.129 
 This commitment caused considerable commotion among the ranks of the KNMG. 
In the pages of Medisch Contact, physicians cried out that antivivisectionists simply 
denounced all of modern medical science and thus had no right to take part in Dutch 
academic life. Heringa was sure that the realization of a chair in vivisection-free med-
icine was “an experiment of massive gruesomeness that far surpassed any human or 
animal vivisection imaginable”.130 The KNMG-President posted concerned letters to 
the Dutch Prime Minister, the Minister of Social Affairs, the State Secretary of Public 
Health, and the Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences, to warn them that such a 
chair would not only endanger the general level of scholarship in the Netherlands, but 
would also cause substantial damage to public health by instilling young impression-
able students with grossly flawed doctrines.131 Really, they had to understand that the 
antivivisectionist stance posed a threat to the entire Dutch nation. As a result of this 
lobby, the Minister of Social Affairs convinced the Minister of Education that, in the 
interest of Dutch public health, it was best to leave the matter alone.132 
Throughout the 1950s, various Dutch social groups kept pushing together with the 
SGP for an alternative to “an understanding of medicine based solely on the modern 
sciences of nature” at a Dutch university. Every other year, the government received a 
request for a chair in vivisection-free medicine or homoeopathy. In the Dutch Jour-
nal of Medicine and Medisch Contact, proponents of experimental medicine kept on 
eying such requests with concern. At stake in these heated debates over a single prof-
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essorial chair was the ideological embedding of ‘modern medicine’ within the Dutch 
state. For the proponents of vivisection-free medicine, the experimental tradition in 
medicine was based on a flawed conception of health and healing. It was a dangerous 
practice, which meant the government had a duty to intervene in the organization of 
Dutch medicine, open up universities to other ways of knowing, and, ideally, prohibit 
all forms of animal and human vivisection. In contrast, those in favour of the experi-
mental tradition in medicine argued that such experiments were an intrinsic part of 
the modern health care state. Without vivisection there would be no medical progress 
and, hence, no potential for realizing better futures for Dutch citizens. The govern-
ment therefore had a duty to support medical experiments and to protect it from un-
due attacks. As Brutel wrote in a letter accompanying the presentation of the 1954 
Health Council advice on the legality of animal vivisection: 
 
We have considered adding a passage about the actions that the Government 
could take to protect those who work in the field of vivisection […] Although such 
recommendations lie outside the mandate of this committee, I would like to 
point out that the Government has the possibility to critically investigate the de-
famatory methods used by the AVS.133 
 
This type of reminders, the essays in Dutch medical journals denouncing vivisection-
free medicine, the letters by the KNMG—they all indicate that the Dutch medical pro-
fession was by no means certain in the mid-twentieth century that ‘modern medicine’ 
was ingrained enough in Dutch society to withstand the accusations which its critics 
brought forward. Hence, when the Health Council in 1953 received a request to ex-
plore the conduct of human experimentation in the Netherlands, the physicians that 
gathered to consider its permissibility were highly aware of the possible political con-
sequences of their findings. They had to develop a report that suggested how human 
experiments could be kept within bounds without exposing modern medicine as such 
to fundamental questions about its legitimate position in Dutch society. 
 
A ‘modern approach’ to medical ethics 
 
The affair over vivisection-free medicine in the late 1940s did not end wholly without 
success for the Dutch antivivisection movement. In 1949, Drees’ successor as Minis-
ter of Social Affairs decided to have his civil servants chart how often and under what 
circumstances animal experiments were conducted in the Netherlands. This report 
was presented to the Health Council in 1953, with the request to determine whether 
any further legal measures were necessary to keep this practice under control. That 
same year, the Health Council was also asked to investigate if the Dutch government 
needed to take any action in the governance of human experimentation.134 Again, the 
reason behind this request were accusations by the AVS at the address of Dutch phy-
sicians, who would prey on the weak members of society to conduct scientific experi-
ments. On Saturday 9 May 1953, specifically, Dutch newspaper Het Vrije Volk report-
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ed on a movie and lecture night organized by the AVS to inform the public about vivi-
sections in the Netherlands. “Serious accusation against the Leiden hospital”, its bold 
headline read, “Babies and lunatics used for experiments?”.135 During the course of 
the evening, the AVS had produced several dissertations and articles by Dutch physi-
cians to prove its audience what sort of human experiments took place in the Nether-
lands. One example concerned a study conducted in the Academic Hospital of Leiden 
to confirm a hypothesis concerning the aetiology of nettle-rash. To test whether the 
disease was caused by a virus, a physician had dripped ‘sterile urine and faeces fil-
trates’ into the noses of babies admitted to the Leiden hospital.136 
 Het Vrije Volk was one of the biggest newspapers of the Netherlands in the 1950s 
and the article soon reached the State Secretary of Public Health Piet Muntendam, 
himself a physician, who decided to contact the Health Council for advice. Were these 
accusations true and, if so, did measures have to be taken to prevent them? Council 
President Pieter van Luijt decided to answer these questions by installing an ad hoc 
committee titled ‘tests upon human beings’, the common terminology for human ex-
perimentation in the Netherlands until the 1970s. This committee seated prominent 
members of the Dutch artsenstand. First, there was Brutel, who acted as chairman 
for most of the two years it took the committee to produce its final report. Then, there 
was the internist Cornelis Douwe de Langen, a highly honoured member of the Dutch 
medical profession and the other co-author of the report which had been sent to the 
WMA in 1952 on the subject of human experimentation.137 There was internist Job 
Pannekoek, another leader of the Dutch medical resistance in World War II.138 The 
Dutch Superintendent of Public Health Cornelis Banning participated.139 Pharmacol-
ogist Samuel Elzevier de Jongh, soon to be rector of Leiden University, participated 
(also see chapter 2).140 Willem Karel Dicke, director of the Juliana Children’s Hospi-
tal, took part.141 Willem Paul Plate, gynaecologist to the Dutch royal family held a 
seat.142 So on and so on.143 No antivivisectionists were invited. No ‘medical outsiders’ 
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Piet Muntendam was listed as a committee member, as was the physician Pieter Adrianus van Luijt, 
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essorial chair was the ideological embedding of ‘modern medicine’ within the Dutch 
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point out that the Government has the possibility to critically investigate the de-
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A ‘modern approach’ to medical ethics 
 
The affair over vivisection-free medicine in the late 1940s did not end wholly without 
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needed to take any action in the governance of human experimentation.134 Again, the 
reason behind this request were accusations by the AVS at the address of Dutch phy-
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ments. On Saturday 9 May 1953, specifically, Dutch newspaper Het Vrije Volk report-
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were asked to hold a seat. Apparently, in the 1950s still, the governance of human 
experimentation was a subject which, in the eyes of the Council President, could be 
considered by members of the Dutch artsenstand alone. 
These participants were furthermore expected to consider the subject under inves-
tigation solely with their identity as physician. As the Council President proclaimed in 
his introductory speech during the first committee meeting: 
 
I have the hope that the significantly different sources from which we derive our 
ethical principles, like religion, philosophy or conscience, will not be brought to 
the fore during our discussions. What this circle of physicians has in common is 
medical ethics. While nuances are also possible in this area, I am confident that it 
is this commonality which will allow us to formulate one definitive advice.144   
 
In other words, even though the participating physicians in their personal lives might 
be members of different religious congregations or have different political tendencies, 
in the committee ‘tests upon human beings’ this was considered background noise. 
Professional ethics was expected to trump personal viewpoints. 
 Indeed, their professional identity proved crucial for the way in which the commit-
tee members approached the question if additional safeguards had to be realized for 
human experimentation in the Netherlands. For one thing, they shared many of the 
concerns that had led physicians like Hamburger to address the international medical 
community in the 1950s. All felt that, judging from research studies that recently had 
been published in medical journals, it was high time that international guidelines 
were formulated to keep this practice in check. Certainly in countries like the United 
States, committee members argued, medical researchers seemed to have little hesita-
tion to subject “prisoners, negroes, and orphans” to all sort of risky procedures that 
hardly had any benefit for participating research subjects.145 But also in the Nether-
lands it seemed as if every new generation of physicians felt it could go a bit further in 
experimenting on their patients. As the internist Cornelis Douwe de Langen wrote 
sternly on the subject in the Dutch Journal of Medicine in 1958: 
 
These days, one can research the circulation of blood with a catheter in one of the 
compartments of the heart of a sick man, of a healthy human being, or of a pa-
tient that suffers from an entirely different illness. One can stick needles in his 
veins and arteries, without being afraid that emotions will run high or that a 
medical scandal will develop.146 
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It was a concern he and others voiced repeatedly in committee meetings. The artsen-
stand, all felt, had to put a lid on things before they would get out of hand.  
Yet at the same time, the committee was very aware of the immediate cause behind 
its congregation and sought to use its advisory position to the Dutch government to 
protect the experimental tradition in medicine. De Langen, outspoken conservative in 
allowing human experimentation, drummed it into the committee that it had to think 
long and hard about which ethical provisions for the practice it was willing to defend 
in public and which were to remain absolutely confidential.147 Its final policy report 
just could not provide grist to the mill of the antivivisectionist cause.  
This tension between the desire for internal control and fear for undue outside in-
terference dominated the committee meetings. Its members attempted to formulate 
safeguards that would prevent unethical behaviour among medical researchers, while 
simultaneously reaffirm to those in power that human experimentation as such was 
beyond moral suspicion. It was a balancing act that took various forms. First of all, 
the committee spent much time on the exact wording of its report. The Health Coun-
cil would recommend the government that additional measures could be taken to 
safeguard the ethical conduct of human experimentation in the Netherlands, but with 
words that would reassure the government that no reasons existed for drastic actions. 
Thus, words like many [dangerous experiments] were changed into some, terms like 
often into sometimes.148 A sentence that stated “if the doctor uses a patient for a dif-
ferent goal [than the recovery of his health], the doctor violates his position of trust” 
was deleted when a committee member recalled why the government had asked the 
Health Council for advice.149 Instead, the final report included reassuring segments to 
take the edge off “comments that patients are used as guinea pigs” in Dutch hospitals, 
which were “false depictions” that needlessly caused anxiety.150 
 Secondly, the committee made sure to disarm any antivivisectionist claims about 
the “corrupting effects of modern medicine” by dismissing outright that such state-
ments had any bearing whatsoever on the topic which the Health Council had been 
asked to advise upon. Thus, its report started by stating firmly: 
 
This committee wishes to stress that the scientific methods […] have proven their 
value for science and humanity. They need no defence and the Committee only 
has to ascertain if their application has in exceptional cases led to irresponsible 
acts, and in those cases outline the means to combat these excesses.151 
 
In other words, by stressing that modern experimental medicine needed ‘no defence’, 
the committee took pains to emphasize that neither the epistemic status nor societal 
position of human experimentation was at stake in its governance. The Health Coun-
cil only needed to formulate safeguards against a few excesses. 
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 Third and most importantly, because the practice as such needed no defence, the 
committee proposed a different ethical framework to regulate the behaviour of medi-
cal practitioners. Antivivisectionists often claimed the experimental tradition in med-
icine violated the traditional medical ethics. The ancient Hippocratic precept primum 
non nocere, after all, prescribed that physicians above all else had a duty to abstain 
from causing harm. Thus, in the Council committee on vivisection-free medicine, the 
two antivivisectionists had argued that the “the official science of healing has come to 
wander from its original goal” with the use of vivisections in medicine, as “physicians 
have a duty to help not harm”.152 Also the participants in the Council committee ‘tests 
upon human beings’ noticed an incongruence to exist between the Hippocratic oath 
and human experimentation. They, however, reached the exact opposite conclusion 
as the antivivisectionists had done: i.e. not the modern experimental tradition was 
the problem, the traditional ethics of medicine was. 
 The internist Job Pannekoek was the first to make this link explicit. Modern medi-
cine, he argued, was full of risk. Since the nineteenth century, an array of medications 
and surgical techniques had been developed that could potentially cause great harms. 
Nonetheless, the medical profession did use these tools, as they also potentially could 
do great good. Physicians, in other words, had learned to make risk-benefit analyses 
(the ‘calculus of suffering’) to determine whether a medical intervention was justified. 
Pannekoek invoked the example of narcotics in surgery to underscore his point. Even 
though patients experienced more negative side effects from “modern narcotics” than 
from traditional aether narcotics, their use was justified because they allowed for saf-
er surgical interventions.153 “Both modern medications and modern medical practice 
carry risks”, Pannekoek stated firmly, “Hippocrates’ old theorem can therefore in this 
modern day and age no longer be maintained in its entirety”.154 
 The cardinal question was, however, whether this calculus of suffering also held up 
when risks were taken by some individuals to benefit the health of others. This, after 
all, was the ethical problem at stake in most human experimentation. The committee 
was unsure. Some members appeared to think it did. The paediatrician Willem Karel 
Dicke, for instance, brushed aside the issue by arguing that modern life itself was full 
of risk. After all, all sorts of ‘modern goods’, such as detergents, insecticides, and cars, 
carried risk. “We live in technical times and we simply need to adapt to them”, Dicke 
proclaimed with fervour, “The existence of risk is not a medical problem. It is a prob-
lem of society at large”.155 Others stated that life in modern society had become more 
“group-minded” than “individual-minded”.156 Although no committee member stated 
it outright, some seemed to think it was justified to expose a few individuals to more 
than average risk if this could possibly benefit a great many others.  
 Others disagreed. De Langen, for one, argued a crucial difference to exist between 
the conscious decision to drive a car (or undergo surgery with narcotics) and uncon-
sciously being experimented upon as a hospital patient. The doctor-patient relation-
ship always had been of an individual nature and had to remain so. Brutel also ap-
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pears to have had his doubts. He felt strongly, at least, that if the committee decided 
that the profession of medicine should become more group-minded than individual-
minded, they had a duty to inform the Dutch people about this change. Patients had a 
right to know if their physicians decided that “the old principle that was once the po-
sition of trust between patient and physician has been forsaken”.  
Eventually, the committee decided that the solution was not so much to formulate 
ethical imperatives that held up under all circumstances (e.g. ‘first, do not harm’ or 
‘the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people’), but to propose professional 
and institutional safeguards that made it possible to establish on a case-by-case basis 
whether risks were worth taking. “When experimenting on human beings is absolute-
ly necessary”, Brutel concluded (as the committee clearly felt it was), “we need to cre-
ate conditions that keep each risk as small as possible”.157 The goal was not to avoid 
all risk, but to minimize those risks that sometimes just had to be taken. The modern 
practice of medicine required a modern approach to risk governance. 
 What were these safeguards then? The first was the formulation of guidelines for 
tests upon human beings that “carry some risk, extraordinary discomfort or pain with 
them”. These guidelines were strict. They emphasized the need for informed consent 
and made clear that, even then, “the responsibility of the researcher and not the will-
ingness of the subject is primary”. They forbade tests on children, prisoners or “luna-
tics” with more than average risk, discomfort or pain. The same went for group inves-
tigations in homes for children or the elderly. Likewise, tests upon dying individuals 
were forbidden under all circumstances. The guidelines furthermore advised against 
tests on patients who suffered from incurable diseases and disapproved of tests which 
carried substantial risk. These were “not in harmony with the nature and goal of med-
ical science”. All tests immediately had to be brought to a halt if a patient asked for it 
or if unforeseen danger arose. Also, it was not allowed to bother patients with unnec-
essary tests and “it goes without saying that any not strictly unavoidable physical or 
mental suffering and danger has to be prevented”.158 
 With the exception of tests on dying patients, the presence of risk was decisive for 
whether the guidelines applied. The committee did not make a categorical distinction 
between experimental, diagnostic, or therapeutic tests. All, the committee argued, 
ultimately served to benefit a patient’s health. Hence, not the experimental character 
of a test determined its permissibility, but its risks as opposed to its benefits. Accord-
ing to the committee, its guidelines therefore also applied to diagnostic or therapeutic 
tests with more than average risk, discomfort, or pain. However, vice versa, if these 
risks were absent, physicians did not have to take the guidelines into account, regard-
less of the nature of the intervention. Hence, despite its strong emphasis on the need 
for informed consent, the final Health Council report also stated: 
 
The position of trust between physician and patient is not violated if the physi-
cian, without actually asking permission, performs actions that serve to increase 
knowledge or his own experience, as long as these actions do not do any damage 
or delay recovery.159 
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 Third and most importantly, because the practice as such needed no defence, the 
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 The cardinal question was, however, whether this calculus of suffering also held up 
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The committee did distinguish, however, between the professional identities of the 
attending physician and medical researcher. If a physician wanted to do experiments 
that entailed risks on patients that he was currently treating, he was obliged to “mobi-
lize an advisory committee” before he was allowed to proceed.160 The final report was 
not entirely clear whether this advisory committee actually needed to give permission 
for the experiment to continue. Nonetheless, it was the first time that some form of 
local peer review was proposed for the oversight of human experimentation in the 
Netherlands: substantial risks could best be governed through a process of communal 
control. Of course, these committees were to consist solely of medical colleagues.161 
After all, only members of the artsenstand could truly know when a medical-ethical 
line was crossed and when risks could legitimately be taken. 
Lastly, the report recommended the government to consider installing a perma-
nent advisory board, seating “persons who are familiar with the subject of tests upon 
human beings”, which researchers could turn to for advice if needed.162 Too often, the 
Health Council suggested, human experiments were either redundant or invalid be-
cause the experimenter had not kept abreast of current developments in his field or 
because he had not picked the right research design.163 It was advisable, therefore, to 
realize a national advisory body that could function as an information centre for phy-
sicians considering to conduct human experiments. Due to the ongoing specialization 
of medical science, it could no longer be expected from the average practitioner to 
have a complete overview of all various subdomains that made use of human experi-
mentation. Hence, it made sense, both ethically and methodologically, to pool exper-
tise to prevent bad science and promote good science. The 1955 Health Council advice 
‘tests upon human beings’ concluded, therefore, with the sort of poetic statement that 
only policy documents can muster: “For this goal, the Committee proposes to bring a 
Committee into being”.164 Together with the suggestion for communal review on the 
local level, it was the first ever proposal for the governance of human experimenta-
tion in the Netherlands through a system of ethics by committee. 
 
*** 
 
Officially, the Council advice ‘tests upon human beings’ was directed to the nation-
al Dutch government. The State Secretary of Public Health, after all, had ordered this 
policy report in 1953 after the accusations of the AVS in Het Vrije Volk. In practice, 
however, its recommendations for the governance of human experimentation were all 
directed at the organization that headed the Dutch medical profession: the KNMG. To 
make sure that the Dutch medical community would take notice of the guidelines, the 
Health Council proposed the government to request the KNMG to “push the thoughts 
contained in the advice on its members” through measures that the organization saw 
fit. Also, it was a good idea if the WMA was notified of these measures. Furthermore, 
the government had to request the KNMG to exert its influence on editors of medical 
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journals to make sure that article submissions “that are in conflict with medical eth-
ics” would be refused.165 Finally, the government was to ask the KNMG to incorporate 
the most important elements of the Health Council report in the booklet on the ethics 
of medicine it was currently preparing (also see chapter 3). 
These were recommendations of a group of physicians who believed strongly that a 
practice like human experimentation could best be governed by an artsenstand. Even 
though the Health Council was an official advisory body to the Dutch government, the 
committee ‘tests upon human beings’ wrote the advice with their colleagues in mind. 
The guidelines were formulated not as measures for public policy, but as general rules 
for fellow physicians. All the government had to do was to protect experimental med-
icine from undue attacks from antivivisectionists. For the rest, the artsenstand would 
take care of things. The safeguards the Health Council proposed for the governance of 
human experimentation were all meant as measures of internal control: by members 
of the medical profession for members of the medical profession. 
What is more, the policy report marked a defence of the societal position of human 
experimentation as much as it sought to formulate safeguards for incidental excesses. 
The members of the committee ‘tests upon human beings’ genuinely feared the politi-
cal influence of antivivisectionists and purposefully downplayed any concerns it had 
about unethical experiments on human beings in the Netherlands. Trust in the medi-
cal profession was essential, they argued, and their report had to reassure both the 
government and general public that the Dutch artsenstand had things under control. 
The committee members did so to protect the experimental tradition in medicine, 
which they believed was the only way to realize progress in medical science and prac-
tice. For them, human experimentation was, albeit within bounds, a moral obligation: 
some risks just had to be taken to realize better cures for current and future patients. 
What was more, in the eyes of the committee, this held true not only for physicians, 
but for patients as well. As it was stated in the 1955 Health Council report: 
 
The Committee feels obliged to point out that the patient admitted in the hospital 
profits significantly from experiences that the physician has gained from past pa-
tients. The public knows that hospitals do not only exist to nurse and treat the 
sick, but also to increase scientific knowledge.166 
 
In committee meetings, some members had argued that just like physicians, patients 
had a moral duty to expose themselves to experimentation. Dicke even felt that they 
were morally indebted to the medical profession, who had brought so much relief to 
modern society.167 Others, however, had remarked that a term like “moral obligation” 
should not be used in the report, as it would also be read by laypeople. Still, it could 
not hurt to remind the public that hospitals did not just exist to heal the sick, but also 
to further medical progress. The entire Dutch nation, the undertone was, had a moral 
obligation to contribute to medical progress, in whatever way possible. 
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 In the 1960s and 1970s, in a remarkably short period of time, this belief that an 
autonomous artsenstand was best capable to govern the conduct of Dutch physicians 
started to show cracks that many believed were beyond repair. Chapter 3 of this PhD-
thesis explores how in a period of only a decade the ideals of men like Brutel about a 
‘free medical profession’ made place for a sense of crisis about the societal position of 
the artsenstand. The existing medical ethics, even if ‘modernized’, came to be consid-
ered outmoded, while a cadre of medical outsiders united to rally against the societal 
position of the artsenstand in ways that were much more successful than the antivivi-
sectionists had ever been. Medicine in modern society, the argument became, did not 
require internal but external control. However, before moving on to this call for more 
external control, chapter 2 first takes up another proposal for more internal control in 
the governance of human experimentation that was proposed by elite members of the 
Dutch medical profession in the late 1960s. By then, the antivivisectionist threat had 
largely retreated into the background for Dutch proponents of ‘the experimental tra-
dition in modern medicine’. Instead, a number of its most vocal advocates had started 
eying their own medical colleagues with concern. Because most Dutch practitioners, 
as it turned out, did not keep abreast of new developments in the field or show much 
interest in things such as research design. Hence, the reform of Dutch medicine was 
direly needed, this new elite told itself, perhaps even with use of government force. 
For internal control over medicine could only be realized if the average practitioner 
was actually made to listen to what the profession’s experts had to say. 
 
 
· Chapter 2 · 
a moral need for epistemic filters 
 
In 1962, the Dutch Journal of Medicine published an article on the ethics and science 
of clinical trials: experiments done with patients in clinical practice. “The resistance a 
physician feels against experimenting on his patients is understandable”, the author 
wrote with regards to the ethics of clinical trials.1 After all, every patient deserved the 
best treatments currently available. Yet, due to the recent boom of medical science, it 
had become increasingly difficult for a physician to decide which treatments really 
were best. In older times, the body of collected knowledge about healing substances—
the traditional materia medica—had expanded only slowly, which had made it possi-
ble for most physicians to gain a comprehensive overview of available medicines and 
their appropriate use in clinical practice. In recent decades, however, the explosive 
growth of medical science had made it virtually impossible for the average practition-
er to keep track of all new medicines pushed on the market every year. Even worse, as 
“products of the pharmaceutical industry generally find their way into practice before 
a sound judgement has been obtained about their value and risks”, it was very well 
possible for physicians to prescribe ineffective drugs to their patients. Especially “pe-
ripheral doctors”, the author wrote, constantly felt pressured by patients and industry 
to prescribe the newest wonder drugs available. “In this new situation, thousands of 
physicians are constantly experimenting”, often with high risk and only little reward, 
as it was hardly possible in most of these cases to speak of sound scientific research. 
“One can thus state without reservation”, the author concluded, “that the conduct of 
good experimental research is ethically more responsible than the usually ineffective 
evaluations in practice”.2 It was high time for reform in Dutch medical research and 
practice. A moral need existed for proper human experimentation. 
 
*** 
 
 This chapter examines two more policy reports that were developed by the Dutch 
Health Council between 1968 and 1981 on the governance of human experimentation. 
In this period, an awareness grew among Dutch politicians that the rights of research 
subjects required additional protection, resulting in various requests for advice to the 
Health Council to determine whether public policy measures in this area were desira-
ble. In 1971, the national advisory body delivered the first of these two reports, which 
contained the first fully developed Dutch blueprint for research ethics committees. 
And in contrast to the Council’s report of 1955, the 1971 report now granted the Dutch 
state a central role in the governance of human experimentation. Public regulation of 
the practice really was necessary, the advisory body had come to argue—a position it 
repeated in 1981 when it published a second report containing elaborate suggestions 
for the oversight of human experimentation with research ethics committees. 
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 Who participated in these two Health Council committees? Why did they diverge 
from their 1955 predecessors who had shied away from any state involvement with 
the governance of medicine? And, once more, which role did these committees imag-
ine as a result of these reflections for research ethics committees in the oversight of 
human experimentation? This chapter argues that the development of these reports, 
including their proposals for an oversight system using research ethics committees, 
has to be viewed in light of a larger Dutch reform movement in the twentieth century 
that sought to make medical practice more ‘rational’ by submitting new and existing 
medicines to systematic clinical experimentation. Dutch clinicians, this group argued, 
especially those operating “in the periphery”, still prescribed medications to patients 
without much scientific proof that these actually worked. Driven by ignorance and 
financial motives, they would try out most medicines that were sent their way by the 
pharmaceutical industry and, at best, write up incidental case reports of their find-
ings with individual patients. Hence, reform was needed—to bring the uncontrolled 
proliferation of medicinal substances under control and make sure that all Dutch pa-
tients, regardless of who treated them, were beneficiaries of treatments whose effica-
cy had been proven through controlled clinical trials on enough human patients to 
yield statistically significant results. “Rational medical practice”, in short, demanded 
systematic human experimentation. This chapter shows that research ethics commit-
tees in the Netherlands were imagined in the 1970s to fulfil a specific governance 
function in these specific attempts at therapeutic reform. 
 Section I of this chapter first explains the notion ‘therapeutic reform’, a term from 
historian Harry Marks, and makes clear why systematic clinical experimentation (and 
thus human experimentation) gained significant support in the mid-twentieth centu-
ry in countries like the United States and Great Britain. Section II subsequently out-
lines why this international development initially found little support among Dutch 
physicians, to the great frustration of a group of (mainly) pharmacologists who start-
ed to seek out state support in the 1960s and 1970s to push their ideals of therapeutic 
reform on Dutch medical practice as well. Finally, sections III and IV show how these 
attempts at reform were instrumental in the realization of two Health Council reports 
between 1968 and 1981, and explain why their authors believed that the practice of 
ethics by committee could help bring about a medical system in the Netherlands built 
around their specific epistemic ideals of “rational therapeutics”. 
 
Therapeutic reform and clinical experimentation 
 
In his 1997 book The Progress of Experiment, the late Harry Marks traces the his-
tory of a “disparate group whom I have labelled ‘therapeutic reformers’, individuals 
who sought to use the science of controlled experiments to direct medical practice”.3 
Since this publication, the notion of therapeutic reform has come to be generally used 
in historical literature to denote attempts to change the organization of medicine by 
individuals who were convinced that medical practice had to be rationalized by link-
ing the ethos of scientific research to clinical care. In the following pages, this notion 
is shortly discussed, with specific attention to the ideas of Marks. 
                                                 
3 Harry M. Marks, The Progress of Experiment. Science and Therapeutic Reform in the United States, 
1900-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 4. 
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According to Marks, whose work covers American history, this call for more con-
trolled experimentation to steer medical practice first emerged towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. In the early 1800s, pharmacists in France and Germany had iso-
lated the active ingredients of some of the most significant parts of the materia medi-
ca—including morphine, quinine, caffeine, and codeine—that could be manufactured 
in standardized bulk extracts and sold for commercial purposes.4 Together with the 
development of synthetic chemical methods for producing pharmaceuticals after the 
mid-1800s, this development gave rise to what is often called “the modern pharma-
ceutical industry”.5 The result of this “therapeutic revolution”, Marks claims, was that 
by the end of the nineteenth century “a seemingly interminable series of potent ther-
apeutic agents” had been introduced in the American drug market.6  
The development of these techniques for isolating and synthesizing pharmaceuti-
cal compounds brought optimism to medical practice. A firm belief existed that phy-
sicians had more options for successfully healing patients than ever before in history, 
and that these compounds had been brought about thanks to the development of the 
experimental tradition in medicine (see chapter 1). The array of pharmaceutical com-
pounds appeared to be “material vindication of medicine’s growing faith in laboratory 
science”.7 Yet, at the same time, the growing influence of pharmaceutical companies 
over patient treatment also provoked serious concern among physicians. The nascent 
drug industry relied heavily on colourful advertisements full of promises of all sorts 
of wonder drugs that were often targeted directly at patients.8 What was more, many 
pharmaceutical firms put so-called proprietary products on the market: compounds 
marketed under scientific sounding brand names—often protected by trademarks—
that masked their actual chemical composition. Hence, it was often unclear what, if 
any, therapeutic effects many of these supposed “miracle cures” had, apart from those 
advertised by the pharmaceutical company selling them.9 
These developments, Marks writes, left the medical profession’s scientific leader-
ship around the turn of the twentieth century with a “novel intellectual and political 
problem”: i.e. “how best to harvest the riches of the laboratory while protecting medi-
cine from the incursions of the market?”.10 The solution, according to Marks, was 
found in an intellectual program called “rational therapeutics”. Already in the 1870s, 
American physicians impressed by the experimental programme of the French physi-
ologist Claude Bernard (see chapter 1) had started to insist that progress in clinical 
practice depended on the realization of a proper experimental tradition in medicine. 
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In particular the laboratory study of drug actions was heralded by these physicians as 
the engine of future therapeutic progress.11 In the early twentieth century, these ideals 
translated in a programme of ‘rational therapeutics’ built on two pillars. Firstly, ther-
apeutic agents were only considered a ‘rational choice’ if their mechanisms of action 
had been established ‘scientifically’ by laboratory study and animal vivisection prior 
to their introduction into clinical practice. Secondly, rational therapeutics required 
physicians to conduct themselves according to the principles of scientific medicine in 
their practice: they had to use drugs in accordance with what had been established 
‘scientifically’ about their pharmacological effects, meaning that they were not per-
mitted to prescribe them for ailments other than those for which they actually had 
been proven to work through laboratory study. Yet, these new epistemic ideals were 
not accepted by all members of the medical profession, and certainly not by all social 
groups (see chapter 1). They were part of a specific paradigm that lauded the rise of 
“modern experimental medicine”, whose fruits would be intellectually superior to all 
other ways of knowing in medical research and practice. Its proponents therefore felt 
they had to organize a reform movement that would convince the profession at large 
of the benefits of “rational therapeutics” (or, if colleagues were unwilling to listen, to 
impose these ideals upon them somewhat more forcefully, see below). 
The intellectual programme of rational therapeutics was built on a deep distrust of 
the pharmaceutical industry. Only an independent science of drug evaluation, headed 
by the medical profession, would be able to withstand the pressures of big business—
or so these reformers believed. But, and this is an important point in Marks’ work, in 
addition to distrust of corporate sponsored research, therapeutic reformers had just 
as little faith in the capacities of the average physician to rationally use the drugs that 
were available for treating patients. Drug firms did not only target patients with their 
advertisements, they also tried to persuade physicians to purchase their goods for an 
attractive price or with the promise that a particular new product did wonders for the 
treatment of patients. “Among therapeutic reformers”, Marks maintains, “the gullible 
physician soon vied with the ignorant layman as a symbol of the corrupt state of ther-
apeutics”.12 With true reformist zeal, they therefore set about to enlighten particularly 
“the peripheral physician” of the crucial importance of rational therapeutics—an ab-
stract entity encompassing all practitioners that were not part of medicine’s scientific 
elite.13 The average practitioner had to be taught how to behave rationally, in order to 
offer patients the best therapeutic care available and to withstand the pressures of 
industry. The project of therapeutic reform, in other words, was first and foremost an 
attempt at internal control over medicine by a self-conceived elite of the (American) 
medical profession, who believed the periphery had to be managed. 
 
*** 
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Notably, this distrust of the peripheral clinician did not translate so much in any 
direct attempts to regulate clinical practice, but in attempts to conduct more and bet-
ter clinical research. “What binds reformers”, Marks states, “is the shared belief that 
better knowledge about the effects and uses of drugs will lead directly to better thera-
peutic practice”.14 If only the scientific standards of drug evaluation could be elevated, 
pharmacotherapy would follow as a matter of course. This, however, posed a second, 
albeit related, problem. Although laboratory study reigned as the pinnacle of medical 
science in the early twentieth century, therapeutic reformers at the time readily ac-
cepted that the evaluation of a drug’s efficacy ultimately had to take place in clinical 
practice. Traditionally, this type of evaluation had meant that physicians tried out a 
new medicine on a few patients and shared their findings by means of case reports. In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, however, distinct numerical approaches to 
determining clinical efficacy had been developed: from the 1850s onwards, followers 
of the French physician Pierre Louis had started to argue that efficacy could only be 
proven by systematically comparing between groups of patients that had been treated 
with different procedures (see chapter 1). Only this way was it possible to determine if 
a new substance offered a welcome addition to the materia medica. 
This type of experimentation required gathering observations on large numbers of 
patients with a given disease under fairly controlled circumstances. Sometimes, this 
was possible in large hospital wards, but often the number of comparable cases need-
ed to yield satisfactory results exceeded the number of cases available on a single 
ward in a limited space of time. In the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, 
therapeutic reformers tried to organize so-called “cooperative clinical studies” which 
brought together clinicians in various institutional settings to follow the same agreed-
upon treatment plan in tackling a specific illness. Their individual case files were sub-
sequently collected and compared. Ideally, these trials would make sure that enough 
patients were treated by enough physicians under comparable conditions to eliminate 
what therapeutic reformers had come to argue was an important source of bias in 
clinical experimentation: the clinical judgment of individual physicians.15  
In practice, however, most trials were a failure. Since no infrastructure existed for 
their systematic conduct, it was difficult to convince hospital staff and boards to ac-
cept the organizational limitations which cooperative studies imposed on their daily 
practice. Neither was much money available to realize such an infrastructure. In addi-
tion, crucial cultural limitations existed that made it hard for such studies to succeed. 
After all, their set-up required physicians to regiment their behaviour: all participants 
had to adopt strict social norms to ensure their observations followed an agreed-upon 
treatment plan that allowed for the comparison of results. “Such sacrifices of intellec-
tual autonomy”, Marks argues, “proved especially difficult for researchers raised in a 
medical culture that prized individual experience and judgement above all else”.16 
Consequently, cooperative trials in the early twentieth century were often plagued by 
a lack of uniformity—the exact problem they were meant to resolve. 
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This changed in the second half of the twentieth century. Historians generally rec-
ognize that the 1940s ushered in “a new era for [clinical] trials”.17 One reason is that 
the desired infrastructure for organizing cooperative trials was realized in this peri-
od—in countries like the United States at least—due to the outbreak of World War II. 
To further the war effort, the United States government in 1941 created the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, which was given almost unlimited amounts of 
funding and resources to coordinate scientific research for militaristic purposes for 
the duration of the war.18 This Office also included a Committee for Medical Research 
(CMR), which received about 25 million dollars between 1941 and 1947 to plan and 
oversee medical research studies—an unparalleled amount of money spent on medi-
cal research at the time.19 Its management was given in the hands of prominent aca-
demic physicians who adhered to the ideals of rational therapeutics that had devel-
oped in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This, Marks argues, offered 
them an opportunity to put their ideals of therapeutic reform into practice.20 The cen-
tral and militaristic organization of the CMR, combined with the amount of available 
funds, greatly favoured the execution of controlled clinical trials. 
Crucially, this infrastructure was maintained after the end of the war. In 1945, the 
director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development Vannevar Bush wrote a 
now famous report titled Science, the Endless Frontier, in which he listed among oth-
er things the spectacular advances that medical research would have made during the 
war. His prime example was penicillin. The antibiotic drug, first discovered in 1928, 
had been mass produced during World War II with the help from the CMR. “We all 
know how much the new drug, penicillin, has meant to our grievously wounded men 
on the grim battlefronts of this war – the countless lives it has saved – the incalcula-
ble suffering which its use has prevented”, Bush wrote passionately. “Science and the 
great practical genius of this nation made this achievement possible”.21 To make sure 
that also in times of peace the war against disease could be fought, Bush felt that sys-
tematic federal funding of medical research was absolutely necessary. 
According to historian David Rothman, American Congress responded to this call 
by reorganizing the existing National Institutes of Health (NIH) along the lines of the 
CMR.22 To this end, incredible sums of money were pumped into the expansion of the 
NIH in the first post-war decades. Whereas the organization had in 1945 still received 
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about 700.000 dollars on a yearly basis for medical research studies, this number had 
by 1965 increased to almost 437 million a year.23 In 1970, this had become 1.5 billion 
dollars.24 In addition, the NIH opened a Clinical Research Centre in the 1950s, where 
healthy individuals were routinely hospitalized to participate in clinical studies under 
strictly controlled circumstances.25 These developments, to use the words of Roth-
man, turned many of the medical experiments on human subjects that had been con-
ducted prior to World War II into a “cottage industry” by comparison.26 
A second reason why the 1940s ushered in a new era for clinical trials is the fact 
that a new method for conducting these trials was brought to fruition in this decade 
that would soon come to dominate clinical research: the randomized controlled trial 
(RCT). In 1948, the British Medical Journal published the outcome of a clinical study 
on the effects of the antibiotic drug streptomycin on pulmonary tuberculosis that had 
been conducted from 1946 to 1948 under auspices of the Medical Research Council in 
Great Britain.27 Modelled after statistical theories about randomization developed 
earlier in the century, participating patients had been randomly allocated between a 
treatment group and a control group that received only the existing standard treat-
ment (bed rest). All other variables had been kept as constant as possible in the clinic 
to determine if the variable under investigation (the administration of streptomycin) 
produced a statistically significant beneficial effect in treating pulmonary tuberculo-
sis. Patients in neither of the two groups had been informed about participating in an 
experiment, nor did the specialists grading the monthly X-rays or the bacteriologists 
examining patients’ sputum know who belonged to the treatment and who to the con-
trol group. To eliminate any potential bias all parties involved had been kept as igno-
rant as possible. The trial was, as it is now called, “double-blind”.28 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the randomized controlled trial would 
acquire the status of “gold standard” for rational therapeutics.29 In 1998, in an issue 
of the British Medical Journal commemorating 50 years of RCTs, the journal’s Editor 
even suggested that the method might be the most important development in medi-
cine in the past century or more, “as important a change as that in the renaissance, 
when medicine began to base itself on experimental evidence rather than on reinter-
preting the teachings of the ancients”.30 Thanks to the RCT, his argument was, medi-
cine had finally been able to move to “a type of medicine where treatment is expected 
to be based more on firm evidence of benefit than on the treating doctor’s opinion”.31 
Instead of an art, clinical practice had at last become a science. 
                                                 
23 Beecher, ‘Ethics and Clinical Research’, pp. 1354-1360. 
24 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 53. 
25 See also: Stark, Behind Closed Doors. 
26 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 18. 
27 ‘Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis. A Medical Research Council Investigation’, in 
British Medical Journal 2 (1948b), pp. 769-782; Alan Yoshioka, ‘Use of Randomisation in the Medical 
Research Council’s Clinical Trial of Streptomycin in Pulmonary Tuberculosis in the 1940s’, in British 
Medical Journal Vol. 317 (1998), pp. 1120-1223. 
28 J. Crofton, ‘The MRC randomized trial of streptomycin and its legacy. A view from the clinical front 
line’, in Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Vol. 99 (2006), pp. 531-534. 
29 Marcia Meldrum, ‘A Brief History of the Randomized Controlled Trial. From Oranges and Lemons 
to the Gold Standard’, in Hematology/Oncology Clinics of North America Vol. 14 (2000), pp. 745-760. 
30 ‘Fifty years of randomized controlled trials’, in British Medical Journal Vol. 317 (1998), p. 1167. 
31 Ibid. 
· chapter 2 · 
· 66 · 
This changed in the second half of the twentieth century. Historians generally rec-
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about 700.000 dollars on a yearly basis for medical research studies, this number had 
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Of course, what counts as medical science has changed through time. The famous 
nineteenth-century physiologist Claude Bernard would likely have scoffed at the sug-
gestion that medicine had finally become a science due to the invention of the RCT. 
As he wrote in his 1865 Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine: “I do 
not […] reject the use of statistics in medicine, but I condemn not trying to get beyond 
them and believing in statistics as the foundation of medical science”.32 Where statis-
tical analysis offers only probabilistic knowledge, the laboratory study of disease cau-
sation could offer deterministic proof of the nature of disease and healing processes.33 
Still, in the mid-twentieth century, the RCT was surprisingly quickly accepted in med-
ical literature as truly a superior way of knowing to other types of scientific evidence. 
Already by the end of the 1950s, the term “gold standard” had taken hold to position 
the RCT at the top of the hierarchy of evidence in clinical science.34  
Historians who have investigated this paradigm shift offer various reasons for this 
swift transition that contributed to the conduct of many more clinical experiments in 
this period. Marks, for instance, explains the quick acceptance of the RCT by pointing 
to the organizational purposes it fulfilled for therapeutic reformers. The RCT’s use of 
centrally controlled treatment allocations and—if possible—blind assessment of ther-
apeutic outcomes “provided researchers with a mechanism that reduced the investi-
gator’s opportunity to change his mind in midstream about the methods of purposes 
of a study”.35 Within the project of rational therapeutics, in other words, the RCT suc-
cessfully functioned as a tool of internal control that allowed therapeutic reformers to 
steer the conduct of individual clinical researchers. Other historians have argued that 
randomized allocation helped to solve an ethical dilemma of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, i.e., which patients would receive a lifesaving drug like streptomycin as long as 
its industrial production was outnumbered by patients’ requests.36  
Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that the development of the RCT coincided 
with the growing state involvement in the governance of medicine around the mid-
twentieth century. The level of organization that a large-scale RCT requires was made 
possible in large part because of government support. The British streptomycin trial, 
for instance, was executed within the structure of the country’s National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) which had been established in 1946 as the world’s first single-payer health 
care system.37 The centralized organization of the NHS proved an important vehicle 
for drawing together patients from various hospital settings as well as for the execu-
tion of standardized research protocols. The same was true for the first American 
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RCT, that was conducted from 1946 to 1948 under the auspices of the United States 
Public Health Service (PHS), which provided the funds and infrastructure needed for 
the collection of comparable results. Together with a number of other RCTs conduct-
ed in the early 1950s, these trials provided a proof of principle that large-scale con-
trolled clinical trials, which had been so difficult to organize in the first half of the 
twentieth century, were in fact possible if the right conditions were realized. 
Hence, by the late 1950s, the frustrations that had plagued Marks’ therapeutic re-
formers earlier in the twentieth century were starting to be replaced by opportunities 
to impose their epistemic ideals of rational therapeutics on the medical profession at 
large. In nations like the United States and Great Britain at least, the combined avail-
ability of funds, infrastructure, and a standardized research method resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in clinical trials in the immediate post-war decades. 
 
*** 
 
Historians have at times expressed their surprise (and dismay) about the fact that 
there appears to have been little consideration of the ethics and governance of human 
experimentation in precisely this crucial period in its history. Rothman, for instance, 
remarks that while the first two decades after World War II “witnessed an extraordi-
nary expansion of human experimentation in medical research”, they were marked at 
the same time by a remarkable neglect of the rights of research subjects. In a period 
that the Nazi concentration camp experiments should have been fresh on the minds 
of clinical researchers, “utilitarian justifications that had flourished under conditions 
of combat and conscription persisted, and principles of consent and voluntary partic-
ipation were often disregarded”. In the media, the Nuremberg Code received only 
sporadic attention, while in government “the thrust of public policy was not to check 
the discretion of the experimenter but to free up the resources that would expand the 
scope and opportunity for research”.38 In a Gilded Age of clinical research, Rothman 
concludes, an astonishingly laissez-faire attitude persisted among medical research-
ers and practitioners with regards to the ethics of this practice.39 
Rothman is right that fairly little attention existed for the rights of research sub-
jects in the immediate post-war decades. As chapter 3 will make clear, the language of 
patients’ rights would start to take centre stage only from the mid-1960s onwards in 
international discussions over the governance of human experimentation. That does 
not mean, however, that the ethics of human experimentation—and clinical research 
in particular—were not discussed in the 1940s and 1950s. “Historians [who] have 
puzzled over the relative absence of ethical discussions over medical research in the 
first twenty years after World War II”, Marks remarks delicately in direct response to 
Rothman’s claims, “have been looking in the wrong place”. Debates over clinical re-
search in this period were highly ethically charged, even if contributors did not typi-
cally emphasize the importance of patient autonomy. “The ethics in question”, Marks 
writes, “was the traditional ethics of therapeutic reformers, who tried to persuade 
physicians that their beliefs about therapy were unjustified”.40  
                                                 
38 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 51. 
39 Ibid., pp. 51-69. This remark has since been repeated by Robert Baker in Before Bioethics. 
40 Marks, The Progress of Experiment, p. 157. 
· chapter 2 · 
· 68 · 
Of course, what counts as medical science has changed through time. The famous 
nineteenth-century physiologist Claude Bernard would likely have scoffed at the sug-
gestion that medicine had finally become a science due to the invention of the RCT. 
As he wrote in his 1865 Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine: “I do 
not […] reject the use of statistics in medicine, but I condemn not trying to get beyond 
them and believing in statistics as the foundation of medical science”.32 Where statis-
tical analysis offers only probabilistic knowledge, the laboratory study of disease cau-
sation could offer deterministic proof of the nature of disease and healing processes.33 
Still, in the mid-twentieth century, the RCT was surprisingly quickly accepted in med-
ical literature as truly a superior way of knowing to other types of scientific evidence. 
Already by the end of the 1950s, the term “gold standard” had taken hold to position 
the RCT at the top of the hierarchy of evidence in clinical science.34  
Historians who have investigated this paradigm shift offer various reasons for this 
swift transition that contributed to the conduct of many more clinical experiments in 
this period. Marks, for instance, explains the quick acceptance of the RCT by pointing 
to the organizational purposes it fulfilled for therapeutic reformers. The RCT’s use of 
centrally controlled treatment allocations and—if possible—blind assessment of ther-
apeutic outcomes “provided researchers with a mechanism that reduced the investi-
gator’s opportunity to change his mind in midstream about the methods of purposes 
of a study”.35 Within the project of rational therapeutics, in other words, the RCT suc-
cessfully functioned as a tool of internal control that allowed therapeutic reformers to 
steer the conduct of individual clinical researchers. Other historians have argued that 
randomized allocation helped to solve an ethical dilemma of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, i.e., which patients would receive a lifesaving drug like streptomycin as long as 
its industrial production was outnumbered by patients’ requests.36  
Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that the development of the RCT coincided 
with the growing state involvement in the governance of medicine around the mid-
twentieth century. The level of organization that a large-scale RCT requires was made 
possible in large part because of government support. The British streptomycin trial, 
for instance, was executed within the structure of the country’s National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) which had been established in 1946 as the world’s first single-payer health 
care system.37 The centralized organization of the NHS proved an important vehicle 
for drawing together patients from various hospital settings as well as for the execu-
tion of standardized research protocols. The same was true for the first American 
                                                 
32 See: Timo Bolt, ‘A Doctor’s Order. The Dutch Case of Evidence-Based Medicine (1970-2015)’ 
(PhD-thesis, Utrecht University, 2015), p. 62. Original citation: Bernard, An Introduction to the Study 
of Experimental Medicine, p. 138. 
33 See: Matthews, Quantification and the Quest for Medical Certainty. 
34 Meldrum, ‘A Brief History of the Randomized Controlled Trial’. 
35 Marks, The Progress of Experiment, p. 128. 
36 Iain Chalmers, ‘Statistical Theory Was Not the Reason That Randomization Was Used in the British 
Medical Research Council’s Clinical Trial of Streptomycin for Pulmonary Tuberculosis’, in Gérald 
Jorland, Annick Opinel & George Weisz (eds.), Body Counts. Medical Quantification in Historical & 
Sociological Perspectives (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), pp. 309-
334. Also: Benjamin Toth, ‘Clinical Trials in British Medicine 1858-1948, with special reference to the 
development of the randomised controlled trial’ (PhD-thesis, University of Bristol, 1998); Edwards, 
Control and the Therapeutic Trial. 
37 Charles Webster, The National Health Service. A Political History (New Edition) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
· a moral need for epistemic filters · 
· 69 · 
RCT, that was conducted from 1946 to 1948 under the auspices of the United States 
Public Health Service (PHS), which provided the funds and infrastructure needed for 
the collection of comparable results. Together with a number of other RCTs conduct-
ed in the early 1950s, these trials provided a proof of principle that large-scale con-
trolled clinical trials, which had been so difficult to organize in the first half of the 
twentieth century, were in fact possible if the right conditions were realized. 
Hence, by the late 1950s, the frustrations that had plagued Marks’ therapeutic re-
formers earlier in the twentieth century were starting to be replaced by opportunities 
to impose their epistemic ideals of rational therapeutics on the medical profession at 
large. In nations like the United States and Great Britain at least, the combined avail-
ability of funds, infrastructure, and a standardized research method resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in clinical trials in the immediate post-war decades. 
 
*** 
 
Historians have at times expressed their surprise (and dismay) about the fact that 
there appears to have been little consideration of the ethics and governance of human 
experimentation in precisely this crucial period in its history. Rothman, for instance, 
remarks that while the first two decades after World War II “witnessed an extraordi-
nary expansion of human experimentation in medical research”, they were marked at 
the same time by a remarkable neglect of the rights of research subjects. In a period 
that the Nazi concentration camp experiments should have been fresh on the minds 
of clinical researchers, “utilitarian justifications that had flourished under conditions 
of combat and conscription persisted, and principles of consent and voluntary partic-
ipation were often disregarded”. In the media, the Nuremberg Code received only 
sporadic attention, while in government “the thrust of public policy was not to check 
the discretion of the experimenter but to free up the resources that would expand the 
scope and opportunity for research”.38 In a Gilded Age of clinical research, Rothman 
concludes, an astonishingly laissez-faire attitude persisted among medical research-
ers and practitioners with regards to the ethics of this practice.39 
Rothman is right that fairly little attention existed for the rights of research sub-
jects in the immediate post-war decades. As chapter 3 will make clear, the language of 
patients’ rights would start to take centre stage only from the mid-1960s onwards in 
international discussions over the governance of human experimentation. That does 
not mean, however, that the ethics of human experimentation—and clinical research 
in particular—were not discussed in the 1940s and 1950s. “Historians [who] have 
puzzled over the relative absence of ethical discussions over medical research in the 
first twenty years after World War II”, Marks remarks delicately in direct response to 
Rothman’s claims, “have been looking in the wrong place”. Debates over clinical re-
search in this period were highly ethically charged, even if contributors did not typi-
cally emphasize the importance of patient autonomy. “The ethics in question”, Marks 
writes, “was the traditional ethics of therapeutic reformers, who tried to persuade 
physicians that their beliefs about therapy were unjustified”.40  
                                                 
38 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 51. 
39 Ibid., pp. 51-69. This remark has since been repeated by Robert Baker in Before Bioethics. 
40 Marks, The Progress of Experiment, p. 157. 
· chapter 2 · 
· 70 · 
By the early 1950s, many new drugs came on the market every year, including a 
stream of antibiotics, hormones, and antipsychotics—all potent drugs with a capacity 
to cause great harm.41 According to Marks, these developments caused a new genera-
tion of therapeutic reformers to rally with ever greater intent for the need for con-
trolled trials to evaluate the uses and effects of new and existing medicines. Clinicians 
who still prescribed ‘unproven cures’, these reformers maintained, were the ones who 
played with human lives, who experimented without any hope for trustworthy results, 
who ultimately conducted themselves unethically. “In treating patients with unprov-
en remedies we are, whether we like it or not, experimenting on human beings”, the 
statistician and “father of the RCT” Austin Bradford Hill wrote in 1954, “and a good 
experiment well reported may be more ethical and entail less shirking of duty than a 
poor one”.42 In the world of therapeutic reformers, controlled clinical trials were ethi-
cally more justifiable than no systematic experimentation at all. 
Indeed, as the next parts of this chapter will show, in the 1960s and 1970, the time 
period that ethical discussions over human experimentation came to be dominated in 
the United States by concerns over the rights of research subjects, parallel discussions 
in the Netherlands were just as much influenced by concerns over the apparently 
dismal state in which Dutch therapeutics found itself—at least according to a group of 
Dutch pharmacologists and statisticians who hoped to reorganize clinical research in 
the Netherlands after American and British models. More controlled experiments had 
to be conducted on human patients in the Netherlands if Dutch therapeutics ever was 
to become fully rational and relatively safe. A moral need existed in the Netherlands, 
this group of scholars came to argue, for urgent therapeutic reform. 
 
Dutch attempts at therapeutic reform 
 
 In the mid-1950s, when the Dutch Health Council was asked by the government to 
write a report on the governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands, there 
were arguably not that many Dutch clinical researchers in need of ethical constraint. 
Better put, there were not that many Dutch clinical researchers, although antivivisec-
tionists might counter that all of modern medicine was one big unethical experiment 
that put innocent creatures in harm’s way. Unlike the United States, where medical 
research became a national industry during World War II, the occupied Netherlands 
did not develop centrally coordinated clinical research programmes in the war years 
in the hope of obtaining strategic advantages. Dutch physicians that did manage to 
conduct research in this period were lauded in later years for their work, which they 
would have “performed under difficult circumstances during the war”.43 
In this period, a number of Dutch physicians did start to lobby for the conduct of 
more systematic clinical trials in the Netherlands. This group consisted of researchers 
and practitioners from a variety of backgrounds. Some had been trained as internists, 
others as statisticians. However, the leading Dutch spokespersons for this movement 
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in the mid-twentieth century were pharmacologists. Pharmacology, the study of drug 
action, had flourished in the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth century due 
to financial investments of the Rockefeller Institute and Dutch pharmaceutical indus-
try.44 Yet, like in most countries, Dutch pharmacological research in this period had 
mostly proceeded through animal experiments. Although large-scale clinical trials did 
at times take place, clinical tests usually occurred in the form of sending out samples 
to clinicians who were asked to report back their findings in case reports, usually with 
only a handful of patients.45 By the early 1950s, Dutch pharmacologists increasingly 
evaluated this practice as unsatisfactory. Inspired by the recent developments in the 
United States and Great Britain, they started to advocate the need for systematic clin-
ical experimentation to determine the efficacy of medications. Without comprehen-
sive knowledge of the physiological responses of drugs in actual human patients, they 
argued, the study of drug action remained incomplete. A new branch therefore had to 
be added to medicine, i.e. the branch of clinical pharmacology. 
An early and prominent Dutch advocate of clinical pharmacology was Frans Nele-
mans, the first scholar appointed to teach the subject (as a privatdozent) at one of the 
Dutch universities in 1956.46 In his inaugural lecture, Nelemans lauded the progress 
pharmacology had made in the twentieth century, but also declared that as a result of 
this “a gap [now] exists between the laboratory and the clinic”. While most pharma-
cologists could no longer call themselves clinicians because they spent all their time 
in a laboratory, most clinicians no longer understood the study of drug action due to 
the advancements that pharmacology had made in the last century. According to Ne-
lemans, this was dangerous, especially in an era in which so many new pharmaceuti-
cals found their way to clinical practice each year. Clinicians had to consult pharma-
cologists about the drugs they could sensibly prescribe, while pharmacologists had to 
move back into the clinic to study drug action. The field’s current dependency on an-
imal experiments made the use of pharmaceuticals in clinical practice at best incom-
plete, at worst hazardous.47 In short, clinical pharmacologists were needed to bridge 
the divide between laboratory and clinic, between science and practice. 
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By the early 1950s, many new drugs came on the market every year, including a 
stream of antibiotics, hormones, and antipsychotics—all potent drugs with a capacity 
to cause great harm.41 According to Marks, these developments caused a new genera-
tion of therapeutic reformers to rally with ever greater intent for the need for con-
trolled trials to evaluate the uses and effects of new and existing medicines. Clinicians 
who still prescribed ‘unproven cures’, these reformers maintained, were the ones who 
played with human lives, who experimented without any hope for trustworthy results, 
who ultimately conducted themselves unethically. “In treating patients with unprov-
en remedies we are, whether we like it or not, experimenting on human beings”, the 
statistician and “father of the RCT” Austin Bradford Hill wrote in 1954, “and a good 
experiment well reported may be more ethical and entail less shirking of duty than a 
poor one”.42 In the world of therapeutic reformers, controlled clinical trials were ethi-
cally more justifiable than no systematic experimentation at all. 
Indeed, as the next parts of this chapter will show, in the 1960s and 1970, the time 
period that ethical discussions over human experimentation came to be dominated in 
the United States by concerns over the rights of research subjects, parallel discussions 
in the Netherlands were just as much influenced by concerns over the apparently 
dismal state in which Dutch therapeutics found itself—at least according to a group of 
Dutch pharmacologists and statisticians who hoped to reorganize clinical research in 
the Netherlands after American and British models. More controlled experiments had 
to be conducted on human patients in the Netherlands if Dutch therapeutics ever was 
to become fully rational and relatively safe. A moral need existed in the Netherlands, 
this group of scholars came to argue, for urgent therapeutic reform. 
 
Dutch attempts at therapeutic reform 
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were arguably not that many Dutch clinical researchers in need of ethical constraint. 
Better put, there were not that many Dutch clinical researchers, although antivivisec-
tionists might counter that all of modern medicine was one big unethical experiment 
that put innocent creatures in harm’s way. Unlike the United States, where medical 
research became a national industry during World War II, the occupied Netherlands 
did not develop centrally coordinated clinical research programmes in the war years 
in the hope of obtaining strategic advantages. Dutch physicians that did manage to 
conduct research in this period were lauded in later years for their work, which they 
would have “performed under difficult circumstances during the war”.43 
In this period, a number of Dutch physicians did start to lobby for the conduct of 
more systematic clinical trials in the Netherlands. This group consisted of researchers 
and practitioners from a variety of backgrounds. Some had been trained as internists, 
others as statisticians. However, the leading Dutch spokespersons for this movement 
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in the mid-twentieth century were pharmacologists. Pharmacology, the study of drug 
action, had flourished in the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth century due 
to financial investments of the Rockefeller Institute and Dutch pharmaceutical indus-
try.44 Yet, like in most countries, Dutch pharmacological research in this period had 
mostly proceeded through animal experiments. Although large-scale clinical trials did 
at times take place, clinical tests usually occurred in the form of sending out samples 
to clinicians who were asked to report back their findings in case reports, usually with 
only a handful of patients.45 By the early 1950s, Dutch pharmacologists increasingly 
evaluated this practice as unsatisfactory. Inspired by the recent developments in the 
United States and Great Britain, they started to advocate the need for systematic clin-
ical experimentation to determine the efficacy of medications. Without comprehen-
sive knowledge of the physiological responses of drugs in actual human patients, they 
argued, the study of drug action remained incomplete. A new branch therefore had to 
be added to medicine, i.e. the branch of clinical pharmacology. 
An early and prominent Dutch advocate of clinical pharmacology was Frans Nele-
mans, the first scholar appointed to teach the subject (as a privatdozent) at one of the 
Dutch universities in 1956.46 In his inaugural lecture, Nelemans lauded the progress 
pharmacology had made in the twentieth century, but also declared that as a result of 
this “a gap [now] exists between the laboratory and the clinic”. While most pharma-
cologists could no longer call themselves clinicians because they spent all their time 
in a laboratory, most clinicians no longer understood the study of drug action due to 
the advancements that pharmacology had made in the last century. According to Ne-
lemans, this was dangerous, especially in an era in which so many new pharmaceuti-
cals found their way to clinical practice each year. Clinicians had to consult pharma-
cologists about the drugs they could sensibly prescribe, while pharmacologists had to 
move back into the clinic to study drug action. The field’s current dependency on an-
imal experiments made the use of pharmaceuticals in clinical practice at best incom-
plete, at worst hazardous.47 In short, clinical pharmacologists were needed to bridge 
the divide between laboratory and clinic, between science and practice. 
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Given the need for a better understanding of drug action in actual human patients, 
Nelemans envisioned clinical pharmacologists to spent much of their time conducting 
clinical research studies: more clinical trials needed to be conducted to test the safety 
and efficacy of new and existing medicinal products. Clinical pharmacologists would 
do so, Nelemans explained to his audience, by drawing on the latest scientific insights 
about sound research methods. These, he continued, prescribed that more clinically 
controlled studies had to be conducted, in which neither the patients nor the clini-
cians would know which patients were administrated an active medicinal substance 
and which a placebo for the full duration of the trial period. Furthermore, Nelemans 
claimed confidently, “a clinical trial is only called reliable these days if the results can 
be treated statistically”.48 The first official clinical pharmacologist of the Netherlands, 
in other words, was a strong advocate of the double-blind RCT. 
Nelemans was not the only Dutch pharmacologist who actively started to promote 
the need for controlled clinical trials in this period. In 1958, for instance, pharmacol-
ogist and rector of Leiden University Samuel Elzevier de Jongh (see chapter 1) gave a 
public speech in honour of the 383rd birthday of Leiden University—a lecture he dedi-
cated to discussing the history and future of pharmacotherapy. This branch of medi-
cine, De Jongh argued, found itself in the midst of “tempestuous times”.49 Since the 
nineteenth century, the pharmacologist explained, much progress had been achieved 
thanks to the discovery of new drugs. Diseases that once caused certain death could 
now be cured or prevented with pills, sera, and vaccines.50 However, because “it rains 
rather than drizzles new medications today”, an urgent need had developed for their 
systematic clinical evaluation.51 After all, unless the introduction of new drugs into 
clinical practice would categorically be forbidden (which De Jongh argued was clearly 
undesirable), every new medicine at some point had to be tried out on patients for the 
first time: “It does not do to obscure the affair with fine words, the first application in 
man carries the character of an experiment”.52 Yet, precisely because experimentation 
was an indispensable part of clinical practice, De Jongh felt it was ethically more jus-
tified to make sure that such tests were systematically conducted in controlled clinical 
settings than to rely on individual clinicians to write up case reports of incidental in-
vestigations with a new drug. Some people, De Jongh argued, claimed the use of con-
trol groups was unethical as they withheld possibly effective therapies to patients in 
need. But these people were mistaken. “The unjust, although well-intended, omission 
of a control group in the past has had the result that the effectiveness of currently 
established therapies is strictly still unproven”.53 For De Jongh, previous member of 
the Council committee ‘tests upon human beings’ (see chapter 1), this was a distinct 
ethical problem. Without controlled clinical trials, patients would routinely be treated 
with worthless medicines, thereby threatening their recovery. Hence, systematic clin-
ical experimentation was a moral necessity—for the sake of the patient. 
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Six days after De Jongh’s commemorative speech, the Dutch pharmacologist Chris 
Rümke made a similar ethical argument in a public lecture given at the Free Universi-
ty of Amsterdam to inaugurate his appointment as privatdozent in another branch of 
medicine that was just gaining attention in the Netherlands: medical statistics.54 In 
this lecture, Rümke also stated that experimentation should be considered an indis-
pensable part of clinical practice. Experiments on patients could not be avoided, they 
could only be kept at a bare minimum. This meant, however, that an “ethical necessi-
ty” existed “that efficient use be made of data obtained from experiments on human 
beings” to ensure that clinical experiments could in fact be kept at a bare minimum.55 
Medical statistics, Rümke argued, could help researchers meet this demand. Clinical 
trials had to be set up in such a way that with a minimal input of patients a maximum 
result could be achieved. Like Nelemans, Rümke was convinced this optimization was 
ideally realized with the conduct of an RCT. Instead of the often “worthless investiga-
tions of individual clinicians”, systematic clinical trials had to be organized that were 
built around statistical notions of scientific controls and randomization. 
Nelemans, De Jongh and Rümke were therapeutic reformers: they were convinced 
that more controlled clinical experimentation would ensure better knowledge about 
clinical drug use, which would in turn contribute to better therapeutic practice. They 
were also—at times—frustrated elitists. They felt they understood better than the av-
erage practitioner which courses of action in clinical research and practice should be 
considered rational, but they had few means at their disposal, other than the power of 
persuasion, to make their medical colleagues comply with their epistemic convictions. 
In short, Dutch therapeutic reformers of the 1950s and 1960s desired internal control 
to realize their ideals of rational therapeutics, but lacked hard political and economic 
power to bring these to fruition. In his 1958 lecture, De Jongh lamented the fact that 
no “communal apparatus” existed in the Netherlands to direct the experimental in-
vestigation of new pharmaceutical products. A group consisting of “chemists and 
physicians, scholars and manufacturers, laboratory workers, and clinicians” did regu-
larly cooperate in attempt to determine the clinical safety and efficacy of all the new 
medicines that were introduced in Dutch medical practice each year, but this situa-
tion was “far from ideal”.56 Some sort of formal structure had to be realized in the 
Netherlands for the systematic conduct of controlled clinical trials. 
 
*** 
 
One Dutch research organization was trying to organize such a system for the con-
duct of coordinated clinical trials in the mid-1950s. This was the Netherlands Organi-
zation of Applied Scientific Research (TNO), an independent research organization 
which had been established in 1932 by the Dutch government to conduct applied sci-
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entific research studies “in service of the public interest”. The organization received 
government funds, but—as an independent body—made its own decisions about what 
type of research it would fund. By the mid-twentieth century, TNO had become the 
largest Dutch research organization for applied science.57 In December 1951, Dutch 
pharmacologist Johan Gaarenstroom, a previous pupil of De Jongh and a former su-
pervisor of Rümke, had just finished an internal memo for TNO on “the possibilities 
of coordinated research on pharmaceuticals” in the Netherlands.58 In this memo, 
Gaarenstroom concluded that Dutch scientists were “at their wits’ end” due to a lack 
of any infrastructure for clinically testing the safety and efficacy of new drugs. Some-
times, researchers knew “a friendly clinical relation willing to try out a new sub-
stance”, but this option was scarce. With the help of TNO, therefore, Gaarenstoom 
hoped to organize systematic clinical trials in the Netherlands after American mod-
el.59 The pharmacologist wanted to bring together players from industry, academia, 
and clinical practice to realize a system for clinical experimentation. 
Despite its central position in the Dutch scientific research landscape, TNO was in-
itially sceptical of Gaarenstroom’s plans. When his memo was discussed at a board 
meeting of the organization’s Health Department, for instance, most board members 
openly doubted if “any willingness can be found in the Netherlands for the systematic 
conduct of clinical research”.60 In their eyes, a “complete lack of interest” existed for 
such matters in the country. From others in academia and industry, Gaarenstroom 
received similar replies. Most were unconvinced that cooperative clinical studies had 
much chance of success in the Netherlands. Past attempts at cooperation between the 
parties the pharmacologist had in mind had always failed. Sometimes, joint exploita-
tion had proven impossible due to disputes over the distribution of commercial gain. 
At other times, the relations between chemists and pharmacologists had proven too 
strained to cooperate productively. To expect these parties suddenly to be capable to 
work together after all on systematic drug trials was wishful thinking.61 
Another difficulty that Gaarenstroom’s respondents foresaw was the professional 
ethos of Dutch clinicians. In 1951, a board member of TNO’s Health Department re-
marked that the reigning Dutch medical ethics made physicians reluctant to partici-
pate in clinical trials.62 One of these contacts wrote in response to his memo: “I would 
have thought you knew the Dutch clinician well enough to know this proposal in its 
current form does not have much chance of success”.63 In comparing the Dutch situa-
tion to the United States, where “the big bosses have access to much more patient 
material”, this contact (probably from the pharmaceutical industry) wrote: 
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I know agreements exist there between industrial firms and certain clinicians 
that oblige clinicians to test everything for these companies in exchange for sig-
nificant sums of money. Do you deem this possible in the Netherlands? I don’t. 
The entanglement of research with teaching, the overburdening of clinicians, the 
small size of this country, the specialization of interests—they make that I have 
little hope of radical change. Also here, industry will have to find her own way. 
 
For various reasons, in short, the realization of an infrastructure for large-scale clini-
cal trials in the Netherlands was deemed unrealistic by many insiders in the field in 
the mid-twentieth century. Still, TNO did install a Committee Clinical Drug Research 
in 1952 to “fill the existing void of clinical research in the Netherlands”.64 It included 
prominent Dutch physicians and medical scientists, like the internist Cornelis Douwe 
de Langen (see chapter 1) and the eminent Dutch pharmacologist Ulbe Gerrit Bijlsma 
who had held a professorial chair at Utrecht University since 1928 and who had been 
its rector in the late 1940s. Three of its other members were Rümke, Gaarenstroom, 
and Nelemans—who was appointed as its chairman in 1956.65 
From its inception in 1952 onwards, the Committee Clinical Drug Research sought 
to stimulate clinical experimentation in the Netherlands by functioning as coordina-
tion centre for cooperative clinical studies and by putting funds available for clinical 
trials in general.66 It also sought to communicate “sound judgements” about the effi-
cacy of new and existing medications to Dutch clinicians in the hope this knowledge 
would rationalize pharmacotherapy in the Netherlands.67 It did so by collecting avail-
able literature and non-published data in comprehensive overviews, but also by con-
ducting clinical research studies itself. In publications like the Dutch Journal of Med-
icine and Pharmaceutical Weekly, the Committee informed clinicians and pharma-
cists of its findings.68 In addition, it served as a helpdesk for questions about pharma-
ceutical products.69 The goal was that by ‘educating’ the average Dutch clinician about 
the responsible use of drugs, a rational therapeutics would be brought into existence 
in the Netherlands: i.e. only pharmaceuticals that had been proven effective through 
“sound research” (meaning they fitted the epistemic standards of the reformers that 
held a seat in the TNO Committee) would be used in clinical practice, by practitioners 
who knew how to responsibly prescribe them to patients. 
In practice, however, this proved difficult. In part, because the committee only had 
limited funds at its disposal. In part, because, as TNO made clear in a press release 
when it decided to dismantle the Committee in 1975, “the research programme of this 
committee could hardly be built up responsibly due to the great difficulty to acquire 
representative clinical data, seriously handicapping the reproducibility of results”.70 
Even with a large organization like TNO behind them, in other words, controlled clin-
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entific research studies “in service of the public interest”. The organization received 
government funds, but—as an independent body—made its own decisions about what 
type of research it would fund. By the mid-twentieth century, TNO had become the 
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received similar replies. Most were unconvinced that cooperative clinical studies had 
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tion had proven impossible due to disputes over the distribution of commercial gain. 
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work together after all on systematic drug trials was wishful thinking.61 
Another difficulty that Gaarenstroom’s respondents foresaw was the professional 
ethos of Dutch clinicians. In 1951, a board member of TNO’s Health Department re-
marked that the reigning Dutch medical ethics made physicians reluctant to partici-
pate in clinical trials.62 One of these contacts wrote in response to his memo: “I would 
have thought you knew the Dutch clinician well enough to know this proposal in its 
current form does not have much chance of success”.63 In comparing the Dutch situa-
tion to the United States, where “the big bosses have access to much more patient 
material”, this contact (probably from the pharmaceutical industry) wrote: 
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I know agreements exist there between industrial firms and certain clinicians 
that oblige clinicians to test everything for these companies in exchange for sig-
nificant sums of money. Do you deem this possible in the Netherlands? I don’t. 
The entanglement of research with teaching, the overburdening of clinicians, the 
small size of this country, the specialization of interests—they make that I have 
little hope of radical change. Also here, industry will have to find her own way. 
 
For various reasons, in short, the realization of an infrastructure for large-scale clini-
cal trials in the Netherlands was deemed unrealistic by many insiders in the field in 
the mid-twentieth century. Still, TNO did install a Committee Clinical Drug Research 
in 1952 to “fill the existing void of clinical research in the Netherlands”.64 It included 
prominent Dutch physicians and medical scientists, like the internist Cornelis Douwe 
de Langen (see chapter 1) and the eminent Dutch pharmacologist Ulbe Gerrit Bijlsma 
who had held a professorial chair at Utrecht University since 1928 and who had been 
its rector in the late 1940s. Three of its other members were Rümke, Gaarenstroom, 
and Nelemans—who was appointed as its chairman in 1956.65 
From its inception in 1952 onwards, the Committee Clinical Drug Research sought 
to stimulate clinical experimentation in the Netherlands by functioning as coordina-
tion centre for cooperative clinical studies and by putting funds available for clinical 
trials in general.66 It also sought to communicate “sound judgements” about the effi-
cacy of new and existing medications to Dutch clinicians in the hope this knowledge 
would rationalize pharmacotherapy in the Netherlands.67 It did so by collecting avail-
able literature and non-published data in comprehensive overviews, but also by con-
ducting clinical research studies itself. In publications like the Dutch Journal of Med-
icine and Pharmaceutical Weekly, the Committee informed clinicians and pharma-
cists of its findings.68 In addition, it served as a helpdesk for questions about pharma-
ceutical products.69 The goal was that by ‘educating’ the average Dutch clinician about 
the responsible use of drugs, a rational therapeutics would be brought into existence 
in the Netherlands: i.e. only pharmaceuticals that had been proven effective through 
“sound research” (meaning they fitted the epistemic standards of the reformers that 
held a seat in the TNO Committee) would be used in clinical practice, by practitioners 
who knew how to responsibly prescribe them to patients. 
In practice, however, this proved difficult. In part, because the committee only had 
limited funds at its disposal. In part, because, as TNO made clear in a press release 
when it decided to dismantle the Committee in 1975, “the research programme of this 
committee could hardly be built up responsibly due to the great difficulty to acquire 
representative clinical data, seriously handicapping the reproducibility of results”.70 
Even with a large organization like TNO behind them, in other words, controlled clin-
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ical trials had remained difficult to organize in the Netherlands. Dutch clinicians of-
ten had been unwilling or unable to cooperate and, even if they did, their results had 
often differed too much to yield trustworthy results. It appeared as if Gaarenstroom’s 
contacts in the early 1950s had been right: there was little hope of radical change in 
the Netherlands regarding the conduct of clinical drug research—and, by implication, 
of other types of clinical (and thus human) experimentation as well. 
 
*** 
 
Throughout the 1960s, Dutch therapeutic reformers like Nelemans did continue to 
advocate the importance of controlled clinical trials in the Netherlands. In 1961, Ne-
lemans co-edited the handbook Algemene Farmacotherapie with two fellow pharma-
cologists that would go through seven editions in the decades thereafter as education 
material for Dutch students.71 In one of the first chapters—on the subject of clinical 
pharmacology—Nelemans taught: “Even though tests with the double blind technique 
cannot always be conducted upon patients because of ethical reasons, there are rela-
tively few cases known in which a study without the double blind method has led to 
truly sound judgements”.72 In 1963, Nelemans and De Jongh gave speeches at a con-
ference of the Dutch pharmaceutical industry to convince drug manufacturers of the 
necessity to conduct systematic clinical trials prior to the release of new products.73 In 
Dutch newspapers, their talks were reported under headlines such as ‘New Medicines 
Demand Experiments on Humans’, ‘The Necessity of the Clinical Experiment’ and, in 
one paper with a bit of flair for drama, ‘Humans are the Best Laboratory Animals’.74 
Dutch reformers embarked on a national campaign in the 1960s, in short, to convince 
the field of the epistemic and ethical superiority of their way of knowing. 
In 1970, Nelemans co-authored another booklet titled Therapeutic Evaluation of 
Medicines. By then, however, his appeal for rational therapeutics had grown consid-
erably more sour. With the publication of this booklet, he and his co-author wrote in 
the preface, they hoped “to ask attention for one of the most stepmotherly endowed 
branches of science” and to point out “the pitfalls that one runs into with every thera-
peutic evaluation and that are responsible for the fact that an intolerable number of 
therapeutic studies go wrong”. “As difficult as it must be to process for many physi-
cians”, the two carried on in the introduction, “conclusions about the therapeutic val-
ue of a medicine based on observations of the patient who is ‘only treated’ are almost 
always useless and often misleading”. They sorely hoped, therefore, “that with the 
publication of this booklet more physicians than is currently the case will delve into 
the problems that play a role in this [i.e. clinical drug research]”.75 
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With publications such as these, Nelemans tried to both increase and improve the 
conduct of Dutch clinical drug research in the 1960s. Others attempted so as well, by 
publishing concerned opinion pieces in Dutch medical journals that warned about the 
shortcomings of clinical drug research in the country.76 Increasingly, however, Dutch 
therapeutic reformers in this period started to turn to other tools of reform in attempt 
to realize their ideals of rational therapeutics. Most prominently, instead of the soft 
power of academic persuasion, the hard power of government force started to surface 
in their work. “It is neither wrong nor unwise”, Nelemans and his co-author surmised 
delicately in conclusion to their booklet in 1970, “if society, by means of the govern-
ment, ensures that only drugs which are effective […] may be put into circulation”.77 
Reform would be realized, in the end, not by convincing Dutch clinicians with valid 
epistemic or ethical arguments, but through state interference. 
In his work, Nelemans was careful to present this growing state interference with 
the organization of Dutch medical practice as an external force: an intervention from 
outside the system of medicine that he or other therapeutic reformers really had little 
influence on. In their 1970 booklet, for instance, the two authors presented a future 
vision for clinical drug research in the Netherlands. The state would increasingly put 
regulatory criteria in place demanding drug manufacturers to offer clinical evidence 
to prove the efficacy of their products. The state would increasingly hold clinicians 
accountable if they did not provide ‘optimal pharmacotherapy’. With these measures, 
the state would increasingly stimulate clinical experimentation. This vision was pre-
sented in a dry, matter-of-fact tone. “We leave open whether this development is de-
sirable”, the two authors concluded, “we just signal her”.78 As the next section shows, 
however, behind the scenes therapeutic reformers like Nelemans had everything to 
do with the growing state involvement in Dutch pharmacotherapy in the 1960s and 
1970s. On various occasions, they lobbied with the Dutch government in these dec-
ades to enforce their ideals of rational therapeutics: if medical practitioners would 
not cooperate willingly, they had to be made to walk in line using state force. In 1971, 
one of these lobby attempts contained the first Dutch blueprint for the governance of 
human experimentation using a system of ethics by committee. 
 
State imposed epistemic reform 
 
 In 1958, Dutch parliament passed the Medicines Supply Act to regulate the produc-
tion and distribution of medicines in the Netherlands.79 It replaced a much older 
Dutch Law on Pharmacy, dating from 1865, which had regulated the Dutch pharma-
ceutical drug market for almost a hundred years.80 The 1958 law substantially altered 
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the Dutch regulatory regime of pharmaceuticals.81 From then on, so-called ‘packaged 
medicines’—medicines produced industrially and delivered pre-packaged to apothe-
caries, druggists, and grocers—could be put on a restricted list by a thereto appointed 
regulatory agency, so they could only be purchased at licensed apothecaries. In addi-
tion, wholesale drug manufacturing now required government authorization, while 
the existing Dutch Pharmaceutical Inspection was empowered to monitor the profes-
sional practice of pharmacists much more closely.82 In short, from the late 1950s on-
wards, the Dutch government had much more hard power than ever before in history 
to steer the production and distribution of medicines in the Netherlands—and hence, 
in theory, to direct the conduct of Dutch pharmacotherapy as well. 
 Still, the 1958 Medicines Supply Act was not meant, in first instance, to stimulate 
the conduct of ‘rational therapeutics’ in the Netherlands, at least not as envisioned by 
reformers like Nelemans. The Act primarily had been designed to ensure good manu-
facturing practices: to make sure medicines were prepared in hygienic environments 
and under controlled circumstances, to prevent contamination and to ensure that the 
dose of active principle in each unit of medicine was fixed and known.83 “Criteria for 
the toxicity and efficacy of drugs”, public servants responsible for the execution of the 
Act recalled in 1988, “were only of secondary importance”.84  
Nonetheless, Dutch therapeutic reformers did take the 1958 Medicines Supply Act 
as an opportunity to realize some of their ideals of rational therapeutics. In 1959, for 
instance, the TNO Committee Clinical Drug Research discussed the implications of 
the Act for large-scale clinical research in the Netherlands. Nelemans was adamant it 
offered distinct possibilities. Most directly, Article 3 of the Act stipulated that a yet to 
be installed regulatory agency would only register packaged medicines “of which it 
may reasonably be expected that they possess the advertised effect”. The text of the 
Act did not mention how exactly this agency was to determine if packaged medicines 
did in fact possess the effects advertised or, more importantly, what standards of effi-
cacy it should insist on. Yet, Nelemans argued, if the right people were appointed to 
this regulatory agency, Article 3 offered a realistic chance to force drug manufacturers 
to conduct more controlled clinical trials: “If these methods would be standardized, 
and if only those medicines that have been tried and tested according to these meth-
ods would be accepted, much would have been accomplished already”.85 
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 Notably, not all members of the Committee Clinical Drug Research agreed this was 
a good idea. The eminent Bijlsma, in particular, was sceptical about Nelemans’ sug-
gestion to make sure this new regulatory agency would only be permitted to “accept 
medicines that have been investigated in a statistically responsible manner”. This 
epistemic ‘tunnel vision’, the famous pharmacologist stated, made him feel uncom-
fortable. For one thing, because such a strict legislative rule would turn patients in 
many instances into “nothing more than test animals”, as the efficacy of not only new 
but also existing medications would have to be established through controlled clinical 
trials. And for another, because he doubted whether the type of epistemic singularity 
advocated by Nelemans should be enforced on medical researchers and practitioners 
by the state. “In former times, without statistical research”, Bijlsma remarked sharp-
ly, “medicines were also developed”. Sure, it could be useful to demand specific scien-
tific evidence for the efficacy of medicines in instances that obviously worthless drugs 
were pushed for market access (to keep ‘alternative healers’ of the drug market, for 
instance), but to demand from regular researchers that they could only establish the 
efficacy of drugs with one method bordered on the dogmatic. Indeed, another com-
mittee member added, all clinics had their own proven methods for testing the effica-
cy of drugs for patients. To enforce the standardization of these practices from above 
was questionable, as it took away physicians’ autonomy. Nelemans, however, openly 
wondered if his colleagues fully understood the difference between the clinical study 
and clinical use of drugs. Variation might be defended in case of the second, he stat-
ed, but could not possibly in case of the first. After all, embracing variety undermined 
the very idea of conducting large-scale trials to control for any sources of potential 
bias in clinical experimentation. This was why the Dutch government should enforce 
the standardization of clinical research methods with legislation.86  
 Despite the fact that the 1958 Medicines Supply Act did not mention which stand-
ards this yet to be established regulatory agency had to use in its evaluation of clinical 
efficacy, Nelemans would soon get a chance to implement his ideas of enforced ther-
apeutic reform on a state level. Initially, the effectuation of the 1958 Act had not been 
a priority for the Dutch government. Only in 1963, in fact, did it install the regulatory 
agency that would from then on be responsible for the registration of packaged medi-
cines in the Netherlands: the (Packaged) Medicines Evaluation Board.87 It did so after 
the infamous Thalidomide-disaster of 1961, when it became clear that the over-the-
counter drug thalidomide, that had been sold since the late 1950s as a low-risk medi-
cine against nausea and morning sickness, had in a few years’ time caused more than 
10.000 infants to be born worldwide with severe teratogenic deformities.88 Marketed 
in the Netherlands under the brand name Softenon, thalidomide had also been pre-
scribed to Dutch pregnant women, although much less in comparison to other coun-
tries.89 Nonetheless, the disaster caused a big scare in the Netherlands. Newspapers 
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the Dutch regulatory regime of pharmaceuticals.81 From then on, so-called ‘packaged 
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 Notably, not all members of the Committee Clinical Drug Research agreed this was 
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reported that such disasters could easily occur again, not in the least because the gov-
ernment was hardly prepared for them.90 In parliament, Minister Veldkamp of Social 
Affairs and Public Health was urged to finally make haste with the effectuation of the 
Medicines Supply Act. On television, the Director-General of Public Health Piet Mun-
tendam had to promise that the effectuation of the Act would prevent a disaster like 
Softenon from ever happening again in the Netherlands.91 
Because of the thalidomide-tragedy, the Medicines Evaluation Board was granted 
much leeway in 1963 to develop a regulatory system capable of evaluating the safety 
of packaged medicines prior to their market release. Two central figures in its set-up 
were pharmacologists Poppe Siderius, then Chief Medical Officer of the Netherlands, 
and Willem Lammers, who was employed by the National Institute for Public Health 
and Environmental Hygiene. The two men knew each other well. They had been co-
workers in Groningen under direction of Gaarenstroom and, together with Nelemans, 
had sat on the editorial board of the handbook Algemene Farmacotherapie of 1961.92 
Like Nelemans, who was appointed as a board member to the Medicines Evaluation 
Board, Siderius and Lammers were convinced of the need to conduct elaborate con-
trolled clinical experiments to evaluate the efficacy of pharmaceutical products. What 
was more, they agreed with Nelemans that the Medicines Evaluation Board should 
interpret Article 3 of the Medicines Supply Act to mean that the regulatory agency 
could demand drug manufacturers to provide proof of the efficacy of their products 
through the conduct of controlled clinical experimentation. 
 In 1988, in honour of the 25th anniversary of the Medicines Evaluation Board, the 
two pharmacologists commemorated this decision under the banner “A Law is Just a 
Law”. The Dutch government had put them in the position to regulate the national 
pharmaceutical drug market and Siderius and Lammers had taken it as their respon-
sibility to regulate it as they saw fit. “From the beginning onwards, we had to work as 
trendsetters”, Lammers recalled in 1988. “Until then, no formal monitoring of medi-
cations existed and suddenly we were there with a system that made all sorts of de-
mands”.93 One of the first members of the Medicines Evaluation Board, internist Job 
Pannekoek (a prior member of the Health Council committee ‘tests upon human be-
ings’) similarly recalled: “At first, it was hard work to substantiate that a sound clini-
cal judgment requires scientifically sound research methods”: 
 
I remember I gave a talk in 1956 about the importance of ‘clinical trials’. In Eng-
land, they were already pretty advanced at the time in this way of doing sound 
medical research. But in the Netherlands, no one was thinking this way. Here, 
most were still working chiefly subjectively.94 
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It was necessary, therefore, Pannekoek argued, that the Medicines Evaluation Board 
would start to demand that the efficacy of medications could only be proven by “clini-
cal trials with truly double blind investigations from which real evidence can be ob-
tained to establish a significant difference between a group that is treated with a cer-
tain drug and a group that is not”. “Demanding such an objective criterion of effica-
cy”, he added proudly, “was pretty revolutionary at the time”.95 To ensure the Board 
also took this ‘revolutionary view’, Siderius and Lammers had known advocates of the 
RCT take up a seat in the regulatory agency. “Because of the experiences that we had 
gained with the publication of our [hand]book”, the two explained in 1988, “we were 
well-informed about the expertise that then existed in the Netherlands”.96 They knew 
exactly who to ask to reform the Dutch pharmaceutical drug market. 
Hence, even though the 1958 Medicines Supply Act brought more state control to 
Dutch pharmacotherapy than ever before in history, elite members from the medical 
profession took the driver’s seat in the realization of these oversight mechanisms. As 
a result, the disciplinary power of a fairly small group of Dutch physicians, who had 
since long been dissatisfied with the way most of their colleagues practiced medicine, 
grew significantly. With the hard power provided by the state, Dutch therapeutic re-
formers acquired a tool in the early 1960s that in theory allowed them to steer the 
conduct of clinicians in the Netherlands: if only drugs whose efficacy had been prov-
en with ‘objective’ clinical research methods would be granted market access, all clin-
ical researchers had to start conducting their trials according to the rules prescribed 
by the RCT, while all clinical practitioners could only prescribe those drugs which had 
been approved by the Medicines Evaluation Board. This, reformers such as Nelemans 
hoped, would soon result in the conduct of more clinical trials in the Netherlands. As 
he wrote in his vision for the future of Dutch clinical drug research in 1970: 
 
On the one hand, it will be allowed to state that every practicing physician has the 
duty, when an appeal is made on him, to cooperate with studies that serve to de-
termine the value of medicines and to spent part of his working hours […] in this 
vein. On the other, society may expect and perhaps even demand from her pa-
tient-members that they make themselves available for studies as meant here.97 
 
The Medicines Evaluation Board, in short, was designed to function as an epistemic 
filter for clinical drug research in the Netherlands, i.e., it had to use the hard power of 
the Dutch state to sift out what reformers like Nelemans believed to be good clinical 
research from bad clinical research. And in doing so, the Evaluation Board would be 
able to enforce a specific epistemic perspective upon Dutch pharmacological science 
and medical practice—and upon Dutch society more generally.98 
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*** 
 
 The measures taken by the Medicines Evaluation Board did not immediately result 
in more controlled clinical trials in the Netherlands. In fact, although few data exist of 
the frequency with which RCTs (and other clinical trials) were conducted in the 1960s 
and 1970s, estimates suggest that Dutch clinical research (including the conduct of 
clinical trials) only significantly started to grow in size towards the end of the 1980s, 
when the Dutch government started to make systematic investments into the infra-
structure needed to coordinate large-scale clinical research studies.99  
Still, from about the mid-1960s onwards, controlled clinical trials, and particularly 
the RCT, did become more widely known in the Netherlands. In late August 1967, for 
instance, the matter of “double-blind pharmacological investigations” was discussed 
for the first time by Dutch parliament.100 The immediate cause was the publication of 
a paper in the Dutch Journal of Medicine earlier that year describing a clinical trial 
that had been conducted on the treatment of coronary afflictions with oral anticoagu-
lants (thinners that prevent the blood from clotting). The paper was written by Nele-
mans and had been conducted under auspices of the TNO Committee Clinical Drug 
Research in such a way, he wrote, that it “comes close to the requirements of an ideal 
trial”: the double-blind RCT.101 Significant results had been found as well. From the 
thirteen trial patients who had died between 1964 and 1966, eleven had been part of 
the control group. The statistical likelihood that this difference could be attributed to 
chance had been calculated to be less than 0.01 percent. Further experiments on the 
appropriate duration of anticoagulant treatments had established that the death rate 
in the placebo group was significantly higher than in the treatment group. Within 
three months, therefore, TNO terminated its second study and recommended that all 
patients in the Netherlands who had suffered a heart attack should be prescribed a 
life-long treatment of oral anticoagulants, as this would greatly increase their overall 
life expectancy. In Dutch newspapers, these results were published in bold and exult-
ant headlines: the scientific experiments of TNO “directly saved lives”.102 
In Dutch parliament, however, the study provoked more critical responses. Mem-
ber of parliament Henk Vonhoff of the conservative-liberal party VVD, for instance, 
wished to know from the government whether it was aware that double-blind clinical 
investigations were conducted in the Netherlands and whether it was true that pa-
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tients participating in these trials usually were not asked for their permission.103 In 
addition, if this was true, did the government not agree that these studies fundamen-
tally violated the dignity of individual human beings? Also, was it true that the Medi-
cines Supply Act encouraged the conduct of double-blind studies in the Netherlands, 
and did this method truly have such great advantages that they should be accepted as 
an integral part of Dutch society? Then, if this was correct, was the government not of 
the opinion that the Dutch state carried a responsibility to monitor the way in which 
and by whom these studies were conducted in the Netherlands?104 
The State Secretary of Social Affairs and Health Care Roelof Kruisinga (a physician 
himself) initially responded in writing to Vonhoff’s questions. “Leading experts from 
around the world”, Kruisinga stated confidently, “are of the opinion that double-blind 
research as a rule should be regarded inevitable”.105 In this sense, it was true that the 
Medicines Supply Act demanded the conduct of RCTs, as it stipulated that packaged 
medicines could only be brought into circulation if they could reasonably be expected 
to possess the advertised effect. It was not true, however, that such studies were usu-
ally carried out without patients’ consent. While patients were not allowed to choose 
if they preferred the treatment or the control group, they were “usually informed that 
an experimental investigation was taking place”, leaving them free to withdraw from 
the study at any time they wanted. Kruisinga did not agree, therefore, that RCTs fun-
damentally violated the dignity of individual human beings.106 
Vonhoff was not satisfied with these answers. Armed with newspaper snippets, he 
confronted the State Secretary in parliament. Kruisinga might claim that researchers 
in the Netherlands generally obtained the consent of their research subjects, but “one 
of the research leaders, dr. Nelemans”, had argued publicly on multiple occasions to 
find informed consent illogical. Only recently, the clinical pharmacologist had been 
quoted in a Dutch newspaper to say that research subjects could only truly provide 
informed consent if they were completely aware of the risks they exposed themselves 
to and that, if this information was available, no need existed to conduct the experi-
ment, since the whole point of a trial was to find out the risks and benefits of a treat-
ment. Nelemans had even stated that since written consent forms often served only to 
absolve researchers in case experiments went south, the emphasis on informed con-
sent could also be considered unethical.107 Vonhoff suspected that a different reason 
underlay the reluctance to obtain consent: “In Medisch Contact, I at one point find 
the statement that the manner and persuasion in which a physician prescribes a reci-
pe to his patient has important effects on the healing process and that this placebo-
effect needs to be eliminated to get objective results”.108 In other words, full disclo-
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Still, from about the mid-1960s onwards, controlled clinical trials, and particularly 
the RCT, did become more widely known in the Netherlands. In late August 1967, for 
instance, the matter of “double-blind pharmacological investigations” was discussed 
for the first time by Dutch parliament.100 The immediate cause was the publication of 
a paper in the Dutch Journal of Medicine earlier that year describing a clinical trial 
that had been conducted on the treatment of coronary afflictions with oral anticoagu-
lants (thinners that prevent the blood from clotting). The paper was written by Nele-
mans and had been conducted under auspices of the TNO Committee Clinical Drug 
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life-long treatment of oral anticoagulants, as this would greatly increase their overall 
life expectancy. In Dutch newspapers, these results were published in bold and exult-
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tients participating in these trials usually were not asked for their permission.103 In 
addition, if this was true, did the government not agree that these studies fundamen-
tally violated the dignity of individual human beings? Also, was it true that the Medi-
cines Supply Act encouraged the conduct of double-blind studies in the Netherlands, 
and did this method truly have such great advantages that they should be accepted as 
an integral part of Dutch society? Then, if this was correct, was the government not of 
the opinion that the Dutch state carried a responsibility to monitor the way in which 
and by whom these studies were conducted in the Netherlands?104 
The State Secretary of Social Affairs and Health Care Roelof Kruisinga (a physician 
himself) initially responded in writing to Vonhoff’s questions. “Leading experts from 
around the world”, Kruisinga stated confidently, “are of the opinion that double-blind 
research as a rule should be regarded inevitable”.105 In this sense, it was true that the 
Medicines Supply Act demanded the conduct of RCTs, as it stipulated that packaged 
medicines could only be brought into circulation if they could reasonably be expected 
to possess the advertised effect. It was not true, however, that such studies were usu-
ally carried out without patients’ consent. While patients were not allowed to choose 
if they preferred the treatment or the control group, they were “usually informed that 
an experimental investigation was taking place”, leaving them free to withdraw from 
the study at any time they wanted. Kruisinga did not agree, therefore, that RCTs fun-
damentally violated the dignity of individual human beings.106 
Vonhoff was not satisfied with these answers. Armed with newspaper snippets, he 
confronted the State Secretary in parliament. Kruisinga might claim that researchers 
in the Netherlands generally obtained the consent of their research subjects, but “one 
of the research leaders, dr. Nelemans”, had argued publicly on multiple occasions to 
find informed consent illogical. Only recently, the clinical pharmacologist had been 
quoted in a Dutch newspaper to say that research subjects could only truly provide 
informed consent if they were completely aware of the risks they exposed themselves 
to and that, if this information was available, no need existed to conduct the experi-
ment, since the whole point of a trial was to find out the risks and benefits of a treat-
ment. Nelemans had even stated that since written consent forms often served only to 
absolve researchers in case experiments went south, the emphasis on informed con-
sent could also be considered unethical.107 Vonhoff suspected that a different reason 
underlay the reluctance to obtain consent: “In Medisch Contact, I at one point find 
the statement that the manner and persuasion in which a physician prescribes a reci-
pe to his patient has important effects on the healing process and that this placebo-
effect needs to be eliminated to get objective results”.108 In other words, full disclo-
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sure of the experimental procedure would make it hard to meet “the requirements of 
an ideal trial”. Hence, omitting informed consent was not primarily in the interest of 
patients, but in the interest of eager researchers such as Nelemans. 
Other members of parliament voiced concerns as well. Jan Lambers of the Labour 
Party PvdA (also a physician) agreed with State Secretary Kruisinga that double-blind 
investigations were needed, but had heard that such experiments were usually only 
conducted with publicly insured patients, i.e. patients that depended on health funds 
provided by the state because their income was too low to afford private health insur-
ances.109 Again, Kruisinga offered a reassuring reply: “In my experiences in academic 
hospitals, also class patients are included in this type of research studies”.110 Nonethe-
less, he promised to investigate the concerns of the members of Dutch parliament. In 
particular, he would seek advice about one of the last questions posted by Vonhoff: if 
the state had a responsibility to monitor the conduct of double-blind pharmacological 
studies in the Netherlands. To this end, Kruisinga in 1968 submitted a request for 
advice to the national Health Council. The State Secretary wished to know from the 
scientific advisory body whether “legislation for clinical drug research and state over-
sight of such research is needed” and, if so, what such regulations should look like.111 
To this end, four internists, two pharmacologists, a general practitioner, and a phar-
macist met up thirteen times between 1969 and 1971 to write a report for the regula-
tion of clinical drug research in the Netherlands.112 One of these pharmacologists was 
Frans Nelemans, who, in this capacity, helped to draw up the first Dutch blueprint for 
the governance of human experimentation with research ethics committees. 
 
Research ethics committees as epistemic filters 
 
 Appointed as the chairman of the Council committee ‘clinical drug research’ was 
Leiden pharmacologist Erik Noach. Noach was a former student of Samuel de Jongh 
and had taken over the latter’s professorial chair in 1963.113 At Leiden University, he 
had been experimenting with the communal review of clinical research studies since 
1965 (also see chapter 5), which made him an excellent candidate in the eyes of the 
Council President to chair a committee on the regulation of clinical drug research in 
the Netherlands. In the second half of the twentieth century, Noach would make vari-
ous important contributions to the organization and governance of medical science in 
the Netherlands. He was one of the architects of a new curriculum for the biomedical 
sciences at Leiden University, for instance, and was considered an authority on the 
appropriate regulation of ‘alternative medications’ and animal experiments. First and 
foremost, however, Noach is remembered for his contributions to the Dutch govern-
ance of human subjects research. In many ways, in fact, as will become clear, he may 
be considered the founding father of Dutch research ethics committees. 
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 Noach advised the Council President to compose the committee ‘clinical drug re-
search’ of three types of experts: practitioners of the clinical and pre-clinical sciences, 
stakeholders in the Dutch pharmaceutical industry, and representatives of the Dutch 
civil service. Finally, if the Council President found it desirable to seek advice from a 
“non-medical expert in ethical issues”, Noach recommended to invite the Leiden Pro-
fessor in the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics Herman Heering.114 No records have 
been preserved that indicate that Heering, who would go on to become a prolific au-
thor on medical ethics in the 1970s (see chapters 3 and 6) was invited to participate in 
the committee ‘clinical drug research’. Instead, the Council President invited seven 
physicians and a pharmacist, all established disciplinary insiders to the Dutch field of 
medicine and health. The men were all appointed in a personal capacity, yet each of 
them did represent an organization relevant to the practice and politics of Dutch clin-
ical drug research in the late 1960s. The industrial pharmacist worked for Brocades & 
Stheeman, one of the largest Dutch pharmaceutical companies at the time.115 The first 
internist sat on the board of the National Specialists Association, the second was em-
ployed as a public health officer, the third was a highly-esteemed academic, while the 
fourth, the internist Louis Stuyt, headed a department of internal medicine at a large 
hospital (and would go on to become the Dutch Minister of Public Health and Envi-
ronmental Hygiene in 1971). The general practitioner, in turn, sat on the board of the 
College for General Practitioners. Finally, there was Frans Nelemans, long-time lead-
er of TNO’s Committee Clinical Drug Research, a known advocate of the controlled 
clinical trial, and, as it happened, the direct reason why the State Secretary of Public 
Health had requested the Health Council to write this policy report. 
 Already in his pre-advice, Noach had drafted the framework within the committee 
was to operate. Deliberations had to start from four premises. First, that “human ex-
perimentation to determine the useful, undesirable, and toxic effects of medicines is 
of the utmost importance” and, following the 1958 Medicines Supply Act, “to a cer-
tain extent mandatory by law”. Second, that it was essential to follow “rigorous scien-
tific methods” to ensure clinical research “yields optimal information with minimal 
risks”. Third, given these first two premises, that the committee was to keep close ties 
with the Medicines Evaluation Board. And, finally, that committee members were not 
to forget that clinical drug research was just one type of human experimentation. Ex-
isting “international opinions” in this area, such as the 1964 Helsinki Declaration (see 
chapter 1) for instance, would have to be consulted.116 
 In laying down these ground rules for any Council deliberation on the governance 
of clinical drug research, Noach invoked a clear rhetoric of therapeutic reform. As he 
stated very explicitly in his pre-advice: 
 
The committee will need to develop a description of clinical drug research in such 
a way that it will encourage the conduct of experimental tests—which are scientif-
ically and ethically correct—as being in the interest of public health and therefore 
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necessary, while scientifically flawed tests—which on this ground are already eth-
ically deplorable—will be hindered as much as possible.117 
  
Noach, in other words, made it clear from the start that any form of state oversight 
for clinical drug research would have to function as another epistemic filter: i.e. it had 
to sift out good clinical research from bad clinical research—good here simultaneous-
ly referring to methodologically sound and ethically just. 
 This tight knit between sound clinical research methods and good moral behaviour 
would continue to form the core of the committee’s final advisory report to the Dutch 
government of 1971. Its opening pages, for instance, contained a telling citation from 
a 1968 report by the World Health Organization (WHO) on “principles for the clinical 
evaluation of drugs” (drawn up under leadership of statistician Austin Bradford Hill). 
“For the investigation of drugs”, this citation read, “planned scientific studies in man 
are always necessary. It is not always recognized that it is unethical to introduce into 
general use a drug that has been inadequately tested”.118 Ergo, the WHO-report read 
on, “The ethical problem is not solely one of human experimentation; it is also one of 
refraining from human experimentation”.119 Noach’s Council committee ‘clinical drug 
research’ firmly supported this assessment: controlled clinical experimentation was 
ethically necessary and, therefore, its active promotion under the right circumstances 
a moral good. What was more, as this type of scientific research was likely to increase 
biomedical knowledge and have a positive pedagogical effect on medical students and 
practicing physicians, every reason existed for the Dutch government to actively sup-
port and promote clinical drug research in the Netherlands.120 
 This did not mean, the Health Council emphasized, that foundational principles of 
medical ethics did not have to be taken into account in the conduct of human experi-
ments.121 However, as the Council report underscored literally multiple times, sound 
clinical research was both necessary and inevitable (the latter because the Medicines 
Supply Act ‘simply’ demanded proof of efficacy).122 Hence, like the Council committee 
‘tests upon human beings’ before it in 1955, also the Council committee ‘clinical drug 
research’ maintained in 1971 that all that it could sensibly do was to propose policy 
measures that would minimize risks that just had to be taken in human experiments, 
and to ensure that no fundamental ethical lines were crossed in the process. 
 
*** 
 
 What these policy measures for clinical drug research should look like formed the 
core of the thirteen committee meetings which took place between 1969 and 1971. Its 
eight members eventually agreed on four “general guidelines”. First, conducting clini-
cal drug research was only permitted for physicians and dentists. Second, while no 
group of research subjects should a priori be excluded from participation in clinical 
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research, strong caution had to be exercised in conducting experiments with ‘special 
groups’, like children or mentally ill patients. Third, as the try-out of drug samples on 
individual patients “as a rule misses any scientific value”, this should only be allowed 
with registered pharmaceuticals with a known composition. Finally, following the 
1964 Helsinki Declaration, the report stated that “in general” the informed consent of 
research subjects was required. Notably, however, the committee made a distinction 
between the consent of healthy research subjects and those participating in a clinical 
trial. In case of the first, informed consent was a necessary requirement. Yet, in case 
of the second, the Health Council recommended the government to demand only that 
permission should be acquired “as is common in normal medical treatments”.123 In 
other words, clinical researchers had to be permitted to take the consent of patients 
to undergo a clinical procedure as sufficient information that they were also willing to 
take part in a clinical trial. Whether or not a researcher was in such instances obliged 
to inform patients that they possibly could also receive a placebo instead of an active 
therapeutic agent was left unspecified in the 1971 Council report. 
 In his 1970 booklet (which appeared in the midst of the committee deliberations), 
Nelemans had also invoked the Declaration of Helsinki. This international document, 
he and his co-author explained, was of the utmost importance for the conduct of clin-
ical drug research. Still, researchers really had to interpret it “to the spirit of the let-
ter”. After all, the two claimed, if the Declaration was taken literally, pretty much all 
clinical experiments would become impossible, which “certainly cannot have been the 
intention of the Declaration”. The passage in the Declaration on the requirement of 
informed consent, for instance, “really has to be understood to mean that no research 
may ever be conducted if the patient would not have given his permission if he would 
have been informed of all data available”.124 “It makes more sense”, Nelemans and his 
co-author wrote in closing of the booklet, “to automatically assume the cooperation of 
a patient (at least as far as it concerns the evaluation of therapeutic and diagnostic 
procedures), unless there is clear evidence to the contrary”.125 
 To be sure, Nelemans did emphasize the need for strict ethical rules in the conduct 
of clinical research studies. Such experiments were only permitted, he argued, “if they 
satisfy medical ethics, perhaps most easily described in practice as that the physician 
would not hesitate to let himself or his family participate [in the trial]”.126 In addition, 
the experiment, if successful, would have to yield important new insights and existing 
pharmacotherapies would need to have objections “which can be overcome complete-
ly or partially by the new medicine”.127 In addition, Nelemans made very clear that 
also “a scientifically sound trial, no matter how important it is, may never be execut-
ed if it sins against medical ethics”.128 The pharmacologist just was unconvinced that 
the requirement of informed consent—in case of clinical experiments—added much 
to these rules. Instead, the medical community had to invest in its professional ethics, 
institutional safeguards, and other types of communal control.129 
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research, strong caution had to be exercised in conducting experiments with ‘special 
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 The Council committee ‘clinical drug research’ largely followed Nelemans’ logic in 
its recommendations for policy measures to the Dutch government. Instead of devel-
oping suggestions on how best to ensure the freely given informed consent of patients 
in clinical drug research, the committee proposed a system of oversight “that should 
better guarantee the safety and wellbeing of research subjects”.130 This system worked 
as follows: a physician (or dentist) who wanted to conduct a clinical drug trial would 
have to make a report about his plans to the Dutch Medical Inspection. He could then 
start with the execution of his study. However, if the Inspection suspected something 
to be wrong, it was entitled to bring this study to a halt. If a researcher failed to report 
his study and this was found out, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service would be enti-
tled to take legal steps and possibly even penal measures. 
In its report, the committee formulated two main reasons for this type of oversight 
of clinical drug research. The first was that “in the interest of science only technically 
correct investigations, in which a warrant of optimal information acquisition is pre-
sent, may be conducted”. One of the main things the Dutch Medical Inspection had to 
assess, therefore, was whether the clinical studies that had been reported were meth-
odologically sound. The second was that, “on ethical grounds, it is necessary to estab-
lish impartially if the objectives and execution of the study weigh out against the risks 
taken by research subjects”.131 If a clinical trial simply duplicated another study, for 
instance, no new scientific insights would be gained, which the committee deemed to 
be a wasteful use of resources. Or, if a hospital did not have the right research facili-
ties to properly execute a clinical trial, no valid results could be obtained (and partici-
pants could be put in danger), which would be another reason for the Dutch Medical 
Inspection to bring the clinical study in question to a halt. 
 To assist the Dutch Medical Inspection in this task, Noach et al. proposed to set-up 
local review committees in the main Dutch research centres (including medical facul-
ties and academic hospitals). Experts in the field of clinical drug research would take 
up a seat in these committees to evaluate “the scientific merits of a proposed study as 
well as on its closely related ethical aspects”.132 In addition, one overarching national 
committee had to be installed which could fulfil a variety of functions. For instance, if 
multiple centres took part in a clinical study (a so-called multicentre trial) the nation-
al committee could coordinate the activities of local committees. Also, if the Dutch 
Medical Inspection or a local committee did not possess the right expertise to mean-
ingfully evaluate a research proposal, the national committee could take on this task. 
Finally, to gain a comprehensive overview of the field of clinical drug research in the 
Netherlands and to minimize any unnecessary duplications, the national committee 
could keep track of all clinical drug trials conducted in the Netherlands and, if possi-
ble, even to propose measures to better organize such studies.133 
 Noach et al. compared the functioning of these committees to the practice of refer-
eeing that had since long been popular with academic journals and, somewhat more 
recently, with grant organizations.134 The local committees would be asked primarily 
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to assess the scientific quality of research proposals and the availability of appropri-
ate research facilities. If this was all in order, the study could proceed. If not, sugges-
tions for improvement would have to be made. For instance, researchers might have 
to include more patients in their study to get statistically significant results or make 
changes in the way they collected data to eliminate possible confounding variables. In 
other words, like the Medicines Evaluation Board was imagined to operate as an epis-
temic filter at the end of the clinical drug research pipeline, these boards were imag-
ined to operate at the beginning of it. In this regard, the Health Council followed the 
1968 WHO report, which stated that “investigators should discuss the plans of inves-
tigation with other physicians and experienced medical research workers before em-
barking on the initial investigation of a new drug […] best done by a local medical or 
scientific committee rather than by an official control organization”.135 The more epis-
temic filters in place, in short, the better the system functioned. 
 Taken together, this system of review committees was expected to raise the quality 
of clinical drug research in the Netherlands. “Consultation of this nature is a powerful 
tool to raise the level of science”, the 1971 Council report stated, “which is in the long 
haul also in the interests of the participants in the study”.136 In addition, Noach et al. 
hoped this system would raise the quantity of clinical drug trials in the Netherlands. 
A main reason why it remained difficult to undertake large-scale controlled clinical 
trials in the Netherlands, they argued, was the moral reluctance of Dutch clinicians to 
engage in clinical research. Yet, “the committee cannot shake the impression”, the 
Council report read, “that these restraints are often more founded on emotion than 
on reason”.137 Review committees, tasked to carefully evaluate if study protocols lived 
up to the reigning moral standards of the Dutch medical profession, could take away 
these doubts. In addition, if critics would unjustly accuse clinical researchers of un-
ethical conduct, these committees could offer appropriate “moral backing”.138 This 
way, clinicians no longer stood alone in fulfilling their moral obligation to bring about 
medical progress, which in turn would help to “contribute to the intensification of 
clinical drug research in the Netherlands, which has been developed insufficiently in 
part because of hesitations of physicians on ethical grounds”.139 
 In short, between 1969 and 1971, seven Dutch physicians and one pharmacist drew 
up the first blueprint of the governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands 
by means of review committees that were to judge clinical research protocols on their 
scientific and ethical merits. Although Noach et al. at the time did not refer to these 
committees explicitly as research ethics committees, their system of combining local 
review committees with one national committee would become the core of all Dutch 
policy discussions on the subject in subsequent decades, when the governance of hu-
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man experimentation gradually became a matter of national importance in the Neth-
erlands. Research ethics committees, in their initial conception, were expert commit-
tees, intended to promote more systematic and controlled clinical experimentation in 
the Netherlands and to weed out methodologically good science from bad science in 
Dutch clinics and research institutions. Noach et al. acknowledged that methodologi-
cally good science did not necessarily equate to ethically good science. However, they 
were convinced that methodologically bad science did equate to ethically bad science. 
Hence, they imagined review committees to function first and foremost as epistemic 
filters, which they believed to be an absolute moral requirement for the conduct of all 
forms of clinical—and other types of human—experimentation. 
 Noach et al. were also certain that this change in governance had to be realized by 
state interference. In theory, they argued in the 1971 Council report, voluntary coop-
eration of researchers with this system of oversight was very well possible. Equivalent 
to the general practitioner who had grown accustomed to consulting medical special-
ists, a clinical researcher could be conditioned to consult the appropriate experts in 
the conduct of clinical drug research. However, these experts remained a scarce good 
in the Netherlands. Hence “as long as no specialized training in clinical drug research 
exists […] the danger remains that voluntary oversight will lead to unacceptable risks, 
for example because a necessary correction is not made because of the misplaced self-
confidence of a researcher”.140 As long as clinical research was not up to par in the 
Netherlands, therefore, the hard power of the government was needed to direct the 
professional conduct of individual Dutch clinical researchers. 
 Still, the precise involvement of the government had to be carefully orchestrated. 
“A straightjacket which is too narrow”, the 1971 report read, “will reduce the enthusi-
asm for conducting clinical drug research […] which certainly cannot be in the inter-
est of the public health”.141 After all, “a Government generally exercises more caution 
than is strictly necessary on ethical or scientific grounds, as she is vulnerable to pub-
lic opinion, even if the latter is predominantly based on emotional grounds”.142 The 
role of the government, therefore, had to be strictly limited to authorizing the Dutch 
Medical Inspectorate and the conglomerate of review boards to keep watch over the 
conduct of clinical research in the Netherlands (and demanding from researchers that 
they reported any clinical studies to these bodies). The actual administration of these 
legislative measures—i.e. the review of clinical studies—had to remain the prerogative 
of the Dutch medical profession itself. Or, more precisely, it had to become the pre-
rogative of specific elite members of the Dutch medical profession, who would use the 
hard power provided by the government to control those peripheral researchers who 
did not always know what they were doing, but who suffered from “misplaced self-
confidence” and thereby put patients at risk. What the Dutch government had to ena-
ble, in short, was more internal control over clinical research in the Netherlands, by a 
self-appointed elite of the Dutch medical profession. 
 
*** 
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 After the Health Council sent a final draft version of the report to the Ministry of 
Public Health and Environmental Hygiene in December 1971 (before it would be pub-
lished publically for all to read), nothing happened for almost two years. Only in May 
1973 did the Council President receive a reply from the department, with the remark 
that the government agreed that “national legislation for the protection of those in-
volved in clinical research is desirable”, but that questions still existed about the sys-
tem of oversight proposed by the Health Council.143 First, was the Council absolutely 
certain this system would not “put a break on clinical investigations, which are neces-
sary”? Second, given the scarcity of expertise on clinical drug research in the Nether-
lands, which experts precisely would take up a seat in these review committees? Was 
a lack of this expertise, after all, not one of the main reasons why oversight was need-
ed in the first place? Before the government would undertake any steps to prepare 
legislation for clinical drug research in the Netherlands, therefore, it first wanted the 
Health Council to think further about the possible implications which these policy 
measures could have for the development of clinical drug research and clinical phar-
macology in the country.144 The Dutch government, it seemed, was not in any hurry in 
the early 1970s to realize additional oversight for clinical experimentation. 
In response to this request, the Council President duly brought another committee 
into existence which started deliberating in 1974. Noach this time served as a regular 
committee member, as did eight other physicians, a pharmacist, and a lawyer. Again, 
this committee set out to write a report on the regulation of clinical drug research in 
the Netherlands, to make sure it absolutely would not ‘put a break on clinical investi-
gations’, and to make policy suggestions on how enough expertise could be cultivated 
in the Netherlands to effectively take on the oversight of clinical drug research. This 
Council committee ‘clinical pharmacology’ officially started its work in 1974. In 1976, 
it was joined by another committee tasked to consider the permissibility of experi-
ments with radioactive material in the Netherlands.145 By that time, the Health Coun-
cil was working on its fourth policy advice on the governance of human experimenta-
tion—in a period of only 20 years. Both reports were published in the early 1980s: the 
report on experiments with radioactive material in 1980, the report on clinical phar-
macology (that contained the first official publication of the 1971 Council report ‘clin-
ical drug research’) in 1981. This was fourteen years after the politician Vonhoff had 
asked State Secretary Kruisinga if the Dutch state was not responsible to monitor the 
way in which clinical drug trials were conducted in the Netherlands.146 
There were various reasons why it took the Health Council this long to finish a re-
port that was only meant to provide some additional reflections on the advice already 
delivered in 1971. One was simply administrative: the calendars of participants often 
did not align. Another was the expansion of the committee’s tasks to formulate policy 
measures for the cultivation of expertise in clinical drug research in the Netherlands. 
Now the committee members, who were all enthusiasts of clinical pharmacology, had 
the ear of the Ministry, they used the opportunity to develop elaborate plans for the 
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expansion of the discipline. In name of the public interest, they argued, the number 
of clinical pharmacologists active in university hospitals had to increase from a mea-
gre six to at least sixteen, but preferably to 25 or even 30.147 In addition, the govern-
ment seriously had to invest in traineeships for clinical pharmacologists and to inte-
grate the discipline in the existing Dutch system of medical specialists. 
In developing these plans, the oversight system of review committees to ensure the 
ethical conduct of clinical drug research (the original reason the Health Council had 
been asked to further consider the expansion of clinical pharmacology in the Nether-
lands) increasingly took a backseat. Towards the end of the committee deliberations, 
in the late 1970s, some committee members even remarked that it would be a waist if 
their plans for the growth of clinical pharmacology would not be realized because the 
policy report also contained chapters on the regulation of clinical experimentation in 
the Netherlands through a system of local review committees. 
 One committee member who did continue to care intensively about the sections in 
the report on the functioning of review committees was Erik Noach. In an early stage 
of the committee deliberations, the majority of the Council committee ‘clinical phar-
macology’ decided to resolve the lack of enough experts to man multiple local review 
committees by advising the government to install only one national Council for Clini-
cal Research that would evaluate all patient-related research in the Netherlands. Re-
searchers were still obliged to report a study to this Council before starting it, and this 
Council would still inform the Dutch Medical Inspection if it suspected any wrongdo-
ings. However, in contrast to the 1971 Council report, the 1981 version now came to 
argue that “this Council is not supposed to act as a scientific advisory body for clinical 
researchers”.148 Noach disagreed. The centralization of review procedures, he warned, 
“will greatly stall the much needed growth of clinical research in the Netherlands”.149 
Given the expectation that researchers would likely await the verdict of the Council 
for Clinical Research before starting their studies, undesired delays in the conduct of 
clinical trials could once again be expected. In addition, Noach felt that review com-
mittees should evaluate the scientific quality of research protocols. By the late 1970s, 
in fact, he had even come to argue that clinical trials should only be permitted in the 
Netherlands after “a review committee has notified a researcher in writing that no 
scientific or ethical objections exist against the research study”.150 
 Noach could not convince the other committee members. The majority maintained 
that one Council for Clinical Research was the most practical solution for the problem 
of insufficient available expertise and that, moreover, “the installation of the Council 
and the duty to report research studies is only meant to stimulate sound research, not 
to make scientific research dependent on the medical insights of the Council”.151 The 
Leiden pharmacologist decided, therefore, to invoke his right as a Council member to 
write a minority report for the Dutch government in which he set out his alternative 
plans for the governance of clinical experimentation in the Netherlands by means of 
                                                 
147 Gezondheidsraad, Advies inzake klinische farmacologie, p. 36. 
148 Ibid., p. 57. 
149 Ibid., p. 98.  
150 Ibid., p. 99. E.L. Noach & P.J.W.M. de Kroon, ‘Medische ethiek: patiënten en proeven. De Com-
missie Medische Ethiek in het Academisch Ziekenhuis en de Faculteit der Geneeskunde te Leiden’, in 
Medisch Contact Vol. 34 (1979), pp. 1575-1583.  
151 Ibid., p. 57. Italics added. 
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local review committees (which he now explicitly referred to as ethics committees). In 
his alternative system—which resembled much of the system his Council committee 
had proposed in 1971—one national Council did function as coordination and super-
vision office, but local ethics boards formed the backbone in the oversight of clinical 
research. What was more, the ethical evaluation of research protocols very much in-
cluded a strict evaluation of their scientific quality. 
 Noach’s diverging opinion slowed down and further weakened a policy report that 
already for quite some time had started to look like a failure. When the definitive ver-
sion of the report was finally sent to the Ministry of Public Health and Environmental 
Hygiene in November 1981, the political winds had changed. By then, ethical discus-
sions over the rights of research subjects, which had dominated public discourse in 
countries such as the United States and Great Britain since the late 1960s, had finally 
reached the Netherlands. All of a sudden, a report from a scientific advisory body that 
emphasized the need for more clinical experimentation and power for elite members 
of the medical profession appeared incredibly outdated. So much so, in fact, that the 
Dutch government had decided a few years earlier, in 1978, to request another policy 
report on the appropriate governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands. 
Only this time it did not sent this request to the Health Council—an expert advisory 
body—but to the Central Council for Public Health, an advisory body that seated rep-
resentatives of various political and civil society organisations. Since 1975, this Coun-
cil had been tasked to develop policy reports for the realization of patients’ rights in 
the Netherlands (see chapter 3) and in 1982, also this Council published a report rec-
ommending the oversight of human experimentation using local review committees 
(see chapter 4). Contrary to the Health Council reports, however, this report did not 
advocate the moral need for therapeutic reform or more internal control. Instead, it 
emphasized the rights of research subjects and a need for more democratic oversight 
mechanisms, i.e., research ethics committees were now argued to be needed to realize 
more external control over human experimentation. Still, one member of the Central 
Council for Public Health, the one who in fact wrote most of its 1982 report on the 
public governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands, was a familiar face. 
This Council member was Leiden pharmacologist Erik Noach. 
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medical ethics in a modern society 
 
In August 1969, the social-democratic Dutch newspaper Het Vrije Volk ran an almost 
full-page interview with psychiatrist Rudi van den Hoofdakker, better known to large 
audiences as the poet Rutger Kopland.1 The piece was accompanied by a photograph 
of the psychiatrist. Sitting on a camping chair without a shirt on, legs crossed, he was 
vigorously arguing a case. Addressing someone outside of the frame, his brows were 
furrowing, his hands gesticulating. “Artsenstand”, the headline read, “a drift anchor 
that inhibits progress”.2 The interview was held because the psychiatrist had recently 
published an article in which he had claimed that the Dutch artsenstand resembled a 
“stronghold of know-it-alls”.3 The moment students started medical school, Van den 
Hoofdakker argued, they learned to don themselves in age-old cloaks of medical eth-
ics, hanging nicely ironed in the closet next to their white coats, just waiting to be put 
on. They did not have to decide for themselves what was morally right or wrong, they 
just had to act as members of the artsenstand would. This conservatism, the psychia-
trist felt, inhibited social progress. Physicians and patients had to break free from the 
chains of medical paternalism, in which the child constantly expected the father to 
solve all problems, while the father was constantly afraid to violate the trust the child 
put in him. The artsenstand had to descend from its stronghold and discover it did 
not stand apart from society. Physicians had to learn to “talk, talk, talk” with patients 
and make decisions with instead of for them. What was needed was an “ethics against 
ethics”: a close examination of why doctors held the moral beliefs they did.4 For like 
many others around 1970, Van den Hoofdakker had come to believe that the Dutch 
artsenstand and its ethics tradition had fallen into deep, deep crisis. 
 
*** 
 
 Chapters 3 and 4 of this PhD-thesis explore the growing call for external control 
over Dutch medicine in the 1960s and 1970s, and the encapsulation of research ethics 
committees by this movement in the early 1980s. In 1982, the Dutch Central Council 
for Public Health published a report stating that ethics review was needed to secure 
the rights of human research subjects in medical experiments. Public oversight of this 
practice was needed, this report read, because in a modern democratic society “seclu-
sion and mystery have to make way for openness and transparency”.5 
                                                 
1 See: Stefaan Evenepoel, Volmaakt onaf. Over de stijl en thematiek in de vroege poëzie van Rutger 
Kopland (Leuven: Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2000); J. Coetzee, Landscape with Rowers. Poetry from 
the Netherlands (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). 
2 K. Tamboer, ‘Groningse zenuwarts R.H. van den Hoofdakker: “Artsenstand – sleepanker dat vooruit-
gang afremt”’, in Het Vrije Volk, Saturday 30 August 1969, p. 5. 
3 R.H. van den Hoofdakker, ‘Het bolwerk der beterweters’, in Wijsgerig Perspectief op Maatschappij 
en Samenleving Vol. 9 (1968-1969), pp. 292-301. 
4 R.H. van den Hoofdakker, Het bolwerk van de beterweters. Over de medische ethiek en de status quo 
(Amsterdam: Kritiese Bibliotheek, 1970), p. 33. 
5 Centrale Raad voor de Volksgezondheid, Deeladvies inzake medische experimenten, p. 7, p. 15. 
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 The specific events that led the Dutch government to request this report from the 
Central Council for Public Health, as well as the committee deliberations that preced-
ed its publication in 1982, will be examined further in chapter 4. First, this chapter 
details the rise of the patients’ rights movement in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 
1970s. Even though the KNMG had announced after World War II that it would make 
significant investments in the existing Dutch medical ethics tradition to ensure that 
the professional identity that had kept Dutch physicians strong in times of war would 
not wither away (see chapter 1), this optimism crumbled in the decades thereafter. By 
1970, the Dutch Journal of Medicine and Medisch Contact were filled with concerns 
over an apparent crisis of medical ethics that plagued the Netherlands. In national 
parliament, questions started to be asked about the need to formulate new ethics for 
Dutch medicine, while an amalgam of social movements started to advocate the need 
to elevate the position of the patient in the Dutch health care system. Instead of “ver-
tical relations of dependence and subordination”, the new mantra became, the Dutch 
government had to realize “horizontal relations of consultation and participation” in 
health care. Eventually, towards the end of the 1970s, as the next chapter will show, 
the notion of ‘ethics by committee’ became part of this discourse. 
 Section I of this chapter traces how this sense of crisis about the existing medical 
ethics tradition arose in the Dutch medical community in the 1960s, a feeling that 
gradually diluted the idea that the artsenstand still formed a separate class in Dutch 
society in charge of its own mores. Section II, in turn, maps the initial response of the 
Dutch government to this crisis, while section III investigates the growing popularity 
of a patients’ rights lingo in Dutch policy circles in the early 1970s. Section IV, finally, 
details how these developments in 1978 resulted in the installation of the Committee 
Rights of the Patient by the Central Council for Public Health. This committee, that 
marked a true attempt at participative decision-making in Dutch health care, wrote 
the 1982 Central Council report on the governance of human experimentation in the 
Netherlands. To secure the rights of research subjects, also this report came to argue, 
the Dutch government had to enforce a system of ethics by committee. 
 
The Dutch crisis of medical ethics 
 
Ever since World War II, medical ethics had been an important area of focus in the 
Dutch medical community. In 1947, the (K)NMG announced plans to establish new 
departments that would invest in the professional ethics of physicians to preserve the 
“spiritual unity” which had kept Dutch physicians strong during the war. In 1949, at 
the closing festivities of the centennial birthday of the KNMG, the primus inter pares 
Jean Jacques Brutel de la Rivière called for the production of a work “that adapts our 
existing medical ethics to the radical changes that have taken place in the profession 
of medicine and in society at large”. That same year, the association installed a Com-
mittee Professional Confidentiality, that was succeeded in 1954 by a Committee Med-
ical Ethics which was to write a new booklet describing Dutch medical ethics (for all 
developments, see chapter 1). These measures were needed, the KNMG maintained, 
because in the past the association had functioned too much as a trade union. Change 
was required if the organized Dutch medical profession hoped to safeguard the future 
ethical conduct of medical research and practice in the Netherlands. 
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In the 1950s, the Dutch medical community seemed to take pride in this renewed 
attention for medical ethics. The KNMG-journal Medisch Contact, for instance, regu-
larly kept its readers updated of the excellent progress made by the Committee Medi-
cal Ethics on the new ethics booklet. Between 1954 and 1958 it regularly printed draft 
versions of chapters with the request to readers to send in their comments and ques-
tions. This collective effort, the idea was, would result in robust ethics guidelines that 
carried the seal of approval of the majority of the Dutch artsenstand, that could then 
be expected to uphold them in practice.6 Similarly, in the mid-1950s, the KNMG rel-
ished the fact that the Dutch had brought the ethics of human experimentation to the 
attention of the international medical community (see chapter 1). In the Netherlands, 
its message was, everything was done to keep the ethics of medicine in high regard, to 
make sure it remained an effective mechanism of internal control. 
At the start of the 1960s, this positive image initially continued to reign supreme. 
In 1959, the KNMG had finished working on its new ethics booklet.7 Titled Medische 
Ethiek en gedragsleer (Medical ethics and behavioural rules), it covered all sorts of 
subjects, like the importance of medical confidentiality, the rights and responsibilities 
of general practitioners when handing over their practice to colleagues, the appropri-
ate attitude toward the pharmaceutical industry and the general press, the position of 
Dutch physicians in the national health care system, etcetera.8 The plan was that all 
members of the KNMG would be sent a copy of the ethics booklet, and that all Dutch 
medical students would from then on be presented with a copy upon their graduation 
to remind them of the moral duties that this rite of passage bestowed upon them. The 
Committee Medical Ethics, in the meanwhile, would be reinstated by the KNMG as a 
permanent advisory board for all matters concerning medical ethics.9 
In their announcement of the new booklet in 1960, the editors of Medisch Contact 
expressed their excitement over the realization 0f new ethics for Dutch medical prac-
tice. In the past, the editors explained, Dutch physicians had at times mistakenly spo-
ken of ethics—which was a ‘heavy word’, suggesting deep moral reflection—when they 
had really meant to talk of etiquette: the customary mores of polite conduct among 
medical colleagues. The new booklet therefore strictly separated between the two, “so 
that it is clear that also in the leading circles of the medical society this distinction is 
appreciated”.10 With the wealth of material that each of the chapters contained, the 
editors were convinced it offered Dutch physicians solid handles for the sometimes 
difficult ethical decisions that awaited them in their practice.11 
                                                 
6 Draft chapters were regularly printed in Medisch Contact between 1954 and 1958. For examples, see: 
‘Het overdoen van de praktijk’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 9 (1954), pp. 298-299; ‘De pers en de genees-
kunde’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 10 (1955), pp. 242-245; ‘Assistentie, waarneming en associatie’, in 
Medisch Contact Vol. 11 (1956), pp. 16-21; ‘Honorarium’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 12 (1957), pp. 
546-551; ‘Het ziekenfondswezen’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 (1958), pp. 105-108. 
7 KNMG, Medische ethiek en gedragsleer (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot 
Bevordering der Geneeskunst, 1959). 
8 One chapter addressed the ethics of medical experiments on human beings and contained the ethical 
guidelines of the 1955 Council report. For the publication of the draft chapter in Medisch Contact, see: 
‘Proeven op mensen’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 91958), pp. 108-109. 
9 ‘Commissies’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 (1958), p. 335; Dekker, ‘De derde druk van het boekje 
‘Medische Ethiek en Gedragsleer’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 15 (1960), p. 160. 
10 ‘“Medische Ethiek” opnieuw gedrukt’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 15 (1960), pp. 169-170, p. 169. 
11 Ibid., p. 170. 
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editors were convinced it offered Dutch physicians solid handles for the sometimes 
difficult ethical decisions that awaited them in their practice.11 
                                                 
6 Draft chapters were regularly printed in Medisch Contact between 1954 and 1958. For examples, see: 
‘Het overdoen van de praktijk’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 9 (1954), pp. 298-299; ‘De pers en de genees-
kunde’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 10 (1955), pp. 242-245; ‘Assistentie, waarneming en associatie’, in 
Medisch Contact Vol. 11 (1956), pp. 16-21; ‘Honorarium’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 12 (1957), pp. 
546-551; ‘Het ziekenfondswezen’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 (1958), pp. 105-108. 
7 KNMG, Medische ethiek en gedragsleer (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot 
Bevordering der Geneeskunst, 1959). 
8 One chapter addressed the ethics of medical experiments on human beings and contained the ethical 
guidelines of the 1955 Council report. For the publication of the draft chapter in Medisch Contact, see: 
‘Proeven op mensen’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 91958), pp. 108-109. 
9 ‘Commissies’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 (1958), p. 335; Dekker, ‘De derde druk van het boekje 
‘Medische Ethiek en Gedragsleer’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 15 (1960), p. 160. 
10 ‘“Medische Ethiek” opnieuw gedrukt’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 15 (1960), pp. 169-170, p. 169. 
11 Ibid., p. 170. 
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That same year, the Protestant internist Gerrit Arie Lindeboom published another 
booklet on medical ethics, Opstellen over medische ethiek (Essays on medical ethics), 
which contained chapters on subjects like medical confidentiality, human and animal 
vivisection, but also on subjects like artificial insemination and euthanasia.12 The in-
ternist had written the essays, he stated in the introduction, to fill the void that exist-
ed in Protestant medical circles with regard to counselling on subjects of medical eth-
ics.13 In the Dutch Journal of Medicine, Lindeboom’s booklet was recommended as a 
learned and thoughtful publication that was certainly of interest to physicians of oth-
er persuasions as well.14 Various newspapers also reviewed the booklet positively.15 
One, which printed a joint review of Lindeboom’s essays and the new KNMG booklet, 
even commented enthusiastically on “the curious fact that, as much as their philoso-
phies of life may differ, physicians have ever since Hippocrates displayed a profound 
agreement on medical ethics”. The publication of these two new ethics booklets was 
only further proof of the “fortunate fact that physicians in difficult circumstances can 
rely on a common opinion”.16 In short, quite some confidence existed in the Nether-
lands anno 1960 about the capacity of the Dutch artsenstand to regulate the conduct 
of its physicians through the formulation of solid medical ethics. 
Over the course of the 1960s, however, this image would change radically. In a pe-
riod of only ten years, the perception in Dutch medical circles of its ethics tradition 
took a sharp downturn. In 1970, a physician even declared in Medisch Contact that 
Dutch medical ethics was “in full crisis”.17 Anyone denying this just had to reread a 
recent policy report of the KNMG. There, tucked away between a few policy decisions, 
a paragraph titled ‘serious problems’ contained the admission that the association’s 
Committee Medical Ethics had been unable to write an updated version of Medische 
ethiek en gedragsleer.18 The Committee could, if this was desired, create another edi-
tion containing behavioural rules for physicians, but had “given up hope to compose 
another Medische Ethiek”.19 The author in Medisch Contact felt this failure stood tes-
timony to a deep crisis in moral medical authority in the Netherlands that had “be-
come manifest around 1960” and that had brought about a “degeneration in medical 
thinking”.20 Within a single decade, ‘the leading circles of Dutch medical society’ had 
lost their once easy connection to that “heavy word”: ethics. 
 
*** 
                                                 
12 G.A. Lindeboom, Opstellen over Medische Ethiek (Kampen: J.H. Kok N.V, 1960). 
13 In Catholic circles, discussion of medical ethics was more common. Pope Pius XII, for instance, 
frequently addressed the subject and spoke on conferences such as those of the World Medical Asso-
ciation. See: Darrel W. Amundsen, ‘The Discourses of Roman Catholic Medical Ethics’, in Cambridge 
World History of Medical Ethics, pp. 218-254. 
14 C.L. de Jong, ‘G.A. Lindeboom, Opstellen over medische ethiek’, in Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Geneeskunde Vol. 104 (1960), p. 1897. 
15 See for instance: ‘Leemte in medische opleiding’, in Leeuwarder Courant, Tuesday 13 September 
1960, p. 2; ‘Nieuwe uitgaven’, in Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, Thursday 2 June 1960, p. 27; ‘Gesprek 
aan het ziekbed’, in Gereformeerd Gezinsblad, Saturday 16 July 1960. 
16 ‘Over medische ethiek. Twee nieuwe uitgaven’, in De Tijd-Maasbode, Thursday 19 May 1960, p. 7. 
17 W. Metz, ‘Over de crisis in de medische ethiek’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 25 (1970), pp. 330-332. 
18 ‘Kort verslag H.B.-vergadering’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 21 (1966), pp. 210-211, p. 210; G. Dekker, 
‘Jaarverslag 1967 der Maatschappij’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 718-723, p. 721. 
19 ‘Inleiding 154ste Algemene Vergadering’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 25 (1970), pp. 5-6, p. 5. 
20 Metz, ‘Over de crisis in de medische ethiek’, p. 330. 
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 What happened to Dutch medical ethics in the 1960s? On 24 March 1961, Medisch 
Contact printed a review of the new KNMG ethics booklet and Lindeboom’s Opstellen 
by the Utrecht theology and ethics professor Johannes de Graaf that was much less 
enthusiastic about the two booklets than previous reviews had been. While both pub-
lications had clearly been written with good intentions, De Graaf wrote, neither could 
exactly be called modern: “One senses a certain longing for the good old days of per-
sonal relations […] as if physicians still feel helpless in the industrialized mass society 
of today”.21 Both booklets, he felt, envisioned the doctor-patient relationship as a spe-
cial bond of trust between two individuals who knew one another intimately. Yet, like 
most of “modern society”, the modern health care system was now organized through 
collective social structures (hospitals, health insurance plans) and a far-reaching divi-
sion of labour (specialization, teamwork). In effect, doctor and patient had often be-
come strangers to each other and their interactions functional and fleeting.22 That did 
not mean medical ethics no longer mattered in a modern society, De Graaf continued. 
Quite the opposite, in a world with weak social ties clear moral guidelines for a prac-
tice like medicine had become more important than ever. Still, the ethics professor 
argued, the medical profession would have to find a new way of relating to patients, 
and to “tune the ethos of the physician in to the modern wavelength”.23 
De Graaf was wary, for instance, of the recurring appeal to the conscience of physi-
cians in the KNMG booklet for dilemmas that it did not have a clear answer to: “As if 
we may just trust this conscience as long as the physician acts in the spirit of the pro-
fessional ethics formulated in this book”. In ethics, the professor argued, scholars had 
since long stopped using ‘conscience’ as a normative authority: it served to recognize 
feelings of guilt and remorse, but did not provide an “index of moral guidelines”. In 
fact, De Graaf stated, for a work with the words ‘medical ethics’ in its title, the KNMG 
booklet had surprisingly few moral guidelines to offer for medical practice. That is, it 
dealt in detail with a specific subset of ethical problems—those “on which consensus 
since long exists”—like the need for professional confidentiality or (im)permissibility 
of commercial advertising. But subjects that most people in recent years had come to 
associate with medical ethics, such as the permissibility of birth control, artificial in-
semination, or lobotomy, passed in review only in the chapter ‘The physician and 
religion’ with the comment to respect patients’ personal viewpoints. Perhaps such an 
elusive approach was inevitable for any association hoping to represent all physicians 
in the country, De Graaf remarked delicately, but it did mean the KNMG had little to 
offer for physicians struggling with truly difficult ethical questions.24 
A year later, in April 1962, the editors of Medisch Contact responded to De Graaf’s 
critiques with a leading article titled ‘Ethical problems for the physician’. Given their 
enthusiastic reaction to the new KNMG booklet only two years earlier, their reply was 
surprisingly pliable. While physicians could rest on a longstanding tradition of moral 
                                                 
21 ‘Medische Ethiek’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 16 (1961), pp. 190-191, p. 190. For Johannes (Hannes) 
de Graaf, who was also a pastor as well as the leader of the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) in the Nether-
lands, see: E.D.J. de Jongh, Hannes de Graaf. Een leven van bevrijding (Kampen: Ten Have, 2004). 
22 For a similar analysis in this period, see: I. Boerema, ‘De Keerzijde van de Vooruitgang in de Ge-
neeskunde’, in W. Peremans et al., Acht voordrachten over de keerzijde van de vooruitgang in de na-
tuur- en geneeskundige wetenschappen (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 39-55. 
23 ‘Medische Ethiek’, p. 190. 
24 All quotes in this paragraph: Ibid., p. 191. 
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contemplation, they wrote, it was true this tradition increasingly seemed to fall short 
these days. The main cause of this development, the editors argued, was the “dizzying 
speed in which ‘the new sciences’ [had] penetrated the terrain of the physician” in the 
last century (and thus not, as De Graaf had stated, the changing social bonds in Dutch 
society). In recent years, for example, the medical profession had tried to get to grips 
with the implications of technologies for respiration and resuscitation developed by 
electrical engineers in the mid-twentieth century that fundamentally altered the pos-
sibilities to preserve life. But before a moral consensus had been reached on this top-
ic already “a new wave of technical skill [was] poured out onto humanity” in the form 
of artificial insemination, which now offered the possibility also to conceive life. The 
editors agreed with De Graaf that such developments demanded more reflection than 
was currently the case, but they understood why this often did not happen: 
  
The consequences of these technical possibilities are so far reaching, that some 
are hardly willing to think further about them. […] People want to be undisturbed 
and live their old lives as much as possible, not just because these new possibili-
ties are incalculable and frightening, but because they do not know how to cope 
with the type of ethical concerns that these [technologies] bring.25 
 
Nonetheless, the editors did feel the KNMG had a leading role to fulfil in this regard 
and emphasized that debates about these new developments could also be held in the 
pages of their journal: “The more use is made out of this […] the more serious we can 
strive to stay faithful to the tradition that physicians can draw support from their pro-
fessional ethos in determining their standpoint [on ethical issues]”.26 
 This call for more communal reflection was certainly put into effect in the Nether-
lands in the 1960s. In 1962, already, the KNMG issued a reflection paper on the ethics 
of artificial insemination and organized a live debate on the topic at its General As-
sembly.27 In the next few years, Medisch Contact published essays on the ethical im-
plications of new medical technologies almost every other week. In these papers, the 
most frequently asked question was if the old adage in medical ethics to sustain life as 
much as possible still held true in an era when the possibilities for doing so seemed to 
grow evermore endless. In 1965, a two day medical conference was held on the theme 
‘Ethics or Etiquette’ with talks like ‘The inadequacy of our existing medical ethics’ and 
‘What should the norm of our practice be?’.28 In 1966, the KNMG took under consid-
eration if it should start to study medical ethics “scientifically” (it did not specify what 
it meant with this exactly) and in 1967, it decided that its standing Committee Medi-
                                                 
25 Red., ‘Ethische problemen voor de arts’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 17 (1962), pp. 237-238., p. 238. 
26 Ibid., p. 238. 
27 ‘Discussie over: rapport kunstmatige inseminatie’, Medisch Contact Vol. 17 (1962), pp. 239-241. 
28 ‘Varia’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 20 (1965), p. 278. Around the same time, Medisch Contact fre-
quently started to advertise lectures on the topic of medical ethics and any ongoing problems therewith. 
See, for instance: M.W. Jongsma, ‘Medische ethiek’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 21 (1966), pp. 311-316; 
‘Dr. J.C. Schultsz over Medische Ethiek’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 21 (1966), pp. 782-783; ‘Voor-
drachten: internist C.L.C. Nieuwenhuizen, onderwerp “De ethische consequenties van de moderne 
ontwikkeling in de geneeskunde en biologie”’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 22 (1967), p. 377; C.P. Spor-
ken, ‘Katholieke moraal en abortus’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 22 (1967), pp. 385-389; ‘Voordrachten: 
Dr. H. Hamminga, onderwerp “Enige medisch-ethische problemen”’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 22 
(1967), p. 469; ‘Varia: Het dogma in de medische ethiek’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 22 (1967), p. 1163. 
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cal Ethics was in serious need of rejuvenation. Among other things, it had to critically 
scrutinize the contents of the KNMG ethics booklet (only eight years old at the time) 
and, if it believed this to be necessary, completely rewrite them.29 In 1968, the KNMG 
approached all medical faculties in the country with the request to pay more attention 
in their curricula to the discussion of medical ethics.30 
 This enthusiastic increase of communal reflection on medical ethics in Dutch med-
ical circles in the 1960s, however, did not quite have the desired effect. The more 
journals like Medisch Contact discussed the implications of new technologies for the 
existing Dutch medical ethics tradition, the more it became clear that Dutch doctors 
often could not “rely on a common opinion in difficult circumstances”. In the 1950s, 
still, this communis opinio had, at least rhetorically, been taken as self-evident. Sure, 
separate factions existed in the artsenstand that were aligned to the (in)famous ‘pil-
lars’ that organized social and political life in Dutch society into four main politico-
denominational movements in this period (i.e. a Catholic, Protestant, socialist, and 
liberal pillar).31 Yet, according to the elite of the organized Dutch medical profession, 
these “personal viewpoints” did not conflict with the professional ethos of physicians, 
which they derived from being members of the artsenstand. Thus, in 1953, during the 
first meeting of the Health Council committee ‘tests upon human beings’, the Council 
President had felt confident to remind the participating physicians that ethical prin-
ciples based on “religion, philosophy, or conscience” would not be brought to the fore 
in committee deliberations, as they all had the ethics of medicine in common: profes-
sional ethics trumped personal ethics (see chapter 1). However, when the Dutch med-
ical profession in the 1960s increasingly started discussing ethical issues other than 
the importance of medical confidentiality or commercial advertising, it became clear 
that physicians often did not agree on the morally right or wrong thing to do in diffi-
cult circumstances. On closer inspection, it turned out, the unitary ethos of the Dutch 
artsenstand was much less solid than had often proudly been assumed. 
 
*** 
 
 These first dents in the professional identity of the Dutch artsenstand were further 
exacerbated in the mid-1960s by a growing recognition that also patients increasingly 
seemed to question the moral authority of the physician. In 1966, the psychiatrist Jan 
Marlet (who was an often cited contributor to Dutch debates on medical ethics at the 
time) co-authored a book with his two brothers—one a jurist, the other a theologian—
to examine why, despite a lack of much evidence of medical malpractice among Dutch 
physicians, the Dutch patient increasingly seemed dissatisfied with his practitioner.32 
                                                 
29 ‘Kort verslag H.B.-vergadering’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 21 (1966), pp. 210-211, p. 210; G. Dekker, 
‘Jaarverslag 1967 der Maatschappij’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 718-723, p. 721. 
30 Korte verslagen vergaderingen hoofdbestuur’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 337-338, p. 
338; W.B. van der Mijn, ‘Het takenpakket der maatschappij’, in Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 631-637, p. 632. 
31 Thus, in addition to the official KNMG journals, also Catholic and Protestant medical journals exist-
ed, while hospitals and health funds often operated within these frameworks as well. See: Friso Wie-
lenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009); Peter van Dam, Staat van verzui-
ling. Over een Nederlandse mythe (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2011). 
32 J.J.C. Marlet, M.F.J. Marlet & L.N. Marlet, Schuld en verontschuldiging in de medische praktijk 
(Roermond: J.J. Romen & Zonen, 1966). 
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*** 
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29 ‘Kort verslag H.B.-vergadering’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 21 (1966), pp. 210-211, p. 210; G. Dekker, 
‘Jaarverslag 1967 der Maatschappij’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 718-723, p. 721. 
30 Korte verslagen vergaderingen hoofdbestuur’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 337-338, p. 
338; W.B. van der Mijn, ‘Het takenpakket der maatschappij’, in Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 631-637, p. 632. 
31 Thus, in addition to the official KNMG journals, also Catholic and Protestant medical journals exist-
ed, while hospitals and health funds often operated within these frameworks as well. See: Friso Wie-
lenga, Nederland in de twintigste eeuw (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009); Peter van Dam, Staat van verzui-
ling. Over een Nederlandse mythe (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2011). 
32 J.J.C. Marlet, M.F.J. Marlet & L.N. Marlet, Schuld en verontschuldiging in de medische praktijk 
(Roermond: J.J. Romen & Zonen, 1966). 
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An important psychological reason, the psychiatrist Marlet asserted, was the growth 
of medical power in recent years. It had made patients continuously expect more and 
better care, ironically leaving them less satisfied than when physicians had only been 
able to offer pastoral care.33 A cultural reason, the jurist Marlet stated, was the strong 
levelling of social classes in the Netherlands in recent decades. Anno 1966, the doctor 
was no longer revered as a true “authority-figure”. Instead, patients’ “sense of self-
worth” had increased: if they did not like their physicians, they no longer hesitated to 
simply choose a different one.34 A key economic reason, the jurist added, was the fact 
that since the 1940s many more people had acquired health insurance in the Nether-
lands. This had caused waiting rooms to flood, leaving much less time for the average 
physician to spend per patient, who felt neglected because of it. The doctor-patient 
relationship, the psychiatrist Marlet concluded with some sadness, was likely to turn 
into an ordinary business arrangement in the Netherlands with two parties—a suppli-
er and a consumer—constantly in search of “best value for money”.35 
 Around the same time, also authors in Medisch Contact started to comment on the 
changing attitude of the Dutch patient toward his caregivers. The modern patient, the 
expression went, had become mondig (assertive, mature): he no longer just accepted 
the authority of his physician, but made demands on the type of treatments he wished 
to undergo.36 Doctors were no longer respected as “magi”, as members of a priestly 
class who could ease suffering with a touch of their hands, but were taken to be mere 
technical engineers.37 In 1967, the liberal Dutch paper Algemeen Handelsblad caused 
a national stir with the headline ‘The doctor is not God’.38 Medical malpractice did 
occur in the Netherlands, the article stated, but the general public was often wilfully 
kept ignorant of misbehaviour or mistakes in Dutch medical practice:  
 
The artsenstand uses the term ‘trust’ as a sacred token necessary for a proper 
medical treatment. In principle, that is true. The danger exists, however, that it 
also uses the same term as a shield to keep issues that hurt the medical treatment 
and therefore the general interest out of the public eye.39 
 
                                                 
33 J.J.C. Marlet, ‘De in rechten vervolgde arts’, in Schuld en verontschuldiging, pp. 57-82. 
34 L.N. Marlet, ‘Enige raakpunten tussen de medische praktijk en het leerstuk der aansprakelijkheid’, in 
Schuld en Verontschuldiging, pp. 5-65, p. 7. 
35 Marlet, ‘De in rechten vervolgde arts’, p. 65. See also: J.M.F. Phaff, ‘Toepassing medische psycho-
logie door de huisarts’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 18 (1963), pp. 480-483. 
36 Dutch historians Stephen Snelders and Frans Meijsman have investigated the history of ‘de mondige 
patiënt’ and have concluded that the supposed emergence of the mature patient in the 1960s is largely a 
historical myth. Dutch patients, they argue, were well capable of voicing their opinions about the 
treatments they desired long before the 1960s. See: Stephen Snelders & Frans Meijsman, De mondige 
patiënt. Historische kijk op een mythe (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2009).  
37 For a contemporary analysis of the emergence of ‘the mature patient’, see: A. Querido, ‘De mon-
digheid van de patient: I. Diagnose’, in Metamedica Vol. 49 (1970), pp. 205-208. 
38 ‘De dokter is God niet’, in Algemeen Handelsblad, Saturday 13 May 1967, Supplement p. 1. 
39 The Algemeen Handelsblad based its claim that medical misconduct did take place in the Nether-
lands on an empirical article published in the Dutch Journal of Medicine in 1963 that had hardly re-
ceived any coverage in the general press. The newspaper argued it was the first ever article from within 
the Dutch artsenstand to admit to the existence of such mistakes. See: P.J. Kuijer, J.F. van Rhede van 
der Kloot & J. Logeman, ‘Sterfte, medische tekortkomingen en foutenbronnen’, in Nederlands Tijd-
schrift voor Geneeskunde Vol. 107 (1963), pp. 1268-1270. 
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The artsenstand was an impenetrable stronghold, devoid of much social control, that 
did not operate in a transparent, and therefore accountable, manner. When patients 
were aware of any misconduct, for instance, the options for filing complaints were 
scarce. And when cases made it to court, their proceedings were usually kept a secret. 
In effect, patients could hardly get their voice heard while physicians could do pretty 
much whatever they pleased. This would not do. In future years, a more “mature and 
open relationship” had to be developed between the two parties.40 
 The KNMG tried to account for such complaints in the 1960s. Already in 1958, its 
board had proposed to include a legal counsel in its disciplinary courts (see chapter 
1). At first, this proposal had given rise to fierce opposition among members. ‘Outsid-
ers’ had no place there, the argument ran, as collegial justice was administered ac-
cording to “the principles of medical ethics which only slowly mature in each physi-
cian through his education, experience, and insights”.41 In 1964, however, the KNMG 
did install a committee with five physicians and three jurists for the modernization of 
its justice system. The report delivered by this study group in 1968 strongly advised 
openness in the association’s juridical proceedings. Verdicts had to be made public, 
including the identity of the accused, even if complaints had been ruled unfounded. 
Moreover, jurists most certainly had to take up a seat in the disciplinary courts. These 
measures were needed, the report read, to allow for a more open dialogue with the 
Dutch public and to ensure the KNMG “keeps pace with social life”.42 
Such measures, however, did not take away a growing unrest in the Netherlands in 
the late 1960s about the uneven dynamic of the doctor-patient relationship. In 1968, 
Dutch jurists organised a conference on ‘The physician and the law’. Physicians often 
failed to realise, speakers complained, that they were bound to the same laws as eve-
ryone else in the Netherlands.43 According to one speaker, it was just typical how “in 
the familiar ethics booklet of the KNMG […] the personal bond of trust between phy-
sician and patient is repeatedly emphasized”, while their legal relation was, if refer-
enced at all, interpreted mostly as an impoverishment of the vocation.44 This attitude, 
where physicians kept on thinking of their profession as an ordained ministry akin to 
priesthood, agitated ‘outsiders’. For society to keep its trust in the medical profession, 
he warned, it was essential that physicians started to recognize the patient as a “legal-
ly equal contract partner” and to resist the temptations of paternalism. This idea that 
the artsenstand formed a separate class in society, and that doctors were like fathers 
to their patients, just did not fit life in a modern society anymore. 
                                                 
40 The editors of Medisch Contact responded very angrily to what it called was a ‘sensationalist publi-
cation’ in the Algemeen Handelsblad: ‘Massamedia en Medici. Het Handelsblad constateert ‘de muur 
van geheimzinnigheid, die de medische wereld om zich heeft opgebouwd, doorbroken’, in Medisch 
Contact Vol. 22 (1967), pp. 527-528. 
41 See: P.Th. Hugenholtz, ‘Wijziging rechtspraak’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 13 (1958), p. 785. 
42 G. Dekker, ‘Rapport van de commissie herziening rechtspraak. Pre-advies van het hoofdbestuur’, in 
Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 84-104; W.B. van der Mijn, ‘De rechtspraak van de maatschap-
pij’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 24 (1969), pp. 1029-1031; ‘De 150ste Algemene Vergadering der Maat-
schappij’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 453-463, p. 453. 
43 F.F.X. Cerutti et al., De Geneesheer en het Recht (Deventer: Kluwer, 1968); ‘Congres te Nijmegen: 
De geneesheer en het recht’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23. (1968), pp. 315-317; Red. ‘Aesculapius en 
Themis. Een nuttige ontmoeting’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 23 (1968), pp. 313-314. 
44 J. Maeijer, ‘Juridische relatie geneesheer en patiënt’, in Geneesheer en het Recht, pp. 9-23, p. 9. 
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 This surging criticism on the doctor-patient relationship in the Netherlands in the 
late 1960s did not hamper the enthusiastic production of new works of medical ethics 
in this period. In 1968, a long running Dutch editorial series published the title Re-
cent medisch ethisch denken I (Recent medical ethical thinking I) that intended to do 
justice to “the evolution, one might even say revolution, that is unfolding itself in 
thinking about medical ethics”.45 The chapters were mostly written by physicians, but 
one was by the Remonstrant theologian Herman Heering and one by the jurist Jaap 
Rang. Its contents, moreover, were starkly different from the KNMG ethics booklet 
that had been published a decade earlier, with chapters taking on topics like euthana-
sia, artificial insemination, and anticonception. In 1970, another edition with chap-
ters on topics like sterilization and sexuality was added to the series.46 In 1969, a 
journalist published the booklet Medische ethiek vandaag (Medical ethics today) 
with interviews of “sixteen prominent physicians who are confronted day-in-day-out 
with the most strange and complex new questions of ethics and religion”.47 That same 
year, a conference was held on ‘medical ethics between science and society’, Heering 
brought out a book on (medical) ethics titled Ethiek der voorlopigheid (Provisional 
ethics), and the Catholic theologian Paul Sporken—who would go on to become the 
first Dutch professor of medical ethics in 1974 (see chapter 6)—published a book ti-
tled Voorlopige diagnose (Provisional diagnosis).48 
 In all these publications, concepts like newness, change, and temporality dominat-
ed. “Every era has its own ethics”, the conference participants concluded.49 The exist-
ing Dutch medical ethics, Heering and Sporken maintained, fell short because it was 
too static: physicians believed the Hippocratic tradition transcended particular times 
and places, but moral rights and wrong could only be determined within the context 
of specific situations and were thus subjected to change through time and space (see 
chapter 6). In these publications, also the position of patients increasingly took centre 
stage. Sporken, in particular, maintained that a context-dependent ethics should in-
clude the patient’s perspective, who was after all a crucial participant in medical prac-
tice. This was where the old KNMG-booklet went astray. It only dealt with physicians: 
the responsibilities of general practitioners versus specialists, the relation with other 
caregivers, etcetera. An ethics of health care, Sporken maintained instead, had to take 
patients as its starting point. Accordingly, his book was divided into five parts: prob-
lems of birth (abortion, reproduction); marriage (anticonception, sexuality); maturity 
(medication, sterilization); end-of-life (reanimation, euthanasia); and death (death 
criteria, transplantation). By taking this lifecycle approach, the theologian explained, 
medical ethics would be able to include patients’ voices. By extension, this egalitarian 
approach would move away from the old idea that only members of the artsenstand 
knew what was ethically best because of their professional identity. 
                                                 
45 L.H.Th.S. Kortbeek et al.(eds.), Recent Medisch Ethisch Denken – I (De Nederlandse Bibliotheek der 
Geneeskunde, nr. 40) (Leiden: Stafleu’s Wetenschappelijke Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1968), p. 5. 
46 A.G.M. van Melsen et al., Recent Medisch Ethisch Denken – II (De Nederlandse Bibliotheek der 
Geneeskunde, nr. 60) (Leiden: Stafleu’s Wetenschappelijke Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1970). 
47 J.P. Calff, Medische Ethiek Vandaag (Amsterdam: Agon Elsevier, 1969), backflap. 
48 ‘Medische ethiek tussen natuurwetenschap en samenleving’, in Wetenschap en Samenleving Vol. 23 
(1969), no. 5/6; H.J. Heering, Ethiek der Voorlopigheid (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1969); C.P. Sporken, 
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49 J.J. Groen, ‘Iedere tijd heeft zijn eigen ethiek’, in De Groene Amsterdammer, 5 juli 1969, pp. 9-10. 
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Heering and Sporken and their provisional (medical) ethics were popular among 
Dutch physicians. Both were regularly invited to publish in Medisch Contact, asked to 
give lectures, and nominated to participate in advisory bodies like the Health Council. 
Their works helped ensure that the Dutch discourse on medical ethics was more lively 
and rich by the end of the 1960s than it had been since a long time. Yet, at the close of 
the decade, a feeling that something was sorely amiss with the existing Dutch medical 
ethics tradition dominated public debate in the Netherlands. If change and temporal-
ity dictated ethical thinking, the worry was, and if patients’ voices had to be included 
as well, it was next to impossible to formulate moral guidelines that would transcend 
the here and now. The idea of a longstanding tradition of medical ethics shared by all 
members of the artsenstand that functioned as an important tool of internal control 
over the conduct of practitioners seemed to be evaporating into thin air. 
 
*** 
 
In April 1970, the KNMG held its biannual General Assembly. At this meeting, the 
President announced the association’s standing Committee Medical Ethics would be 
dissolved.50 “The acceleration in the evolution of science and society”, the President 
said in defence of this decision, demanded a more “modern approach” to the study of 
medical ethics.51 In the past, the medical community had often thought that only the 
opinions of physicians mattered in the moral reflection on medicine, but it now rec-
ognized that two groups could be distinguished in society on this terrain: “physicians 
and others”.52 “Medical ethics”, the President asserted, “is essentially pluralistic and 
multiple opinions on one and the same question can be fully accounted for”.53 Hence, 
while the KNMG did feel that ‘the circle of physicians’ had its own unique perspective 
on what was morally right and wrong in medical practice, the association would start 
to “give room to representatives of the non-medical population” in the formulation of 
new medical ethics. “If this does not happen”, the President warned, “the danger ex-
ists that the ethos of physicians is alienated from the ethical feelings in the population 
[…] to the detriment of its trust in the class of physicians”.54 
The KNMG planned, therefore, to establish a new committee with “representatives 
from the Roman-Catholic medical community, Protestant-Christian medical organi-
zation, Remonstrant medical association, and humanistic group Socrates” that would 
be tasked to modernize the existing behavioural rules for physicians—strictly keeping 
in mind that the social structures in society had changed radically in recent years and 
that patients were now increasingly mondig.55 In addition, the association would start 
publishing loose-leaf essays on pressing issues in medical ethics that would prefera-
bly be written by experts from fields of law, sociology, psychology, and theology (out-
                                                 
50 L. van der Drift, ‘Medische Ethiek anno 1970’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 25 (1970), pp. 413-417.  
51 Ibid., p. 413. 
52 Ibid., p. 414. 
53 Ibid., p. 416. 
54 Ibid., p. 415. 
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Heering and Sporken and their provisional (medical) ethics were popular among 
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*** 
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ists that the ethos of physicians is alienated from the ethical feelings in the population 
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The KNMG planned, therefore, to establish a new committee with “representatives 
from the Roman-Catholic medical community, Protestant-Christian medical organi-
zation, Remonstrant medical association, and humanistic group Socrates” that would 
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siders, in short). These essays would have to take a “pluralistic approach” and include 
literature suggestions for further self-study. This way, the KNMG hoped to kill two 
birds with one stone: (1) ensure that “the ethical aspects of the rapid developments on 
medical-scientific and technological terrain are brought to the attention of physicians 
and medical students in a timely manner”, and (2) provide an appropriate solution to 
the growing dissatisfaction in the Netherlands with the societal functioning of physi-
cians. “The times have passed”, the KNMG President declared solemnly in conclusion 
to his speech for the General Assembly, “that we could pretend medical ethics to be a 
secret doctrine belonging to the professional secrets kept by physicians”.56 In modern 
society, everyone had something to say about medical ethics. 
 
The first steps of political interference 
 
 In 1970, still, the KNMG figured that all it needed to do to defuse this crisis was to 
invest even more in the formulation of better medical ethics—this time with the input 
of a whole range of medical outsiders. Yet, around the same time that the President of 
the association held his speech for the General Assembly, Dutch parliament started to 
interfere as well in ongoing public discussions over the existing Dutch medical ethics 
tradition. On Tuesday 3 February 1970, to be exact, in a debate in parliament over the 
annual budget of the Department of Social Affairs and Public Health, the leader of the 
Protestant Christian-democratic party Arnold Tilanus used his allotted speaking time 
to address “the position of the physician in modern society”.57 According to Tilanus, a 
growing discomfort could be detected in the Netherlands about this position. Trade 
unions regularly complained that medical fees were too high; consumer organizations 
accused medical specialists of treating publicly insured patients less carefully than 
(the more lucrative) privately insured patients; frequent complaints were made that 
doctors and nurses refused to work night and weekend shifts; and concerns could be 
heard about the growing unwillingness of general practitioners to make house calls. 
All in all, Tilanus said cautiously, the societal functioning of physicians “has become a 
public phenomenon, about which this House can and should speak”.58 
 The examples given by Tilanus were all of a socio-economic nature. Nonetheless, 
the Protestant politician continued whilst turning to the members of the labour party 
across the aisle, it would be a mistake to solely attribute the growing discomfort about 
the social position of physicians to structural inequalities in the financial organisation 
of the national health care system. No, Tilanus stated, “the causes of the existing dis-
content between physician and patient lie much deeper”.59 To make his case, the poli-
tician invoked the booklet Medische macht en medische ethiek (Medical power and 
Medical Ethics) published a year earlier by Dutch ‘zenuwarts’ (neuropsychiatrist) Jan 
Hendrik van den Berg.60 In this publication, Van den Berg had, like many others in 
the late 1960s, argued that new medical ethics had to be developed to account for the 
growing technical powers of medical practitioners. Unlike many others, however, Van 
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den Berg had explicitly written his booklet for a lay public and had included multiple 
confronting images of suffering patients who were alive only because they had been 
‘saved’ by medical technology: a man whose lower body had been surgically removed, 
a baby with a split spine and hydrocephalus (a ‘water head’), etcetera.61 In “the era of 
medical power”, the psychiatrist had concluded, the once “holy rule” of medical ethics 
to preserve life at all costs had to be replaced by a new rule stating the physician only 
“preserves, spares, and lengthens human life when this makes sense”.62 
 Medische macht en medische ethiek, in short, was a plea for allowing passive and 
sometimes even active euthanasia. As such, it caused great uproar in the Netherlands. 
It was not the first Dutch essay to make this claim, but it was the first to actively seek 
out a non-academic audience and to provoke great debate in the mainstream media.63 
Some commentators expressed sympathy for Van den Berg’s ideas. Sporken, for in-
stance, stated publicly that he could “follow most parts of the road that Van den Berg 
is travelling with him”.64 Others, however, voiced fundamental concerns. In reformed 
circles, the booklet was referred to as a “Godless book” and its author a “competitor of 
God”.65 But also in left-wing intellectual circles Van den Berg’s ideas were compared 
to the older Nazi doctrines. “Even people with few taboos will shudder when reading 
this”, one author wrote, “and wonder where it is that we are going and whether physi-
cians really have any competence in making this type of decisions”.66 
In Dutch parliament, Tilanus drew on Van der Berg in support of his claim that the 
growing unrest over ‘the societal functioning of the physician’ went much deeper than 
annoyances over the working hours of doctors. The growth of medical power, the pol-
itician stated, had brought about new “fundamental questions about the beginning 
and end of life”. And while he did not “want to go as far as Professor Van den Berg in 
his booklet”, Tilanus agreed that “new medical power perhaps requires new medical 
ethics”. This was why he had an official request for the government: to ask the KNMG 
to bring together “a group of physicians and ethicists to study the problem of medical 
power and ethics and to submit a report about this”.67  
The responsible State Secretary Roelof Kruisinga (see chapter 2) reacted positively 
to Tilanus’ request. He agreed the societal functioning of physicians had been subject 
to much debate in recent years—a fact he had been reminded of when reading an arti-
cle by psychiatrist Rudi van den Hoofdakker in 1969 in which the revered public im-
age of the Dutch artsenstand had been identified as the reason why Dutch physicians 
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had no answers for the ethical dilemmas generated by new technologies. Their high 
societal standing, Van den Hoofdakker had argued, had turned physicians into sanc-
timonious know-it-alls: i.e. ‘whatever the doctor says is right’. As students, physicians 
had never learned to think critically, just to behave as members of the artsenstand 
would. In effect, they were left helpless in the face of dilemmas for which their ethics 
booklets did not already provide them with readymade answers. 
Also Van den Hoofdakker had explicitly addressed a lay audience. The artsenstand 
was not solely responsible for the inability of physicians to handle ethical dilemmas, 
the psychiatrist maintained, for the role of know-it-all was a persona which had been 
shoved down physicians’ throat by Dutch society at large for years: 
 
This isolation, this social inertia, this authoritative role of the parental figure is 
forced upon us from all sides. […] Slowly but surely you will be turned into a holy 
cow. They will ask you: and what do you as a physician think of this? And woe be-
tides you, if you say: Me, being a physician, I do not have an opinion about this. I 
know just as little about this as you.68 
 
Hence, the only way for Dutch society to cope with the ethical dilemmas generated by 
new medical technologies was to assume responsibility and take the artsenstand out 
of its social isolation. Medical practice, Van den Hoofdakker stated, was not a neutral 
activity: it was a social practice perpetuating specific religious and ideological beliefs 
about what lives were worth living and which identities worth existing. Consequently, 
medical ethics was not the prerogative of the medical profession alone. On a macro 
level the formulation of moral rights and wrongs in medicine had to be a public con-
versation, while in the doctor’s office the physician and patient had to learn to “talk, 
talk, talk” with each other, to explore the insecurities and doubts of both persons and 
to reach decisions that both parties understood and agreed with. 
The words of Van den Hoofdakker spoke to Kruisinga, the State Secretary said in 
parliament. Across the world, the societal functioning of physicians was changing due 
to the rapid transformations of societies: “Questions that hardly used to be questions, 
now bring unrest and demand constant attention from the government”.69 Hence, the 
State Secretary agreed with Tilanus that the subject of medical ethics had turned into 
something about which politicians could and should speak, which was why Kruisinga 
planned to request the Health Council to develop a report on the societal position of 
physicians, and the role fulfilled therein by medical ethics. 
 Tilanus was pleased with this promise of the State Secretary, although he was a bit 
confused about the sort of policy document that would be written and by whom this 
would be done exactly. He had understood Kruisinga to say that he would request the 
Central Council for Public Health to write a policy report, a choice that the Protestant 
politician found unfortunate. The Central Council had officially been installed in 1958 
as a complimentary body to the Health Council and advised the Dutch government on 
the organization of the national health care system. Relevant players in the arena of 
Dutch public health held a seat in the Central Council: government representatives, 
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the health inspectorates, health insurance agents, the KNMG, etcetera.70 But this was 
exactly why Tilanus was confused. Rethinking the societal position of physicians and 
Dutch medical ethics, the politician put forward, required “qualified scholarship” of 
“professors of medicine, ethics, and possibly social psychology”. This was not the ter-
rain of the Central Council.71 Sure, Kruisinga responded, which was why he had said 
he would contact the Health Council. “I find”, he concluded, “this belongs much more 
with a specific expert committee than with the Central Council”.72 
 
*** 
 
 Merely ten days later, the Health Council brought together a small study group to 
make preparations for “a big committee that will study medical ethics in its broadest 
sense”.73 The group mostly consisted of physicians, but Sporken had been invited as 
well, as had Theo Beemer, a moral theologian from the Catholic University of Nijme-
gen. A year later, this ‘big committee’, titled the Committee Medical Ethics, was offi-
cially installed with the explicit task “to position the physician and patient within the 
social order […] according to the insights that exist and are developed within society, 
so that the government can found policy on this”.74 More specifically, it would inform 
the Dutch government under what circumstances physicians were “ethically allowed 
to put to use the available medical-technical possibilities” (especially in life and death 
situations) and if any additional steps had to be taken to codify these moral precepts 
into criminal law.75 In his request for advice, Kruisinga had asked the Health Council 
to have a “versatile group that carries the trust of the KNMG” investigate these ques-
tions.76 Accordingly, the Committee initially consisted of eight physicians, five jurists, 
a judge, nurse, sociologist, and moral theologian. Later, in the spring of 1973, Heer-
ing, Sporken, and a philosopher joined the committee deliberations as well, to “rein-
force the representation from the side of ethics”.77 Most were from diverse religious-
ideological backgrounds and came from universities across the country. 
Still, despite the explicit decision of Kruisinga to ask an expert-group to rethink 
Dutch medical ethics, some committee members did wonder if their composition re-
ally befitted a committee like theirs. During the first meeting, for instance, participat-
ing psychiatrist and editor of Medisch Contact J.H. van Meurs brought up if patients 
were not underrepresented in the Committee.78 Similarly, when the Committee pre-
pared to discuss euthanasia in newborn babies in 1973, Heering asked whether moth-
ers should be included in the deliberations, as they were “most closely involved with 
the issue”.79 Other members, however, strongly opposed such suggestions. Their work 
was “of a scientific nature”, they objected, and therefore did not include the perspec-
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*** 
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tive of interest groups.80 And when participating jurist Jaap Rang voiced scepticism 
over the ability of the Committee to formulate new medical ethics which would carry 
the support of all people in the Netherlands, vice-chairman and neurosurgeon Boet 
de Lange replied soothingly that “while this Committee does not represent the Dutch 
cultural pattern in every detail, it also does not deviate that much from it”. In other 
words, the expert committee really should be able of formulating “a communis opinio 
that will serve as a benchmark for the Minister to base his policy upon”.81  
What it meant, however, to formulate expert opinions that simultaneously repre-
sented “the Dutch cultural pattern” mostly remained unclear. During its first meet-
ing, the Committee decided to take a topical approach to the formulation of new med-
ical ethics and to tackle those problems that received the most attention in the media 
and politics first. The topic of euthanasia was considered urgent, for instance, and 
would be the subject of the Committee’s first interim-report. Thereafter, the matter of 
“euthanasia of heavily defected newborns” would be tackled. The Committee made a 
list of ethical problems it wished to deal with later, including controversial topics like 
abortion, anticonception, and “test tube babies”. The estimate was that most of these 
topics would take up only limited time, meaning that the Committee would be able to 
move quickly. The ethics of human experimentation, for example, was something the 
Committee did not want to spend more than one meeting on.82 
Reality proved to be more unruly. The development of the first report on euthana-
sia alone took the Committee already over one and a half year. And when it published 
this document in the fall of the 1972, the Committee admitted it had been “difficult, 
yes, even virtually impossible” to formulate ethical norms that would be acceptable to 
the majority of the Dutch people.83 Pointing to recent public upheavals over the per-
missibility of abortions in the country, the report explained that the Netherlands had 
become a pluralist society in recent years. “It used to be possible to speak of a com-
munis opinio among the majority of physicians and other groups of the population on 
this topic”, the report read, “but now this same measure provokes contradictory and 
often strong reactions among various social groups and among doctors themselves”.84 
Hence, although the government had asked the Health Council to formulate ethical 
norms that could be codified into criminal law, the Committee felt that as long as this 
plurality of opinions continued to exist among the Dutch people, it would be wrong 
for any government advisory body to stipulate normative rules. Any state had to avoid 
acting as “a master of morality”, the report concluded, as “the boundaries between 
democratic and dictatorial governance are, after all, fluid”.85 
The Committee Medical Ethics did, however, have a different proposal. In recent 
years, the interim-report read, a trend had been noticeable in Dutch society in which 
the longstanding authority of paternal figures—like “the government, Church, or sci-
entifically formed expert”—had come under attack: “The conviction is gaining ground 
that every individual has enough self-knowledge to decide for himself what is in his 
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own best interest”.86 Thus, instead of codifying potentially oppressive norms of moral 
behaviour into criminal law, the Dutch government could better stipulate “wat a pa-
tient is entitled to demand from a physician” and “to what extent a physician is enti-
tled to meet such demands”.87 A modern medical ethics, the Committee felt, should 
take its starting point in the rights of both patients and physicians. 
 This frame of rights sort of worked for the interim-report on euthanasia. A patient, 
the Committee argued, could demand from a physician to act according to the best of 
his abilities and to respect a patient’s wishes (meaning that active involuntary eutha-
nasia was always forbidden). But a patient could never demand from his physician to 
act against his will (and administer euthanasia), since also a physician had rights.88 
By delegating the question whether euthanasia was desirable to individual patients 
and whether it was permitted to individual doctors, the Committee hoped to avoid 
formulating many normative moral viewpoints itself in its first report. For its second 
report on euthanasia in newborns, however, this procedural approach to ethical deci-
sion-making proved more difficult. Babies, after all, could not know or voice what was 
in their own best interest.89 To solve this problem, some of the participating jurists 
proposed to build the report around the notion of a ‘presumed will’—i.e. “what can be 
assumed the patient would have wanted if he would be able to form his will as a men-
tally normal adult human being”.90 Most members, however, found this approach 
unacceptable. “No physician or ethicist can make head or tail of this juridical fiction”, 
Heering even sneered at one point in dismissal of this suggestion.91 
This, however, left the Committee Medical Ethics with a serious problem. It would 
have to formulate normative ethical rules after all, which was precisely what it had 
tried to avoid with its rights discourse. Over the course of 1973 and 1974, the Com-
mittee did try to reach some sort of agreement on the topic, but the more committee 
members deliberated, the more it became clear they just could not agree on what was 
ethically permissible in euthanasia in newborns. By the fall of 1974, one member sug-
gested that the second interim-report should perhaps contain the caveat stating that 
“the report does represent a communis opinio, but the personal opinions of members 
may deviate on certain points.92 Yet, in order to satisfy all those opinions, more and 
more footnotes and caveats had to be added to the report. The Council Committee 
Medical Ethics, as it turned out, could not form a benchmark for the government to 
base policy on, other than establishing that a carefully selected expert group was un-
able to reach an agreement on ethically sensitive ‘medical’ interventions. 
By the end of 1974, it was clear the Committee would not be asked to develop any 
further policy reports. During their final meeting, the Committee’s chairman reflected 
on how difficult their work had been.93 The committee members had been requested 
to position the physician and patient in modern Dutch society and to think about the 
implications of the growing technological powers for Dutch medical ethics. But three 
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years of deliberations had only brought them two reports on euthanasia (that would 
both be heavily contested in the political arena in the years to come).94 In early 1975, 
the Committee Medical Ethics was disbanded without much publicity. This ‘failure’ 
by no means ended government involvement in the “societal functioning of the physi-
cian in modern society”. Quite the contrary, the 1970s would become a defining dec-
ade for Dutch political initiatives to—as Van den Hoofdakker had framed it—take the 
artsenstand out of its social isolation. However, instead of the psychiatrist’s proposal 
to achieve this with his mantra of “talk, talk, talk”, suggestions increasingly surfaced 
in the Netherlands during the 1970s in favour of “law, law, law”. 
 
The consolidation of a patients’ rights discourse 
 
 In 1972, the Health Council was the first ever advisory body to the Dutch govern-
ment to propose the frame of patients’ rights as a suitable alternative to the tradition-
al conception of the doctor-patient relationship in existing Dutch medical ethics texts. 
The term “patients’ rights” was not new at the time. Already in 1953, for instance, the 
Dutch Senator (and well-known proponent of social medicine) Arie Querido had co-
authored a Declaration of the Rights of the Patient, which was presented that year in 
Amsterdam to the World Health Organization (WHO).95 The code had ten principles, 
such as the right to be seen as a person instead of a complex of organs and symptoms, 
the right to all possible help in overcoming concerns and anxieties, and the right to 
full attention to one’s socio-cultural background and moral-religious attitudes. Yet, 
the WHO had not accepted this Declaration in 1953 and neither had patients’ rights 
gained much traction in Dutch political circles in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 Why the patients’ rights frame did gain political currency in the 1970s is a question 
that cannot easily be answered by pointing to a single sufficient cause. An important 
and obvious context, of course, is the fact that the 1960s had also in the Netherlands 
been a decade of social turbulence in which multiple anti-establishment movements 
emerged. As in other countries, the Dutch counterculture of the Sixties had included 
a rebellion against traditional modes of authority like the Church, state, and expert.96 
The medical profession was not exempt from such attacks. Certainly in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, numerous conflicts erupted in Dutch care facilities over their “pater-
nalistic set-up”—at times resulting in the occupation of buildings by activists (and, in 
one instance, in widely broadcasted police raids).97 Occupiers typically protested the 
hierarchical organisation of these facilities and demanded that residents could influ-
ence their own living conditions and treatment plans. In a democratic and egalitarian 
society, the argument was, everyone should be able to take charge of their own lives. 
Similarly, in 1970, a group of Dutch physicians began the movement ‘kritiese artsen’, 
                                                 
94 Heleen Weyers, Euthanasie. Het proces van rechtsverandering (Amsterdam: AUP, 2004); Kennedy, 
Een weloverwogen dood. 
95 H.L. ‘De rechten van de patiënt’, in Katholiek Artsenblad Vol. 47 (1968), pp. 162-164. 
96 Hans Righart, De eindeloze jaren zestig. Geschiedenis van een generatieconflict (Amsterdam: De 
Arbeiderspers, 1995); James Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig (Am-
sterdam: Boom, 1995). 
97 E.H. Tonkens, Het zelfontplooiingsregime. De actualiteit van Dennendal en de jaren zestig (Amster-
dam: Bakker, 1999). Also: Commissie van advies inzake het democratisch en doelmatig functioneren 
van gesubsidieerde instellingen, Discussie-nota, September 1975 (Rijswijk: Secretariaat, 1975), p. 8. 
· medical ethics in a modern society · 
 · 115 · 
(critical doctors) that identified repressive social structures as the main cause for dis-
ease in civilized society. If physicians truly wanted to help their patients, this group 
argued, they had to overthrow the elitist Dutch health care system.98 
 Yet, that the discourse of patients’ rights would emerge victorious from this turbu-
lent period is not as self-evident as it is sometimes taken to be. In the Netherlands, at 
least, the most vocal social criticism over the set-up of the Dutch health care system 
in these years was predominantly a socialist critique: a conviction that skewed socio-
economic structures and institutional hierarchies were to blame for the suffering of 
patients. Hence, grand plans to right these injustices were not geared so much toward 
the codification of rights for individual patients (a liberal ideal), but toward the reali-
zation of alternative social structures and an improvement of the economic position 
of historically disenfranchised societal groups. In Dutch parliament, in contrast, the 
initial response to the presumed crisis of medical ethics predominantly had been con-
servative. When Tilanus in 1970 called for a reconsideration of Dutch medical ethics, 
for instance, he emphasized that he wanted the artsenstand to get its house in order 
before the growing public unrest about the societal functioning of physicians would 
force the government to step in. For the Protestant politician, governing the ethical 
conduct of medical practitioners in the Netherlands mostly had to be left to the field 
itself—as it had been in the past. As he stated in support of his request: 
 
The physician has to integrate in modern society and make himself familiar with 
the modern thinking of the people. When he fails to do so and when he keeps on 
resisting modern thinking men and the modern and open society, this society will 
try to encapsulate him because it cannot miss him. By isolating himself, he pro-
vokes socialization. I would regret that. I am an opponent of that.99 
  
 Of course, the perception that patients increasingly seemed dissatisfied with main-
stream medical practice did play a central role in the emergence of the Dutch crisis of 
medical ethics during the 1960s. Still, only few commentators on this crisis in the late 
1960s had proposed a patients’ rights frame as the new foundation for medical prac-
tice in a modern society. Sporken, for instance, who probably stressed the inclusion 
of patients’ perspectives most strongly out of all commentators in that period, did not 
write much about patients’ rights. His approach was more discursive. The conception 
of ‘what it means to be human’ (het mensbegrip) in modern medical science, the the-
ologian frequently stated, had come to differ too much from what it had always meant 
in social life. Therefore, to resolve the anxieties people experienced about the growing 
medical powers, these two viewpoints had to be integrated through an ongoing dia-
lectic confrontation with one another. Medical ethics, Sporken maintained, in essence 
was cultural criticism.100 Similarly, Van den Hoofdakker had proclaimed his mantra 
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of “talk, talk, talk” to encourage patients and doctors to express their insecurities and 
doubts and to explore the socio-cultural implications of medicine—not for patients to 
start using their newfound voices to claim rights. Only Van den Berg, really, outright 
stated in the late 1960s that a new Dutch medical ethics should revolve around pa-
tients’ rights to decide on their own lives. In Medische Ethiek en Medische Macht, the 
psychiatrist envisioned a future in which physicians had become instruments for pa-
tients who planned their own medical treatments after full disclosure of all available 
information, if needed with a medical dictionary at hand.101 Yet, Van den Berg’s work 
was also the most controversial in the Netherlands in the early 1970s. 
 
*** 
 
 So why did the Health Council Committee Medical Ethics land on a patients’ rights 
frame as the foundation for modern Dutch medical ethics? One key reason likely was 
the early participation of five jurists and a judge in the Committee (compared to only 
one theologian and sociologist). Already in the first meeting, chairman and jurist Jan 
de Vreeze had declared that “the relation between the rights and duties of the physi-
cian and rights of the patient will be an important point for this Committee”. Not all 
members had immediately agreed. Theologian Beemer, for instance, had proposed to 
take a broader approach: medical ethics was an application of “the general ethics” of 
society, which the Committee had to study first to determine what could be consid-
ered morally right and wrong in medicine. Physician Gerard Dekker, a previous sec-
retary-treasurer of the KNMG, remarked that the existing medical ethics did not deny 
patients’ rights and that the KNMG these days even made it a point to develop moral 
guidelines with medical outsiders. So why would a new medical ethics have to revolve 
around the notion of patients’ rights? Because, De Vreeze replied, medical ethics just 
could no longer be “medico-centric”. “In practice”, jurist C.J. Goudsmit added, “the 
ethical viewpoints of physicians sometimes deviate strongly from patients’ wishes”.102 
New medical ethics had to take these wishes as their starting point. 
 The influence of the five jurists on the Committee Medical Ethics was substantial. 
They prepared discussion papers for committee meetings, participated actively, and 
often reminded the other members that the reports they were preparing would likely 
form the basis for government policy. Their findings therefore had to be translatable 
into administrative and legislative measures. The majority of the Committee accepted 
this legalistic approach to formulating new medical ethics.103 The first interim-report 
stated, for instance, that an intimate connection existed between the domains of med-
ical ethics and law. The first was an application of general moral principles, while the 
second derived its precepts from basic human rights, but both could be traced back to 
generally accepted norms for human interaction. This was why ethical principles, the 
report read, were over time often encoded in laws and treaties.104 Medical ethics, in 
short, could also be debated with a predominantly juridical approach. 
                                                 
101 Van den Berg, Medische Macht en Medische Ethiek, p. 48. 
102 For all: NL-HaNA, 2.15.36, 1374, Minutes Commissie Medische Ethiek, 20 April 1971, pp. 6-7 
103 Van Meurs retired in 1972 because felt the approach of the Committee failed to “solve any funda-
mental problems”. See: NL-HaNA, 2.15.36, 1374, Minutes Commissie Medische Ethiek, 22 June 1972. 
104 Gezondheidsraad, Interim-advies inzake euthanasie, p. 8, p. 15. 
· medical ethics in a modern society · 
 · 117 · 
 In 1973, after Sporken and Heering joined the Committee, this legalistic approach 
to medical ethics came to be questioned more frequently in committee meetings. Nei-
ther theologian was a big fan of principlism, the ethical theory that moral rights and 
wrongs can be deduced from general moral principles which remain stable over time 
(see chapter 6). Their approach to ethics was predominantly situational: moral rights 
and wrongs always had to be induced from a specific context and required conversa-
tion rather than legislation. Although this did not contradict a patients’ rights frame 
(both theologians in fact agreed that patients should be an equal conversation partner 
to their physicians), neither Sporken nor Heering was convinced it should be under-
stood as a foundation for medical ethics in and of itself. Yet, in Dutch policy circles in 
the early 1970s, the input of jurists in discussions over the public governance of med-
ical practice weighted stronger than that of ethicists. In part, they were invited to par-
ticipate more often and in larger numbers because their legal expertise was consid-
ered a sine qua non for formulating policy measures that might alter the legal system. 
Yet, in part, they were also invited to participate more often because they were better 
organised and politically connected than ethicists in this period.105 
All jurists participating in the Committee Medical Ethics, for instance, were mem-
bers of the Dutch Society for Health Law, which had been established in 1968 by the 
upcoming jurist Henk Leenen. Leenen, who had written his doctoral thesis on “fun-
damental social rights and health care”, had come up with the idea after visiting the 
first international conference on medical law in Belgium in 1967. All Dutch jurists 
interested in the regulation of the field of health, he felt, should regularly meet to ex-
change ideas and build a network.106 Notably, only jurists were allowed to become a 
member of the Society. Health law, Leenen argued, had to be understood as a sub-
category of law, not medicine—and health jurists had to use “the definitions and cate-
gories of the law”, which required professional legal training. Hence, while the jurist 
considered it valuable that medical students took notice of the field, it had to be clear 
that the topic could only be studied academically in the faculty of law. Jurists were 
the experts and health law was their terrain, even if they would cooperate closely with 
“experts in the field of executive health care” (i.e. with caregivers).107 
Health law, as envisioned by Leenen, encompassed a variety of terrains. It includ-
ed environmental legislation (as the environment was potentially a threat for health), 
but also the development of the welfare state (to ensure that all citizens had access to 
health care).108 Predominantly, however, the academic field of health law in the Neth-
erlands in the 1970s and 1980s revolved around the codification of patients’ rights. In 
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1973, jurist Jaap Rang was appointed as the first Dutch professor in the field of health 
law—The title of his oration was ‘Patient Law’.109 According to Rang, it was “undenia-
ble that the patient is a key figure in both the ethics and morality of medical practice, 
but when it comes to the translation of this [precept] in terms of legislation, the pa-
tient appears to have been lost”.110 It did not matter whether one checked the first 
(1929) or last (1972) Dutch handbook on ‘the physician and the law’—in neither did 
the patient even make it as an index-entry.111 This had the unfortunate effect, Rang 
argued, that patients were virtually forced to surrender themselves upon entering the 
health care system.112 Hence, the freshly appointed professor stated, it was high time 
that the Dutch government took action and started integrating the rights of patients 
into Dutch health laws. Not as an antithesis to the authority of physicians, but be-
cause such laws primarily had to serve “the persons for whom this care is meant”.113 
Solid health laws had to be synonymous with patients’ rights.114  
Both Leenen and Rang participated in the Health Council Committee Medical Eth-
ics and took up a seat in multiple government advisory bodies in the 1970s and 1980s 
concerned with the revision of the Dutch health care system.115 They were academics, 
but they were also practitioners: both actively wished to influence government policy 
on the terrain of health care. And in the advisory bodies to which they were invited as 
experts on the terrain of health law, both emphasized again and again that the most 
crucial change that had to be brought about in the Netherlands was the overthrow of 
the hierarchical conception of the doctor-patient relationship in the old Dutch medi-
cal ethics tradition through the proper codification of patients’ rights. 
 
*** 
 
 To be sure, not only jurists and ethicists took part in the Health Council Committee 
Medical Ethics. The majority of seats was reserved for physicians, and the composi-
tion of the committee as a whole had to be approved by the KNMG. It would have 
been very well possible, in other words, for the organized Dutch medical community 
to steer the committee deliberations in a different direction from the patients’ rights 
frame that De Vreeze had proposed already in the first committee meeting. Yet, the 
KNMG had a key strategic reason in the early 1970s for supporting a patients’ rights 
approach to medical ethics: it was scared that the increasing public unrest over medi-
cal ethics would otherwise translate in government policy that would curb the thera-
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peutic freedom of Dutch physicians. This concern was not without reason. Tradition-
ally, the Dutch government had taken a hands-off approach in its governance of the 
medical domain. Legislation had mostly served to delimit who was permitted to prac-
tice medicine (and who was not), while the actual content of medical practice—which 
actions were permitted (and which were not)—had largely been left to the field itself. 
Around 1970, however, the Dutch government started to shift gears on this terrain—a 
change that did not go unnoticed in the Dutch medical community. 
A defining moment in this regard was the decision by State Secretary Kruisinga in 
1970 to ask the Health Council if the government had to take steps to codify medical-
ethical principles into criminal law. The KNMG was anxious about this development. 
The Committee Medical Ethics, secretary-jurist Wim van der Mijn (and active mem-
ber of the Dutch Society for Health Law) told the association’s General Assembly in 
1972, was a first sign the government no longer just sought to regulate the precondi-
tions of medical practice in the Netherlands, but to meddle with its content as well.116 
Although the KNMG had ensured that enough experts participated in the Committee 
“who enjoy the confidence of the Association”, political developments in the early 
1970s made the association fear that the Dutch government might just curb therapeu-
tic freedom altogether. An ominous sign, for instance, was that soon after the installa-
tion of the Committee Medical Ethics in 1971, the new government announced that it 
would establish another “committee to advise on legal safeguards for medical inter-
ventions with important psychological, ethical, legal, and social aspects”. This plan 
was proof, Van der Mijn said at the General Assembly of 1972, “that those in political 
circles are willing to go far under pressure of public opinion.117 
To determine the official stance of the KNMG on these political developments, the 
General Assembly of 1972 was organized around the topic of ‘the role of the legisla-
ture in medical practice’. The association’s board itself seemed to accept that medical 
practice would increasingly be regulated by the Dutch government in years to come. 
Most physicians realized, the President stated during his introduction, that their soci-
etal position had changed in recent years. Although it had been common not so long 
ago for physicians to “advocate complete independence with regard to their societal 
functioning”, many now accepted that they operated in institutions and networks that 
were governed by company mores, government regulations, and insurance policies.118 
In addition, Van der Mijn pointed out in his contribution, the growth of medical pow-
ers scared people, making it understandable that “increasingly the desire is expressed 
for others to have a say and for the legislator to regulate”.119 Anno 1972, in short, the 
old political ideal of the artsenstand as a separate class in Dutch society governed by 
its own mores and internal justice system was apparently no longer considered a real-
istic or even desirable option by leaders of the organized Dutch medical community. 
Doctors just no longer worked in solitude, the President stated at the General Assem-
bly, a reality that the medical community had to face head on.120 
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Still, the association’s leadership did continue to have strong reservations about 
what type of government regulations would come to govern Dutch medical practice in 
the future. “Modern thinking about individual and authority”, Van der Mijn said to 
the General Assembly, “moves increasingly towards an appeal on everyone’s personal 
responsibility”. The patient was now understood to be able to make his own medical 
decisions, but surely this held for the physician as well: as long as he was a competent 
practitioner who was willing to account for his actions, no state should seek to regu-
late his behaviour. Instead, it should aim to cultivate the personal responsibility of 
both patient and physician. “Certainly when it concerns ethical problems that allow 
for plural insights”, Van der Mijn added, “this appeal to the personal responsibility of 
the physician will be justified. The legislator then best stands aloof”.121 
That did not mean that it was not advisable for the government to take additional 
measures for the ways in which patients and physicians reached decisions. The codi-
fication of patients’ rights, for instance, Van der Mijn pointed out, might not be such 
a bad thing. After all, despite all this talk of the mondigheid of patients, “most carry 
their suffering more through hope than knowledge. […] They miss the expertise for a 
true dialogue”. Hence, particularly in medical interventions in which much was at 
stake, the legal reassurance of their rights could make patients feel safe again in the 
hands of their caregivers. Vice versa, Van der Mijn continued, it could offer important 
support to physicians: “Not every doctor feels happy with the appeal on his expertise, 
his ethical opinions, his sense of responsibility”.122 Thus, codifying which rights pa-
tients did—and did not—have could help physicians in their interactions with patients 
and provide clarity about their liability in case things went wrong. Finally, by clearly 
regulating procedures of medical decision-making in the Netherlands, Van der Mijn 
suggested, the government could more easily leave alone the actual content of these 
decisions and thus the therapeutic freedom of physicians. “If this would also be the 
opinion of the medical world”, Van der Mijn promised the General Assembly in clos-
ing of his speech, “the legislator will certainly have attention for this”.123 
Not everyone in the Dutch ‘medical world’ shared this opinion. In 1972, in fact, a 
substantial group of physicians had actually separated itself from the KNMG because 
it felt that the medical association had been bargaining away the longstanding Dutch 
medical ethics tradition in recent years. One year earlier, in 1971, the KNMG had pub-
lished new guidelines for induced abortions in unwanted pregnancies in the Nether-
lands. Instead of stipulating univocal ethical norms, the association had stated that 
the decision to cooperate with such procedures should be left to individual physicians 
in consultation with a second practitioner after a careful consideration of the relevant 
factors at play (and that they should always occur in general hospitals or thereto ap-
pointed clinics).124 The KNMG, in short, had published largely procedural guidelines 
for ethical decision-making in abortions. What was more, it had communicated these 
guidelines to the government stating that it was willing to cooperate with legislative 
measures in this direction.125 In reaction to this development, 2200 Dutch physicians 
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had signed a petition pleading the KNMG not to cooperate with the legalization of 
abortions in the Netherlands. And, in 1972, a group of them had started their own 
medical association, titled Nederlands Artsenverbond (Dutch Covenant of Doctors), 
which took ‘respect for human life’ as its unwavering point of departure. “We feel sold 
and betrayed as physicians”, the dissenters wrote of the KNMG in its first publication 
in 1973, “by those of whom it may be expected that they, from the virtue of their posi-
tion, would have been the last ones standing to defend our Hippocratic tradition”.126 
From its establishment onwards, therefore, the Covenant started publishing its own 
medical ethics journal in an urgent attempt to counteract the “ethical derailment” of 
the KNMG—and with that of the entire Dutch medical community.127 
The Covenant was a fairly flourishing medical association in the 1970s and 1980s, 
with over a thousand members and a journal which appeared about four times a year. 
Still, by 1983, the Protestant physician and prominent Covenant-member Gerrit Arie 
Lindeboom had to admit that the association was largely isolated from the rest of the 
medical world.128 It was treated as a quantité négligeable by the KNMG and shunned 
by the Dutch Journal of Medicine and Medisch Contact. In effect, it had hardly any 
influence on mainstream medical-ethical debates. The same held true for Dutch poli-
cy circles. The Covenant hoped to maintain a more hierarchical doctor-patient rela-
tion in the Netherlands governed by strict ethical norms.129 Most politicians and poli-
cy officials, however, took the KNMG as the sole representative of the Dutch medical 
community. And its main representative in these circles, the jurist Wim van der Mijn, 
stated again and again in this period that the Dutch medical community favoured a 
patients’ rights frame in the regulation of the doctor-patient relationship—provided 
that the state left alone the therapeutic freedom of Dutch physicians. 
 
*** 
 
 In May 1973, another government took office in the Netherlands: the Den Uyl cab-
inet, a coalition of five political parties that is often remembered as the most left-wing 
government the Netherlands has ever had. An important policy goal of the Den Uyl-
administration was to replace “vertical relations of dependence and subordination” in 
publically financed institutions with “horizontal relations of consultation and partici-
pation”.130 The underlying ideology of this governance ideal was the idea of the mon-
dige burger (assertive citizen) who sought to make his voice heard in Dutch society 
but who lacked institutional outlets for doing so. By then, also the term mondige pa-
tient had become a commonplace in mainstream Dutch newspapers.131 
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Initially, the term patients’ rights had not formed a big part of this discourse. Solu-
tions were mostly sought not in the legal codification of individual rights but in the 
realization of alternative social structures: citizens had to be made mondig through a 
levelling of social classes and a public school system.132 In May 1975, however, during 
a debate on the reform of the national health care system, member of parliament Dick 
Dees—a representative of the conservative-liberal party VVD that did not take part in 
the Den Uyl-administration—complained that the government hardly had any atten-
tion for the realization of patients’ rights in the Netherlands, even though “the call for 
a better description of the rights and duties of the patient, the call for better legal pro-
tection is getting louder” in the country.133 In support of this statement, Dees pointed 
to the recent development of health law as a “new scientific discipline” in the country, 
the establishment of multiple patient associations in the early 1970s, and the growing 
body of “excellent publications” on the topic, especially those of “Leiden professor of 
health law, Prof. Rang”.134 Dees had decided to file a motion, therefore, requesting the 
government to conduct a study about the “recalibration of patient law”.135 His request 
could count on overwhelming support. On 13 May 1975, the ‘motion-Dees’ was adopt-
ed unanimously by the Dutch House of Representatives. As a member of the Labour 
Party (then the biggest government party) put it: it was crucial for patients’ rights to 
be codified in the Netherlands “in the shortest time possible”.136 
 
The establishment of yet another Committee 
 
 Despite such univocal calls for immediate action in Dutch parliament in May 1975, 
the Den Uyl-administration was in no hurry to implement the motion-Dees. It took 
the government over a year, for instance, to send a first update to Dutch parliament 
(after an inquiry by Dees what had happened to his motion) and by then it could only 
announce that the department of Public Health was making preparations for a com-
mittee that would study the subject of patients’ rights.137 At the department of Public 
Health, in the meanwhile, responsible State Secretary Jo Hendriks could not make up 
his mind about what type of committee should take on this project. Initially, he had 
wanted to establish an independent State Committee that would report directly to the 
government, but after government officials had made all the necessary preparations 
for the installation of this committee, he decided he rather wanted the Central Coun-
cil for Public Health to take the matter into consideration.138  
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This did not fall well with the department. The officials preparing this dossier had 
advised the State Secretary against the involvement of the Central Council. If a State 
Committee would be installed, they felt, the government could participate in the elec-
tion procedure and keep close tabs on the approach that would be taken to patients’ 
rights. The Central Council, in contrast, was an independent advisory body that elect-
ed its own members, who all had “constituents to represent” (i.e. the health insurance 
boards, health inspectorates, KNMG, etcetera).139 What was more, any policy reports 
written by sub-committees of the Central Council would first have to pass through the 
Council’s Committee of Delegates and the main Council itself, with ample opportuni-
ties for original conclusions to be watered down. Yet, despite these objections, Hen-
driks had become adamant by early November 1976 that the Central Council for Pub-
lic Health should take on the study of patients’ rights—a decision for which he did not 
give any justification to the disgruntled government officials (at least not in writing), 
who could start all over again with their preparations. As a result, the Central Council 
only received the request to study the realization of patients’ rights in October 1977—
months after the left-wing Den Uyl administration had fallen.140 
In execution of this request, the President of the Central Council for Public Health 
physician Henri Festen contacted Leenen and Van der Mijn (then still secretary-jurist 
to the KNMG) to see if they would lead a Committee Rights of the Patient as respec-
tively its chairman and vice-chairman.141 The two health jurists accepted and together 
set out together to form a team which could tackle the study of patients’ rights in the 
Netherlands. It was another procedure that provoked extensive internal debate and 
led to considerable delays. In his initial request for advice, State Secretary Hendriks 
had asked for a versatile committee to be established with “adequate representation 
from the side of the patient/client or, put differently, the consumer of health care”.142 
Yet in the first plans of Leenen and Van der Mijn, only two patient-representatives on 
a total of nine committee members had been suggested, with one of these two repre-
senting the Dutch Consumer Association.143 The other suggested committee members 
were mostly jurists or health professionals. The Central Council’s Committee of Dele-
gates—which had to approve these plans—was the first to express dissatisfaction over 
this distribution. One delegate felt that a member of the Diabetes Association really 
should be elected, another that someone from the National Council for Social Welfare 
should be asked to participate as well. Also, was it not a good idea to invite someone 
from “the circles of women associations” to ensure the female sex was represented? 
And perhaps someone from “the group of homophiles” should be included too, given 
the delicate subject-matter of the Leenen-committee.144 
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Van der Mijn, who was also a delegate, protested. The upcoming study concerned 
the rights of patients, he argued, not “the rights of citizens in general”.145 Still, he was 
willing to concede that patients were perhaps somewhat underrepresented in the cur-
rent proposal and that a representative from the women associations and the Nation-
al Council of Social Welfare could be invited (the Association for Housewives eventu-
ally made the final cut). However, when this amended proposal was discussed in the 
Central Council itself, additional protests could be heard. Complaints were voiced 
that no dentist or psychiatrist had been included and that still too few seats were re-
served for patient-representatives. One Council-member representing the Society for 
Outpatient Mental Health Care even argued that a committee about patients’ rights 
should consist solely of patient-representatives, as “in the circles of patient/client-
organisations a widespread belief exists that nothing will change if patients’ rights are 
approached from the perspective of caregivers”.146 
Again, Van der Mijn—who was also a Council-member—protested. This type of ar-
guments really exaggerated the situation, he maintained, and “in no way do justice to 
the serious aim […] to give sufficient voice to all those who clearly represent the in-
terests of the patient”. In addition, “the slightest need” existed “for a report in which 
the rights of the patient are proclaimed for the umpteenth time, as […] no one bene-
fits from rights when they cannot be realized in practice”.147 Most Council members 
agreed with the KNMG-jurist and gave Leenen and Van der Mijn permission to pro-
ceed with the installation of the Committee Rights of the Patient.  
In the months thereafter, however, the Council kept on receiving letters of com-
plaint about the composition of the committee. “According to our interpretation”, the 
Association for Patients’ Interests wrote in, only “three persons in the committee may 
act or speak on behalf of the patient […] in contrast to eight persons who clearly rep-
resent the caregivers”.148 Another letter was sent by the organized paramedical asso-
ciations with the request that also they would be allowed to “contribute either directly 
or indirectly to the work of the Committee”.149 Similar letters followed from organisa-
tions representing retirement homes, “parents around residential schools”, and vol-
unteer organisations for individuals with psychiatric problems. The chairman of the 
Association Equal Rights for all Ways of Healing sent in a letter, asking if their input 
was not desired. After all, the association represented a wide range of healing practic-
es in the Netherlands and had as goal to further the interests of patients both in the 
alternative healing circuit and more in general.150 The trade association Nefarma, in 
the meanwhile, wrote in to state that it hoped also the pharmaceutical industry would 
be permitted to offer its insights on the subject of patients’ rights.151 
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In February 1979, when the Committee Rights of the Patient had just got under-
way, the committee members decided to invite two more patient-representatives, one 
from a national foundation for health education, the other from the Dutch Disability 
Council.152 By June that year, the Committee of Delegates concluded that also people 
with learning disabilities needed addition representation in the Committee.153 It was a 
trend indicative of the difficulties the Central Council experienced in honouring the 
ideal of the mondige patient. Reality was that all sorts of patients existed, many with 
their own needs and interests, so how did one decide who got to talk? And excluding 
a specific patient group from a committee on patients’ rights was like withholding a 
suffragist her right to vote. The entire idea of the Committee, many argued, was that 
patients would finally be treated as mature individuals whose voice would be listened 
to in health care—so they should most certainly have their say in a committee that got 
to set an important standard for the ways in which the doctor-patient relationship 
would be regulated in the Netherlands in the years to come. Any policy measures that 
the Committee Rights of the Patient would propose, the ideal was, should have been 
reached through a process of participative decision-making in which the inclusion of 
patient-representatives would make sure that their perspective was heard and, just as 
important, that the scales of influence would not unfavourably tip in the direction of 
the interests of caregivers. After all, vertical relations of dependence and subordina-
tion had to make way for horizontal relations of consultation and participation on all 
governance levels in health care: from the doctor-patient relationship to the confer-
ence tables of the Central Council Committee Rights of the Patient. 
 
*** 
 
 Between 1980 and 1982, the Committee Rights of the Patient produced five policy 
reports on the realization of patients’ rights in the Netherlands. Four of these reports 
primarily offered policy proposals for the future regulation of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship in the Netherlands. The first outlined the “juridical relation between patient 
and physician”, including legal conditions for informed consent in medical practice. 
The second offered measures for protecting patients’ privacy in health care. The third 
report detailed mediation processes for handling patients’ complaints, and the fourth 
discussed a number of “core provisions for the regulation of the relationship between 
patient and doctor” in terms of a legally binding medical contract.154 
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The Committee took pains not to sketch a dichotomy between patients and physi-
cians in these reports. Already in his inaugural address to the Committee, Festen had 
emphasized that “the development of patients’ rights is not about the creation of an 
antithesis between patient and caregiver”.155 The Committee had to pay as much at-
tention to the rights of physicians as to the rights of patients and, most importantly, 
flesh out how the two could be regulated symbiotically. “A unilateral approach from 
the legal status of the patient”, also the Central Council warned, could very well result 
in “a disruption of the interplay [between patient and doctor], as is already the case in 
the United States” (apparently an undesirable prospect).156 In addition, the Commit-
tee did not just want to focus on rights but also on duties—of both physician and pa-
tient. The latter, for instance, was obliged to pay his bills.157 A number of committee 
members even felt that once patients had agreed to a treatment they also should be 
obliged to keep it up.158 Also, patients should not be permitted to mislead a caregiver, 
since this would inhibit their recovery and disadvantage not only their own wellbeing 
but also that of society in general (as it would suffer the financial costs). As Van der 
Mijn, a strong proponent of this view, put it during a committee meeting: 
 
There can be no such thing as a free consultation. If one assumes the physician 
has the duty to advise the patient to the best of his abilities and according to the 
[current] state of science, it would be disproportionate when the patient would be 
completely free to ignore this advice. In my view, the patient is certainly obliged 
either to follow the advice or to say something of it. Perhaps legal consequences 
should be connected to this (say, in the terms or conditions for funding).159 
 
Leenen counteracted this viewpoint of his vice-chairman. Although the jurist agreed 
that honesty and diligence were clear moral duties of patients, he did not think these 
could be put in a legal framework. And that was their mission, Leenen emphasized, to 
outline the future legal relation of doctors and patients in the Netherlands.160 
 It was a narrow frame the Committee Rights of the Patient had set for itself. In his 
1977 request for advice, still, State Secretary Hendriks had made explicit that the gov-
ernment did not want the Central Council to focus just on the codification of patients’ 
rights, but to reflect on the general mentality in Dutch health care about the position 
of patients and to investigate under what conditions the ideal of the mondige patient 
could be realized in the country. Such conditions, Hendriks had emphasized, “are not 
just juridical”.161 However, in their preparations for the instalment of the Committee, 
Festen, Leenen and Van der Mijn had decided that priority had to be given to “topical 
sub-problems that currently present clear choke points in the daily practice of health 
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care”.162 Thus, the committee would in turn address the patient’s right to information, 
his right to self-determination (to accept or refuse health care), the protection of his 
personal sphere (his privacy), and the handling of his complaints.163 At a later stage, 
much of this translated into the legal relation between the doctor and patient and the 
possible regulation of this relation in terms of a medical contract. 
 This narrow frame also meant that the Committee Rights of the Patient, despite all 
the various patient-groups participating in the deliberations, often functioned rather 
like an expert committee. After all, with such strict delimitations, it was unavoidable 
that juridical expertise was of formative importance to the work done by the Commit-
tee. It also meant the Committee almost religiously avoided using the word ethics. As 
Van der Mijn explained in 1980 during a meeting of the Committee of Delegates in 
response to a delegate’s question whether a paragraph on the duties of a general prac-
titioner should not at least mention some ethical aspects: 
 
Indeed, it used to be that a good physician was identified as he who acts in ac-
cordance with the latest scientific and ethical insights. But since pluralistic views 
with regards to ethics have developed which can exist next to one another, such a 
moral assessment has become much more difficult. These days, a reference to 
ethics is omitted.164 
 
For the secretary-jurist of the KNMG, the idea that a unitary professional ethos regu-
lated the behaviour of every Dutch physician had become an antiquarian notion anno 
1980. Instead, both patient and physician had to look to the legislature for the codifi-
cation of their principal rights and duties—a legislature that in the future was likely to 
draw up separate frameworks for ethically sensitive (medical) practices like abortion 
or euthanasia, but that was to stay clear of legal moralism as it was no master of mo-
rality. In the realm of law, it was better to avoid the pitfall of ethics. 
 In line with this approach, the word ethics was not mentioned a single time in the 
four policy reports mentioned above. Only in the fifth report of the Committee Rights 
of the Patient did the e-word pop up again: a policy document proposing government 
measures for the public oversight of medical experiments with humans in the Nether-
lands. It was an odd report for the Committee; the only one out of five that dealt with 
one specific medical (research) practice and that outlined clear norms for its permis-
sibility. It was also a document which, as will become clear, the Central Council had 
initially not wanted to write, but that nevertheless would go on to become the corner-
stone policy report in the 1980s and 1990s for the realization of a legal framework for 
human experimentation in the Netherlands. Chapter 4 explains why the Committee 
Rights of the Patient had to write this report—and explores why it decided in the early 
1980s to dust off the traditional lingo of ethics to still be of use in the governance of 
medical science in a modern society full of mature citizens. 
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experimenting with human beings 
 
“Societal developments”, the biologist and philosopher Matthijs Visser concluded in 
an October 1979 issue of Medisch Contact, “have made a consumer, also one of health 
packages, more mondig and critical. […] The modern patient wants to know what is 
done with him or her”.1 What else is new, the weary reader at the close of the 1970s 
might have thought. By then, the notion of the mature patient made an appearance in 
journals like Medisch Contact almost every other week, with authors (doctors, jurists, 
philosophers, and others with a claim to a specific type of expertise) stating again and 
again that the modern patient now increasingly sought to make his voice heard and 
no longer just accepted the authority of caregivers. Anno 1979, Dutch experts stood in 
line to profess they now knew the expert’s place in health care. 
 But Visser did have something new to say. Despite all the talk of patients’ rights in 
the Netherlands, he wrote, one key element of this discourse was still wholly neglect-
ed: the rights of human research subjects. Hardly any form of public oversight existed 
for human experimentation in the country, for instance, even though “trust in experts 
has been shaken quite a bit” recently. True, some policy measures had been proposed 
in the past years to strengthen the “internal surveillance” of human research studies, 
including the realization of expert review bodies in Dutch research centres. Yet Visser 
did not think these were appropriate for the governance of a scientific practice in an 
open, egalitarian society. “Expert-thinking”, he argued, “stands in the way of a satis-
factory ethics review of biomedical experiments on humans, as scientific interest usu-
ally prevails above ethical interest”. To keep the biomedical research establishment in 
check, therefore, committees consisting mostly of lay members had to be installed in 
the Netherlands to decide on the permissibility of human experiments. As “only dem-
ocratic decision-making is acceptable”, Visser argued, such committees had to oper-
ate as jury trials, allowing ordinary citizens to participate in the governance of sci-
ence. In the eyes of the biologist-philosopher (and later self-proclaimed bioethicist), 
the realization of patients’ rights would not be complete in the Netherlands if the 
practice of human experimentation was not brought under external control.2 
 
*** 
 
 This chapter examines the policy report written by the Central Council Committee 
Rights of the Patient in the early 1980s on the governance of ‘medical tests upon hu-
man beings’ in the Netherlands. In 1982, it recommended the Dutch government to 
demand that experiments with humans could only take place in the country if a there-
to installed review committee had first given its permission for doing so. These bodies 
had to include at least two “society-representatives” to ensure “seclusion and mystery 
make way for openness and transparency” in a democratic society. 
                                                 
1 M.B.H. Visser, ‘Ethische aspecten van medische experimenten op de mens (I) & (II)’, in Medisch 
Contact Vol. 34 (1979), pp. 1351-1358 & pp. 1386-1390, p. 1352. 
2 All quotes in this paragraph:, p. 1351, p. 1352, p. 1390. 
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 In the 1980s and 1990s, this report by the Central Council of Public Health came to 
function as the cornerstone document for the governance of human experimentation 
in the Netherlands. In virtually all Dutch policy deliberations on the subject, the re-
port was referred back to as the blueprint for an appropriate governance system for 
human research studies and, from its publication onwards, the Central Council report 
was preferred by Dutch politicians over all the Health Council reports that had previ-
ously been published on the subject (see chapters 1 and 2). By the end of the century, 
in fact, it often seemed as if none of the Health Council reports had ever been written 
at all. In Dutch policy circles, the Central Council report had come to function as the 
single most authoritative policy document on human experimentation. 
 But why did the Central Council Committee Rights of the Patient, a working group 
installed to modernize the doctor-patient relationship in the Netherlands, develop a 
policy report on the public governance of human experimentation in the early 1980s? 
And why did someone like the Leiden pharmacologist Erik Noach, who simultaneous-
ly participated in the Health Council committee ‘clinical pharmacology’ (see chapter 
2), take up a seat in the Committee Rights of the Patient? Who else participated and 
why did they recommend that human experiments should be reviewed by committees 
in which at least two “society-representatives” held a seat? Finally, what type of over-
sight function did the Central Council imagine for these committees in the govern-
ance of human experimentation and how did this conception relate to the policy re-
ports which had previously been published by the Health Council? 
 To answer these questions, Section I of this chapter first outlines how, in compari-
son to countries such as the United States and Great Britain, unrest over unethical 
human experimentation only played a minor role in “the backlash against profession-
al society” in the Netherlands in the 1960s and early 1970s. Section II subsequently 
explains how in the late 1970s this unrest suddenly did emerge, resulting in an urgent 
request of the Dutch government to the Central Council for Public Health to include 
the topic of human experimentation in the Committee Rights of the Patient. Sections 
III and IV, finally, study the 1982 Central Council report on the governance of human 
experimentation and make clear that, contrary to the older Health Council reports, 
this new report envisioned research ethics committees to function as tools of external 
control that gave laypeople an opportunity to participate in the governance of medical 
research. Yet, they also show that, like the older Health Council reports, the Central 
Council report intended to protect and promote the conduct of human research in the 
Netherlands. Only this time the project of therapeutic reform went hand in hand with 
a narrative of egalitarian decision-making in a democratic society. 
 
A discernible absence of Dutch concern 
 
 Historians who have investigated the emergence of the patients’ rights movement 
in other countries in the 1960s and 1970s—most notably the United States and Great 
Britain—have often maintained that a series of exposés of unethical human research 
studies in medicine inaugurated the quickly spreading public distrust in the autono-
my of the medical profession in this period. Rothman, for instance, claims in his 1991 
Strangers at the Bedside—in which he famously investigates the transformation of 
the American doctor-patient relationship from the mid-Sixties to the mid-Seventies—
· experimenting with human beings · 
 · 131 · 
that “the story opens in the laboratory, not the examining room”: i.e. the revelation of 
a number of human research scandals in the mid-1960s first “revealed a stark conflict 
between clinical investigators and human subjects, between researchers’ ambitions 
and patients’ well-being”, a perception that almost singlehandedly “undercut an older 
confidence in the exercise of medical discretion”.3 
 The defining moment that caused this pendulum to swing, according to Rothman, 
was a publication by Harvard anaesthesiologist Henry Beecher in the June 1966 issue 
of the renowned New England Journal of Medicine. In this article, titled ‘Ethics and 
Clinical Research’, Beecher discussed 22 clinical research studies that had been pub-
lished in recent years in prominent medical journals, which he believed to be ethically 
questionable.4 His list included studies in which known effective treatments had been 
withheld in favour of placebos; invasive physiological studies with little to no benefit 
for the participating subjects; studies in which patients deliberately had been infected 
with disease; studies in which no informed consent had been obtained. This “roll of 
dishonour” included the now infamous Willowbrook State School study that had been 
running since the late 1950s in which clinical researchers infected disabled children 
with hepatitis to study the period of infectivity of infectious hepatitis.5 It also included 
a study conducted at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in 1962, in which elderly 
patients had been injected with cancer cells without their knowledge.6 The study Bee-
cher himself found most shocking was a clinical trial in which penicillin deliberately 
had been withheld from 109 soldiers with streptococcal infections and which caused 
two soldiers to develop acute rheumatic fever and one acute nephritis.7 
 Beecher was not the first to raise the alarm about unethical clinical research studies 
in the United States in the mid-1960s, but, according to Rothman, the significance of 
his publication was twofold for the emerging patients’ rights discourse in this period. 
First, it argued that unethical research studies were no exception to modern medical 
science. Beecher pressed his 22 anonymized cases had all recently been published in 
“excellent journals” and were just a selection from a much larger pool of questionable 
studies.8 Second, it made clear that mainstream medical researchers did not shy away 
in the post-war era from using human beings as research subjects “who were in one 
sense or another devalued and marginal […] retarded, institutionalized, senile, alco-
holic, or poor, or […] military recruits, cannon fodder in a war against disease”.9 This, 
despite knowledge of the atrocities that had taken place in World War II in the name 
of medical science. “The thought that some would have agreed that deliberate infec-
tion was all right since the subjects were mental defectives”, Beecher said at one point 
of the Willowbrook State School study, “gives me the Nazi shudders”.10 
                                                 
3 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 10. 
4 Beecher, ‘Ethics and Clinical Research’, pp. 1354-1360. 
5 Walter M. Robinson & Brandon T. Unruh, ‘The Hepatitis Experiments at the Willowbrook State 
School’, in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, pp. 80-85. 
6 John D. Arras, ‘The Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case’, in Ibid., pp. 73-79. 
7 D.S. Jones, C. Grady & S.E. Lederer, ‘“Ethics and Clinical Research”—The 50th Anniversary of Bee-
cher’s Bombshell’, in The New England Journal of Medicine Vol. 374 (2016), pp. 2393-2398, p. 2395. 
8 Beecher, ‘Ethics and Clinical Research’. 
9 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 80. 
10 Jones, Grady & Lederer, ‘“Ethics and Clinical Research”’, p. 2396. Original source: Henry K. Bee-
cher papers, 1948-1976. Boston: Harvard Medical Library, Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine. 
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 The admission that mainstream American medical researchers regularly conducted 
experiments on disenfranchised social groups, Rothman states, ensured anno 1966 
that Beecher’s article “quickly became linked to the rights movements that were gain-
ing strength in the 1960s”.11 Studies like the ones that took place in Willowbrook and 
the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital were seen as evidence that weaker members of 
society were easily abused by (medical) elites that violated their rights and used them 
as guinea pigs for their own advancement. In 1972, this perception was further cor-
roborated in the mainstream media by the uncovering of the Tuskegee syphilis study: 
a study by the U.S. Public Health Service in which the progression of untreated syphi-
lis in impoverished African-American men from Tuskegee (Alabama) had been moni-
tored since 1932, even though penicillin had been available as an effective cure for the 
disease since the 1940s and other cures had commonly been used before then. For a 
period of 40 years, these men had been offered free ‘medical care’, hot meals and—so 
as to conduct an autopsy—free burials in return for their participation. Yet, they were 
never told they suffered from syphilis and that actual cures existed for their illness. As 
a result, many of the men died, 40 of their wives contracted the disease, and nineteen 
of their children were born with congenital syphilis.12 
 These and other exposés of unethical human experimentation in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, Rothman writes, fostered a great distrust of the discretionary authority 
of the American medical profession and brought a rights discourse to medicine: i.e. 
the notion of informed consent first gained prominence in the context of the subject-
researcher relationship in the United States, not the doctor-patient relationship.13 In 
addition, Rothman maintains, research scandals contributed to the realization of new 
“mechanisms for collective decision-making” in medicine.14 In 1966, the U.S. Surgeon 
General drew support from Beecher’s article for a memo he had sent out to American 
hospitals and universities a few months earlier, announcing that applications to the 
U.S. Public Health Service for financial support for clinical research studies from then 
on had to “provide prior review of the judgement of the principal investigator or pro-
gram director by a committee of his institutional associates” (i.e. Institutional Review 
Boards).15 In 1974, after the Tuskegee study, this prerequisite was codified into law by 
the passing of the National Research Act.16 This new mechanism of ethics by commit-
tee, Rothman argues, would later spread to the governance of regular medical prac-
tice as well in the United States. Hence, human research scandals played a key role in 
the rise of the American patients’ rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s, including 
the call for more public procedures of medical decision-making. 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 10. 
12 Jones, Bad Blood. The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Free Press, 1981); Susan M. Re-
verby, Examining Tuskegee. The Infamous Syphilis Study and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
13 Ibid., p. 100. See also: Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed 
Consent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
14 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 10. 
15 Stark, Behind Closed Doors, p. 154. Original source: Memo to the Heads of Institutions Conducting 
Research with Public Health Service Grants from the Surgeon General, February 8, 1966, folder 2, 
Ethical, Moral and Legal Aspects, CC, ONIHH, NIH. 
16 Tom. L. Beauchamp, ‘The Belmont Report’, in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, pp. 
149-155; Joan P. Porter & Greg Koski, ‘Regulations for the Protection of Humans in Research in the 
United States’, in Ibid., pp. 156-167. 
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A similar case has often been made for the emergence of a patients’ rights move-
ment in Great Britain in the 1960s. Since the late 1950s, British medical tutor Mau-
rice Pappworth had started writing concerned letters to medical journals he found to 
publish reports of questionable human experiments without much hint of any ethical 
reservations. When journal editors refused to publish Pappworth’s letters, however, 
the medical tutor in 1962 decided to write a piece for a popular British magazine, list-
ing dubious experiments on patients with a call for a “battle to defend the rights of all 
patients against the whims and ambitions of some doctors”.17 In early 1963, historian 
Duncan Wilson writes, this call led to the establishment of the British Patients Asso-
ciation, a high-profile social movement that in the 1960s “regularly challenged medi-
cal paternalism in letters to newspapers and professional journals”.18 Pappworth, in 
the meanwhile, kept on collecting medical research articles mentioning dubious ex-
periments on humans (mostly conducted in Great Britain and the United States) and, 
in 1967, published over 200 of them in a book titled Human Guinea Pigs.19 Again, the 
physician berated the organized medical profession for its unwillingness or inability 
to prevent this type of studies from taking place and called for the active involvement 
of “medical outsiders” to halt these activities. British Parliament had to demand every 
regional hospital board to install a “consultation committee”, seating at least one lay 
member, to review (clinical) research protocols. “The medical profession”, Pappworth 
wrote, “must no longer be allowed to ignore the problems or assert, as they often do, 
that this is a matter to be solved by doctors themselves”.20 
 Pappworth’s call to arms, Wilson emphasizes, did not actually lead to more outsid-
er involvement in or formal regulation of medicine in Great Britain in the late 1960s. 
When British parliament debated Pappworth’s claims in May 1967, for instance, the 
responsible statespersons rejected any form of government involvement with human 
experimentation. Similarly, a year later, when the Patients Association demanded a 
public inquiry into the matter, the Ministry of Health rejected this proposal by stating 
that ethical questions were “for the profession to consider”.21 As a result, Wilson ar-
gues, the governance of clinical research in Great Britain mostly remained a form of 
“club regulation” (internal control) for quite some years to come.22 Still, Pappworth’s 
work marked one of the “earliest and strongest critiques of medicine” in Great Britain 
in the 1960s and, as such, concerns over human research practices contributed signif-
icantly to a larger “backlash against professional society” and a concomitant rise of 
the patients’ rights movement in Great Britain in this period.23 
 
*** 
                                                 
17 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 45. Original source: Maurice H. Pappworth, ‘Human 
Guinea Pigs. A Warning’, in Twentieth Century Vol. 171 (1962-1963), pp. 66-75, p. 75.  
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20 Ibid., p. ix. 
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23 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 44, p. 43. 
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researcher relationship in the United States, not the doctor-patient relationship.13 In 
addition, Rothman maintains, research scandals contributed to the realization of new 
“mechanisms for collective decision-making” in medicine.14 In 1966, the U.S. Surgeon 
General drew support from Beecher’s article for a memo he had sent out to American 
hospitals and universities a few months earlier, announcing that applications to the 
U.S. Public Health Service for financial support for clinical research studies from then 
on had to “provide prior review of the judgement of the principal investigator or pro-
gram director by a committee of his institutional associates” (i.e. Institutional Review 
Boards).15 In 1974, after the Tuskegee study, this prerequisite was codified into law by 
the passing of the National Research Act.16 This new mechanism of ethics by commit-
tee, Rothman argues, would later spread to the governance of regular medical prac-
tice as well in the United States. Hence, human research scandals played a key role in 
the rise of the American patients’ rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s, including 
the call for more public procedures of medical decision-making. 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 10. 
12 Jones, Bad Blood. The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment (New York: Free Press, 1981); Susan M. Re-
verby, Examining Tuskegee. The Infamous Syphilis Study and its Legacy (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
13 Ibid., p. 100. See also: Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A History and Theory of Informed 
Consent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
14 Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside, p. 10. 
15 Stark, Behind Closed Doors, p. 154. Original source: Memo to the Heads of Institutions Conducting 
Research with Public Health Service Grants from the Surgeon General, February 8, 1966, folder 2, 
Ethical, Moral and Legal Aspects, CC, ONIHH, NIH. 
16 Tom. L. Beauchamp, ‘The Belmont Report’, in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, pp. 
149-155; Joan P. Porter & Greg Koski, ‘Regulations for the Protection of Humans in Research in the 
United States’, in Ibid., pp. 156-167. 
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A similar case has often been made for the emergence of a patients’ rights move-
ment in Great Britain in the 1960s. Since the late 1950s, British medical tutor Mau-
rice Pappworth had started writing concerned letters to medical journals he found to 
publish reports of questionable human experiments without much hint of any ethical 
reservations. When journal editors refused to publish Pappworth’s letters, however, 
the medical tutor in 1962 decided to write a piece for a popular British magazine, list-
ing dubious experiments on patients with a call for a “battle to defend the rights of all 
patients against the whims and ambitions of some doctors”.17 In early 1963, historian 
Duncan Wilson writes, this call led to the establishment of the British Patients Asso-
ciation, a high-profile social movement that in the 1960s “regularly challenged medi-
cal paternalism in letters to newspapers and professional journals”.18 Pappworth, in 
the meanwhile, kept on collecting medical research articles mentioning dubious ex-
periments on humans (mostly conducted in Great Britain and the United States) and, 
in 1967, published over 200 of them in a book titled Human Guinea Pigs.19 Again, the 
physician berated the organized medical profession for its unwillingness or inability 
to prevent this type of studies from taking place and called for the active involvement 
of “medical outsiders” to halt these activities. British Parliament had to demand every 
regional hospital board to install a “consultation committee”, seating at least one lay 
member, to review (clinical) research protocols. “The medical profession”, Pappworth 
wrote, “must no longer be allowed to ignore the problems or assert, as they often do, 
that this is a matter to be solved by doctors themselves”.20 
 Pappworth’s call to arms, Wilson emphasizes, did not actually lead to more outsid-
er involvement in or formal regulation of medicine in Great Britain in the late 1960s. 
When British parliament debated Pappworth’s claims in May 1967, for instance, the 
responsible statespersons rejected any form of government involvement with human 
experimentation. Similarly, a year later, when the Patients Association demanded a 
public inquiry into the matter, the Ministry of Health rejected this proposal by stating 
that ethical questions were “for the profession to consider”.21 As a result, Wilson ar-
gues, the governance of clinical research in Great Britain mostly remained a form of 
“club regulation” (internal control) for quite some years to come.22 Still, Pappworth’s 
work marked one of the “earliest and strongest critiques of medicine” in Great Britain 
in the 1960s and, as such, concerns over human research practices contributed signif-
icantly to a larger “backlash against professional society” and a concomitant rise of 
the patients’ rights movement in Great Britain in this period.23 
 
*** 
                                                 
17 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 45. Original source: Maurice H. Pappworth, ‘Human 
Guinea Pigs. A Warning’, in Twentieth Century Vol. 171 (1962-1963), pp. 66-75, p. 75.  
18 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 45. See also: Hazelgrove, ‘The Old Faith and the new 
Science’; A. Mold, ‘Patient Groups and the Construction of the Patient-Consumer in Britain. An His-
torical Overview’, in Journal of Social Policy Vol. 39 (2010), pp. 505-521. 
19 Maurice H. Pappworth, Human Guinea Pigs. Experiments on Man (London: Routledge, 1967). 
20 Ibid., p. ix. 
21 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 48. 
22 In making this claim, Wilson joins scholars like Laura Stark and Adam Hedgecoe to argue that the 
origins of neither IRBs in the United States nor RECs in Great Britain can be explained simply by 
pointing to the outbreak of research scandals. See the introductory chapter of this PhD-thesis. 
23 Wilson, The making of British bioethics, p. 44, p. 43. 
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 How was this in the Netherlands? Contrary to the United States and Great Britain, 
only little public unrest over human experimentation could be detected in the country 
in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the 1950s, still, antivivisectionists had at times made 
headlines with claims of unethical experiments on vulnerable patients that would be 
conducted in Dutch hospitals and clinics. In 1953, this even led to the instalment of a 
Health Council committee to investigate the governance of ‘tests upon human beings’ 
(see chapter 1). In the 1960s, however, such claims of experimental misconduct grew 
smaller rather than larger in the Netherlands. Sporadically, Dutch media did report 
incidents, but at no time did these result in prolonged public unrest.  
 In 1966, for instance, newspapers reported that pharmaceutical company Philips-
Duphar had tested anti-flu tablets on residents of an ‘insane clinic’ in Eindhoven: 250 
out of 750 patients (as well as a few staff members) had been given these tablets in-
stead of their yearly anti-flu vaccination to compare for their immunity.24 This caused 
a stir. In the liberal newspaper Algemeen Dagblad, Senator Arie Querido (co-author 
to the Declaration of the Rights of the Patient of 1953, see chapter 3) strongly con-
demned the tests: whether or not the pills turned out to be harmless, a principal line 
had been crossed by conducting experiments on “the mentally disturbed”. “Even if it 
is just sugar water”, Querido was quoted to say, “the other end is the gas chamber”.25 
In parliament, the Senator requested the government to forbid all human experimen-
tation in state-supervised facilities in the Netherlands. Despite this uproar, however, 
the matter was easily settled by an admission of the responsible State Secretary that 
such practices indeed should not take place in the Netherlands, a reminder he prom-
ised to convey to the Superintendent for Mental Health and the KNMG.26 Afterwards, 
Dutch newspapers did not keep the scandal alive for much longer. It was one of the 
few Dutch human research ‘scandals’ recorded in the 1960s. 
 Also foreign research scandals occasionally made Dutch news in this period. Papp-
worth’s Human Guinea Pigs, for instance, received widespread news coverage in the 
Netherlands in 1967.27 Similarly, when the British physician claimed during a radio 
interview in 1971 that uninformed and terminally ill patients were commonly used as 
test animals “not only in America but also in England”, he could once again count on 
a significant amount of Dutch media attention.28 In 1972, also the Tuskegee syphilis 
                                                 
24 See: ‘Anti-griepmiddel op krankzinnigen beproefd’, in De Waarheid, Saturday 17 September 1966, 
front page; ‘Directeur psychiatrische instelling: ‘Patiënten geen proefkonijn’, in De Waarheid, Tuesday 
20 September 1966, p. 2; ‘Proeven op verpleegden. Prof. Querido: van toestemming kan geen sprake 
zijn’, in Leeuwarder Courant, Saturday 17 September 1966, p. 7. 
25 ‘Nieuw anti-griep preparaat toegepast in psychiatrische inrichting’, in Algemeen Dagblad, Monday 
19 September 1966, p. 4. 
26 Aanhangsel Eerste Kamer 1966-1967, nr. 19, p. 39. 
27 ‘Boek van specialist veroorzaakt storm. Engelse zieken werden als proefkonijnen gebruikt’, in 
Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, Thursday 18 May 1967, front page; ‘Ernstige beschuldigingen Britse 
arts. Experimenten op onwetende patiënten. Binnenkort vragen in Lagerhuis’, in De Waarheid, 
Thursday 18 May 1967, p. 2; Dr. Maurice Pappworth: In Engeland en VS experimenten op patiënten’, 
in Leeuwarder Courant, Thursday 18 May 1967, front page; ‘Opwinding in Engeland. Proeven op 
mensen in ziekenhuizen. Onderzoek regering gevraagd’, in De Tijd, Friday 19 May 1967, p. 9. 
28 ‘Bekende Londense arts onthult: Britse zieken zijn vaak ‘proefkonijn’, in De Telegraaf, Tuesday 12 
October 1971, p. 9; ‘Arts beschuldigt: Britse ‘fonds’-patiënten als proefkonijnen’, in Het Vrije Volk, 
Monday 11 October 1971, front page; ‘Schandaal in Engeland en VS. Fondspatiënten als proefkonij-
nen. Experimenten met kernstraling’, in De Tijd, Monday 11 October 1971, p. 5; ‘Britten bang voor rol 
van proefkonijn’, in Limburgsch dagblad, Tuesday 12 October 1971, p. 3; ‘Brit blind na experiment in 
ziekenhuis’, in De Telegraaf, Wednesday 13 October 1971, p. 9. 
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study made headlines (although this was nothing compared to the storm of indigna-
tion which the study provoked in the United States).29 However, when news of these 
scandals broke in the Netherlands, they were discussed as foreign problems by Dutch 
media and did not translate—at least in writing—into any heightened awareness that 
unethical human experimentation in medicine might present a significant problem 
for the position of patients ‘at home’ as well. Similarly, none of these foreign scandals 
resulted in parliamentary questions or debate in the Netherlands. 
 Likewise, in the emergence of a crisis of medical ethics in Dutch medical circles in 
the 1960s (see chapter 3), concerns over unethical human experimentation in medi-
cine only played a minor role. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, still, prominent phy-
sicians like internist Cornelis Douwe de Langen (see chapter 1), internist Gerrit Arie 
Lindeboom (see chapter 3), and surgeon Ite Boerema had warned that the number of 
questionable clinical research studies recorded in international medical journals was 
increasing rapidly, a development that gave rise to grave concern.30 Boerema, in fact, 
claimed already in 1961 that these articles were a sign that medical professions were 
no longer capable of regulating the conduct of ‘their’ physicians.31 Yet, these Dutch 
commentators had pointed largely to the United States in their concerns over human 
experimentation: American physicians no longer knew right from wrong, American 
patients were in danger, American medical ethics was failing. When in the late 1960s 
a similar sense of crisis emerged about Dutch medical ethics, different concerns took 
centre stage: new technologies raised questions about life and death, while changing 
social bonds demanded a new approach to the doctor-patient relationship. In medical 
journals and mainstream media alike, interventions like abortion, artificial insemina-
tion, and euthanasia dominated—not human experimentation.32 
 In the early 1970s, Dutch proponents of a patients’ rights approach to the govern-
ance of medicine did occasionally start to focus their attention on human experimen-
tation. In 1970, for instance, health jurist Jaap Rang (see chapter 3) wrote a lengthy 
treatise on human experimentation and the Dutch criminal law system for the book-
let Recent medisch ethisch denken II in which he discussed a number of questionable 
medical experiments involving human beings that had taken place recently in France, 
                                                 
29 ‘Onthulling na experiment van 40 jaar. Amerikaanse negers waren proefkonijnen voor syfilisonder-
zoek’, in Leeuwarder Courant, Wednesday 26 July 1972, p. 6; ‘Rumoer om experiment met negers’, in 
Nederlands Dagblad, Thursday 27 July 1972, p. 3; ‘Syfilislijders als proefkonijn. Medisch schandaal in 
VS’, in De Tijd, Wednesday 26 July 1972, front page; ‘Proefkonijnen…’, in Limburgsch Dagblad, 
Thursday 27 july 1972, p. 3. Beecher’s accusations seem to have been hardly mentioned in Dutch 
newspapers at all. The only article this author could find was: ‘Patiënten gebruikt als proefkonijnen’, in 
Limburgsch Dagblad, Friday 17 June 1966, p. 3. 
30 De Langen, ‘Proeven op mensen en de verschuiving van te stellen normen’; G.A. Lindeboom, Ge-
neeskundige Proeven op mensen. Referaat voor de negendertigste wetenschappelijke samenkomst op 3 
juli 1957 (Assen: G.F. Hummelen’s Boekhandel en Eletrische Drukkerij N.V., 1957); Boerema, ‘De 
Keerzijde van de Vooruitgang in de Geneeskunde’. 
31 ‘Felle conclusie van Prof. Boerema. Moderne maatschappij wordt ‘gekkenhuis’. Ernstig verval medi-
sche stand’, in De Telegraaf, Saturday 8 April 1961, p. 9; ‘Prof.dr. I. Boerema. Menselijke geest groei-
de niet mee met materiële vooruitgang. Medische ethiek ernstig bedreigd’, in Nieuwsblad van het 
Noorden, Saturday 8 April 1961, p. 6;‘Prof. Boerema op natuur- en geneeskundig kongres: Materieel-
medische vooruitgang niet met een morele teruggang betalen’, in Leeuwarder Courant, Friday 7 April 
1961, p. 13. 
32 Likewise, when the government asked the Health Council to reconsider the societal position of the 
physician in 1970, tests upon human beings was a topic the Committee did not want to spend more than 
one meeting on (see chapter 3). 
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study made headlines (although this was nothing compared to the storm of indigna-
tion which the study provoked in the United States).29 However, when news of these 
scandals broke in the Netherlands, they were discussed as foreign problems by Dutch 
media and did not translate—at least in writing—into any heightened awareness that 
unethical human experimentation in medicine might present a significant problem 
for the position of patients ‘at home’ as well. Similarly, none of these foreign scandals 
resulted in parliamentary questions or debate in the Netherlands. 
 Likewise, in the emergence of a crisis of medical ethics in Dutch medical circles in 
the 1960s (see chapter 3), concerns over unethical human experimentation in medi-
cine only played a minor role. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, still, prominent phy-
sicians like internist Cornelis Douwe de Langen (see chapter 1), internist Gerrit Arie 
Lindeboom (see chapter 3), and surgeon Ite Boerema had warned that the number of 
questionable clinical research studies recorded in international medical journals was 
increasing rapidly, a development that gave rise to grave concern.30 Boerema, in fact, 
claimed already in 1961 that these articles were a sign that medical professions were 
no longer capable of regulating the conduct of ‘their’ physicians.31 Yet, these Dutch 
commentators had pointed largely to the United States in their concerns over human 
experimentation: American physicians no longer knew right from wrong, American 
patients were in danger, American medical ethics was failing. When in the late 1960s 
a similar sense of crisis emerged about Dutch medical ethics, different concerns took 
centre stage: new technologies raised questions about life and death, while changing 
social bonds demanded a new approach to the doctor-patient relationship. In medical 
journals and mainstream media alike, interventions like abortion, artificial insemina-
tion, and euthanasia dominated—not human experimentation.32 
 In the early 1970s, Dutch proponents of a patients’ rights approach to the govern-
ance of medicine did occasionally start to focus their attention on human experimen-
tation. In 1970, for instance, health jurist Jaap Rang (see chapter 3) wrote a lengthy 
treatise on human experimentation and the Dutch criminal law system for the book-
let Recent medisch ethisch denken II in which he discussed a number of questionable 
medical experiments involving human beings that had taken place recently in France, 
                                                 
29 ‘Onthulling na experiment van 40 jaar. Amerikaanse negers waren proefkonijnen voor syfilisonder-
zoek’, in Leeuwarder Courant, Wednesday 26 July 1972, p. 6; ‘Rumoer om experiment met negers’, in 
Nederlands Dagblad, Thursday 27 July 1972, p. 3; ‘Syfilislijders als proefkonijn. Medisch schandaal in 
VS’, in De Tijd, Wednesday 26 July 1972, front page; ‘Proefkonijnen…’, in Limburgsch Dagblad, 
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Keerzijde van de Vooruitgang in de Geneeskunde’. 
31 ‘Felle conclusie van Prof. Boerema. Moderne maatschappij wordt ‘gekkenhuis’. Ernstig verval medi-
sche stand’, in De Telegraaf, Saturday 8 April 1961, p. 9; ‘Prof.dr. I. Boerema. Menselijke geest groei-
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one meeting on (see chapter 3). 
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Italy and the United States (Rang mentioned Beecher and the Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital study), and emphasized that a research subject’s informed consent was also 
in the Netherlands a sine qua non for the legal permissibility of human research stud-
ies (even if this condition was not codified by Dutch law).33 A few years later, in June 
1975, health jurist Henk Leenen (see chapter 3) wrote two articles for Medisch Con-
tact, in which also he brought up Beecher and the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 
study and emphasized the absolute precondition of a subject’s informed consent.34 In 
addition, Leenen recommended the installation of review committees in Dutch hospi-
tals and research centres to decide on the permissibility of medical experiments with 
humans that reported to a national council in which “at least the professional organi-
zations, hospitals, medical faculties, independent scientific practitioners, and jurists” 
took up a seat.35 In the United States, Leenen wrote in defence of this suggestion, a 
similar oversight system already existed for human experimentation. 
 In Dutch parliament, Leenen’s articles inspired a number of parliament members 
to ask the government why exactly no regulatory system for human experimentation 
still existed in the Netherlands.36 The responsible State Secretary of Public Health Jo 
Hendriks replied soothingly. The current disciplinary laws offered medical examiners 
boards the option to take repressive action if needed, the State Inspectorate for Public 
Health could keep an eye on things, and pharmaceutical products that were used for 
experimental use first had to be registered with the country’s Medicines Evaluation 
Board. What was more, “the possibility of being held liable in civil courts for any pos-
sible damages in the treatment of patients (resulting from experimentation) will sure-
ly prevent irresponsible experiments”.37 There was no need to worry, in other words. 
Nonetheless, since the House of Representatives had recently adopted a motion that 
requested the government to recalibrate Dutch patient law (see chapter 3), Hendriks 
promised to ensure that the Council that would execute this study would also take the 
position of patients in experimental treatments into account.38 
 Indeed, when Hendriks finally contacted the Central Council for Public Health in 
1977 to take up the study of patients’ rights in the Netherlands, the request for advice 
contained a sentence stating that also “the position of the patient in medical research 
and in teaching situations (demonstrations) may deserve consideration”, a statement 
which in itself makes clear that, toward the late 1970s, the governance of human ex-
perimentation was still not considered a matter of immediate concern in Dutch polit-
ical circles.39 In any case, it did not make the list of topical choke points drafted by 
                                                 
33 Jacob F. Rang, ‘Medisch experiment op de mens en strafrecht’, in Recent medisch ethisch denken II, 
pp. 33-87. See also: C.P. Sporken, ‘Ethische reflexies. Experimenten met de mens’, in Katholieke Ge-
zondheidszorg Vol. 37 (1968), pp. 190-194. 
34 H.J.J. Leenen, ‘Juridische aspecten van medische experimenten op de mens (I) & (II)’, in Medisch 
Contact Vol. 30 (1975), pp. 746-750 & pp. 753-767. 
35 Ibid., p. 767. 
36 Aanhangsel van de Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1974-1975, nr. 1690, p. 1307. 
37 Ibid., p. 1307. 
38 None of the politicians present in this exchange seemed to remember that parliament member Henk 
Vonhoff had already asked the government in 1968 how it sought to guarantee the rights of patients 
participating in clinical research, which had led the government to request a Health Council report on 
the regulation of clinical drug research—a report that had still not been published (see chapter 2). 
39 NL-HaNA, Centr. Raad Volksgezondheid, 2.27.16, 803, Adviesaanvrage inzake patiëntenrecht, 26 
oktober 1977. Italics added. 
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Festen, Leenen, and Van der Mijn in early 1978 (see chapter 3), which the Committee 
Rights of the Patient absolutely had to discuss. Hence, also the author of the two arti-
cles which had provoked Dutch parliament to ask questions about the governance of 
human experimentation in 1975 did not consider the matter so urgent in early 1978 to 
make it part of a committee on the realization of patients’ rights. In the Netherlands, 
no one really seemed to worry about human experimentation. 
 
The effect of two atypical research scandals 
 
 This all changed in the spring of 1978. On the morning of Thursday 20 April 1978, 
Dutch newspapers had big news to report: Leiden University would have appointed 
criminologist Wouter Buikhuisen—an employee of the Ministry of Justice—as Profes-
sor of Criminology and Penology and offered him a dowry of 250.000 guilders “from 
public funds” to conduct scientific research into the “biological characteristics of the 
delinquent”.40 With this money, the papers reported, Buikhuisen was planning to hire 
a neurobiologist, a psycho-physiologist, and an endocrinologist to study the role of 
the nervous system in criminal behaviour. It was news that led to a great public out-
cry in the Netherlands. “Views from the nineteenth century threaten to return”, one 
newspaper headlined, “Buikhuisen wants to conduct brain research on prisoners”.41 
Even though the criminologist made a public statement two days later that he had no 
wish to deny the social determinants of criminal behaviour and that he had no plans 
whatsoever to start putting electrodes in people’s brains (as “innocent measurements 
of the heart, urine, wrist, and a little blood may already provide many clues about the 
influence that certain bodily substances have on behaviour”), it was the comparison 
with the nineteenth-century Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso and his infamous 
theory of criminal atavism that stuck in the Dutch media.42 
 In the influential left-wing magazine Vrij Nederland, well-known linguist and lit-
erary critic Hugo Brandt Corstius soon started up a weekly column dedicated to tack-
ling Buikhuisen’s ideas.43 In these columns, Corstius repeatedly argued that Buikhui-
sen was not only a perverted scientist—a Nazi ideologist, in fact—but also an incredi-
                                                 
40 See, for example: F. Gongrijp, ‘Eis van nieuwe hoogleraar in Leiden: Hersenonderzoek bij delin-
quenten’, in De Telegraaf, Thursday 20 April 1978, p. 3; ‘Volgens reclasseringsblad KRI: Dr. R. Buik-
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1978, p. 9; ‘Eis voor aanvaarden hoogleraarschap in Leiden. Criminoloog dr. Buikhuisen wil onder-
zoek hersenen misdadigers’, in Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, Thursday 20 April 1978, p. 3. 
41 ‘Opvattingen uit de negentiende eeuw dreigen terug te keren. Buikhuisen wil hersenonderzoek bij 
gevangenen’, in De Waarheid, Thursday 20 April 1978, front page. 
42 The theory that criminals can be identified through inborn degenerative traits like a sloping forehead 
or excessively long arms. M.E. Chavennes, ‘Criminologie met Buikhuisen: terug om beter te springen’, 
in NRC, Saturday 22 April 1978. See also: ‘Dr. W. Buikhuisen: ‘Geen sprake van hersenonderzoek bij 
delinquenten’, in Nederlands Dagblad, Friday 21 April 1978, p.5. For the comparison with Lombroso, 
see: K. Wiese, ‘Buikhuisen volhardt in gevaarlijke denkfouten’, in Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, 
Tuesday 10 October 1978, p. 4; ‘Plannen Buikhuisen oude wijn in nieuwe zakken’, in Leeuwarder 
Courant, Saturday 27 June 1 981; ‘Omstreden geleerde vertrekt’, in Limburgsch Dagblad, Thursday 2 
March 1989, p. 5. See also: W. Dekker, De affaire Buikhuisen: het ontstaan en de achtergronden rond-
om zijn biosociale onderzoek (Doctoraalscriptie Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2009).  
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stupid and evil). P. Grijs, Buikhuisen, dom én slecht (Amsterdam: Vrij Nederland, 1978). Hugo Brandt 
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Italy and the United States (Rang mentioned Beecher and the Jewish Chronic Disease 
Hospital study), and emphasized that a research subject’s informed consent was also 
in the Netherlands a sine qua non for the legal permissibility of human research stud-
ies (even if this condition was not codified by Dutch law).33 A few years later, in June 
1975, health jurist Henk Leenen (see chapter 3) wrote two articles for Medisch Con-
tact, in which also he brought up Beecher and the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital 
study and emphasized the absolute precondition of a subject’s informed consent.34 In 
addition, Leenen recommended the installation of review committees in Dutch hospi-
tals and research centres to decide on the permissibility of medical experiments with 
humans that reported to a national council in which “at least the professional organi-
zations, hospitals, medical faculties, independent scientific practitioners, and jurists” 
took up a seat.35 In the United States, Leenen wrote in defence of this suggestion, a 
similar oversight system already existed for human experimentation. 
 In Dutch parliament, Leenen’s articles inspired a number of parliament members 
to ask the government why exactly no regulatory system for human experimentation 
still existed in the Netherlands.36 The responsible State Secretary of Public Health Jo 
Hendriks replied soothingly. The current disciplinary laws offered medical examiners 
boards the option to take repressive action if needed, the State Inspectorate for Public 
Health could keep an eye on things, and pharmaceutical products that were used for 
experimental use first had to be registered with the country’s Medicines Evaluation 
Board. What was more, “the possibility of being held liable in civil courts for any pos-
sible damages in the treatment of patients (resulting from experimentation) will sure-
ly prevent irresponsible experiments”.37 There was no need to worry, in other words. 
Nonetheless, since the House of Representatives had recently adopted a motion that 
requested the government to recalibrate Dutch patient law (see chapter 3), Hendriks 
promised to ensure that the Council that would execute this study would also take the 
position of patients in experimental treatments into account.38 
 Indeed, when Hendriks finally contacted the Central Council for Public Health in 
1977 to take up the study of patients’ rights in the Netherlands, the request for advice 
contained a sentence stating that also “the position of the patient in medical research 
and in teaching situations (demonstrations) may deserve consideration”, a statement 
which in itself makes clear that, toward the late 1970s, the governance of human ex-
perimentation was still not considered a matter of immediate concern in Dutch polit-
ical circles.39 In any case, it did not make the list of topical choke points drafted by 
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35 Ibid., p. 767. 
36 Aanhangsel van de Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1974-1975, nr. 1690, p. 1307. 
37 Ibid., p. 1307. 
38 None of the politicians present in this exchange seemed to remember that parliament member Henk 
Vonhoff had already asked the government in 1968 how it sought to guarantee the rights of patients 
participating in clinical research, which had led the government to request a Health Council report on 
the regulation of clinical drug research—a report that had still not been published (see chapter 2). 
39 NL-HaNA, Centr. Raad Volksgezondheid, 2.27.16, 803, Adviesaanvrage inzake patiëntenrecht, 26 
oktober 1977. Italics added. 
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Festen, Leenen, and Van der Mijn in early 1978 (see chapter 3), which the Committee 
Rights of the Patient absolutely had to discuss. Hence, also the author of the two arti-
cles which had provoked Dutch parliament to ask questions about the governance of 
human experimentation in 1975 did not consider the matter so urgent in early 1978 to 
make it part of a committee on the realization of patients’ rights. In the Netherlands, 
no one really seemed to worry about human experimentation. 
 
The effect of two atypical research scandals 
 
 This all changed in the spring of 1978. On the morning of Thursday 20 April 1978, 
Dutch newspapers had big news to report: Leiden University would have appointed 
criminologist Wouter Buikhuisen—an employee of the Ministry of Justice—as Profes-
sor of Criminology and Penology and offered him a dowry of 250.000 guilders “from 
public funds” to conduct scientific research into the “biological characteristics of the 
delinquent”.40 With this money, the papers reported, Buikhuisen was planning to hire 
a neurobiologist, a psycho-physiologist, and an endocrinologist to study the role of 
the nervous system in criminal behaviour. It was news that led to a great public out-
cry in the Netherlands. “Views from the nineteenth century threaten to return”, one 
newspaper headlined, “Buikhuisen wants to conduct brain research on prisoners”.41 
Even though the criminologist made a public statement two days later that he had no 
wish to deny the social determinants of criminal behaviour and that he had no plans 
whatsoever to start putting electrodes in people’s brains (as “innocent measurements 
of the heart, urine, wrist, and a little blood may already provide many clues about the 
influence that certain bodily substances have on behaviour”), it was the comparison 
with the nineteenth-century Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso and his infamous 
theory of criminal atavism that stuck in the Dutch media.42 
 In the influential left-wing magazine Vrij Nederland, well-known linguist and lit-
erary critic Hugo Brandt Corstius soon started up a weekly column dedicated to tack-
ling Buikhuisen’s ideas.43 In these columns, Corstius repeatedly argued that Buikhui-
sen was not only a perverted scientist—a Nazi ideologist, in fact—but also an incredi-
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bly stupid one who neither understood basic philosophy of science nor seemed aware 
of the latest publications in his own field of study. In the national Dutch law journal, 
in the meanwhile, well-known legal sociologist Kees Schuyt strongly questioned “the 
scientific merit of the proposed study” and proposed that Buikhuisen should postpose 
his research until he had managed actually to formulate a sound theoretical model for 
his biosocial hunches. As they stood, his plans had too many methodological short-
comings to yield any reliable scientific results.44 Buikhuisen would confuse statistical 
concepts of normality with juridical ones, for instance, and ignore the difficulties of 
correlating physiological characteristics with social and criminal ones.45 These short-
comings, Schuyt felt, presented a serious moral problem demanding “increased civil 
vigilance” in the Netherlands—especially among academics: 
 
You could argue that we need not be so afraid of research that cannot yield valid 
results anyway. But the opposite is true. If someone uses so little philosophy of 
science in his work, the danger is much greater. Because apparently arguments 
do not always count and politicians do not know that much about philosophy of 
science or other philosophies. In the end, philosophy of science is also ethics for 
researchers, to which they should hold themselves.46 
  
In addition, Schuyt maintained that the way in which Buikhuisen planned to obtain 
his data was morally problematic. Would he conduct tests on prisoners, for instance, 
and, if so, how would he make sure they were in a position to give their free consent? 
Also, was his plan to use medical data for criminological or juridical ends not in con-
flict with the reigning medical ethics? And what about the privacy of individuals? Did 
the Dutch state not have an obligation to protect its citizens from this sort of scientific 
‘progress’? The answers to these questions concerned society at large, Schuyt argued, 
and therefore demanded both public and political debate.47 
 Indeed, in Dutch parliament Buikhuisen’s appointment in Leiden soon became the 
subject of an emergency debate that was requested by the Dutch communist party.48 
On 26 April 1978, 131 members of the Dutch House of Representatives came together 
for an exceptional event in Dutch parliamentary history: in the afternoon of that day, 
                                                 
44 C.J.M. Schuyt, ‘Veroordeeld tot criminaliteit? Een wetenschapsfilosofische en ethische reflectie op 
het voorgenomen onderzoek van Prof.dr. W. Buikhuisen’, in Nederlands Juristenblad Vol. 53 (1978), 
pp. 389-399, p. 395. For Buikhuisen’s reply, see: W. Buikhuisen, ‘De wetenschapsfilosofische en ethi-
sche ‘reflexen’ van Prof. Schuyt’, in Nederlandse Juristenblad Vol. 54 (1978), pp. 477-481. In that 
same edition, see: J.J.M. van Dijk, ‘Weerwoord op het requisitoir van Schuyt’, pp. 481-487. 
45 For example, Schuyt wrote, behaviour , “[Buikhuisen] will have to prove why one person with a 
bulky male body becomes a recidivist and the other an excellent rugby player”. See: Schuyt, ‘Veroor-
deeld tot criminaliteit?’, p. 393. 
46 C.J.M. Schuyt, ‘Reflex of reflectie. Antwoord aan Buikhuisen enVan Dijk’, in Nederlands Juristen-
blad Vol. 53 (1978), pp. 517-526, p. 526. For the reply of Buikhuisen, see: W. Buikhuisen, ‘De ‘regres-
sies’ van Schuyt’, in Nederlands Juristenblad Vol. 53 (1978), pp. 526-530. 
47 Schuyt, ‘Veroordeeld tot criminaliteit?’, pp. 396-397. Schuyt recommended Jay Katz’s famous 1972 
book Experimentation with human beings as an “excellent guide” for these discussions. The physician 
and Yale Law School professor Jay Katz played a defining role in the fledgling bioethics movement in 
the United States in the 1970s and served on the federal inquiry into the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. See: 
J. Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972). 
48 See: ‘Door CPN’er Wolff: Interpellatie over onderzoek dr. Buikhuisen’, in Nieuwsblad van het 
Noorden, Friday 21 April 1978, p. 2; ‘Joop Wolff interpelleert’, in De Waarheid, Friday 21 April 1978, 
front page. 
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both the Minister of Education and Sciences and the Minister of Justice were sum-
moned to parliament to defend the appointment of a single professor at a Dutch uni-
versity.49 Political concern varied per party, but most politicians voiced deep concern 
about Buikhuisen’s plans to do biosocial research on criminal behaviour. A member 
of the Christian-democratic party emphasized it was essential that human kind would 
not become subordinate to science and technology.50 Representatives of the smaller 
progressive parties wanted the government to promise that weak members of society 
would not be abused by the scientific elites and underscored the similarities between 
Buikhuisen’s plans and the prevailing scientific ideologies in Hitler’s Third Reich.51 A 
member of the Labour Party, in the meanwhile, claimed that since Buikhuisen’s prof-
essoriate was supported with public funds, Dutch parliament could hold the govern-
ment responsible for his actions. So, how did the Ministers plan to supervise Buikhui-
sen’s research and which policy measures were they taking to safeguard the voluntary 
consent of imprisoned research subjects in the Netherlands? 
 Also Dick Dees, member of parliament for the conservative-liberal party VVD (see 
chapter 3), was allotted time to speak. Moving away from Buikhuisen, Dees wished to 
direct attention toward “questions of a more general nature”: the autonomy of Dutch 
universities, the freedom of scientific research and, crucially, the regulation of human 
experimentation in the Netherlands. With regard to the first two domains, the liberal 
politician argued, a government had to practice caution. With regard to the third do-
main, however, things were different. After all, Dees stated, it was very well conceiva-
ble that a researcher, “driven by a desire to solve his problems”, might cross the limits 
of what was tolerable. Yet what was the government now actively doing to protect the 
rights of research subjects in the Netherlands? There was the Health Council advice 
from 1955, Dees noted, and questions had been asked in parliament in 1975 about the 
articles by Leenen. But as far as Dees could see, neither initiative had led to any direct 
action from the Dutch government. What had happened, for example, to the promises 
of State Secretary Hendriks in 1975? Could the Minister of Education and the Minis-
ter of Justice perhaps clarify what had come of his plan to make human experimenta-
tion part of a study into the rights of patients in the Netherlands?52 
 In his address, Minister of Education and Sciences Arie Pais (a VVD-member) em-
phasized that this type of broad parliamentary discussion on the relation between 
science and society was a great initiative. After all, the subject under investigation did 
not so much concern the appointment of a single professor, but pertained to “the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil” and the fruits society may reasonably pick from it.53 It 
was important to recall from time to time that “a societal frame exists for academia” 
and that scientists could not just hide away in their ivory towers without accounting 
for their actions to Dutch society. Pais had to agree with party-member Dees, howev-
                                                 
49 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1977-1978 26 april 1978, pp. 2199-2218. 
50 Ibid., p. 2208. 
51 Ibid., pp. 2205-2213. Some politicians also lauded Buikhuisen. The representative of the progressive 
liberal party D66, for instance, called Buikhuisen an excellent researcher and spoke critically of “those 
so-called structuralists […] who believe that, when the structure of society changes, criminal behaviour 
will disappear naturally”. A member of the orthodox Calvinist party SGP felt that Buikhuisen’s ideas 
were like a breath of fresh air in an era in which everything had to be caused by societal injustice. 
52 All quotes in this paragraph: Ibid., p. 2207. 
53 Ibid., p. 2214. 
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er, that a government should practice restraint in interfering with academic freedom. 
The not so distant past had shown, after all, what could happen if “a state believes it 
can misuse the practice of science for its own purposes”.54 He had no intention, there-
fore, to interfere with the appointment of Buikhuisen in Leiden. Nonetheless, his col-
league for the Ministry of Justice, the Christian-democrat Job de Ruiter, could affirm 
that the Dutch government was willing to promote a study into the realization of legal 
safeguards for the protection of human research subjects. In fact, as far as he knew, 
the study mentioned by Hendriks in 1975 had been running for a while now. Hence, 
De Ruiter would request his colleague from the department of Public Health to give 
Dutch parliament an update of this ongoing study.55 
 The Minister of Justice would soon find out, however, that the Committee Rights 
of the Patient had not yet gathered even once (see chapter 3) and had no plans to 
write a report on the governance of human experimentation. Still, Dutch parliament 
kept on firing questions at him in the months thereafter about the measures he was 
taking to handle “professor Buikhuisen and his plans”.56 In October 1978, therefore, 
De Ruiter announced that he had asked the new State Secretary of Public Health Els 
Veder Smit to send a pressing request to the Central Council of Public Health to make 
‘tests upon human beings’ a priority in the Committee Rights of the Patient.57 In the 
meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice would issue an interim-arrangement to protect 
prisoners from undue experimentation, an emergency regulation that went into effect 
in June 1980 and prevented Buikhuisen from doing his study.58 Hence, due to a sin-
gle criminologist, the Dutch government in 1978 suddenly got serious about the gov-
ernance of human research—not because he had actually conducted any questionable 
experiments, but because too many people felt he had questionable ideas. 
  
*** 
 
 In December 1978, political pressure mounted even more when a second research 
scandal came to light. On Wednesday 13 December, national newspaper De Telegraaf 
reported that the Inspectorate of Mental Welfare in Noord-Brabant was investigating 
“circulating rumours that 640 mentally retarded patients have been exposed for years 
to irresponsible and medically unnecessary diagnostic procedures in the context of 
scientific research”.59 It based these claims on an article published five days earlier in 
a regional newspaper which mentioned that in Brabant nursing home Huize Assisië—
a facility run by friars—the general practitioner on duty was accused of having carried 
out all sorts of dubious tests on patients, including craniometry (measurements of the 
skull) and pneumoencephalography (an invasive procedure in which the cerebrospi-
nal fluid around the brain is drained by a lumbar puncture to provide a more defined 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 2215. 
55 Ibid., p. 2218. 
56 Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1978-1979, kamerstuknummer 15300-VI, onder-nummer 12, p. 2. 
57 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1978-1979 18 oktober 1978, p. 584. 
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structure of the brain on a roentgen scan).60 Soon, newspapers also reported that an 
abdominal surgery and castrations had taken place at the nursing home, all without a 
clear medical indication and all by the same general practitioner, who lacked the pro-
fessional qualifications for doing so and who did not have the appropriate equipment 
needed for these operations at his disposal in Huize Assisië.61 
 In Dutch parliament, politicians put pressure on State Secretary of Public Health 
Els Veder Smit by firing a series of pressing questions at her. What was true of the 
rumours surfacing in the Dutch media? What immediate actions was the government 
taking? When would the investigations of the Inspectorate be finished? Quite a few 
members of parliament directly linked the events at Huize Assisië to Buikhuisen: they 
were further proof that the weaker members of Dutch society needed dire protection 
from the overly eager hands of experimenting scientists.62 Veder Smit, however, had 
few answers to these questions, as she herself was awaiting the Inspectorate’s report. 
This report came in on 30 January 1979. Only a censured version was sent to Dutch 
parliament, which was obliged to treat it confidentially.63 
 Between 1969 and 1973, the Inspectorate noted, the general practitioner on duty in 
Huize Assisië had conducted a pneumoencephalography approximately 180 times, at 
least four times under narcosis.64 In addition, between 1965 and 1978, 1447 roentgen 
photos of the skull had been taken—the majority from pupils, but also a few from 
volunteers, and 23 from “students from a remote primary school” without permission 
of their parents.65 In seventeen cases, small drill holes in the skull had been detected. 
Eleven of these could be explained as older lobotomies conducted by a neurosurgeon 
in a specialized clinic, but for the other six no satisfactory explanation was available.66 
Also, in 1972 one stomach and two testicular operations had been carried out. None 
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er, that a government should practice restraint in interfering with academic freedom. 
The not so distant past had shown, after all, what could happen if “a state believes it 
can misuse the practice of science for its own purposes”.54 He had no intention, there-
fore, to interfere with the appointment of Buikhuisen in Leiden. Nonetheless, his col-
league for the Ministry of Justice, the Christian-democrat Job de Ruiter, could affirm 
that the Dutch government was willing to promote a study into the realization of legal 
safeguards for the protection of human research subjects. In fact, as far as he knew, 
the study mentioned by Hendriks in 1975 had been running for a while now. Hence, 
De Ruiter would request his colleague from the department of Public Health to give 
Dutch parliament an update of this ongoing study.55 
 The Minister of Justice would soon find out, however, that the Committee Rights 
of the Patient had not yet gathered even once (see chapter 3) and had no plans to 
write a report on the governance of human experimentation. Still, Dutch parliament 
kept on firing questions at him in the months thereafter about the measures he was 
taking to handle “professor Buikhuisen and his plans”.56 In October 1978, therefore, 
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meanwhile, the Ministry of Justice would issue an interim-arrangement to protect 
prisoners from undue experimentation, an emergency regulation that went into effect 
in June 1980 and prevented Buikhuisen from doing his study.58 Hence, due to a sin-
gle criminologist, the Dutch government in 1978 suddenly got serious about the gov-
ernance of human research—not because he had actually conducted any questionable 
experiments, but because too many people felt he had questionable ideas. 
  
*** 
 
 In December 1978, political pressure mounted even more when a second research 
scandal came to light. On Wednesday 13 December, national newspaper De Telegraaf 
reported that the Inspectorate of Mental Welfare in Noord-Brabant was investigating 
“circulating rumours that 640 mentally retarded patients have been exposed for years 
to irresponsible and medically unnecessary diagnostic procedures in the context of 
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a regional newspaper which mentioned that in Brabant nursing home Huize Assisië—
a facility run by friars—the general practitioner on duty was accused of having carried 
out all sorts of dubious tests on patients, including craniometry (measurements of the 
skull) and pneumoencephalography (an invasive procedure in which the cerebrospi-
nal fluid around the brain is drained by a lumbar puncture to provide a more defined 
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structure of the brain on a roentgen scan).60 Soon, newspapers also reported that an 
abdominal surgery and castrations had taken place at the nursing home, all without a 
clear medical indication and all by the same general practitioner, who lacked the pro-
fessional qualifications for doing so and who did not have the appropriate equipment 
needed for these operations at his disposal in Huize Assisië.61 
 In Dutch parliament, politicians put pressure on State Secretary of Public Health 
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were further proof that the weaker members of Dutch society needed dire protection 
from the overly eager hands of experimenting scientists.62 Veder Smit, however, had 
few answers to these questions, as she herself was awaiting the Inspectorate’s report. 
This report came in on 30 January 1979. Only a censured version was sent to Dutch 
parliament, which was obliged to treat it confidentially.63 
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of these had taken place on the basis of a clear medical indication, in “an appropriate 
and suitable space” or in the presence of an anaesthetist or qualified surgeon. Auxilia-
ry staff had assisted, but they had lacked the proper experience for doing so.67 Finally, 
in the early 1970s the general practitioner had performed insulin shock therapy (a 
highly invasive and at the time already outmoded procedure) on three pupils without 
keeping track of their progress and without prior experience in doing so. No proper 
medical indication had existed for them.68 
 In the report sent to Dutch parliament, no information was provided as to why the 
general practitioner had taken all these tests. In one of the two confidential interim-
reports of the Inspectorate, however, it was noted that a friar who had frequently as-
sisted the general practitioner had during an interview made mention of “pseudosci-
entific theories” which could only be proven with radiographic measurements of the 
skull.69 In addition, in a medical file of one of the pupils of Huize Assisië, the Inspec-
torate had found calculations of a so-called “organicity-coefficient”, a concept about 
which the assisting friar had published in Huize Assisië’s in-house journal that served 
to establish the relation between the shape of the skull, the composition of the brain, 
and human behaviour more generally.70 In fact, the scandal would initially have come 
to light because the friar had enthusiastically tried to get a local newspaper to publish 
about their ideas—He was proud of their scientific work.71 
 In early January 1979, the assisting friar announced his resignation to go and live 
at a neighbouring congregate.72 Both the general practitioner and medical-director of 
Huize Assisië, however, had to appear before a disciplinary court. In September 1980, 
they were fined 10.000 guilders each—at the time the highest financial punishment 
possible in the Netherlands. The court could have taken away their license to practice 
medicine, but had decided against this because no permanent damage had been done 
to the pupils of Huize Assisië and because the defendants had already suffered great 
immaterial disadvantages from the widespread media attention which the case had 
generated. In addition, the court had taken into account that the general practitioner 
had worked as a missionary physician in Nigeria before he started his appointment at 
Huize Assisië and was therefore used to “operating independently”.73 
 This verdict meant that the general practitioner was allowed to resume his practice 
at Huize Assisië, an outcome that caused a great public outcry. On Thursday 18 Sep-
tember, Utrecht neurosurgeon Henk Verbiest stated in De Telegraaf that “the verdict 
of the disciplinary tribunal is utterly unacceptable” and violated “an elementary sense 
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of justice”.74 This discontent was reinforced by the fact that the respective rulings had 
been published as confidential documents. The general public had only been able to 
take notice of them because of a press release issued by Huize Assisië itself.75 It made 
Verbiest suspicious. In January 1979, the neurosurgeon had himself been contacted 
by the Inspectorate for Mental Welfare to investigate the six instances in which drill 
holes had been found without a satisfactory accompanying explanation.76 However, 
when Verbiest had contacted the Inspectorate with multiple “urgent questions” and a 
request for further information, he had never heard anything back. This led the neu-
rosurgeon to wonder how the other evidence underlying the disciplinary verdict had 
been collected. Had the Inspectorate really got down to the bottom of the case or had 
it tried to sweep more serious offenses under the carpet? In any case, the verdict was 
proof for Verbiest—and he was quoted as such in De Telegraaf—that the medical dis-
ciplinary system no longer functioned properly in the Netherlands.77 
 The events at Huize Assisië were not right away linked to the governance of human 
experimentation in the Netherlands. The general practitioner was portrayed in Dutch 
media as an out-of-control cowboy who had operated in Assisië as he had grown used 
to during his time “in the jungle”.78 Although his behaviour was strongly condemned, 
he was framed as an exception who was in no way representative for Dutch medicine 
more generally. In early 1979, however, Huize Assisië became part of a two-piece arti-
cle in Medisch Contact by biologist-philosopher Matthijs Visser on the governance of 
clinical experimentation in the Netherlands. What had occurred at Assisië, also Visser 
affirmed, should be understood as an awful exception. It did not represent the way in 
which physicians generally conducted experiments with patients in the Netherlands. 
Still, the biologist continued, that did not mean there was no reason for concern. To 
prove his point, Visser had collected 45 articles from the Dutch Journal of Medicine 
to show that also in the Netherlands medical researchers were not careful enough in 
experimenting on patients. The articles did not always specify if the informed consent 
of patients had been obtained and if they did, not enough information always had 
been provided. Worse, some articles mentioned non-therapeutic studies (i.e. studies 
unlikely to have direct benefit for participating patients) with substantial risk, which 
made it questionable if they should have been conducted at all.79 
 To ameliorate this situation, Visser argued, the government had to take charge of 
the oversight of medical experiments on human beings in the Netherlands. The biolo-
gist noted that some forms of ‘internal control’ had been proposed for the governance 
of human experimentation in recent years, but these, he maintained, were inadequate 
for the governance of such a sensitive scientific practice. By virtue of their profession-
al disposition, medical researchers were unable to reach unbiased ethical decisions—
their interest in the progress of scientific research prevented them from “fully appre-
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ciating the rights of the research subject”.80 Hence, laypeople had to take on this role. 
People with no affiliation to medical research, after all, were “best able to impartially 
represent the public opinion on the admissibility of experiments”.81 “If we truly want 
to democratize health care, including biomedical research, and to protect the right to 
mental and bodily integrity of all patients and test subjects involved”, Visser wrote in 
conclusion, “some things will have to be regulated by law”.82 Human experimentation 
in the Netherlands had to be brought under external control. 
 In one of the next issues of Medisch Contact, the editor in chief of the Dutch Jour-
nal of Medicine responded indignantly to Visser’s piece. “It is interesting to note how 
more and more non-physicians concern themselves with the actions of physicians to 
check if they are ethical”, the editor started off delicately. Really, he very much appre-
ciated the enthusiasm, and all this under the banner of protecting the integrity of the 
patient. However, the editor continued angrily, as “Dr. Visser violates the integrity of 
at least 45 Dutch physicians, he is morally obligated to not just leave it at such gratui-
tous allegations, but to justify himself properly and understandably”.83 So perhaps 
the biologist could be so kind to help the Dutch Journal of Medicine out and identify 
these “sins against ethics” he had detected in its pages. For the “unsuspecting medical 
reader” just could not find them, although—the editor concluded cynically—this was 
probably because “physicians are blind to their own mistakes”.84 
 Also other physicians and biomedical researchers wrote in.85 Most notably, Dirk 
van Bekkum responded, who was considered an authority on the subject. Trained as a 
physician and a biochemist, Van Bekkum had been director of the Radiobiological 
Institute of the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) since 
1960. Under his leadership, the institute had made key international contributions in 
the 1960s and 1970s to radiobiology, experimental leukaemia research, bone marrow 
transplantation, and stem cell research—and by the end of the 1970s, the radiobiolo-
gist had gained international renown as a leading medical scientist.86 What was more, 
in 1969, Van Bekkum had established a Foundation for the Biosciences and Society 
together with Prince Claus of the Netherlands, husband of Queen Beatrix. Their goal 
was to familiarize a broad audience with new developments in the biomedical scienc-
es and to consider their ethical and social aspects. In this capacity, he had authored 
multiple short texts in the 1970s on the ethics of clinical research.87 
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 In his reply to Visser in Medisch Contact, Van Bekkum remarked that as a result of 
“the emancipation from patient to client” in recent years, people had increasingly 
started to argue that medical research had to be brought under public control. They 
were typically people, Van Bekkum noted, with “no personal experience in the field of 
medical research” who “carry on a theoretical discussion and try to realize regulation 
with the aid of foreign inspiration and information”.88 However, these people tended 
to forget or be oblivious to one crucial thing: contrary to the United States and Great 
Britain, hardly any medical experiments with humans took place in the Netherlands, 
as it very much remained an underdeveloped field. The radiobiologist therefore called 
on all actual medical researchers to start speaking out on the governance of human 
experimentation and to help realize a workable system of oversight. If not, a danger 
existed that a field that was only just beginning to blossom in the Netherlands unduly 
would be nipped in the bud due to overbearing concerns of medical outsiders. This, 
Van Bekkum warned, would ultimately be to the detriment of Dutch health care itself. 
The radiobiologist very much was a therapeutic reformer (see chapter 2). 
 In Dutch parliament, however, Visser’s article was received with more enthusiasm. 
In May 1980, during a parliamentary debate on the possible amendment of the Dutch 
constitution, the biologist’s arguments were used by politicians to advocate the integ-
rity—or inviolability—of the human body to be a fundamental right of Dutch citizens. 
“Visser shows”, one parliament member stated, “that the introduction of new diag-
nostic and treatment methods has been neglected in the Netherlands, also compared 
to other countries”.89 It was a perspective which could count on overwhelming politi-
cal support in the Netherlands at the close of the 1970s. In 1976, still, the proposal to 
codify the inviolability of the human body in the Dutch constitution had been repudi-
ated on the grounds that full inviolability was an unrealisable goal and would as such 
undermine the strength of a constitutional right.90 By 1979, however, politicians from 
across the political spectrum pointed towards Buikhuisen and Huize Assisië to under-
score the crucial importance of the constitutional codification of physical inviolabil-
ity.91 On June 25, the amendment was adopted unanimously by the Dutch House of 
Representatives.92 And whatever the Central Council Committee Rights of the Patient 
was working on, it had to make human experimentation a priority now. 
 
The new function of research ethics committees 
 
 In August 1978, in the aftermath of the Buikhuisen-affair, the Central Council dis-
cussed the urgent request of State Secretary Veder-Smit to make the governance of 
‘medical tests upon human beings’ part of the Committee Rights of the Patient. It was 
not very enthusiastic about the idea. The President of the Health Council, who was a 
delegate of the Central Council, remarked that his advisory body already had the sub-
ject in study (see chapter 2), while a participating jurist argued it was unreasonable to 
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ciating the rights of the research subject”.80 Hence, laypeople had to take on this role. 
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ask Leenen et al. to study the governance of human experimentation in full: a round-
ed investigation of the topic required them to consider more elements than only the 
rights of patients in research situations (like, for example, the need for such research 
in the Netherlands) and the Committee Rights of the Patient had not been installed 
for this purpose. The delegates strongly recommended the Committee, therefore, only 
to write a report stating the rights of patients in medical experimentation and to leave 
its governance for another occasion and advisory body to consider.93 
 In January 1979, also Leenen decided that if the Committee Rights of the Patients 
had to write a report on the subject of ‘medical tests upon human beings’, a separate 
working group had to be installed for this task. The topic was too specific and would 
take the Committee itself too much time and work.94 The jurist N. de Jong, a member 
of the Committee Rights of the Patient, was willing to chair this working group.95 He 
was joined by four other Committee members: an internist representing the KNMG, a 
medical inspector, a member of the National Hospital Council, and a representative 
of a patient organization who had recently published a book on patient law that dealt 
among other things with the governance of human experimentation.96 In addition, a 
number of people that did not take part in the Committee Rights of the Patient partic-
ipated. In addition to two nurses, the Utrecht paediatrician Wim Wolters was invited, 
who was at the time busy organising a conference on “the possibilities and limitations 
of medical experiments with humans”.97 The Leiden pharmacologist Erik Noach took 
part, who had earlier chaired the Health Council ‘clinical drug research’ and who still 
participated in the Health Council committee ‘clinical pharmacology’ (see chapter 2). 
Finally, two TNO-employees were asked to take up a seat: Theo Gerritsen, a biochem-
ist who had chaired an American IRB in the 1970s and who was currently developing 
guidelines for human research at TNO (see chapter 5); and Dick van Bekkum, head of 
its Radiobiological Institute and an authority on clinical research. 
 Hence, the decision of Leenen to install a separate working group for the develop-
ment of a policy report on the governance of medical tests upon human beings meant 
that, contrary to the main Committee Rights of the Patient itself, only one patient-
representative took part in the deliberations of the working group, which lasted from 
May 1979 to May 1981. In fact, with the exception of jurist De Jong (who took part in 
the Committee Rights of the Patient to represent the Dutch Health Insurance Funds), 
all working group members were health care providers. Yet, if this disproportionate 
composition might have worried advocates of the Dutch patients’ rights movement, 
the conclusions of the working group in its final report likely surprised them: in 1982, 
the Central Council recommended a regulatory regime for human experimentation to 
the Dutch government that was more strict than any of the Health Council reports 
which had ever been written on the topic. From its first page onwards, the report put 
the rights and protection of human research subjects centre stage. 
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 First of all, the Central Council report made much more elaborate demands on the 
informed consent of research subjects than any of the older Health Council reports. 
In 1971, for instance, the committee ‘clinical drug research’ had stated that the explic-
it permission of research subjects was “generally” required: non-therapeutic studies 
could never take place without subjects’ informed consent, yet clinical trials could as 
long as patients had given permission “as is common in normal medical treatments” 
(see chapter 2). In 1982, in contrast, the working group ‘medical tests upon human 
beings’ stated that no researcher was ever allowed to conduct medical experiments 
with humans without having first acquired their informed consent. Even more, it em-
phasized that research subjects were always entitled to revoke their permission and to 
submit complaints if they felt that they had not been treated properly.98 Also, experi-
ments with humans could only take place if a research protocol lived up to “reasona-
ble standards” regarding the objectives and execution of the proposed study, which 
included the duty for researchers to ensure an experiment had a positive risk/benefit-
ratio with only limited discomfort for subjects (both physically and mental), that it 
honoured subjects’ privacy and personal integrity, and that in case a research subject 
was also a patient, the refusal to participate would not negatively affect his or her 
treatment plans.99 Finally, individuals who found themselves in “a dependent posi-
tion” could never participate in experiments, unless these were geared directly toward 
the “special situation in which these persons find themselves”, and then only if these 
could absolutely not be held without their participation.100 
 Secondly, the 1982 Central Council report underscored emphatically that the prac-
tice of human experimentation had to be regulated by law. It referred multiple times 
to the articles of Rang, Leenen, and Visser on the topic and admitted that “although 
patient law is now establishing a place for itself in health care, the rights of sick and 
healthy research subjects in the biomedical and behavioural sciences are still hardly 
ever discussed”.101 The working group’s justification for the need for public regulation 
was twofold. One, it argued that the nature of medical experimentation was such that 
the wellbeing of research subjects could potentially come into conflict with a success-
ful outcome of the research study, meaning that legal warrants were needed to pro-
tect the interests of research subjects. Two, it suggested that all biomedical research-
ers had to be held publicly accountable out of principle. The report cited Visser’s arti-
cle from Medisch Contact multiple times, including statements like “biomedical re-
search cannot escape the ever-increasing call for more societal influence on scientific 
research” and “the times have passed that a researcher could autonomously define his 
own field of research”.102 The report also wrote that “progress of medical science can-
not shield itself from social scrutiny and seclusion and mystery have to make way for 
openness and transparency”.103 In a modern democratic society, the suggestion was, a 
practice like human experimentation principally required public control. 
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 Thirdly, following these conclusions, the 1982 Central Council report proposed to 
restrain the individual autonomy of biomedical researchers much more than any of 
the Health Council reports had ever done. The latter of these three had suggested that 
after a researcher had notified a central authority of his resolution to conduct a medi-
cal experiment involving human beings he could immediately start with the execution 
of his study (if this authority suspected something to be wrong, it could then request 
the Dutch Medical Inspection to halt the study). Instead, the Central Council argued 
that researchers should only be permitted to start their study if a thereto appointed 
authority had given its seal of approval. The difference with the older Health Council 
reports, according to the working group, was that the former were based on a ‘yes, if’-
premise, while its own work was built around a ‘no, unless’-principle.104 Less Delphic, 
the working group meant that the decision to start a human research study could not 
be left to individual researchers. To safeguard “the personal integrity, wellbeing, and 
rights of the research subject”, the 1982 report read, the Dutch government had to 
ensure that human experimentation could only take place in the Netherlands after a 
thereto appointed authority had first given its permission for doing so. What was 
more, this authority also had to be empowered to do follow-up checks to inspect if 
researchers stuck to the protocols they had submitted for review. If not, it should be 
authorized to halt studies mid-way.105 To protect human research subjects from any 
wrongdoings, the message was, constant vigilance was required. 
 This type of oversight, the working group maintained in its 1982 report, could best 
be realized by establishing “independent local or regional review committees” which 
would be tasked to assess the permissibility of research protocols “with due regard for 
prevailing views and norms and this both scientifically and ethically”.106 These bodies 
had to be overseen by one national council that would register all approved research 
protocols (to prevent unnecessary duplications of research studies), document devel-
opments in thinking about human experimentation, and direct the local and regional 
committees to review studies in a more or less uniform manner. In addition, it could 
check whether the local and regional committees operated as they were supposed to 
and, if needed, function as an appeal body for research studies that were declined by 
a local or regional committee.107 Finally, this central authority would publish a report 
about her activities each year that would explain developments on the terrain of med-
ical-biological research “in a manner that is understandable for a larger audience, so 
that also in this way more openness and transparency is provided”.108 
 In itself, of course, this suggestion was nothing new. By 1982, review committees 
had become a commonplace in at least the United States, Great Britain and Sweden—
all nations that were important reference cultures for the Netherlands in the govern-
ance of biomedical science.109 Already in 1975, the World Medical Association (WMA) 
had amended its Helsinki Declaration (see chapter 1) to state that all human research 
protocols should be submitted to “a specially appointed independent committee for 
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consideration, comment and guidance”.110 Plus, in the Netherlands itself, authors like 
Leenen, Rang, Noach, Visser, and even Van Bekkum had recommended the installa-
tion of review committees in the 1970s, while the Health Council had already advised 
the Dutch government three times to regulate medical tests on human beings through 
some sort of system of ethics by committee (see chapters 1 and 2). 
 In contrast to the 1955 and 1971 Health Council reports, however, the 1982 Central 
Council report recommended that such review committees should not only consist of 
“experts on the terrain of medicine and medical-biological research”, but should also 
include “a number of other experts, including an ethicist or pastor and a jurist, as well 
as a nurse and at least two laypersons who can function as society-representatives”.111 
The report did not elaborate why ‘an ethicist or pastor and a jurist’ had to be includ-
ed. In a working group meeting, however, Noach had argued that including “someone 
with expertise in ethics” made sense because review committees had to evaluate the 
ethical permissibility of protocols. Hence, it could be useful to include a member with 
authority on the subject. According to the pharmacologist, it did not matter whether 
this member was an ethicist, a theologian, a pastor, or “people who busy themselves 
with norms of human behaviour”; they just needed some sort of affinity with issues of 
morality.112 The report did explain why the participation of a nurse was a good idea; 
she could be expected to offer a different viewpoint on issues and, importantly, “her 
function ensures that she is often better informed of certain situations and has more 
direct contact with research subjects”.113 The inclusion of a nurse, in other words, was 
another important safeguard for the protection of research subjects. 
 Notably, the role of two “laypersons who can function as society-representatives” 
was not defended in the policy report, nor had it been questioned in meetings of the 
working group. When their inclusion was first suggested by Noach, in fact, all mem-
bers had immediately accepted the idea.114 Van Bekkum had even proposed that also 
representatives of patient organizations could take up a seat. It was the participating 
patient representative who had advised against this suggestion, as such organizations 
were not yet organised well enough in the Netherlands to let enough representatives 
take up a seat in multiple local committees. Plus, Noach had added, it was better if lay 
people only participated à titre personnel, otherwise all sorts of groups would want to 
be represented. Committees, he argued, “just need to ask a few people whom they 
know to have a bit of quality and a certain interest [in the topic]”.115 
 The working group did discuss for some time how many laypeople should partici-
pate in the review of human research protocols. In discussing Visser’s and Van Bek-
kum’s articles in Medisch Contact, Van Bekkum himself stated that he did see some-
thing in the installation of review committees consisting almost solely of laypeople. If 
expert committees first evaluated the scientific quality of study proposals, it was fine 
if laypeople thereafter evaluated if they also respected the rights of research subjects. 
This would ensure that laypeople would not be overpowered by experts in committee 
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 Thirdly, following these conclusions, the 1982 Central Council report proposed to 
restrain the individual autonomy of biomedical researchers much more than any of 
the Health Council reports had ever done. The latter of these three had suggested that 
after a researcher had notified a central authority of his resolution to conduct a medi-
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that researchers should only be permitted to start their study if a thereto appointed 
authority had given its seal of approval. The difference with the older Health Council 
reports, according to the working group, was that the former were based on a ‘yes, if’-
premise, while its own work was built around a ‘no, unless’-principle.104 Less Delphic, 
the working group meant that the decision to start a human research study could not 
be left to individual researchers. To safeguard “the personal integrity, wellbeing, and 
rights of the research subject”, the 1982 report read, the Dutch government had to 
ensure that human experimentation could only take place in the Netherlands after a 
thereto appointed authority had first given its permission for doing so. What was 
more, this authority also had to be empowered to do follow-up checks to inspect if 
researchers stuck to the protocols they had submitted for review. If not, it should be 
authorized to halt studies mid-way.105 To protect human research subjects from any 
wrongdoings, the message was, constant vigilance was required. 
 This type of oversight, the working group maintained in its 1982 report, could best 
be realized by establishing “independent local or regional review committees” which 
would be tasked to assess the permissibility of research protocols “with due regard for 
prevailing views and norms and this both scientifically and ethically”.106 These bodies 
had to be overseen by one national council that would register all approved research 
protocols (to prevent unnecessary duplications of research studies), document devel-
opments in thinking about human experimentation, and direct the local and regional 
committees to review studies in a more or less uniform manner. In addition, it could 
check whether the local and regional committees operated as they were supposed to 
and, if needed, function as an appeal body for research studies that were declined by 
a local or regional committee.107 Finally, this central authority would publish a report 
about her activities each year that would explain developments on the terrain of med-
ical-biological research “in a manner that is understandable for a larger audience, so 
that also in this way more openness and transparency is provided”.108 
 In itself, of course, this suggestion was nothing new. By 1982, review committees 
had become a commonplace in at least the United States, Great Britain and Sweden—
all nations that were important reference cultures for the Netherlands in the govern-
ance of biomedical science.109 Already in 1975, the World Medical Association (WMA) 
had amended its Helsinki Declaration (see chapter 1) to state that all human research 
protocols should be submitted to “a specially appointed independent committee for 
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discussions and could really make their voice heard. The radiobiologist knew of cen-
tres in the United States, he told the other working group members, where they had 
gained positive experiences with this type of reviewing, so why not give it a try in the 
Netherlands? Noach, however, argued it was better not to segregate experts and lay-
people. They would have to reach verdicts on the permissibility of research proposals 
together, not separate from one another. The majority of the working group agreed. 
As it was explained in the 1982 report: “The integration between the world of science 
and the non-scientific world is best achieved by mixed committees” in which “scien-
tists and laypeople can both influence one another”.116 In theory, it was another way 
to realize the ideal of mature citizens. Review committees would help establish “hori-
zontal relations of consultation and participation” in health care (see chapter 3) and 
function as tools of external control over medical research studies. 
 Finally, one of the most striking differences between the Central Council report of 
1982 and the previous Health Council reports was the frank acknowledgement of the 
potential dark sides of human experimentation. While the Health Council reports had 
consistently shied away from mentioning too negative examples of medical tests upon 
human beings to shield the practice from undue public outrage (see chapters 1 and 2), 
the Central Council report stated outright in its introduction that human experiments 
had acquired a bad reputation as a result of the “horrendous abuse of the defenceless 
prisoners in the German concentration camps in World War II, and the exposé of a 
few scandals on this terrain in especially the U.S.A.”.117 Noted, the report did not state 
if this reputation was justified, but it established a connection that functioned in itself 
as a justification for public control over human experimentation.  
 Yet, in part, as the next section will show, this break with the Health Council re-
ports in practice served a goal remarkably similar to these reports, namey to protect 
the conduct of human experimentation from all too critical societal critiques. Noach, 
in fact, managed something with the Central Council’s working group ‘medical tests 
upon human beings’ he had not been able to with the Health Council committee ‘clin-
ical pharmacology’, i.e., to make sure that a blueprint for the governance of human 
research would not result in undesired delays in clinical research in the Netherlands. 
The pharmacologist Noach very much remained a therapeutic reformer. 
 
The ‘old’ function of research ethics committees 
 
 In 1979, the deliberations of the working group had started off on a bit of a rough 
note. During the first few meetings, the members had debated what type of interven-
tions should exactly be included in the category of ‘medical tests upon human beings’. 
Like the Health Council committees before it, the working group soon concluded that 
it was not always so easy to distinguish between medical research and practice. When 
did an intervention constitute an experiment and when was it just a form of advanced 
care? Did observational studies count as experiments? Should interventions that were 
already routine in the United States but still hardly ever tried out in the Netherlands 
be included? And what about the first time a surgeon in training carried out an opera-
tion? After a little while, the working group decided to settle on a generic description: 
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“Investigations consisting of the application of new or insufficiently tested resources 
and procedures in humans with the goal to determine if new insights can be acquired 
or if prevailing insights require revision”.118 Most working group members agreed this 
definition had to be understood as a guideline rather than a strict juridical category: 
it would be up to the review committees to decide which activities warranted further 
investigation. As Noach put it during the working group’s first meeting: in practice, 
medical experiments with human beings were simply recognized as everything which 
“deviates from regular medical treatment”.119 
 Van Bekkum, however, strongly disagreed with this generic description for human 
experimentation. Absent from the first three meetings of the working group, the radi-
obiologist sent in pressing notes to express his discontent. Especially the fact that the 
working group’s definition included the conduct of clinical trials frustrated him:  
 
If one wants to classify this work as ‘experiments with human beings’ one has to 
realize that therewith all introductions of new treatments and diagnostic meth-
ods, that is all innovation in health care, will come to fall under the term ‘experi-
ments with human beings’. […] I do not think it is wise to treat these activities by 
a working group called medical tests upon human beings, given the very special 
interpretation that all outsiders and many physicians give to this.120 
 
With this ‘special interpretation’ Van Bekkum meant the recent unrest in the Nether-
lands over human experimentation. The label ‘tests upon human beings’, the radiobi-
ologist argued, had come to acquire a negative connotation in the Netherlands in re-
cent years. It now invoked images of the research scandals that had taken place in the 
United States or worse, of the Nazi concentration camp experiments.121 Clinical trials, 
Van Bekkum pressed, had to be kept away from any association with these atrocious 
events, otherwise the already fragile field of clinical research would be shut down in 
the Netherlands. Clinical trials were not even experiments really, the radiobiologist 
continued, they were a form of “rational therapeutics” in which multiple treatments 
were compared to determine their efficacy. This was different from pure experimen-
tation and labelling them as such would be detrimental to medical research and prac-
tice in the Netherlands. In fact, Van Bekkum wrote in, if the working group decided to 
proceed in this fashion, he was forced to break his ties with it.122  
 This remark provoked considerable dismay among members of the working group. 
Noach pressed, however, that it was important to keep Van Bekkum on board, as he 
belonged to a relatively small group of experts in the Netherlands who had any prac-
tical experience with the subject under investigation. During a subsequent meeting at 
which Van Bekkum was actually present, the radiobiologist explained his frustration: 
as things stood, he claimed, about 50 percent of all therapeutic and diagnostic inter-
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function as tools of external control over medical research studies. 
 Finally, one of the most striking differences between the Central Council report of 
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potential dark sides of human experimentation. While the Health Council reports had 
consistently shied away from mentioning too negative examples of medical tests upon 
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 Yet, in part, as the next section will show, this break with the Health Council re-
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ventions in the Netherlands had never been tested on their efficacy; they only persist-
ed out of tradition.123 Hence, the systematic conduct of clinical trials was direly need-
ed in the Netherlands to evaluate the merits of all these interventions. Yet for that to 
happen, it did not help to start connoting rational therapeutics with the contaminated 
label ‘tests upon human beings’ and argue it required more public control. Patients in 
clinical trials did not need additional legal protection, Van Bekkum argued, they typi-
cally received “a top treatment by a top team, often with resources that are available 
nowhere else”.124 If anything, the radiobiologist scoffed, patients treated by physi-
cians who just meddled about with therapies needed extra protection. 
 Some working group members objected that Van Bekkum seemed to forget he was 
a “frontier scientist”. His experiences with the conduct of clinical research were likely 
to be more positive than those in “hospitals and clinics, where all kinds of things hap-
pen under the guise of science”. The participating medical inspector, in particular, 
argued that he at times encountered situations upon his control-visits that made him 
think that “especially those [working] in clinics often have absolutely no realization of 
what it is they are doing exactly”.125 The elite scientist Van Bekkum, in other words, 
might be trusted with the conduct of clinical trials, but the same could not reliably be 
said of the average physician; the regulation of clinical trials was needed to keep prac-
titioners conducting experiments in the periphery in check. 
 Noach, however, professed to agree with Van Bekkum that the term ‘medical tests 
upon human beings’ had become a bit of a taboo in recent years. In Leiden, he stated, 
they therefore preferred to speak of “patient-related research” instead of clinical ex-
periments.126 Even more, he agreed with the radiobiologist that patients participating 
in clinical trials were usually surrounded with better safeguards than those who did 
not. Yet, he continued by turning to Van Bekkum, this was partly because most clini-
cal researchers acknowledged such patients needed additional protection. Hence, the 
working group’s goal should not be to keep clinical trials away from public regulation, 
but to ensure that all experiments with human beings took place under similar condi-
tions—and to eradicate the negative public image of the practice this way. 
 In part, the participating patient representative added, this negative public image 
was the effect of the “high degree of seclusion and mystery in which this sort of activi-
ties currently takes place”. Most laypeople did not know what to make of the stories 
they heard about human experimentation, because the practice was often wrapped in 
a “dense fog”. Hence, if the general public was to be made “more research-minded”, 
(which apparently also the patient representative considered desirable), “more open-
ness and insight has to be provided”.127 Noach agreed. Their group had to make clear 
that human research was “no unseemly activity” and “be as open as possible to make 
the Dutch public more familiar with the phenomenon”. If the saying “unknown, un-
loved” held true, people had to be introduced as soon as possible to good human ex-
perimentation.128 This was an important duty and opportunity the working group had 
in writing a policy report on the public governance of the practice. 
                                                 
123 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 45, Minutes of the working group, 22 October 1979, p. 3.  
124 Ibid., p. 7. 
125 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 51, Minutes of the working group, 19 November 1979, p. 2. 
126 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 45, Minutes of the working group, 22 October 1979, p. 5. 
127 Ibid., p. 5. 
128 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 24, Minutes of the working group, 8 June 1979, p. 11. 
· experimenting with human beings · 
 · 153 · 
 The entire working group, including Van Bekkum, could agree with this proposal. 
Its policy report would state the rights of research subjects in the conduct of ‘medical 
tests upon human beings’, including clinical trials, but it would also emphasize that 
the practice itself, when conducted within bounds, was (a) needed to realize the much 
desired progress of Dutch health care and (b) nothing to worry about. Thus, while the 
1982 Central Council report frankly acknowledged that human experimentation had 
acquired a bad reputation due to American research scandals and the Nazi concentra-
tion camp experiments, it stated simultaneously that good human experimentation 
should be understood as categorically different from such past wrongdoings. In fact, 
the report read, since “the words ‘medical tests upon human beings’ still invoke asso-
ciations with abuses from the past” and “the working group has wanted to stay away 
from such negative images, it has preferred to speak in her reflections of experiments 
with human beings”. This new label fitted the contents of the report better anyway, as 
the preposition upon unjustly suggested an “underlying position” of the research sub-
ject in experimentation. A healthy researcher-subject relation, after all, was not a ver-
tical relation of dependence of subordination, but a horizontal relation of consulta-
tion and participation.129 Experiments took place with human beings. 
 
*** 
 
 Also the blueprint in the 1982 Central Council report for the functioning of review 
committees served to protect and promote what the working group believed was good 
human experimentation. The report frankly admitted, for instance, that it hoped a 
positive effect of including laypeople in review committees would be the erosion of 
the negative public image of human experimentation. More openness would show the 
general public that “experiments are useful and necessary and take place in compli-
ance with rules and procedures”.130 To ensure this, it was important for participating 
laypeople to agree that human experimentation was in fact ‘necessary and permitted’. 
They could not, for instance, reject the practice altogether like the old antivivisection-
ists had done (see chapter 1). Furthermore, they needed to conduct themselves “in a 
reasonable manner” to participate in the review of proposals. Not just every layper-
son was qualified, they had to have “a bit of quality and a certain interest” to be eligi-
ble for a committee seat. To ensure that the right ‘society-representatives’ were elect-
ed, therefore, Noach proposed that in practice laypeople would be chosen via a “co-
optation procedure”, whereby each of the sitting members, i.e. the experts, would be 
permitted to decide which laypeople were suitable to take part.131 
 In addition, the working group maintained review committees had to seat enough 
scientific experts to judge the scientific quality of proposals. For studies to be permit-
ted, they had to adhere to “generally accepted scientific principles […] including both 
the theoretical and methodological aspects as well as the organization of the study”.132 
Thus, like the Health Council reports before it, the Central Council report proposed 
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ventions in the Netherlands had never been tested on their efficacy; they only persist-
ed out of tradition.123 Hence, the systematic conduct of clinical trials was direly need-
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happen, it did not help to start connoting rational therapeutics with the contaminated 
label ‘tests upon human beings’ and argue it required more public control. Patients in 
clinical trials did not need additional legal protection, Van Bekkum argued, they typi-
cally received “a top treatment by a top team, often with resources that are available 
nowhere else”.124 If anything, the radiobiologist scoffed, patients treated by physi-
cians who just meddled about with therapies needed extra protection. 
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to be more positive than those in “hospitals and clinics, where all kinds of things hap-
pen under the guise of science”. The participating medical inspector, in particular, 
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think that “especially those [working] in clinics often have absolutely no realization of 
what it is they are doing exactly”.125 The elite scientist Van Bekkum, in other words, 
might be trusted with the conduct of clinical trials, but the same could not reliably be 
said of the average physician; the regulation of clinical trials was needed to keep prac-
titioners conducting experiments in the periphery in check. 
 Noach, however, professed to agree with Van Bekkum that the term ‘medical tests 
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they therefore preferred to speak of “patient-related research” instead of clinical ex-
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cal researchers acknowledged such patients needed additional protection. Hence, the 
working group’s goal should not be to keep clinical trials away from public regulation, 
but to ensure that all experiments with human beings took place under similar condi-
tions—and to eradicate the negative public image of the practice this way. 
 In part, the participating patient representative added, this negative public image 
was the effect of the “high degree of seclusion and mystery in which this sort of activi-
ties currently takes place”. Most laypeople did not know what to make of the stories 
they heard about human experimentation, because the practice was often wrapped in 
a “dense fog”. Hence, if the general public was to be made “more research-minded”, 
(which apparently also the patient representative considered desirable), “more open-
ness and insight has to be provided”.127 Noach agreed. Their group had to make clear 
that human research was “no unseemly activity” and “be as open as possible to make 
the Dutch public more familiar with the phenomenon”. If the saying “unknown, un-
loved” held true, people had to be introduced as soon as possible to good human ex-
perimentation.128 This was an important duty and opportunity the working group had 
in writing a policy report on the public governance of the practice. 
                                                 
123 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 45, Minutes of the working group, 22 October 1979, p. 3.  
124 Ibid., p. 7. 
125 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 51, Minutes of the working group, 19 November 1979, p. 2. 
126 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 45, Minutes of the working group, 22 October 1979, p. 5. 
127 Ibid., p. 5. 
128 NL-HaNA, 2.27.16, 554, 8008 24, Minutes of the working group, 8 June 1979, p. 11. 
· experimenting with human beings · 
 · 153 · 
 The entire working group, including Van Bekkum, could agree with this proposal. 
Its policy report would state the rights of research subjects in the conduct of ‘medical 
tests upon human beings’, including clinical trials, but it would also emphasize that 
the practice itself, when conducted within bounds, was (a) needed to realize the much 
desired progress of Dutch health care and (b) nothing to worry about. Thus, while the 
1982 Central Council report frankly acknowledged that human experimentation had 
acquired a bad reputation due to American research scandals and the Nazi concentra-
tion camp experiments, it stated simultaneously that good human experimentation 
should be understood as categorically different from such past wrongdoings. In fact, 
the report read, since “the words ‘medical tests upon human beings’ still invoke asso-
ciations with abuses from the past” and “the working group has wanted to stay away 
from such negative images, it has preferred to speak in her reflections of experiments 
with human beings”. This new label fitted the contents of the report better anyway, as 
the preposition upon unjustly suggested an “underlying position” of the research sub-
ject in experimentation. A healthy researcher-subject relation, after all, was not a ver-
tical relation of dependence of subordination, but a horizontal relation of consulta-
tion and participation.129 Experiments took place with human beings. 
 
*** 
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ble for a committee seat. To ensure that the right ‘society-representatives’ were elect-
ed, therefore, Noach proposed that in practice laypeople would be chosen via a “co-
optation procedure”, whereby each of the sitting members, i.e. the experts, would be 
permitted to decide which laypeople were suitable to take part.131 
 In addition, the working group maintained review committees had to seat enough 
scientific experts to judge the scientific quality of proposals. For studies to be permit-
ted, they had to adhere to “generally accepted scientific principles […] including both 
the theoretical and methodological aspects as well as the organization of the study”.132 
Thus, like the Health Council reports before it, the Central Council report proposed 
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for review committees to function like epistemic filters: they had to sift out good re-
search studies from bad research studies, with good also referring to methodological-
ly sound (see chapter 2). In meetings, Van Bekkum literally referred to review com-
mittees as “filters” with the appropriate “know-how” to judge research design.133 Only 
the Central Council no longer spoke of the maxim ‘only good science is ethical sci-
ence’, but of ‘only good science is reasonable science’. Sound science, as defined by a 
specific class of medical researchers, had become a patients’ right. 
 Thirdly, the working group purposefully recommended an oversight system built 
around multiple local review committees. It argued this would benefit the intensifica-
tion of clinical research studies in the Netherlands more than a system built around a 
single national council, as the Health Council had recommended in 1981 (see chapter 
2). As a member of the Health Council committee ‘clinical pharmacology’, Noach had 
in 1981 already written a minority report on the matter because he feared the installa-
tion of a single national Council for Clinical Research would lead to undesirable de-
lays in the conduct of clinical trials in the Netherlands (see chapter 2). In the working 
group ‘medical tests upon human beings’, the pharmacologist repeated his concern 
and found an ally in Van Bekkum. According to both researchers, the swift realization 
of medical progress in the Netherlands demanded that ethics review would never take 
more than a few weeks, which implied that enough committees had to be installed in 
the country to guarantee that all review requests could be handled quickly. 
 Finally, the working group advocated local review committees because it believed 
these to hold a more workable mid-way between the public and professional regula-
tion of human experimentation. Particularly Noach and Van Bekkum feared that a 
national council was likely to enact abstract principles and rigid demarcations in the 
review of protocols due to its physical distance from actual research situations. Ac-
cording to Van Bekkum, the criteria proposed by the Central Council for determining 
the permissibility of research studies could never be taken as conditiones sine quibus 
non, but as benchmarks to decide if a study was reasonable. Were the scientific quali-
fications of researchers in order? Check. Did the host organisation have proper re-
search facilities? Check. Did the review committee feel enough laboratory and animal 
experiments had already been conducted? Check. These questions could only be an-
swered by committees familiar with the actual research setting; no national authority 
could stipulate absolute criteria for them.134 In research, Noach explained, “there are 
always imponderable elements at play” that could not be written down on paper. 
Hence, as only local authorities could truly know their “pappenheimers” [darlings], 
only they could emphatically decide whether the research(ers) being reviewed meant 
to do well—and thus reach informed and, crucially, flexible decisions.135 
 It was in this context that the word ‘ethics’ once again popped up in the reports of 
the Committee Rights of the Patient. While the word had not been mentioned a single 
time in one of the other four reports that were written under the flag of the Commit-
tee between 1980 and 1982 (see chapter 3), it was used several times in the 1982 re-
port ‘medical experiments with human beings’, which spoke of the “ethical and jurid-
ical aspects” of human experimentation and the need to ensure the practice violated 
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“neither ethical standards nor human rights”.136 The report nowhere specified what it 
meant precisely with ‘ethical standards’, but in an appendix to the report prepared by 
Noach, the pharmacologist justified this heuristic use of the e-word: 
 
Views of medical-ethical issues have gone through a rapid revolution in recent 
decades, which does not yet appear to be complete. For this reason, the stipula-
tion of all too strict and detail norms is premature and undesirable.137 
 
The recent crisis of medical ethics (see chapter 3), in short, meant that the working 
group could not specify which ethical norms should precisely govern the conduct of 
medical experiments with human subjects. However, this crisis was precisely the rea-
son why the word ‘ethics’ was used in the policy report: i.e. as it was still unclear what 
would be considered ethical in years to come, the stipulation of all too detailed legal 
norms might stifle a practice that was still developing. Instead, “a certain standard of 
norms needs to be developed through experience within each review committee over 
the course of her existence”. Reviewers, Van Bekkum had argued in a working group 
meeting, continuously had to “align themselves with prevailing views in a particular 
country […] which are not static and will change from time to time”. Tacit and fluid, 
such views could not be laid down in sterile legislation—they depended on the context 
of individual research studies and fell in the category of ‘ethics’.138 
 Hence, all in all, despite the fact that the 1982 Central Council report drew explic-
itly on articles like those by Visser to frame its policy recommendations, its blueprint 
for the oversight of human experimentation differed crucially. Where Visser favoured 
the participation of laypeople to institutionalize a healthy form of public distrust in 
medical researchers, the working group hoped their participation would restore pub-
lic trust in the medical research establishment. Similarly, where Visser felt reviewers 
should operate as distant judges to reach impartial decisions, the working group stat-
ed that a close proximity to and intimate familiarity with research studies was needed 
to reach objective decisions. And where advocates of the patients’ rights movement 
typically emphasized the importance of univocal legal rules for human experimenta-
tion, the working group preferred to speak of fluid ethical standards and the need to 
decide on a case-by-case basis if studies were permitted. Although the working group 
agreed, in short, that medical experiments with humans demanded external control 
to protect participating research subjects, it hoped much more than critical thinkers 
such as Visser that this control would safeguard the practice itself as well. According 
to therapeutic reformers like Noach and Van Bekkum, a moral need still very much 
existed in the Netherlands for proper human experimentation. 
 
*** 
 
 After the working group finished its deliberations in May 1981, its report first had 
to be discussed by, consecutively, the Committee Rights of the Patient, the Council’s 
Committee of Delegates, and the Central Council itself, before it could be released for 
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publication (a true Matryoshka-effect of the famous Dutch polder model). Although 
the report was accepted fairly easily by the Committee Rights of the Patient itself, it 
ran into difficulties when it was discussed in the Committee of Delegates and Central 
Council. In the Committee of Delegates, the new President of the Central Council Jo 
Hendriks (the old State Secretary of Public Health) noted that even though the report 
presented an important and solid piece of work, hesitation had befallen him with re-
gard to “the aspects of the subject which have to do with ethics”. As the report dealt 
with an “extremely sensitive matter”, it felt out of order to freely use the word ethics 
while “the ethical discipline as such” had not been represented in the working group. 
Before the report was ready to be published, therefore, Hendriks first wanted to con-
tact a number of ethicists and ask them what they thought of the document’s “ethical 
merits”. Multiple delegates agreed. Certainly because the report also mentioned past 
research scandals, it would be wise to ask individuals who concerned themselves with 
ethics and religion to check if they could live with its contents. 
 Delegate Wim van der Mijn, the jurist representing the KNMG who served as the 
vice-chairman of the Committee Rights of the Patient (see chapter 3), objected. The 
report was in line with “prevailing views on medical ethics”, he argued, and his con-
stituency, the Dutch medical profession, had no problem with the concept-document. 
Besides, the working group had been asked to explore the juridical difficulties of ex-
perimenting with human subjects—not its ethical aspects—and this had been done. 
Every Council report had ethical aspects, so why make a problem out of this one? In 
the opinion of the jurist, Hendriks really attributed “a weight to ethicists above their 
significance”. Another delegate wondered if the Council President not rather wanted 
advice on how the report could be read. Hence, did Hendriks not mean public rela-
tions officers instead of ethicists? Hendriks was adamant, however, that ethicists had 
to take another look at the report. The Committee of Delegates decided, therefore, to 
send the document to five authors who had published on the subject of (medical) eth-
ics in recent years to check if they could agree with its contents.139 
 The responses of these authors varied, but they generally concurred that the report 
did not contain any statements that flagrantly violated any ethical norms and values. 
Most importantly, their responses satisfied Hendriks, which meant that the report 
could now be discussed in the Central Council itself. There, however, additional ob-
jections mounted. One member in particular, a representative of a Dutch patient or-
ganization, confessed to have shivered when reading the report, as it emphasized so 
strongly the absolute necessity of experimenting on humans while speaking only in 
veiled ethical terms about interactions between researcher and subject. In his opinion 
as a “medical outsider”, the report came across as suspiciously “medical”: i.e. its rec-
ommendations had been written from a technical perspective, whereas it should have 
been written from the perspective of patients’ rights.140 What was more, he was un-
impressed with the composition of the oversight committees that the report pro-
posed. Physicians dominated, while only a few seats had been reserved for those who 
would see it as their primary aim to secure the interests of patients. 
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 Both Leenen and Noach, who were present for comments, assured the hesitant 
Council members that the experience they already had with reviewing research pro-
tocols taught them that there was no need to worry about these things. In practice, 
reviewers always worked things out in an open and congenial manner, whereby am-
ple attention was paid to the rights and interests of research subjects.141 Leenen ad-
mitted that also he found the use of the term ethics somewhat vague in the report, but 
this, the jurist argued, was unavoidable. Ethical norms changed from time to time, so 
it did not make sense to try and nail them down in a policy report. He could guaran-
tee, however, that the norms used in the report rested on a “widespread and interna-
tional consensus”, such as the Declaration of Helsinki.142 If the Council insisted, how-
ever, Leenen was willing to tone down those parts of the report that came across as 
overly enthusiastic about the conduct of human experimentation.143 
 With that admission and a few changes, the Central Council report ‘medical exper-
iments with human beings’ was finally authorized for publication in March 1982. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, it became the blueprint for the governance of human research 
studies in Dutch political circles. Nonetheless, as will become clear from the next two 
chapters, it would take another sixteen years for the Dutch government to effectuate a 
law for the conduct of ‘medical experiments with human beings’ in the Netherlands. 
In effect, when Dutch parliament in 1997 for the first time got to debate a legislative 
proposal based on the 1982 Central Council report, it was discussing a system of eth-
ics by committee that had already congealed around the ideas of those who had start-
ed to push in the 1980s for more expert control over human research. In fact, when 
members of parliament once again brought up the need for more democratic control, 
the Dutch government increasingly found solace in a new type of expert to resolve the 
tension between these two modes of governance: the ethicist. For while Van der Mijn, 
a strong advocate of the Dutch patients’ rights movement, had still argued in the early 
1980s that it was foolish to attribute a weight to ethicists above their significance, this 
new expert on the block in the late twentieth century came to fulfil a key function in 
the public governance of human research studies in the Netherlands. 
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public governance in a pluralist society 
 
Around half past eight in the evening of Tuesday 3 September 1997, the Dutch House 
of Representatives began its official deliberations on ‘the medical research involving 
human subjects bill’, a legal proposal that had been in the works ever since 1982. Ad 
Lansink, representative of the Christian Democratic Appeal, was the first member of 
parliament to shine his light on the long-awaited bill. “Mr. Speaker!”, the Christian-
democrat began formally, “the fight against disease and the care for the sick and dis-
abled remains both a task and a mission, also for science and technology”. Progress in 
these fields was absolutely necessary if society was ever going to end the suffering of 
patients. Still, Lansink continued solemnly, not everything which had sprung forth 
from science and technology in the past years could be labelled as progress, of which 
a growing number of questionable human research studies served as ringing remind-
ers. Now more than ever, the Christian politician emphasized therefore, “society and 
the government have a duty to ascertain whether all research is permitted when held 
up to the norms and values that should bind a pluralist society”.1 
 Lansink was not too sure, however, whether the incumbent Dutch government, an 
administration made up solely of secular parties, shared the same concern. The re-
view bodies described in the bill, for instance, were not expected to include a single 
layperson, and did not in any way have “to take the ethical and religious plurality of 
society into account”.2 Similar concerns were put forward by the other confessional 
parties in Dutch parliament. For these committees would not only check if research-
ers respected the rights of patients in ‘regular’ experiments, they potentially also had 
to decide on the permissibility of more contentious studies, such as experiments with 
embryos and foetal material or those that fiddled with genes. Really, Lansink pressed, 
how could “a committee that does not have to account to anyone” decide on studies 
about which no ethical consensus existed in Dutch society?3 What sort of public func-
tion did research ethics committees fulfil in a democratic society? 
 
*** 
 
 This chapter examines the realization of the Dutch Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects Act (WMO), which has regulated the conduct of (medical) research 
with humans in the Netherlands since 1998. In the early 1980s, after the subsequent 
publication of the 1981 Health Council report ‘clinical pharmacology’ (see chapter 2) 
and the 1982 Central Council report ‘medical experiments with human beings’ (see 
chapter 4), the expectation was that the Dutch government would make haste with 
legislation for the conduct of human research in the Netherlands. As Dutch ethicist 
Heleen Dupuis aptly put it in 1982: “The matter of ethics committees, as expressed in 
the report of the Central Council for Public Health, is pretty much one of the only 
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2 Ibid., p. 103-7287. Also: Tweede Kamer, 22588, Nr. 10, Eindverslag, p. 29.  
3 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1996-1997, 3 September 1997, p. 103-7310. 
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things about which a reasonable consensus exists in our country”.4 Yet, the realiza-
tion of an actual legal framework would take another sixteen years. Although none of 
the four statespersons responsible for the WMO ever publicly questioned the urgency 
of a legislative framework, successive Dutch governments found reasons for most of 
the 1980s and 1990s to postpone its parliamentary discussion. 
 This chapter maps this political inertia and argues it has to be understood in light 
of changing political winds in the 1980s and 1990s that oscillated between two gov-
ernance ideals: a proactive and a reactive oversight system for human research, that 
each hinged on a different conception of the role of the government in regulating the 
conduct of its citizens. This inertia did not prevent a plethora of Dutch research ethics 
committees to spring up in the late twentieth century. Spurred on by international 
developments, hospital boards and other consortiums realized numerous review bod-
ies in this period to oversee medical experiments with humans. Yet, it did ensure that 
the government had little influence on how these committees came to organize them-
selves. In effect, when Dutch parliament in 1997 could for the first time debate the 
oversight mechanisms that should ideally govern human experimentation in a demo-
cratic society, it was debating a practice that had congealed in the 1980s around the 
ideals of forerunners who pushed for the expert control of human experimentation to 
guarantee uniform and independent review procedures. This did not prevent Dutch 
parliament members from demanding more democratic oversight of human research 
studies to ensure widely supported ethics review decisions in a pluralist society. It did 
mean, however, that political ideals of democratic governance in the Netherlands had 
to be balanced against a reality of expert review bodies. 
To trace these developments, section I of this chapter first studies the governmen-
tal preparations for the WMO up until its parliamentary treatment in 1997. Section II 
charts the actual realization of Dutch research ethics committees in the 1980s, while 
section III looks at mounting criticisms on this development towards the end of this 
decade. Section IV analyses the parliamentary debates on the WMO, and investigates 
the tension that members of Dutch parliament experienced between the democratic 
and expert oversight of human research practices in a pluralist society. This tension, 
the Dutch government eventually came to argue, could be resolved by granting one 
sort of expert a key role in the public governance of human research by means of the 
practice of ethics by committee. This expert was the professional ethicist. 
 
Political ‘vigour’ in the Dutch polders 
 
 In April 1982, one month after the publication of the Central Council report ‘medi-
cal experiments with human beings’ (see chapter 4), Dutch parliament unanimously 
adopted a motion stating that with the publication of this report, a large enough con-
sensus now existed in the Netherlands in favour of taking legal measures for the regu-
lation of human research studies.5 It was time the government started preparing a bill 
on the topic. This task was taken up by State Secretary of Welfare, Health and Culture 
Joop van der Reijden (member of the Christian-democratic party), who could report 
                                                 
4 NL-HaNA, 2.15.36, 1708, 125-390, Beraadsgroep Gezondheidsethiek, 9 September 1982, p. 21. 
5 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1981-1982, 20 april 1982, p. 3027; Tweede Kamer 1981-1982, Kamer-
stuk 16771, nr. 9, Motie van het lid Wessel-Tuinstra C.S. 
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about a year later that his department was preparing a bill in line with the 1982 Cen-
tral Council report. This meant, he explained to parliament, that he would not follow 
the recommendations of the 1981 Health Council report (see chapter 2): 
 
The Health Council emphasises the importance of scientific research. However, 
while recognizing this importance, I prefer a regime that puts more emphasis on 
the legal position of the research subject. My thoughts are therefore more aligned 
with the scheme the Central Council has developed for this regulation.6 
 
Thus, Van der Reijden planned to develop a proactive oversight system for medical 
experiments with humans in the Netherlands: experiments would only be permitted 
after a research ethics committee had given its approval.7 Notably, however, the State 
Secretary did not plan to fully adopt the Central Council blueprint. While his plans 
mentioned the inclusion of “experts in medicine, medical-biological or pharmacologi-
cal research, ethics, law, and nursing”, they omitted the participation of “representa-
tives of society”, which had been one of the central tenets of the 1982 report to ensure 
that “seclusion and mystery make way for openness and transparency” in a democrat-
ic society (see chapter 4). Van der Reijden offered no justification for this omission.8 
After the report had been published, however, the Council had received multiple let-
ters warning against the inclusion of laypeople in the oversight of scientific research. 
As the renowned pharmacologist Everhardus Ariëns wrote to the Council President in 
1984: “I have doubts about the suggested participation of ‘society-representatives’. 
Who will appoint these?”. What if a proponent of alternative medicine would take up 
a seat and oppose any form of pharmacotherapy? What if a layperson with a confes-
sional background would take part to reject any form of intervention medicine? Real-
ly, Ariëns—who was an active therapeutic reformer—wrote, only “relevant experts” 
should be allowed to participate, who could be “expected to reach a consensus based 
on open argumentations”.9 In Dutch parliament, Van der Reijden adopted this line of 
reasoning. In the absence of enough experts, the State Secretary explained, “unsound 
research is approved and sound research hampered”.10 Ethics boards had to function 
as epistemic filters, leaving little room for the inclusion of laypeople.11 
 In 1984, still, Van der Reijden was optimistic that his ‘human experimentation bill’ 
would be ready to be submitted before the end of the political year. Nonetheless, to 
ensure the safety of research subjects as much as possible before a final law would be 
passed, he decided to already make the installation of an ‘independent medical review 
committee’ an official admission requirement for hospitals wishing to participate in 
the Dutch health insurance funds. To be sure, this policy measure only required hos-
pitals to install a review committee, not for medical researchers actually to pay it a 
                                                 
6 Tweede Kamer 1982-1983, Kamerstuk 16771, nr. 14, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Welzijn, 
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ten met mensen. Een verdwenen advies’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 38 (1983), pp. 97-98. 
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visit—let alone ask for its permission. Yet Van der Reijden hoped that hospital boards 
would stimulate their functioning by working the magic of ‘corporate liability’, i.e., in 
case things went south, hospital insurance would only pay up if researchers had first 
been given permission for their studies by an in-house review board.  
The initiative indicates the determination of the Christian-democrat in the early 
1980s swiftly to realize better oversight mechanisms for human research studies in 
the Netherlands. In 1985, however, his expeditious plans were brought to a halt by a 
change in political winds that came blowing from the very government he was a part 
of. In the mid-1980s, like in many other countries in this period, initiatives to reduce 
government spending and regulations came to dominate Dutch politics. In 1982, the 
Christian-democrat Ruud Lubbers—often called the Dutch Margaret Thatcher—had 
won the elections with the slogan ‘more market, less government’. He held the post of 
Dutch prime minister until 1994, a period of twelve years which were dominated by 
attempts to reduce the “mania for organization” by public organisations. His admin-
istration claimed this held particularly for the Dutch health care system, which would 
be an overwhelming bureaucracy with little leeway for professionals to act efficiently 
and in the interest of patients. Rather than top-down state regulations, therefore, the 
Lubbers-governments nurtured the bottom-up powers of the market—a neoliberal 
politics that went hand in hand with initiatives of privatization and deregulation.12 
This framework proved to be an ill fit for a human experimentation bill that proposed 
to greatly restrict the professional autonomy of researchers by the installation of mul-
tiple local review committees. In 1985, therefore, the Ministers of Justice and Interior 
Affairs decided to veto Van der Reijden’s plans on the grounds that it did not fit the 
Dutch government’s attempts to reduce government regulations.13 
In 1986, therefore, Van Der Reijden set out to write a second Dutch human exper-
imentation bill that agreed more with the recommendations of the 1981 Health Coun-
cil report. Researchers would be obliged to notify a national authority of their plans to 
conduct experiments with humans, but they would not have to await its permission to 
proceed with their studies.14 Before the State Secretary got well underway, however, 
his four year term in office ended. In July 1986, the Christian-democrat was succeed-
ed by a familiar face: the conservative-liberal politician Dick Dees, who served as the 
State Secretary of Welfare, Health and Culture in the second Lubbers-cabinet until 
1989. Dees had been an early political advocate of the codification of patients’ rights 
in the Netherlands and had pressed the Dutch government ever since the Buikhuisen-
affair to make haste with a definitive law for human experimentation (see chapters 3 
and 4). What was more, just months before starting his term as State Secretary, the 
conservative-liberal politician had co-signed a parliamentary motion demanding the 
government that it would submit a ‘human experimentation bill’ as soon as possible.15 
Dees, in short, could be expected to make a priority out of a legislative proposal for 
the governance of human research studies in the Netherlands. 
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Sure enough, by the end of 1987, his department had prepared another bill which 
did meet Lubbers’ deregulation requirements.16 Research ethics committees would 
oversee the conduct of human research in the Netherlands, but these would only op-
erate reactively, i.e., researchers were could engage in studies as long as they regis-
tered these with a national authority, and the State Inspectorate would only intervene 
if wrongdoings were suspected.17 After this renewed vigour, however, things slowed 
down once more, as Dutch legislative tradition demanded that the bill was first dis-
cussed by a number of advisory bodies before it was sent to parliament. Hence, the 
bill first travelled from the Council of Ministers to the National Council for Public 
Health, and from an interdepartmental juridical committee to the Dutch Council of 
State, the country’s highest advisory body. Dees lamented these holdups, but had few 
means to influence them. The realization of a definitive law had to wait.18 
 
*** 
 
 By the time the Council of State was ready to issue its advice on Dees’ human ex-
perimentation bill, three years had passed and Dees had been succeeded by labour 
politician Hans Simons, State Secretary of Welfare, Health and Culture in the third 
Lubbers-government. To make matters worse, the Council of State was, to put things 
mildly, not too enthusiastic in its appraisal of the new human experimentation bill. In 
addition to “some editorial comments”, the Council had no less than twenty points of 
improvement to raise. While not all of these were of equal weight, some went right to 
the heart of the bill. For one thing, as if the matter had not been debated enough in 
the past fifteen years, the Council of State advised the government to replace the reac-
tive mode of oversight in the bill with a proactive one, i.e., human experiments should 
only be legally allowed if a review committee had first given its permission for doing 
so.19 In addition, the Council of State objected to the bill’s caveat that research studies 
were not allowed to “conflict with generally accepted ethical standards”: 
 
The Council considers the criterion set out in these provisions to be unclear for 
the researcher and unmanageable for the prosecuting authorities and criminal 
courts. After all, it is not the task of the criminal court to determine which ethical 
norms that have not been translated into juridical norms may be regarded gener-
ally acceptable.20 
 
The biggest issue the Council of State had with Dees’ bill, however, was that it allowed 
for non-therapeutic research studies to be conducted with individuals who lacked the 
legal capacity to consent. Indeed, Dees had left this option open for “research which 
entails little to no burden for the people involved and which may benefit the health of 
the group to which they belong, as long as the results of this study cannot be obtained 
by means of experiments with persons that do have legal capacity”.21 According to the 
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12 Roland Bertens, Gezondheid tussen staat en markt. De opkomst van het marktdenken in het Neder-
landse zorgstelsel, 1974-1987 (Masterthesis Health Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2015). 
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Sure enough, by the end of 1987, his department had prepared another bill which 
did meet Lubbers’ deregulation requirements.16 Research ethics committees would 
oversee the conduct of human research in the Netherlands, but these would only op-
erate reactively, i.e., researchers were could engage in studies as long as they regis-
tered these with a national authority, and the State Inspectorate would only intervene 
if wrongdoings were suspected.17 After this renewed vigour, however, things slowed 
down once more, as Dutch legislative tradition demanded that the bill was first dis-
cussed by a number of advisory bodies before it was sent to parliament. Hence, the 
bill first travelled from the Council of Ministers to the National Council for Public 
Health, and from an interdepartmental juridical committee to the Dutch Council of 
State, the country’s highest advisory body. Dees lamented these holdups, but had few 
means to influence them. The realization of a definitive law had to wait.18 
 
*** 
 
 By the time the Council of State was ready to issue its advice on Dees’ human ex-
perimentation bill, three years had passed and Dees had been succeeded by labour 
politician Hans Simons, State Secretary of Welfare, Health and Culture in the third 
Lubbers-government. To make matters worse, the Council of State was, to put things 
mildly, not too enthusiastic in its appraisal of the new human experimentation bill. In 
addition to “some editorial comments”, the Council had no less than twenty points of 
improvement to raise. While not all of these were of equal weight, some went right to 
the heart of the bill. For one thing, as if the matter had not been debated enough in 
the past fifteen years, the Council of State advised the government to replace the reac-
tive mode of oversight in the bill with a proactive one, i.e., human experiments should 
only be legally allowed if a review committee had first given its permission for doing 
so.19 In addition, the Council of State objected to the bill’s caveat that research studies 
were not allowed to “conflict with generally accepted ethical standards”: 
 
The Council considers the criterion set out in these provisions to be unclear for 
the researcher and unmanageable for the prosecuting authorities and criminal 
courts. After all, it is not the task of the criminal court to determine which ethical 
norms that have not been translated into juridical norms may be regarded gener-
ally acceptable.20 
 
The biggest issue the Council of State had with Dees’ bill, however, was that it allowed 
for non-therapeutic research studies to be conducted with individuals who lacked the 
legal capacity to consent. Indeed, Dees had left this option open for “research which 
entails little to no burden for the people involved and which may benefit the health of 
the group to which they belong, as long as the results of this study cannot be obtained 
by means of experiments with persons that do have legal capacity”.21 According to the 
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Council of State, however, this caveat was in direct violation of Article 7 of the 1976 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that prohibits any medical and 
scientific experimentation without the prior and in freedom given consent of research 
subjects—a clause which had been adopted to prevent any future recurrence of the 
atrocities committed under the flag of scientific research in the Nazi concentration 
camps in World War II, and that had been ratified by the Netherlands in 1978.22 The 
same went, the Council of State suspected, for the European Convention of Human 
Rights of 1950. While the Convention itself does not explicitly address the conduct of 
human research studies, the European Commission had ruled in 1983 that “medical 
treatment of an experimental character and without the consent of the person in-
volved may under certain circumstances be regarded as prohibited by Article 3” 
which forbids inhumane or degrading treatments or punishments.23 
 It took Simons over one and a half years to respond to the objections raised by the 
Council of State. Surprisingly, despite the bill’s muddled history when it came to de-
sired oversight systems, he took no issue with the Council’s protest against a reactive 
surveillance mode. In fact, the State Secretary now once more proposed a proactive 
system to counteract the Council’s charge that the bill contained vague ethical stand-
ards. A proactive system made the prior permission by a review committee a defining 
criterion for criminal prosecution, which was a crystal-clear juridical norm.24 What 
was more, as review committees were only quasi-judicial bodies, they did not have to 
follow the same judicial rules of evidence as criminal courts had to, meaning that they 
could draw on ethical norms in the review of human research studies. 
 Simons was more reluctant, however, to concede to the Council’s criticism about 
allowing non-therapeutic experiments with legally incapacitated individuals. Yes, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibited such research studies, 
but, as the Council of State itself made clear, this Article had been informed by the 
Nazi concentration camp experiments, which were certainly not the experiments the 
Dutch department of Welfare, Health and Culture had in mind. It wished to allow for, 
say, experiments with patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, to aid a better un-
derstanding of the nervous system of such patients, and to conduct EEG-tests on 
children under the age of ten.25 Simons was therefore only willing to meet the Council 
of State halfway. He would adapt Dees’ bill to state that only those experiments with 
legally incapacitated individuals that directly benefited those belonging to the same 
legal category were permitted, and then only those studies which could absolutely not 
be performed without them. In addition, the bill would demand that this type of stud-
ies was only permitted if they contained minimal risks and objections and that they 
could only be reviewed by one national committee to guarantee “the greatest possible 
care and expertise”.26 With such extra precautions in place, however, Simons did wish 
to allow for non-therapeutic experiments with legally incapacitated individuals, and 
in 1991, he once again felt ready to pilot a third version of the Dutch human experi-
mentation bill through the national House of Representatives. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 1. 
23 Ibid., p. 3. See also: ECHR, X v. Denmark, (no. 9974/82), Commission decision of 2 March 1983, D. 
& R. 32, p. 282. 
24 Tweede Kamer 1991-1992, Kamerstuk 22588-A, p. 4. 
25 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
26 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Unfortunately for Simons, when Dutch members of parliament could for the first 
time submit written comments on this latest version of the human experimentation 
bill, it became clear that members from across the political spectrum struggled with 
precisely this element of the legislative proposal.27 It did not help in this regard, that 
no consensus existed on the issue among influential Dutch commentators on the bill. 
Proponents could count on the support of ethicist Inez de Beaufort, who had success-
fully defended a dissertation on medical experiments with human beings in 1985 and 
who warned that fully excluding legally incapacitated people from medical research 
would make any scientific breakthroughs impossible that could help treat disorders 
from which only these individuals suffered.28 A similar argument was put forward by 
the health lawyer Evert-Ben van Veen, who was an oft-cited authority on human ex-
periments and who supported Simons in his reading of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.29 Opponents, however, could count on the support of jurists 
Lucas Bergkamp and Henk Leenen (see chapter 3), who argued that non-therapeutic 
experiments with the legally incapacitated did violate Article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.30 Although one could think up many examples 
of low-risk experiments that could potentially benefit these groups, the fact remained 
that others would decide if they were willing to contribute to scientific progress with-
out any direct benefit in return. Crossing this line was like opening a can of worms: 
innocent studies would be stretched to match others that were also fairly innocent, 
which would serve as precedent for studies that were surely also reasonably innocent. 
Be warned, Leenen wrote, “exceptions often devour the rule”.31 
The fact that someone of Leenen’s calibre opposed the human experimentation bill 
carried weight among members of Dutch parliament.32 And because they more gen-
erally found it difficult to decide which way was best (“we have not yet found the phi-
losophers’ stone”, the liberal party wrote in 1992), they decided mid-1993 to organize 
another expert hearing on the topic.33 Parliamentarians wanted to know what type of 
non-therapeutic experiments with the legally incapacitated were typically conducted 
in the Netherlands and if these were really necessary from a medical point of view.34 
Although the members did not yet give any verdict, it appeared a realistic possibility 
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28 I. de Beaufort, ‘Niet-therapeutisch wetenschappelijk onderzoek met wils-onbekwame personen’, in 
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde Vol. 133 (1989), pp. 737-740. 
29 Van Veen had also served as the secretary to the National Council committee on medical experimen-
tation to have evaluated Dees’ legislative bill in the late 1980s and was politically regarded as an expert 
on the subject. See: Evert-Ben van Veen, ‘Het betrekken van incompetenten in experimenten – een 
commentaar op enige commentaren’, in Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht Vol. 13 (1989), pp. 536-
551; Evert-Ben van Veen, ‘Het betrekken van incompetenten bij experimenten’, in Tijdschrift voor 
Gezondheidsrecht Vol. 14 (1990), pp. 33-35. 
30 L. Bergkamp, ‘Een voorstel voor een Wet op de medische experimenten: enkele kanttekeningen’, in 
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht Vol. 13 (1989), pp. 190-204; H.J.J. Leenen, ‘Niet-therapeutische 
experimenten met incompetenten’, in Nederlands Juristenblad Vol. 64 (1989), pp. 1501-1504; L. 
Bergkamp, ‘Het betrekken van incompetenten bij experimenten’, in Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Ge-
zondheidsrecht Vol. 14 (1990), pp. 19-26; H.J.J. Leenen, ‘Het betrekken van incompetenten bij expe-
rimenten’, in Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht Vol. 14 (1990), pp. 29-32. 
31 Leenen, ‘Niet-therapeutische experimenten met incompetenten’. 
32 Tweede Kamer 1992-1993, Kamerstuk 22588, nr. 5, p. 38. 
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that Dutch parliament would come to forbid all non-therapeutic research with legally 
incapacitated individuals in the Netherlands. Alarmed by this prospect, no less than 
12 biomedical associations sent a joint letter to the Dutch government in late 1993 to 
explain the “paramount importance that it remains possible in the Netherlands to 
conduct excellent and acceptable non-therapeutic research with the legally incapaci-
tated”.35 It was signed both by politically influential associations such as the KNMG, 
the Royal Dutch Academy of the Sciences (KNAW), and the Netherlands Organisa-
tion for Scientific Research (NWO), and by associations which united medical practi-
tioners who often treated legally incapacitated patients.36 
Due to the commotion, the department of Welfare, Health and Culture decided it 
once again needed more advice on the matter. In May 1994, it therefore installed an 
ad-hoc committee consisting of three physicians, an epidemiologist, an ethicist, and a 
jurist to write up a policy advice. 37 One year later, this committee concluded it should 
be possible to engage in low-risk non-therapeutic experiments with legally incapaci-
tated individuals if a thereto installed committee had first given its approval. It rec-
ommended, however, to replace the terminology of ‘medical experiments’ in the legis-
lative proposal with ‘medico-scientific research’. For one thing, because the scope of 
the bill covered both observational and interventional research studies, while only the 
latter were usually denoted as experiments in the Dutch language. For another, be-
cause the use of “the term [experiment] seems to evoke negative associations in the 
average citizen”.38 Hence, like the Central Council before it, also this committee pro-
posed a rebranding of human experimentation to neutralize what it suspected might 
be a leading cause in the hesitant public opinion about non-therapeutic studies with 
legally incapacitated people: a tarnished public image (see chapter 4). With this latest 
addition in place, the Dutch government in 1995 once more felt confident to submit 
the newly baptised ‘legislative proposal on medico-scientific research with humans’ to 
the national House of Representatives. Yet, due to another change in government and 
standard parliamentary delays, the first oral treatment of the bill did not take place 
before September 1997. By then, a definitive law for regulating human research in the 
Netherlands had been in the making for already more than fifteen years. 
 
*** 
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 The slow trajectory of the Dutch human experimentation bill during the 1980s and 
1990s gave rise to many concerns and frustrations in the Netherlands. In the sixteen 
years that passed between the publication of the Central Council report in 1982 and 
the effectuation of the WMO in 1998, members of Dutch parliament filed numerous 
motions in attempt to pressure the government into making haste with its legislative 
plans for human experimentation.39 In 1989, one member even warned in parliament 
that the lack of proper legislation had made the Netherlands “a true paradise for con-
ducting experiments” for researchers from countries like the United States in which 
human research acts had existed for quite some time now. This, the concerned par-
liament member charged, was “utterly reprehensible from an ethical and patient pro-
tection point of view”.40 Dutch patients were turning into guinea pigs for the world-
wide research community while their own government stood idly by. 
 In Medisch Contact, similar concerns could be heard from time to time as well. In 
1986, for example, health jurist Henriette Roscam Abbing pondered cynically what 
would come in the Netherlands of the regulation of more controversial biomedical 
research fields, like recombinant DNA technology, if the Dutch government could not 
even enact a human research act, a law about which an overwhelming consensus ex-
isted that it actually should be there. If the government did not hurry up its legislative 
process, she warned, the Netherlands would soon turn into “a ‘free state’ for experi-
ments […] which are refused elsewhere”.41 Similarly, in 1987, a group of general prac-
titioners warned that “the Netherlands is (becoming) an international testing ground 
for all sorts of experimental research”.42 In recent years, they claimed, Dutch general 
practitioners had started receiving more and more requests from international phar-
maceutical companies to enrol their patients in clinical trials in return for financial 
rewards or lucrative gifts like a computer.43 Deputy Superintendent of Public Health 
Herman van Geuns confirmed these claims in Medisch Contact: in the past few years, 
the Dutch State Inspectorate had received multiple complaints from general practi-
tioners about advances of ‘Big Pharma’, which would be drawn to Dutch general prac-
tice because of its lack of systematic oversight.44 Although the State Inspectorate tried 
to fill this lacuna the best it could, Van Geuns wrote half apologetically—half angrily, 
“it can only effectively perform this task, if a legal basis exists for it”.45 
 In the late 1980s and 1990s, more of these concerns were voiced in Dutch parlia-
ment, academic journals, and the general press. If the Dutch government failed to act 
soon, their repeated message was, something was bound to go seriously wrong in the 
ethical conduct of human research studies in the Netherlands. Without the realiza-
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*** 
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 The slow trajectory of the Dutch human experimentation bill during the 1980s and 
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tion of a proper legal basis for the governance of these studies, their proper oversight 
was simply impossible. However, if any foreign researcher after reading such articles 
would have descended upon the Netherlands in the expectation that (s)he would be 
able to conduct all sorts of medical experiments with humans in the country without 
encountering some sort of review board, (s)he would have been in for a rude awaken-
ing. For a wealth of oversight bodies for human experimentation did spring up in the 
Netherlands in the 1980s—So many, in fact, that by the end of the decade, traditional 
enthusiasts of the research ethics committee had started to argue that legislation was 
needed to bring the practice of ethics by committee itself under control. 
 
Developments on the ground 
 
 In 1976, the first official ‘research ethics committee’ of the Netherlands was inau-
gurated at Leiden University, titled the Committee Medical Ethics (CME). The Leiden 
CME was installed to provide institutional advice on various issues of ethical concern, 
but its foremost task was the ethics review of research protocols of medical experi-
ments with human subjects that were executed under auspices of the Leiden medical 
faculty and university hospital. This local review board, which would become the pro-
totype for almost all other Dutch research ethics committees in the 1980s and 1990s, 
was the brainchild of a medical scientist who had held a professorial chair in pharma-
cology at Leiden since 1963 and who by 1976 had become quite the national authority 
on the governance of human research with review committees. The founder and first 
chairman of the Leiden CME was the pharmacologist Erik Noach. 
 Noach had actually already been involved in early experiments with the communal 
ethics review of clinical research studies at Leiden university since 1965. In early June 
of that year, the board of the Leiden medical faculty had received a letter from geneti-
cist and scientific director of its Institute for Radio Pathology and Radiation Protec-
tion Frits Sobels with the following request: 
  
Given the medical-ethical issues which the leadership of the Institute of Radio 
Pathology and Radiation Protection faces when it comes to making observations 
in human research subjects, I would appreciate it when you would install a facul-
ty committee that may provide advice in such cases. It seems to me that it might 
be useful in general if a permanent faculty committee will be created for medical-
ethical problems which are related to research on human subjects.46 
 
The faculty board had responded by requesting Sobels to write a report on the possi-
ble installation of such a committee, a task which he set out to fulfil with Leiden in-
ternist Jaap de Graeff and the newly appointed professor in pharmacology at Leiden 
university Erik Noach. In December 1965, Noach presented this report in front of the 
board of the medical faculty and recommended the installation of a “permanent fac-
                                                 
46 The early history of the Leiden committee medical ethics is described in detail by Prof.mr.dr. Dick 
Engberts, the current vice-chairman of the committee (2016) in: D.P. Engberts, ‘De vroege Jaren. Ont-
staan en werkzaamheid van een medisch-ethische (toetsings)commissie in Leiden in de Jaren zestig van 
de vorige eeuw’, in Dilemma’s getoetst, pp. 9-28. This article is based on Noach’s personal archive and 
the archive of the Leiden Committee Medical Ethics. Sobel’s letter is quoted on page 9. 
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ulty committee” that could help formulate standards for the conduct of human exper-
iments and help decide in specific cases if researchers acted in accordance with these 
norms.47 Notably, the board did not follow this advice; no official ethics committee 
was installed in Leiden in 1965. Yet, in the period thereafter, it did occasionally start 
to send human research protocols to the three physicians with the request to evaluate 
their permissibility, making their activities one of the first forms of ethics by commit-
tee in the oversight of human experimentation in the Netherlands. 
 It is not entirely clear why the board of the Leiden medical faculty at times started 
to send human research protocols for evaluation to the triumvirate Sobels, De Graeff, 
and Noach in the late 1960s. At first, they were only asked to advise on the permissi-
bility of ultimum refugium experiments (i.e. experimental interventions that serve as 
a last resort to safe a patient). From July 1967 onwards, however, the men were also 
occasionally asked to review protocols for the execution of a randomized controlled 
trial.48 A letter posted in 1967 by the Leiden medical faculty’s board of trustees to the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare offers one reason why this devel-
opment took place. This letter, that was written in the context of a grant-application, 
served to reassure the United States government of the following: 
 
[…] In 1965, the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Leiden instituted a 
committee to investigate all proposed experimental procedures involving hu-
mans which are to be undertaken by the members of the faculty.49 
 
This was quite an exaggeration, as Sobels, De Graeff, and Noach by no means evalu-
ated all or even most human research protocols in Leiden. Yet in 1966, in the midst of 
the public outrage over the many questionable clinical experiments with human sub-
jects that would regularly take place in United States hospitals, the U.S. Public Health 
Service (PHS) had made “prior review of the judgment of the principal investigator or 
program director by a committee of his institutional associates” an official eligibility 
requirement for those who wished to receive PHS-grants (see chapter 4). Soon there-
after, this policy was also adopted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.50 In theory, these poli-
cies mandated that also Dutch researchers hoping to receive grant money from the 
PHS (or Dutch companies wishing to market their products on the United States con-
sumer market) needed to have their human research studies monitored by ‘a commit-
tee of his institutional associates’, which explains the reassuring letter of the Leiden 
medical faculty to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare: it ensured 
the access of its researchers to American money. In reality, however, only Leiden had 
some sort of review board in the late 1960s and even this committee appears to have 
disbanded for unknown reasons after a few years of semi-active duty.51  
                                                 
47 See also: J. Bennebroek Gravenhorst, ‘Medisch-ethische toetsing van wetenschappelijk onderzoek in 
Nederland’, in Geneeskunde en Ethiek in Harmonie, pp. 97-105, p. 98. 
48 Ibid., p. 19. 
49 Ibid., p. 15. 
50 A detailed overview of this development is provided in Stark, Behind Closed Doors. The quote from 
the PHS’s 1966 decree is derived from page 154. 
51 Engberts, ‘De vroege jaren’, p. 22. 
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 It was in November 1973 that the board of the Leiden medical faculty received an-
other request from one of its physicians to install a research ethics committee. The 
reason underlying this request, this physician wrote, was that medical research inter-
nationally seemed to be subjected increasingly to ethical demands. Publications, for 
instance, “are [now] sometimes made dependent on the existence of a written verdict 
of an ethics committee”. Hence, it would be helpful if the Leiden medical faculty was 
willing to install a review committee that “can operate as official conscience and war-
ranting agency”.52 Again, the faculty council commissioned Noach for a response. The 
pharmacologist wrote back to state that Sobels, De Graeff, and he were no longer ac-
tive because they had expected the government to take over after publication of the 
Health Council advice ‘clinical drug research’ in 1971 (see chapter 2), in which he and 
his team had recommended the formal regulation of human research in the Nether-
lands. However, as it appeared that the Dutch government was in no hurry to realize 
any public oversight mechanisms for the practice (see chapter 2), Noach agreed that 
it would be a good idea for the Leiden medical faculty to reactivate its dormant ethics 
committee.53 In June 1976, this advice resulted in the official instalment of the Leiden 
CME, often taken to be the oldest Dutch research ethics committee. 
 In 1979, Noach proudly reported in Medisch Contact that his CME had received 
more than 60 requests for advice over the past three years, most of which had been 
handled within six weeks.54 Things were going well, the pharmacologist wrote. Even 
though the CME could officially only review protocols which researchers had actually 
decided to submit, it inhabited quite a powerful position within the academic hospital 
and medical faculty, as both institutions had agreed only to be held liable for research 
studies that the CME had authorized. This ‘threat’, the expectation was, would incite 
most researchers to first pay the CME a visit before starting a study. Noach empha-
sized, however, that Leiden researchers did not have to  fear the CME. Protocols were 
always evaluated in consultation with the applicants, and procedures were specifically 
designed to pose only a minimal burden. Researchers really had to think of the CME 
as a collegial form of peer review and not as a meddlesome form of oversight—Noach 
et al. were no police men.55 Still, ethics review was needed, the pharmacologist wrote, 
because “the regularly resurfacing view that particularly in teaching hospitals patients 
would be used as ‘guinea pigs’ can only be combatted with a clearly coordinated poli-
cy that does not need to shun publicity, particularly with regards to ethical issues”.56 
Ethics boards had to help restore the public’s trust in medical research. 
 The Leiden CME was not the only research ethics committee active in the Nether-
lands at the end of the 1970s. In 1973, a committee had been established at the Free 
University of Amsterdam which gave advice about clinical pharmacological research 
as well as about euthanasia and abortion cases.57 In 1977, a survey conducted at TNO 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 22. 
53 Ibid., p. 23. 
54 Noach & De Kroon, ‘Medische ethiek: patiënten en proeven’, pp. 1575-1583.  
55 See also: P.J.W.M. de Kroon, ‘De begintijd van de Leidse Commissie voor Medische Ethiek’, in 
Geneeskunde en Ethiek in Harmonie, pp. 93-95. 
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by the biochemist Theo Gerritsen (see chapter 4) on the existence of review commit-
tees in the Netherlands brought back that a ‘committee research subjects’ had recent-
ly been installed at the university of Rotterdam and that small informal review groups 
were now active at the universities of Nijmegen and Utrecht as well. Gerritsen, how-
ever, was sceptical about the actual functioning of these committees. “With the excep-
tion of Leiden”, the biochemist wrote down in an internal TNO-memo in 1977, “the 
situation with regards to monitoring the use of human subjects is so miserable at the 
Dutch teaching hospitals and medical faculties that it does not appear sensible to 
trust the judgment of these self-styled local committees”.58 By the end of the 1970s, in 
short, the practice of ethics by committee to oversee the conduct of human research 
studies was still hardly a familiar phenomenon in the Netherlands. 
 
*** 
 
 This changed spectacularly in the 1980s. In June 1981, the University of Groning-
en proudly announced in Medisch Contact that “after Leiden now also Groningen has 
its CME”.59 In 1985, Noach could report that approximately 20 ethics boards were 
now active in the Netherlands.60 Merely one year later, jurist Lucas Bergkamp already 
counted 63 research ethics committees in the country. In a few years’ time, Bergkamp 
predicted, their total would likely amount to more than a hundred.61 Sure enough, by 
1989 their grand total was estimated to lie around 150 committees.62 
 Commentators in the 1980s at times puzzled about the sudden exponential growth 
of Dutch research ethics committees in the absence of legislation mandating the eth-
ics review of human experiments in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, various likely rea-
sons exist to explain why they shot up like mushrooms in this period. First of all, the 
fact that State Secretary Van der Reijden in 1984 made research ethics committees an 
admission requirement for Dutch health insurance funds undoubtedly played a role 
in their explosive growth rate after the mid-1980s. Secondly, the history of the Leiden 
CME indicates that changing grant and publishing policies likely had an effect as well. 
Indeed, when Bergkamp in 1986 asked 25 Dutch research ethics committees why they 
had been established in the early 1980s, grant and publishing policies scored high on 
their lists.63 By then, especially Anglo-Saxon funding agencies and journals had made 
written approval of an ethics committee a requirement to be able to apply for funding 
or to submit an article involving the conduct of human research studies. 
                                                                                                                                            
TNO received a letter from the Free University of Amsterdam about the activities of this committee, 
stating it had only been active for four years (thus going back to 1973). See: NL-HaNA, 2.14.36.06, 
481, brief van Chr. L. Rümke aan TNO, 01-04-1977. 
58 NL-HaNA, 2.14.36.06, 481, brief van T. Gerritsen aan H.G. van Brummen, 20-04-1977. In Groning-
en, a research ethics committee existed on paper, which was inactive in practice. 
59 ‘Medisch Ethische Commissie’, in Medisch Contact Vol. 36 (1981), p. 776. 
60 E.L. Noach, ‘De functie van ethische commissies bij medische experimenten met mensen’, in Me-
disch Contact Vol. 40 (1985), pp. 872-874. 
61 L. Bergkamp, Medisch Ethische Commissies en het Toezicht op Experimenten met Mensen. Verslag 
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missies (Universiteit van Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Geneeskunde, 1986), p. 204, p. 14. 
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*** 
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 Also in the Netherlands this policy had started to gain ground in the early 1980s. 
In respectively 1978 and 1980, both the Dutch Foundation for Fundamental Medical 
Research (FUNGO-ZWO) and TNO had adopted the same set of guidelines stipulat-
ing that all grant applications for experiments with humans directed at their address 
had to be accompanied by a positive verdict from a “committee research subjects”.64 
FUNGO and TNO stated to base this policy on the 1975 revision of the Declaration of 
Helsinki, which demanded that all human research protocols from then on had to be 
submitted to “a specially appointed independent committee for consideration, com-
ment and guidance”.65 Hence, rather than awaiting whatever decision the Dutch gov-
ernment might eventually make in the regulation of human research studies, the then 
two most influential public financers of medical research in the Netherlands decided 
to go along with international trends in the governance of the practice. If the national 
government would not act up to protect Dutch research subjects, the suggestion was, 
the Dutch scientific community and its funders would act themselves. 
 In Medisch Contact, the initiative of FUNGO and TNO was interpreted a tat more 
cynically by biologist and philosopher Matthijs Visser (see chapter 4) as an attempt to 
“prevent outside interference by putting one’s house in order”.66 Indeed, when going 
through the archive of the TNO-committee that prepared these guidelines, one comes 
away feeling somewhat ambivalent about why these were issued precisely in 1980. As 
far as can be judged, the committee certainly appears to have had the interests of re-
search subjects in mind when devising these guidelines. For one thing, Leenen served 
as a committee member, who was notorious for his fierce defence of patients’ rights, 
and also chairman Gerritsen seems to have been an enthusiast for realizing research 
ethics committees in the Netherlands that would strongly curb the conduct of clinical 
research studies in favour of the protection of Dutch research subjects. Early drafts of 
the TNO guidelines testify to these concerns. Section 6 of the draft guidelines, for 
example, stipulated that experiments with human beings were only ever allowed if no 
coercion had been exercised on research subjects and that experiments with people in 
a dependent relation—like employees and soldiers—should therefore be discouraged. 
In addition, the Section contained a substantial list of people who should never be 
permitted to serve as research subjects, including children, ‘imbeciles’, ‘the mentally 
disturbed’, comatose patients, dying people, prisoners, and patients suffering from a 
disease other than the one studied in the experiment itself.67 
 When these guidelines were discussed by the Executive Committee of TNO in Feb-
ruary 1978, however, it became clear that not everyone in the upper echelons of the 
applied science organization was equally enthusiastic about the fact that an organisa-
tion like TNO would formulate such strict guidelines. One board member, in particu-
lar, stated outright to have fundamental objections to the draft guidelines: “Human 
research will be seriously hampered on non-scientific grounds, on grounds of sensi-
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tive social repression, if Section 6 is accepted”.68 Although it was important to protect 
research subjects, this board member continued, it was equally essential to protect 
biomedical research studies from overly rigid regulations: “It would be disastrous for 
human research if universal guidelines are imposed, as these make very important 
research impossible through their formal and literal application, and this on pseudo-
ethical grounds”.69 One apparently only had to look at the United States for this fear 
to be confirmed. There, research was made impossible “on grounds that are little sci-
entific and apparently ethical”. Really, it would be “unacceptable if human research is 
substantially curtailed under the guise of medical ethics”.70 
Gerritsen tried to reassure the Executive Committee that he in essence agreed with 
such objections, which was why the guidelines had already been “phrased sufficiently 
relativistic”: the key was that local research ethics committees could decide on a case-
by-case basis whether a research study was ethically acceptable or not, allowing them 
to make flexible decisions.71 Nonetheless, this admission could not assure the TNO-
board members that the guidelines were ready to be published. They internally had to 
be discussed more first. In the months thereafter, Section 6 was effectively watered 
down to state that experiments could “as a rule” not be conducted with special groups 
or coercion and that, if researchers wanted to make an exception to this rule, they had 
to provide persuasive motives for it.72 While this addition saved Section 6 from elimi-
nation, it also gave researchers enough freedom to deviate from it whenever they felt 
this was needed for their work to progress. In an internal memo, Gerritsen concluded 
that the guidelines had become a compromise between those who feared that ethical 
rules would sound the death knell for all Dutch clinical research and those who were 
concerned that not enough was done to guarantee the rights of Dutch patients. At a 
time that international pressure was mounting, they served to protect the conduct of 
human research as much as they served to protect research subjects.73 
Still, even if the precise reasons of TNO (and FUNGO) for honouring the Declara-
tion of Helsinki might have been more ambiguous than they were publicly made out 
to be, the fact that the two of the biggest sponsors of medical research in the Nether-
lands came to demand that all human research studies funded through their channels 
had to be reviewed by ethics boards likely became a significant driver in the installa-
tion of research ethics committees in the Netherlands in the 1980s. As ethicist Mau-
rice de Wachter wrote of this financial incentive in Medisch Contact in 1978: “Recent-
ly, one can recognize a trend of financial sponsors explicitly demanding safeguards 
[for human experiments] as a condition for funding”. “What morality itself could not 
effectuate”, the ethicist concluded both cynically and expectantly of this development, 
“probably thus will be achieved with some pressure on the purses”.74 
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 Other sort of financial incentives probably had a similar effect. In 1981, for exam-
ple, the FDA reached an agreement with the U.S. Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare which mandated institutional review for all FDA-regulated activities in-
volving human research subjects.75 From then onwards, clinical research studies that 
involved medicines, vaccines, medical devices or other products regulated by the FDA 
could not commence until an Institutional Review Board had given its permission. 
Although these regulations were not directly applicable to studies conducted outside 
of the United States—as “standards of protection for human subjects may vary from 
country to country, and the United States should not impose its standards on other 
countries”—it is very well possible that also pharmaceutical companies conducting 
human research studies in the Netherlands decided to comply with these conditions 
to sell their products on the lucrative American consumer market.76 Similarly, in the 
1980s, the European Economic Community (EEC) started to develop harmonization 
requirements for products traded within its member states. In 1990, it published the 
position paper ‘Good clinical practice for trials of medicinal products in the European 
Community’ that stipulated the need for prior ethics review of human research proto-
cols.77 Even though this document only had the status of a ‘compelling recommenda-
tion’, it is likely that also this policy contributed significantly to the explosive rise of 
Dutch research ethics committees in the late twentieth century.78 
 
*** 
 
 As a result of these developments, a dense and at times impermeable forest of re-
search ethics committees had sprung up in the Netherlands towards the end of the 
1980s. These committees operated under various guises—interchangeably called in-
stitutional review boards, medical ethics committees, independent review councils, or 
ethics committees—with hardly any rules for their composition. Anyone, really, could 
claim the existence of a Dutch research ethics committee in the late 1980s. People 
did. In 1987, for instance, a few months after Deputy Superintendent of Public Health 
Van Geuns had warned in Medisch Contact that insufficient oversight mechanisms 
for human research studies existed in Dutch general practice clinics, the journal pub-
lished a letter by two members of an unnamed Dutch research ethics committee huff-
ing angrily that “the State Inspectorate apparently is not aware of the fact that an 
objective review option most certainly does exist”. Did he not know the Foundation 
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‘Independent Review Board’ was active in the Netherlands outside of hospital walls? 
And that it had been brought into existence by ‘the research community’ to “advocate 
the importance of assessing the ethical and legal acceptability of extramural experi-
mental research in an impartial manner, irrespective of any institution and without 
any commercial intention?”.79 Well, clearly Van Geuns did not. From which one may 
either conclude that the Dutch Deputy Superintendent of Public Health was not that 
well informed about the concerns he chose to write about in Medisch Contact or that 
the actual practice and system of ethics review in the Netherlands had become a bit 
inscrutable, to say the least. As a result, even though research ethics committees had 
been envisioned to restore a much needed public trust in the Dutch medical research 
establishment at the start of the 1980s, they themselves were increasingly turning 
into an object of distrust in the Netherlands towards the end of it. 
 
Distrust, frustration, and the call for uniformity 
 
 In itself, of course, distrust of research ethics committees was not altogether new in 
the Netherlands in the late 1980s. Also in the late 1970s and early 1980s the function-
ing of these bodies had occasionally been criticized in the Netherlands. In 1980, for 
instance, one year after Noach had proudly suggested in Medisch Contact that his 
CME was already widely accepted in Leiden, the Dutch medical journal received a 
rather biting letter from the Leiden surgeon M. A. van Dongen suggesting otherwise. 
Printed as ‘Experiments on humans’, its first lines read as follows: 
  
After years of silence about Him, there he is, God, the Father, with his watchful 
eye also in the Academic Hospital of Leiden. Finally in the hospital ‘for advanced 
medicine’ of the Praesidium Libertatis, while the confessional universities are ar-
duously trying to get rid of Him. His name: CME.80 
 
Leiden, the oldest university of the Netherlands, had carried the slogan ‘bulwark of 
freedom’ (Libertatis praesidium) ever since the late nineteenth century to emphasize 
its status as an independent university where scientific study could progress free from 
undue ideological and religious influences. Anno 1980, however, Leiden had also be-
come the first Dutch university to install an in-house committee authorized to deter-
mine whether its researchers behaved ethically—a development which clearly did not 
sit well with all members of the old Praesidium Libertatis.81 
 The event that provoked this disgruntled letter was specific, yet revealing for later 
discussions on the public governance of ethically controversial human research prac-
tices. In December 1979, newspaper De Telegraaf had reported that a Leiden intern-
ist had taken blood samples from foetuses aborted in the fifth month of pregnancy for 
a study he was conducting into ‘normal levels of coagulation’ in foetuses of that age.82 
This news caused a public outcry in the Netherlands. Although it was uncertain if the 
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discussions on the public governance of ethically controversial human research prac-
tices. In December 1979, newspaper De Telegraaf had reported that a Leiden intern-
ist had taken blood samples from foetuses aborted in the fifth month of pregnancy for 
a study he was conducting into ‘normal levels of coagulation’ in foetuses of that age.82 
This news caused a public outcry in the Netherlands. Although it was uncertain if the 
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foetuses had still shown signs of life—like muscular movement or a heartbeat—when 
the tests had been taken, leading Dutch newspapers soon reported that experiments 
were conducted on “live-aborted children” in the Netherlands.83 In the evening of 
Tuesday January 8, Dutch physician Karel Gunning, chairman of the Dutch Doctors 
Covenant (see chapter 3) and the World Federation of Doctors Who Respect Human 
Life, compared the status of foetuses in such experiments on national radio to the 
historical status of slaves and concentration camp prisoners: “The point is—to justify 
these tests, you have to assume they are not human […] That they have no soul and 
feel no pain […]”.84 Gunning therefore called on all listeners of the Evangelical Broad-
casting to start writing letters to Prime Minister Van Agt to show him that Dutch 
people would not stand for such atrocious acts. After the broadcast, multiple Dutch 
families sat down to write emotional letters to Van Agt and Queen Juliana, pleading 
them to please bring these ungodly practices to an immediate halt.85 
 De Telegraaf pointed out that the experiments had been brought to light when the 
internist had tried to submit a research report to the British Journal of Haematology 
for publication. The journal had responded positively, but had requested the internist 
to procure some sort of evidence that his study had been conducted in accordance 
with the reigning Dutch standards for the ethical assessment of clinical experiments. 
To clear this hurdle, the Leiden internist had knocked on the door of Noach’s CME. 
“A bit naïve that he did not already do so before he began [his research]”, Noach was 
quoted to say in De Telegraaf. Nonetheless, his team would take on an after-the-fact 
ethics review of the blood tests taken at the abortion clinic.86 
 This comment had apparently gotten Van Dongen, who was also secretary to the 
Dutch Doctors Covenant, worked up. How could it be, the surgeon charged rhetori-
cally in Medisch Contact, that in an era in which even the KNMG admitted it could no 
longer “adopt in writing generally accepted rules of conduct”, a select group of people 
could be anointed to tell right from wrong within the walls of an academic hospital? 
Why was it that in an age when traditional moral authority was withering away, a new 
‘God’ could be inaugurated to do an ‘after-the-fact ethics review’ of experiments with 
aborted foetuses? And what sort of qualifications did these reviewers have that al-
lowed them to make such grand decisions? “Are we jubilant when first a philosopher 
is added to the little club of moderators?”, Van Dongen wrote angrily, “Are we then 
later put at ease when the philosopher turns out to be an ethicist?” Really, what sort 
of expertise did these professionals possess to help them solve ethical dilemmas that 
the Netherlands at large no longer had a univocal answer to?87 
 In the late 1990s, these pressing questions by Van Dongen were raised again in the 
parliamentary debates on the WMO, specifically in discussions over the permissibility 
of experiments with legally incapacitated individuals: what authority and expertise 
did research ethics committees possess to sensibly decide on the ethical permissibility 
of research studies about which no reasonable consensus existed in the Netherlands? 
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Yet, in the early 1980s, the criticism voiced by Van Dongen, which basically discarded 
the entire notion of ethics by committee, did not do much to dampen the burgeoning 
enthusiasm for research ethics committees in the Netherlands.88 Quite the opposite, 
despite the fact that their rise marked a historically unprecedented incursion on the 
professional autonomy of Dutch researchers, only few felt the need to publicly criti-
cize the establishment of more and more research ethics committees in the 1980s. By 
the early 1990s, still, those looking for biting comments on the functioning of Dutch 
research ethics committees by members of the Dutch medical research establishment 
could really only refer to a single article: a two-page commentary by the Flemish phy-
sician Jan Vandenbroucke that was published in 1990 in the Dutch Journal of Medi-
cine.89 In all its singularity, however, this article made significant waves, in no small 
part because Vandenbroucke was a prominent and respected member of the Dutch 
medical research establishment. Appointed in 1987 at Leiden University as a profes-
sor of clinical epidemiology, the Flemish physician had quickly risen to prominence 
in the Netherlands as a prolific advocate of the upcoming evidence-based medicine 
movement and astute commentator on the Dutch health care system.90 And around 
1990, he would increasingly position himself as an ardent critic of the Dutch patients’ 
rights movement and the detrimental effect he believed this movement to have on the 
conduct of medical research studies in the Netherlands. 
 
*** 
 
 In his 1990 article, provocatively titled ‘Medical ethics and health law: obstacles for 
a further increase of medical knowledge?’, Vandenbroucke strongly criticized the 
functioning of research ethics committees in the Netherlands. In the last few decades, 
the epidemiologist claimed, more and more uniform rules and procedures had been 
introduced for the governance of medical research and practice in the name of medi-
cal ethics, health law, and patient autonomy. The informed consent of patients was 
now required for every little intervention and observation (even if these did not harm 
patients in the slightest) and research ethics committees now perused research proto-
cols to see if they complied with a predetermined set of standards. This had the effect, 
Vandenbroucke stated, that the conduct of biomedical research was becoming impos-
sible in the Netherlands. Frozen vials of blood serum, for instance, could only be used 
in the country for the exact reason they had been stored, which was often later diag-
nostic use. This meant that unless their legal owner (i.e. the patient) gave permission 
otherwise, it was forbidden to use these samples for research purposes, even if they 
were used anonymously. This had the implication that retrospective epidemiological 
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studies into, say, the spread of HIV could not be executed in the Netherlands (a con-
clusion he got published in a leading Dutch newspaper under the headline stating ‘In 
the Netherlands the individual outweighs the fight against AIDS’).91 And, yet, Van-
denbroucke continued exasperated, ethicists and jurists now started to demand even 
more uniformity and stricter compliance with the rules they thought up, especially in 
the governance of human research. An era of “new Marxism” had begun in the medi-
cal sciences, in which national policies regimented scientists at the peril of innovative 
research approaches that were essential for all sciences to progress.92  
The epidemiologist borrowed this conclusion from a famous 1975 editorial by in-
ternist Franz Ingelfinger in the Annals of Internal Medicine, titled ‘The Unethical in 
Medical Ethics’. Despite “an appropriate imposition of stricter ethical guidelines in 
medical research and practice” in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ingelfinger had 
written in this editorial, genuine ethical concerns were now increasingly trivialized by 
the realization of juridical procedures that mainly served to avoid risk and litiga-
tion.93 In the United States, the “interminable regulations in the futile pursuit of cov-
ering all contingencies” already bordered on the absurd, while one had to wonder if 
this “bureaucracy of ethics” made the conduct of human experimentation more ethi-
cal. After all, eventually these rules and procedures were likely to have the opposite 
effect of what institutional ethics review had originally meant to achieve. For in every 
bureaucracy, Ingelfinger claimed, it was almost inevitable that “the force of the basic 
ethic is weakened, [that] the details become more important than their essence, [that] 
the letter of the law takes precedence over its spirit”.94 
In 1975, Ingelfinger had held a new cadre of experts responsible for this supposed 
bureaucratization of medical ethics: jurists and ethicists, professional practitioners of 
the emerging field of bioethics in the United States. In 1990, Vandenbroucke did the 
same. Practitioners from the newly established disciplines of health law and ethics in 
the Netherlands, the epidemiologist argued, constantly clamoured with the constitu-
tion and principles of autonomy in hand that “no one may be obliged to contribute to 
the wellbeing of others, not even if they are not in the least affected”.95 These “outsid-
ers” now even argued that “only good research may pass as ethical research”, a prop-
osition that proved their flawed understanding of scientific practice: 
 
This position assumes it is possible for them (or others) to determine what meth-
odologically correct research is, and that it can be known in advance that meth-
odologically correct research will result in correct results and that methodologi-
cally less good research will automatically result in errors. This [stance] fails to 
take the actual dynamics of medico-scientific research into account.96 
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Actual practitioners of the biomedical sciences, of course, would never come up with 
such a nonsensical demand. Hence, Vandenbroucke suggested austerely in closing of 
his article, rather than guarding the borders of medicine, jurists and ethicists might 
want to guard the borders of their own disciplines a bit more closely. For their enthu-
siasm was turning into an unethical threat to the progress of medicine. 
 Unsurprisingly, Vandenbroucke’s comments were received somewhat scornfully by 
prominent ethicists and jurists in the Netherlands. Leiden ethicist Heleen Dupuis, for 
instance, complained that “the statements of Vandenbroucke testify to a lack of taste 
and are completely incongruent with actual practice”.97 Even if research ethics com-
mittees slowed down the execution of study protocols, she argued, they certainly did 
not prevent whole scores of studies from being executed by acting as obtuse defend-
ers of principles of autonomy. Also the secretary to the Leiden CME, the ethicist and 
jurist Dick Engberts, stated in a reply to Vandenbroucke’s piece that the epidemiolo-
gist’s remarks were improvident, untrue, and at times outright offensive: “By talking 
like this, you bring the integrity of colleagues into disrepute”.98 In the Dutch Journal 
of Medicine, in the meanwhile, Leenen accused Vandenbroucke of sheer ignorance. 
The epidemiologist not only came across uninformed about recent developments in 
health law and ethics, the jurist wrote angrily, he also put words in the mouths of ju-
rists and ethicists that did not belong there. Equally austerely, therefore, Leenen ad-
vised Vandenbroucke “to stay within the borders of his own discipline and to first 
acquire knowledge of other disciplines if he wants to judge them”.99 
Criticism also came, albeit in lesser numbers, from Dutch medical practitioners. In 
Medisch Contact, for one, Editor Cor Spreeuwenberg rebuked Vandenbroucke’s “un-
sophisticated attitude” as outright xenophobia.100 The epidemiologist was simply one 
of those practitioners who rejected all perspectives on medical practice and research 
that had not been put forward by medical colleagues. Vandenbroucke himself, how-
ever, wrote back that he had personally received many positive comments on his arti-
cle, an indication that his contribution “has formed a rendition of a large latent dis-
content within the medical profession”.101 He was willing to admit that his critics of-
fered a “useful counterweight” to his concerns, but he could not shake the impression 
that they did seem a bit too eager to dismiss his criticism as mere “isolated belching”. 
A whole cadre of eminent scientists, after all, had warned against the bureaucratiza-
tion of ethics since the 1970s. Hence, instead of brushing aside his complaints as er-
roneous and perverse, jurists and ethicists might want to try to understand why such 
isolated monodies sounded oddly in tune upon closer inspection. 
 
*** 
 
 As previous chapters have shown, jurists and ethicists only played a modest part in 
the emergence of the practice of ethics by committee in the Netherlands. The demand 
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that human research protocols should first be reviewed on their scientific and ethical 
merits had come from biomedical researchers themselves, who imagined these review 
bodies to function primarily as a form of internal control over the conduct of clinical 
research in the Netherlands. Vandenbroucke was not wrong, however, that especially 
jurists and ethicists had started arguing in the late 1980s that more uniformity had to 
be realized in the functioning of Dutch research ethics committees. Between 1986 and 
1988, for instance, the jurist Lucas Bergkamp had researched the daily functioning of 
Dutch research ethics committees and concluded that review standards differed both 
between and within the committees under investigation.102 In two 300-page reports, 
Bergkamp had analysed all rulings of 1986 from 22 research ethics committees active 
in Dutch academic and general hospitals, and had asked them to review three proto-
cols in which he purposefully had included a number of “methodological, ethical and 
informed consent-problems”.103 From this information, Bergkamp concluded that not 
all committees reviewed the methodological quality of protocols; that most had dif-
ferent rules for the required competence of researchers; and that they showed little 
consistency in their evaluation of informed consent procedures. The jurist located the 
cause for this “variation and inconsistency” in the large number of ethics committees 
active in the Netherlands, which would make it impossible to “avoid big differences in 
composition, procedures, and especially employed standards of evaluation”.104 This, 
Bergkamp claimed, was “one of the most important problems which the review sys-
tem by medical ethics committees currently has to cope with”.105 
Taken by itself, this comment might explain some of the frustration expressed by a 
researcher like Vandenbroucke about the manner in which jurists or ethicists would 
approach the governance of human experimentation. For although Bergkamp listed 
multiple examples of dubious protocols that were approved without too much diffi-
culty by the committees under investigation, his conclusions did not so much empha-
size the fact that the current review system might sustain unethical experimentation, 
but that the research ethics committees did not follow uniform procedures. Likewise, 
although the jurist did emphasize in his reports that “inconsistency between commit-
tees is not necessarily undesirable nor does consistency in itself imply a good judge-
ment”, later statements by him did sound bureaucratic at times.106 In a conference 
report on “the task and function of medical ethics committees in scientific research”, 
for instance, Bergkamp was quoted to favour standardized review procedures because 
“It remains difficult to accept that a protocol is not approved in, say, Leiden but that 
the same study can take place in Amsterdam”.107 If this type of uniformity truly was 
the most important reason why a national oversight system for human experimenta-
tion had to be realized in the Netherlands, it becomes understandable why Vanden-
broucke would voice frustration about the role that jurists (and ethicists) would play 
in discussions over the governance of the biomedical sciences. 
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Yet Bergkamp and fellow thinkers had better reasons for insisting on uniformity in 
the review of human research studies than some sort of zealous bureaucratic desire 
for standardized procedures. Already in 1985, the Dutch ethicist Inez de Beaufort had 
called for “supervision, coordination, and a certain degree of uniformity” in the jum-
ble of research ethics committees she saw springing up in the Netherlands.108 She did 
so in the last few pages of her PhD-thesis, in which she emphasized the need for flexi-
ble review procedures and acknowledged that existing research ethics committees did 
not always manage to strike the right balance between legitimate criticism and med-
dlesome interference (she herself was a member and advisor of three such commit-
tees).109 Nevertheless, De Beaufort did feel it was important to develop more uniform 
review procedures in the Netherlands. In part, she argued, this was needed to avoid 
frustration and delays in the conduct of especially large-scale clinical trials: “Those in 
a review committee who have been confronted with protocols for multi-centre trials 
are likely to have experienced that one committee sometimes judges differently than 
fellow committees”.110 Such discrepancies, De Beaufort argued, were understandably 
frustrating for researchers, who could then collect data at one hospital but not at an-
other, even though they had twice submitted the same research protocol. In part, this 
was needed to avoid frustration among ethics reviewers themselves. For one thing, 
because unexplainable differences between review boards undermined trust in the 
overall system, which had to be avoided. For another, because in those instances that 
one committee passed a protocol while another might consider rejecting it, research-
ers could put pressure on the second committee “with the argument that her ‘difficult 
attitude’ blocks a collaboration with other institutions, while another committee, note 
well, has already given a positive advise”.111 Hence, better coordination and coopera-
tion was likely to leave both researchers and reviewers less frustrated. 
In 1986, Bergkamp added ‘the danger of shopping’ to this list of reasons why varia-
tion between review committees should be avoided: researchers could very well go 
round the existing committees until they had found one willing to give any research 
protocol its blessing.112 In the absence of legislation making demands on the constitu-
tion and operation of research ethics committees, it was not altogether unlikely that 
such a committee could indeed be found. Only uniform review procedures could offer 
adequate protection to human research subjects—without some form of national co-
ordination and registration it remained unclear what standards reviewers used in 
evaluating research protocols, which studies they on average let pass, and whether 
the risks and benefits of participating in research studies were distributed somewhat 
evenly among potential research subjects. Hence, variation became a matter of great 
concern for the jurist—“one of the most important problems which the review system 
by medical ethics committees currently has to cope with”—and the call for uniform 
procedures something he would repeatedly emphasize until the Dutch government 
eventually enacted a law for human experimentation in 1998. 
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*** 
 
In the prolonged absence of any government action in the 1980s and 1990s, vari-
ous self-regulating attempts were undertaken to realize coherence between the review 
procedures of Dutch research ethics committees. Already in 1983, Noach and Dupuis 
started organizing a postgraduate course at Leiden about the ‘ethics review of medical 
experiments with human beings’, with all those active or interested in reviewing hu-
man research protocols invited to attend via Medisch Contact.113 In 1984, an Institute 
for Health Ethics was established in Maastricht, which similarly started to offer train-
ing courses for members of ethics committees, teaching them the ins-and-outs of re-
viewing protocols: what they should pay attention to, which standards they should 
uphold, and what sort of issues they could expect to encounter (also see chapter 6). In 
1987, the Dutch Hospital Council and KNMG even founded a ‘national station of sup-
port’ with information and support for anyone involved in reviewing ‘experimental 
human and patient-related research’.114 And in 1991, the two organizations joined 
forces with an informal partnership of Dutch research ethics committees that had 
existed since 1982 to found the Dutch Society for Medical Ethics Review Committees 
(NVMETC), which was to bring together experts of ethics review, to influence nation-
al developments in this area, to advance cooperation between local committees, and 
to foster reliable and professional review procedures.115 
 What thus more or less took place in the Netherlands in the 1980s was a process of 
attempted professionalization of a trade that had barely existed a decade before. The 
competent ethics reviewer adhered to a communal set of standards and practices, sat 
in on training sessions to refresh his or her reviewing skills, and was a member of a 
national Society that oversaw the conduct of its members. They were attempts to get a 
grip on the quickly expanding mass of research ethics committees in the Netherlands 
and to acquire some sense of control over all sorts of independently operating review-
ers. In this process, much emphasis was put on the importance of expertise. Ethics 
committees were in need of professionals who knew what they were talking about and 
who were equipped to take on the growing number of protocols that were submitted 
for review every year. Unwanted variation, the ideal was, could be combatted by im-
plementing nationwide standards that would be applied uniformly by qualified re-
viewers. Once they were properly trained, it would matter no longer whether a proto-
col was submitted in Leiden or Groningen: uniform protocols would guarantee that 
the outcome of all reviews would be sufficiently similar if not the same. 
 This notion of the expert-reviewer did not sit well with the inclusion of laypeople in 
research ethics committees as had been envisioned by the Central Council in 1982. As 
one of the participants at the 1989 conference on “the task and function of medical 
ethics committees in scientific research” pointed out: “We must prevent that all and 
sundry can take up a seat in such a committee and join in on conversations they don’t 
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understand”.116 In this regard, advocates of uniform review procedures could be hap-
py that Van der Reijden had decided in 1983 to ignore a rather vital section of an ad-
vice commissioned to strengthen the position of research subjects in the Netherlands. 
Still, for these advocates of ‘proper expertise’, reason for concern was on the horizon. 
In the 1990s, due to commotion over non-therapeutic experiments with legally inca-
pacitated individuals, multiple political parties would start to advocate that the vari-
ous beliefs present in Dutch society about contentious ethical issues should be fairly 
represented in the research ethics committees that the bill spoke about. For what sort 
of ethics did these committees really prescribe and promote? And what sort of exper-
tise did these reviewers possess to help them solve ethical dilemmas about which no 
reasonable consensus existed in the Netherlands? Should laypeople not participate to 
voice the precarious position in which vulnerable subjects often found themselves, 
especially those unable to give their consent? And what about the representation of 
specific religious and ideological points of view? After all, was it not true that liberal 
reviewers were more likely to align themselves with the views of the medical research 
establishment than Christian or socialist reviewers would be? 
It was this tension between expert and democratic oversight that remained to be 
resolved when Dutch parliament in 1997 could finally debate the long-awaited Dutch 
human research bill, diligently prepared in the previous decades by State Secretaries 
Van der Reijden, Dees and Simons. By that time, however, the baton had been passed 
to the final maestro of the WMO: the social-liberal politician Els Borst-Eilers, Minis-
ter of Health, Sport and Welfare under both administrations of Prime Minister Wim 
Kok (then leader of the Dutch labour party)—the first Dutch governments since 1918 
that did not include a single party of markedly Christian persuasion. 
 
The fulcrum function of the ethical expert 
 
Today, Els Borst-Eilers (often called Els Borst) is remembered as one of the most 
influential Dutch politicians of the late twentieth century, particularly in the areas of 
health care and medical research, with her signature validating more than a hundred 
Dutch laws.117 Most famously, she was responsible as Minister of Health for the pass-
ing of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) 
Act of 2001, more commonly known in the Netherlands as ‘the euthanasia law’—an 
event that at the time made headlines and waves the world over.118 In 2002, after her 
term as Minister, she was made Officer of the Order of Orange Nassau and, in 2012, 
she was granted the honorary title Minister of State, a lifelong title that is only rarely 
awarded in the Netherlands and only to politicians of exceptional merit, who may use 
it to advise the Dutch Sovereign on delicate political matters.119  
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Prior to her political career, Borst had already compiled an impressive resume as a 
medical doctor and manager. After having obtained her medical degree in 1958, she 
received her doctoral title in 1972 on the genesis and prevention of rhesus immuniza-
tion. By then, she had already come to lead the Utrecht Blood bank and, in 1976, she 
took up the position of medical director at the Utrecht academic hospital, one of the 
largest hospitals of the Netherlands.120 She left this position in 1986 to take on the 
vice-presidency of the Dutch Health Council, a function that she combined from 1992 
onwards with a professorship on ‘evaluation-research of clinical actions’ in Amster-
dam. During her term as Minister, she became a fellow of the Royal College of Physi-
cians of Edinburgh and a member of the American Institute (now National Academy) 
of Medicine.121 After her death in 2014, the many eulogies commemorating her life 
without exception lauded her efforts, both as physician and politician, to help resolve 
many of the complex medical ethics dilemmas that had dominated Dutch public dis-
course since the 1970s. “Few have made such a great contribution to the debate about 
medical ethics in the Netherlands”, the website of Medisch Contact read in 2014.122 In 
these tributes, the euthanasia law served as the prime example of her influence. Yet, 
as Minister of Health, Borst played a decisive part in many other ethics dossiers as 
well. One of these was the governance of human experimentation. 
Already during her time as medical director, Borst had concerned herself with the 
governance of human experimentation. In 1983, for instance, she was asked to speak 
about the “ethics review of medical experiments with human beings” at the first post-
graduate course on the topic that was organized by Noach and Dupuis. In her lecture, 
Borst lauded the institutional functioning of review committees, which she believed 
to “fit […] the current era of the mondige patient critical of governments and modern 
clinical medicine”.123 What was more, when she became vice-president of the Health 
Council in 1986, Borst served as a chairwoman to the Council’s Standing Committee 
Health Ethics and Core Committee Ethics Medical Research (KEMO), that was estab-
lished in 1989 by government request to provide policy advice on “ethical, legal and 
juridical questions of a general nature” relating to “socially relevant” developments in 
medical research.124 The KEMO typically advised the government on research studies 
that could count on much public attention, such as experiments with foetal material 
and studies involving somatic cell therapy. From the early 1990s onwards, this advi-
sory body, and thus also Borst, occasionally even took over reviewing such protocols 
from local ethics boards (which the latter did not always appreciate).125 
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Hence, when Borst became Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport in August 1994, 
she already had quite some experience under her belt to put to good use in one of the 
longest running political dossiers bequeathed to her: the realization of the Dutch hu-
man experimentation bill. Borst held this ministry until 2002, as part of the two con-
secutive governments led by labour party politician Wim Kok, usually referred to as 
the Purple Coalitions due to their union of the Dutch labour party PvdA (red) and the 
conservative-liberal party VVD (blue). Borst was a member of the third party which 
completed these cabinets: the progressive social-liberal party D66.126 None of these 
parties had a religious grounding, which made ‘Purple I’ the first Dutch government 
since the introduction of proportional representation in 1918 in which no confession-
al parties participated. This had its effect, particularly in regulations that were con-
sidered “morally contentious”. Before Kok’s two terms had come to an end, prostitu-
tion had been legalized in the Netherlands, as had same-sex marriage and euthanasia. 
The latter especially divided the secular and confessional parties in Dutch parliament 
like few other dossiers had ever had, with Borst not infrequently cast in the role of 
irreverent statesperson. In 2001, she even faced a motion of no-confidence signed by 
all three Christian factions in the Dutch House of Representatives because she had 
been recorded by a leading Dutch newspaper in an interview about the successful 
completion of her euthanasia bill to have clenched her fist, smiled, and said “It is fin-
ished”—the same last words Jesus spoke on the cross, as recorded in the Bible.127 This 
rift ran so deep that, when the Christian-Union politician Arie Slob spent a few days 
in the headquarters of D66 in 2012, he asked “half-jokingly, but also seriously” for the 
portrait of Borst to be turned facing the wall whilst he was there.128 
In the parliamentary discussions over the Dutch human experimentation bill emo-
tions did not run as high. Yet, also there a divide existed at times between the secular 
coalition parties and Christian opposition parties. Principal dissent manifested itself, 
in particular, over the permissibility of non-therapeutic experiments with legally in-
capacitated individuals. As the Christian-democrats wrote to explain their rejection of 
this particular section of the human experimentation bill in 1996: “Every human be-
ing, created in the image of God, has an intrinsic value, which cannot be reduced to 
his health or intellectual capacities nor to the importance he has for a third party or 
society as a whole”.129 Already in 1992, when their own leader Lubbers had still been 
Prime Minister, the Christian-democrats had issued similar objections to the human 
experimentation bill of the liberal State Secretary Simons.130 And when they were put 
in the opposition benches in 1994, their restrictive stance only grew stronger. Similar-
ly, much more than the secular parties, Christian parties pushed for democratic rep-
resentation in advisory councils like the KEMO because they feared that experiments 
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Prior to her political career, Borst had already compiled an impressive resume as a 
medical doctor and manager. After having obtained her medical degree in 1958, she 
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onwards with a professorship on ‘evaluation-research of clinical actions’ in Amster-
dam. During her term as Minister, she became a fellow of the Royal College of Physi-
cians of Edinburgh and a member of the American Institute (now National Academy) 
of Medicine.121 After her death in 2014, the many eulogies commemorating her life 
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course since the 1970s. “Few have made such a great contribution to the debate about 
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lished in 1989 by government request to provide policy advice on “ethical, legal and 
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sory body, and thus also Borst, occasionally even took over reviewing such protocols 
from local ethics boards (which the latter did not always appreciate).125 
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with foetuses and embryos would be approved more easily if nobody from the pro-life 
movement could have its say.131 Particularly during the 1990s, ‘the importance of eth-
ical pluralism in a democratic state’ became an oft-heard statement by Christian par-
ties in debates over regulations pertaining to medical ethics. 
 Borst was in favour of non-therapeutic experiments with legally incapacitated indi-
viduals and, like her predecessors, wished to make haste with the enactment of the 
human experimentation bill. Before she could do so, however, she had to await the 
report of the ad-hoc committee that had been installed in the last months of the third 
Lubbers-administration to advise on the permissibility of research with legally inca-
pacitated individuals, which meant she could only begin to pilot the human experi-
mentation bill through Dutch parliament in 1995. And when she did, she started off 
with such a political misstep that the governance of human research once more be-
came a subject of heated debate in the Netherlands. In the evening of 3 October 1995, 
Borst confirmed on national television that she was planning to adopt the conclusions 
of the aforementioned ad-hoc committee: i.e. permitting research with legally inca-
pacitated individuals if stringent conditions had been met. She defended this decision 
with the same example of finding a cure for Alzheimer’s disease that Simons had used 
in his response to the Council of State in 1992. However, she did so in a manner that 
caused great consternation. As she was quoted in the Dutch media the next day: “Ac-
cording to Borst, the testing of a pill against Alzheimer’s disease is only possible on 
demented elderly people. In the interest of medical research, she finds it conceivable 
that drugs in the future will be tried out on these patients”.132 
Dutch members of parliament could not point out quick enough that this certainly 
was not what they had in mind when considering non-therapeutic experiments with 
legally incapacitated people. In a leading Dutch newspaper, the Christian-democrats 
were quoted to have “great difficulty with the plans of Borst” and that she “now really 
is starting to overstep the boundaries” (the article did not specify which boundaries 
exactly).133 Leenen went on record to label Borst’s example ‘unfortunate’ and the Alz-
heimer’s Foundation reported to have received “a flood of calls from worried relatives 
of Alzheimer’s patients” since the television broadcast of October 3.134 “Who decides 
that only drugs will be applied that are meant to do something about this dementia? 
As a layperson, you cannot keep a check on this”, a concerned wife of an Alzheimer’s 
patient was recorded to say. Two geriatricians wrote in to explain that the type of re-
search mentioned by Borst was important for the patients they typically treated and 
that the human experimentation bill in its current form certainly was no permit for 
researchers to do as they please; the norms laid down in the proposal were really very 
strict. The geriatricians blamed Borst for suggesting otherwise and voiced strong con-
cerns about the damage she might have done: “Since the statement of Minister Borst 
on October 3, it seems that a majority of politicians and the public are turning against 
the possibility of experiments with the legally incapacitated”.135 
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Borst’s misstep was not so big that it resulted in the sort of moratorium feared by 
the two geriatricians. And in the official presentation of her plans in January 1996, 
she had already learned to phrase her plans differently. She now emphasized that the 
WMO would codify a strict ‘no, unless’-approach in the regulation of non-therapeutic 
research with legally incapacitated individuals. All such studies were forbidden by 
law, unless a realistic possibility existed that the research subject involved could at 
one point benefit from the research results; unless they were ‘group-bound’ (meaning 
that the research could only be conducted with members of the same legal category as 
the research subject); and unless they only had negligible and minimal risks. In addi-
tion, informed consent always had to be obtained from the subject’s legal guardian 
and the study immediately had to be brought to a halt if a subject showed any unusu-
al form of resistance.136 Similarly, to illustrate the sort of studies she did wish to allow 
for, Borst now pointed to the neonatal heel prick (Guthrie test), a procedure by which 
a few blood drops are taken from new-borns to screen for genetic disorders (that had 
been developed thanks to decades of collecting blood samples from infants without 
much of a therapeutic goal). It was a frame that could count on a better reception in 
Dutch media. “Borst says: prohibit experiments with the legally incapacitated”, head-
lines now read, “Only in exceptional cases will it be possible to do medical research 
with the demented elderly, small children, or mentally disabled”.137 
Despite this shift of frame, however, the turmoil over Borst’s remark ensured that 
the oral treatment of the human experimentation bill in Dutch parliament started off 
with substantial discontent among Dutch politicians. In their final written comments 
on the bill, the Christian-democrats stressed their “regret that the first signee [Borst] 
deemed it necessary in October of last year to ventilate her personal position on re-
search with the legally incapacitated in general, and dementia patients in particular, 
ahead of any official government standpoint”.138 With her rash statements, the Minis-
ter of Health had caused “unrest in society”, which was very unfortunate. How could 
Borst guarantee that researchers would always operate in the best interest of research 
subjects when the latter had few to no means, either legally or mentally, to make their 
objections heard? And, importantly, how could laypeople keep an eye on this if they 
had no access to the review committees outlined in the WMO-bill? 
Indeed, the fact that the human experimentation bill did not dictate any laypeople 
to take part in the ethics review of human research studies became another point of 
contention in the public indignation over Borst’s misstep. In its 1996 form, the legis-
lative proposal provided for a two-tier system with a limited number of local research 
ethics committees that were to be recognized and managed by one central committee. 
Article 12 and 14, respectively, laid down that the central committee had to consist “in 
any case of one or more physicians and of persons who have expertise in the field of 
pharmacology, nursing, the behavioural sciences, law, the methodology of scientific 
research, and ethics”—and that it could recognize only those local committees which 
“in any case consist of one or more physicians and of persons who have expertise in 
the field of law, the methodology of scientific research, and ethics”.139 Hence, Borst 
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had decided to carry on the line taken by her predecessors and discard the suggestion 
in the 1982 Central Council report to include “society-representatives” in the ethical 
review of human research studies.140 One was only eligible for a seat in a research 
ethics committee if one could lay claim to a specific sort of expertise, not if one repre-
sented an interest group to the research study under review.  
Most parties in the Dutch House of Representatives—including those that partici-
pated in the Purple Coalition—objected to this exclusion. The labour party argued it 
robbed the bill of its social basis; one of the reformed parties brought up that laypeo-
ple possessed their own useful ‘lay expertise’; the green party argued that the position 
of the research subject needed strengthening in negotiations over the ethical permis-
sibility of experiments; while the conservative-liberal party felt that a representative 
of a patient organisation had to take part to ensure the interests of this group.141 The 
orthodox Protestant party, in turn, stated that lay-representation was “needed to take 
the diversity of ethical views in society into account in the composition of the [local] 
committees and the central committee”, a concern which was voiced by the reformed 
parties and Christian-democrats as well (collectively, these four confessional parties 
took up about 25 percent of the Dutch House of Representatives).142 
In her reply to these objections, Borst admitted that she did not see much use for 
the participation of laypersons. First of all, if they participated solely on the basis of 
not being an expert, they hardly would have anything meaningful to contribute. Any-
one taking part in the review of scientific research, Borst felt, could only ever contrib-
ute in a meaningful way if they had a big enough understanding of the protocol under 
investigation. In order to do so, however, reviewers needed so much expertise that it 
was questionable whether they really were laypeople anymore.143 Secondly, if laypeo-
ple participated to represent interest groups like patients or research subjects, they 
would undermine “the independent assessment of a research protocol” and increase 
the danger that “personal or commercial interests influence the assessment of proto-
cols”.144 Thirdly, Borst considered it redundant to let laypeople participate to ensure 
that “opinions from outside medical circles are expressed” or that “reviewers do not 
start to identify with researchers”. The need to counteract the dominance of research-
ers in committees, she argued, was already fulfilled by the contribution of “experts on 
the terrain of law, research methodology, and ethics”.145 Finally, reviewing protocols 
had to be done by experts to guarantee uniform and independent ethical judgements. 
Only this, Borst argued, could result in objective judgements. In short, the Minister of 
Health was inclined to dismiss the whole issue of lay-representation. 
Dutch parliament members were not so easily persuaded, however, especially not 
because they knew the matter could count on a large majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives. During the first oral treatment of the bill, therefore, they used their right 
of amendment to propose that the WMO should mandate at least one representative 
                                                 
140 Her version of the human experimentation bill was identical, in this regard, to that of Simons, her 
direct predecessor. See: Tweede Kamer 1991-1992, Kamerstuknummer 22588, nr. 1, pp. 5-6, p. 6. 
141 Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, Kamerstuk 22588, nr. 7, pp. 52-53. 
142 Tweede Kamer 1992-1993, Kamerstuk 22588, nr. 5, p. 49, p. 51. See also: Tweede Kamer 1995-
1996, Kamerstuk 22588, nr. 10, p. 29, p. 37. 
143 Tweede Kamer 1995-1996, Kamerstuk 22588, nr. 7, p. 53. 
144 Ibid., p. 53. 
145 Ibid., p. 55. 
· public governance in a pluralist society · 
 · 191 · 
of the Dutch consumer-/patient organization to be added to both the local commit-
tees and central committee.146 These representatives did have a specific type of exper-
tise, they argued, as they were experts in being patients and research subjects, which 
was an essential piece of the jigsaw puzzle that made up the ethics review of human 
research studies. Borst was not convinced, as she felt a nurse also possessed this type 
of expertise, but she was willing to meet Dutch parliament halfway. She would not 
change the human experimentation bill to include a lay-representative, but she would 
add the stipulation that, in addition to the experts already mentioned in Articles 12 
and 14, all committees had to appoint one person to “specifically review the scientific 
research from the perspective of research subjects”.147 This could be a nurse, patient-
representative, or someone else—as long as they took part to watch over the position 
of research subjects, not to represent a specific interest group. 
This did not, of course, solve the objection raised by the Christian parties that the 
committees should fairly represent the diverse ethical and ideological viewpoints pre-
sent in Dutch society. But Borst had a different solution for this. In reply to questions 
posed by the Christian parties she pointed to the requirement of Article 12 and 14 that 
someone ‘with expertise in the field of ethics’ should take up a seat in the various re-
search ethics committees. “From this person it should be expected”, she stated, “that 
he in particular will make visible which visions and arguments exist with regard to a 
specific subject in our pluralistic society”.148 The ethicist was thus responsible for col-
lecting the various moral viewpoints which could exist in the Netherlands on an issue 
relating to human experimentation and to put these forward during committee delib-
erations. Not all members of parliament were immediately convinced. “It is a bit un-
clear why an ethicist should have a seat in the committees”, reformed politician An-
dré Rouvoet remarked, “if he only serves to clarify what attitudes exist in society with 
regard to a particular subject”. “Why should an ethicist do this and not a social scien-
tist, for example?”, Rouvoet continued, “It seems to me, that if you ask an ethicist, he 
brings along his own opinion”.149 Other confessional parliamentarians raised similar 
points. “You have ethicists in all sorts of shapes and sizes”, another reformed politi-
cian remarked, “That does not detract from their scientific quality, but it says pre-
ciously little about how representative they are”.150 
In part, the Christian political parties pressed this hard on the position of ethicists 
in research ethics committees, because the Dutch House of Representatives was sim-
ultaneously having a similar discussion on the composition of the ethics committees 
that would be installed in the Netherlands if Borst’s euthanasia law was to go into 
effect. The idea was that these committees would also include an ethicist, something 
about which particularly the Christian parties were sceptical, as most felt that eutha-
nasia could under no circumstances be considered ethical. So it mattered quite a bit 
what sort of ethicist would be asked to take up a seat in these ethics committees. In 
these related debates, Borst said of the role of the ethicist: 
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had decided to carry on the line taken by her predecessors and discard the suggestion 
in the 1982 Central Council report to include “society-representatives” in the ethical 
review of human research studies.140 One was only eligible for a seat in a research 
ethics committee if one could lay claim to a specific sort of expertise, not if one repre-
sented an interest group to the research study under review.  
Most parties in the Dutch House of Representatives—including those that partici-
pated in the Purple Coalition—objected to this exclusion. The labour party argued it 
robbed the bill of its social basis; one of the reformed parties brought up that laypeo-
ple possessed their own useful ‘lay expertise’; the green party argued that the position 
of the research subject needed strengthening in negotiations over the ethical permis-
sibility of experiments; while the conservative-liberal party felt that a representative 
of a patient organisation had to take part to ensure the interests of this group.141 The 
orthodox Protestant party, in turn, stated that lay-representation was “needed to take 
the diversity of ethical views in society into account in the composition of the [local] 
committees and the central committee”, a concern which was voiced by the reformed 
parties and Christian-democrats as well (collectively, these four confessional parties 
took up about 25 percent of the Dutch House of Representatives).142 
In her reply to these objections, Borst admitted that she did not see much use for 
the participation of laypersons. First of all, if they participated solely on the basis of 
not being an expert, they hardly would have anything meaningful to contribute. Any-
one taking part in the review of scientific research, Borst felt, could only ever contrib-
ute in a meaningful way if they had a big enough understanding of the protocol under 
investigation. In order to do so, however, reviewers needed so much expertise that it 
was questionable whether they really were laypeople anymore.143 Secondly, if laypeo-
ple participated to represent interest groups like patients or research subjects, they 
would undermine “the independent assessment of a research protocol” and increase 
the danger that “personal or commercial interests influence the assessment of proto-
cols”.144 Thirdly, Borst considered it redundant to let laypeople participate to ensure 
that “opinions from outside medical circles are expressed” or that “reviewers do not 
start to identify with researchers”. The need to counteract the dominance of research-
ers in committees, she argued, was already fulfilled by the contribution of “experts on 
the terrain of law, research methodology, and ethics”.145 Finally, reviewing protocols 
had to be done by experts to guarantee uniform and independent ethical judgements. 
Only this, Borst argued, could result in objective judgements. In short, the Minister of 
Health was inclined to dismiss the whole issue of lay-representation. 
Dutch parliament members were not so easily persuaded, however, especially not 
because they knew the matter could count on a large majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives. During the first oral treatment of the bill, therefore, they used their right 
of amendment to propose that the WMO should mandate at least one representative 
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committees should fairly represent the diverse ethical and ideological viewpoints pre-
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posed by the Christian parties she pointed to the requirement of Article 12 and 14 that 
someone ‘with expertise in the field of ethics’ should take up a seat in the various re-
search ethics committees. “From this person it should be expected”, she stated, “that 
he in particular will make visible which visions and arguments exist with regard to a 
specific subject in our pluralistic society”.148 The ethicist was thus responsible for col-
lecting the various moral viewpoints which could exist in the Netherlands on an issue 
relating to human experimentation and to put these forward during committee delib-
erations. Not all members of parliament were immediately convinced. “It is a bit un-
clear why an ethicist should have a seat in the committees”, reformed politician An-
dré Rouvoet remarked, “if he only serves to clarify what attitudes exist in society with 
regard to a particular subject”. “Why should an ethicist do this and not a social scien-
tist, for example?”, Rouvoet continued, “It seems to me, that if you ask an ethicist, he 
brings along his own opinion”.149 Other confessional parliamentarians raised similar 
points. “You have ethicists in all sorts of shapes and sizes”, another reformed politi-
cian remarked, “That does not detract from their scientific quality, but it says pre-
ciously little about how representative they are”.150 
In part, the Christian political parties pressed this hard on the position of ethicists 
in research ethics committees, because the Dutch House of Representatives was sim-
ultaneously having a similar discussion on the composition of the ethics committees 
that would be installed in the Netherlands if Borst’s euthanasia law was to go into 
effect. The idea was that these committees would also include an ethicist, something 
about which particularly the Christian parties were sceptical, as most felt that eutha-
nasia could under no circumstances be considered ethical. So it mattered quite a bit 
what sort of ethicist would be asked to take up a seat in these ethics committees. In 
these related debates, Borst said of the role of the ethicist: 
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A good ethicist is trained in careful reasoning and clear analysis […]. That is his 
contribution. If you have a strong personal opinion which prevents you from ever 
considering pros and cons, you should not take up a seat in such a committee. 
And otherwise you must at times also be sure to take away from your own feel-
ings and personal beliefs and just make an objective judgment.151 
 
Hence, Borst thus envisioned ethical experts to contribute to ethics committees in the 
role of analyst, able to weigh the opinions of others in a careful and objective manner 
and to offer insightful analytical terms and reasoning schemes. As such, they made 
committee deliberations more rational (logical) and therewith more reasonable (fair, 
sensible). In addition, by smartly drawing on her previous life as vice-President of the 
Health Council (in which she had often participated in committee deliberations on 
ethically charged medical issues), Borst maintained that ‘a good ethicist’ could bring 
together different types of experts with different types of temperaments: 
 
During my time at the Health Council, I have always benefited greatly from the 
presence of ethicists in committees. They were the people who, when it comes to 
thinking lucidly […] were often the strongest committee members. A jurist argues 
very carefully and formally, while a doctor often argues with quite a lot of emo-
tion. In those instances, an ethicist was clearly the neutralizing factor.152 
 
Borst’s ethicists, in other words, helped to make deliberations more humane without 
becoming overly emotional, and excelled in navigating difficult discussions through 
troubled waters. They did not have strong moral opinions themselves, but mediated 
the opinions of others, allowing people with conflicting viewpoints to reach harmoni-
ous decisions. Ethicists were, in short, ideal moderators. 
This conception of the ethicist’s contribution in euthanasia committees could have 
easily been transported to their role in research ethics committees. Borst never did 
so, however, for reasons that remain unclear. The sobering truth may well be that her 
department never really thought through the position of the ethicist until pushed for 
it in parliament, with the euthanasia debates taking place just after those on the hu-
man experimentation bill. Indeed, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the participation of 
ethicists in research ethics committees mostly had been accepted to be self-evident in 
Dutch policy circles. Both the 1981 Health Council advice and the 1982 Central Coun-
cil reports had recommended the inclusion of ethicists in local review boards without 
much explanation (even though the Central Council did speak interchangeably of the 
need for either an ethicist or a pastor). And although it was not the case that all ethics 
committees established in the Netherlands in the 1980s seated an ethicist, the sug-
gestion that the review of human research protocols might also take place without 
involving ethicists was never actively questioned in Dutch parliament in these years, 
nor did any of the statespersons responsible for the human experimentation bill ever 
justify why it stipulated the requirement of ethical expertise.153 
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Dutch statespersons at times did, however, use the inclusion of ethicists strategi-
cally. In 1992, for instance, Simons used the requirement of ethical expertise to coun-
ter requests from parliament about lay-representation. The latter was not needed, he 
argued, as “it may be especially expected from the ethicist to take an approach from 
the perspective of research subject protection”.154 When this met loud protests in par-
liament, however, as ethical expertise was argued to differ from lay-representation, 
Simon just as easily dropped this professional function of ethicists from subsequent 
memorandums and parliamentary discussions.155 Borst, likewise, at times maintained 
that ‘a good ethicist’ was defined by the ability to “just make an objective judgement”, 
while she at other times stressed that ethicists had varying ideological-religious back-
grounds that influenced the way in which they reviewed research protocols. She did 
so, for instance, in the solution she devised to pacify the continuing unrest in Dutch 
parliament over non-therapeutic research with legally incapacitated individuals. The 
WMO, she promised, would require that such studies could only take place if permis-
sion had first been acquired by the central committee, which would include “ethicists 
from diverse ideological and religious backgrounds”.156 Hence, when it came to the 
evaluation of more contentious human research studies, it suddenly was desirable to 
base one’s judgement of the socio-cultural background one represented—the sort of 
membership that Borst had explicitly rejected in discussions over the participation of 
laypeople in local ethics committees. And while she stated emphatically at other occa-
sions that a good ethicist ‘takes away from his own feelings and personal beliefs’, per-
sonal beliefs now served as an important eligibility requirement for ethicists to par-
ticipate in the central committee for medical research. 
Borst thus imagined multiple democratic functions for ethicists to fulfil in the pub-
lic governance of human research studies in the Netherlands. On the local level, they 
would make sure to present the various moral viewpoints existent in Dutch society to 
the other committee members, so that also minority opinions would not be neglected 
in the review of ‘regular’ experiments with human beings. On the national level, how-
ever, they would ensure that the outlook on life typical of the group they represented 
was heard to counterbalance it against the views of the other ethicists selected to take 
up a seat in the central committee. Nonetheless, as they were after all experts, they 
were expected to do all this in a uniform, independent, and objective manner. Ethi-
cists did not represent interest groups, but presented the viewpoints of various social 
groups. In doing so, they acted as the fulcrum that balanced democratic with expert 
control, an apparently ideal solution for the public governance of a scientific practice 
in a pluralist society without the actual participation of the unruly “all and sundry”, as 
Bergkamp et al. had started to fear towards the end of the 1980s. 
 
*** 
 
 On 25 February 1998, the Dutch Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act 
went into effect, signed by “Beatrix, by the grace of God, Queen of the Netherlands, 
Princess of Orange-Nassau, etc. etc. etc.”, Els Borst-Eilers, Minister of Health, Wel-
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fare and Sport, and Winnie Sorgdrager, Minister of Justice.157 After forty-five years of 
policy reports, ‘medical tests upon human beings’ were finally regulated by law in the 
Netherlands. Anno 2017, 23 Dutch research ethics committees (METCs) are active in 
the country, overseen by a single Central Commission on Research Involving Human 
Subjects (CCMO), which also acts as administrative body for appeals and objections 
of researchers and reviews protocols about which local committees have no authority 
(as stipulated by the WMO and 2002 Dutch Embryo Act). If a human research study 
includes an ‘advanced therapy medicinal product’ (e.g. gene therapies or genetically 
modified organisms), the protocol must be reviewed by the CCMO. If it is of an inter-
ventional and non-therapeutic nature and involves legally incapacitated individuals, 
the protocol must be reviewed by the CCMO. If it concerns research with embryos, 
human gametes or foetuses (with the exception of non-invasive observational studies 
with human foetuses), it must be reviewed by the CCMO. If it involves human re-
search studies with unregistered vaccines or substances that fall under the Opium Act 
which are used to treat opium addictions, it must be reviewed by the CCMO. If it in-
volves “xenotransplantation with living cells of animal origin”, it must be reviewed by 
the CCMO. In short, an elaborate web of regulations has by now been put in place to 
regulate all sorts of ‘human’ experiments in the Netherlands. 
 This development has not been met with universal enthusiasm, of which the 1990 
article by Jan Vandenbroucke probably remains the best known example. However, 
not just doctors and researchers have faced the growing bulwark of Dutch research 
ethics governance with apprehension. In 2001, for instance, in a Festschrift in honour 
of Noach’s 80th birthday, the ethicist Heleen Dupuis lashed out in no uncertain terms 
against the manner in which the WMO was executed in the Netherlands in the early 
2000s. Citing letters from the CCMO to local research ethics committees threatening 
to take away their licence to review protocols if they did not carry out the regulations 
laid down in the WMO in a ‘uniform manner’, Dupuis wrote bitterly: 
 
Moral pathos has disappeared, to be replaced by managerial arrogance and a 
mania for organization. The patient, who started all this, has disappeared from 
view, the review committees are threatened with punishment like naughty chil-
dren if they do not follow (by the CCMO formulated) procedures.158 
 
By overly emphasizing rules and regulations, the Dutch governance of human exper-
imentation had become a “bureaucratic straightjacket”, according to Dupuis.159 Ironi-
cally, with these scornful remarks, she sounded remarkably similar to the American 
internist Franz Ingelfinger, who had so lamented the growing bureaucracy of ethics in 
the 1970s and who had blamed ethicists like Dupuis for this. Indeed, one can wonder 
why the Dutch ethicist was this unhappy with the WMO. Had her profession, after all, 
not acquired a key function in the public governance of human experiments thanks to 
the WMO, through which she could perhaps even revive moral pathos? 
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 Not quite so much, as Dupuis probably knew very well. For while Borst had been 
generous in her rhetorical depiction of the role of ethicists in research ethics commit-
tees, she had been considerably less lavish in her demarcation of the precise ethical 
framework they were allowed to use in the evaluation of human research protocols. 
When the green party, for example, inquired in parliamentary debates if the WMO 
could help to make sure that public funds were no longer spent on “controversial or 
socially undesirable research”, Borst replied immediately that these were not the sort 
of ethical considerations which the WMO provided for.160 The ethics review of human 
research studies had to be limited strictly to determining “the permissibility of medi-
cal research from a scientific point of view and from the perspective of the protection 
of research subjects”.161 Hence, the only two measuring rods for ethical permissibility 
that Dutch research ethics committees were supposed to take into account were: (1) 
the scientific quality of a study protocol, as ‘only good science is ethical science’, and 
(2) the rights and safety of human research subjects. Ethical concerns that were more 
system-oriented—that took the social desirability of medical research into account—
remained safely beyond the purview of research ethics committees. 
This held for both the local committees and the CCMO. Although the latter was to 
fairly represent the various viewpoints on ‘human’ research studies in a pluralist soci-
ety, it was not allowed to decide what sort of research studies were morally permissi-
ble. If, for instance, a study with xenotransplantation was evaluated by the CCMO, 
the latter was not allowed to halt it on grounds other than its methodological quality 
and the protection of research subjects. The decision whether this sort of research is 
in itself ‘socially desirable’ had to remain the sole prerogative of Dutch parliament. To 
ensure this regulation would be observed, Borst laid down in the WMO that all meet-
ings of the CCMO had to take place in the presence of a policy official from the Minis-
try of Health, Welfare and Sport, who immediately had to notify the statesperson in 
charge if something of this nature was at stake. The latter would subsequently inform 
the Dutch House of Representatives, which since 1997, also thanks to Borst, had the 
legal possibility to halt those treatments and technologies that it deemed “undesirable 
given the social, ethical or juridical aspects” potentially connected to them.162 Borst 
pictured this policy official to act as “the linking pin between government and inde-
pendent expertise” in a similar manner as she had imagined the ethicist to function as 
the fulcrum between expert oversight and democratic control.163  
Also from the disappointed voice that spoke from the pages of Noach’s Festschrift 
in 2001, one gets a sneaking feeling that Borst’s generous depictions of the watchful 
civil servant and mediating ethicist served a rhetorical purpose more than anything 
else. Heleen Dupuis was no insignificant commentator. She had been the first ethicist 
ever to take up a seat in a Dutch ethics board (i.e. the Leiden CME). She had been one 
of the first scholars who had started to identify as ‘health ethicist’ in the 1970s, which 
would go on to become the Dutch variant of the Anglo-Saxon bioethics movement 
(see chapter 6). She had grown into the doyen of that discipline in the 1980s, and she 
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 Not quite so much, as Dupuis probably knew very well. For while Borst had been 
generous in her rhetorical depiction of the role of ethicists in research ethics commit-
tees, she had been considerably less lavish in her demarcation of the precise ethical 
framework they were allowed to use in the evaluation of human research protocols. 
When the green party, for example, inquired in parliamentary debates if the WMO 
could help to make sure that public funds were no longer spent on “controversial or 
socially undesirable research”, Borst replied immediately that these were not the sort 
of ethical considerations which the WMO provided for.160 The ethics review of human 
research studies had to be limited strictly to determining “the permissibility of medi-
cal research from a scientific point of view and from the perspective of the protection 
of research subjects”.161 Hence, the only two measuring rods for ethical permissibility 
that Dutch research ethics committees were supposed to take into account were: (1) 
the scientific quality of a study protocol, as ‘only good science is ethical science’, and 
(2) the rights and safety of human research subjects. Ethical concerns that were more 
system-oriented—that took the social desirability of medical research into account—
remained safely beyond the purview of research ethics committees. 
This held for both the local committees and the CCMO. Although the latter was to 
fairly represent the various viewpoints on ‘human’ research studies in a pluralist soci-
ety, it was not allowed to decide what sort of research studies were morally permissi-
ble. If, for instance, a study with xenotransplantation was evaluated by the CCMO, 
the latter was not allowed to halt it on grounds other than its methodological quality 
and the protection of research subjects. The decision whether this sort of research is 
in itself ‘socially desirable’ had to remain the sole prerogative of Dutch parliament. To 
ensure this regulation would be observed, Borst laid down in the WMO that all meet-
ings of the CCMO had to take place in the presence of a policy official from the Minis-
try of Health, Welfare and Sport, who immediately had to notify the statesperson in 
charge if something of this nature was at stake. The latter would subsequently inform 
the Dutch House of Representatives, which since 1997, also thanks to Borst, had the 
legal possibility to halt those treatments and technologies that it deemed “undesirable 
given the social, ethical or juridical aspects” potentially connected to them.162 Borst 
pictured this policy official to act as “the linking pin between government and inde-
pendent expertise” in a similar manner as she had imagined the ethicist to function as 
the fulcrum between expert oversight and democratic control.163  
Also from the disappointed voice that spoke from the pages of Noach’s Festschrift 
in 2001, one gets a sneaking feeling that Borst’s generous depictions of the watchful 
civil servant and mediating ethicist served a rhetorical purpose more than anything 
else. Heleen Dupuis was no insignificant commentator. She had been the first ethicist 
ever to take up a seat in a Dutch ethics board (i.e. the Leiden CME). She had been one 
of the first scholars who had started to identify as ‘health ethicist’ in the 1970s, which 
would go on to become the Dutch variant of the Anglo-Saxon bioethics movement 
(see chapter 6). She had grown into the doyen of that discipline in the 1980s, and she 
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became the single most famous public face of Dutch medical ethics in the late twenti-
eth century.164 In this role, she was both lauded and despised. Many colleagues con-
sidered her a pioneer. As her former supervisor Herman Heering (see chapter 3) stat-
ed in 1999: “She is the first ethicist who has fully integrated in the medical faculty, the 
one who may guide medical thinking”.165 Particularly Dutch philosophers, however, 
considered Dupuis a prime example of how ethicists should not put their expertise to 
use. In the 1980s and 1990s, these scholars had started to voice frequent complaints 
that Dupuis and her health ethics movement only served to keep the medical research 
establishment safely in their seats of power. Hence, that Dupuis of all people chose to 
subtitle her contribution to Noach’s Festschrift ‘From moral pathos to bureaucratic 
straightjacket’, indicates that not all was well in the Dutch governance of human ex-
perimentation after the enactment of the WMO in 1998—and that the public function 
of ethical experts in the governance of contentious issues in the domains of science, 
technology, and health is not as self-evident as Borst had made it out to be. The next 
and final chapter of this PhD-thesis investigates these suppositions. 
                                                 
164 Plus, at the time of publication of Noach’s Festschrift, Dupuis had just taken up a seat in the Dutch 
Senate as member of the biggest liberal party of the Netherlands—a position she held until 2015.  
165 Joke Mat, ‘Ethica buiten de ivoren toren nu zelf ter discussie’, in NRC Webpagina’s 1 maart 1999. 
See: http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Nieuws/1999/03/01/Vp/03.html. Downloaded from the World Wide Web on 
Tuesday July 11, 2017. 
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the governing function of ethical experts 
 
Allegedly, members of the conservative-liberal party VVD in the early 1990s called 
their chairperson, Senator Dian van Leeuwen-Schut, ‘Stalin of the Koninginnegracht’, 
due to her ability to rule the party with an iron grip. Van Leeuwen-Schut was known 
for taking decisive measures and having clear-cut opinions. If she felt strongly about 
something, she was not one to mince her words. In the afternoon of Tuesday 6 April 
1993, in a debate with State Secretary Simons on the annual budget of the Ministry of 
Welfare, Health and Culture, Van Leeuwen-Schut showed this firm side. “Mr. Speak-
er!”, she stated after a heated debate on government spending in the health care sec-
tor (the liberal Senator did not think the government was doing a good job), “I now 
get around to another point that concerns me, which is the role and position of medi-
cal ethicists in health care”.1 Today, Van Leeuwen-Schot began, “ethicists increasingly 
start to fulfil the role of policy officials at the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture 
and to master the ‘officialese’: i.e. [the ability] to draw up regulations and formulate a 
few ad hoc rules”. This, she declared by citing the Dutch philosopher Gerard de Vries, 
was “extremely annoying”: “they show us how we ought to speak about good and evil” 
and “strive for consensus as the outcome of ethical debates, as if formulating an opin-
ion that is shared by everyone would the goal of the ethicist”. The liberal Senator felt 
this development to be “patronizing and condescending” and, importantly, not quite 
the fault of ethical experts themselves: “They are also asked to do so by policymakers 
to reduce their uncertainties”.2 Hence, if it was up to Senator van Leeuwen-Schot, the 
government would immediately roll back the role of ethicists in Dutch policy circles. 
One, because “ethical theories cannot take the place of political debate” and two, be-
cause “ethicists are intellectuals and not policymakers”.3 
 
*** 
 
 This chapter examines the rise of health ethics as a new field of study in the Neth-
erlands in the second half of the twentieth century and, in particular, the debates that 
ensued in the late 1980s about the function which this field would fulfil in the public 
governance of ethically contentious medical (research) practices. As explained in the 
introduction to this PhD-thesis, the field is often argued to have emerged in the 1960s 
to hold the once autonomous class of physicians, the artsenstand, publicly accounta-
ble. In a secular world, the mantra of this accountability movement would have been, 
all reasonable people should have access to the norms governing medicine, not just a 
selected group of anointed professionals. As a part of this origin story, the emergence 
of research ethics committees has often been framed as an early success of the health 
ethics movement. The two would have arisen as two peas in a pod—as twin responses 
to growing societal critiques on the medical profession in this period. 
                                                 
1 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1992-1993, 6 April 1993, p. 24.1081.  
2 Ibid., p. 24.1082. Italics added. 
3 Ibid., p. 24.1123. 
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 As previous chapters have shown, however, this origin story cannot be maintained 
for the Netherlands, nor can it, as others have shown, for either the United States or 
Great Britain.4 Instead of an effort to democratize the oversight of human experimen-
tation, the emergence of the first Dutch research ethics committees has to be under-
stood as an attempt by a self-appointed elite of the Dutch biomedical research estab-
lishment to gain more control over the actions of peripheral practitioners and to in-
crease both the quality and quantity of human research studies. For a long time, this 
monumental change in governance was only marginally connected to the simultane-
ous rise of a new discipline or political movement of critical outsiders. Still, as chap-
ter 5 has also alluded to, from the late 1980s onwards, critical commentators on this 
change in governance did start to attribute the rise of research ethics committees to 
the health ethics movement arising alongside of it. According to physician Jan Van-
denbroucke (see chapter 5), this new “bureaucracy of ethics” had been brought about 
by jurists and ethicists who obsessed over rules and procedures, but who hardly ever 
practiced medicine themselves. Consequently, the old ideal of the republic of (medi-
cal) science—governance by members of the medical profession for members of the 
medical profession—would have been replaced by a model of “new Marxism” with an 
alien group of Commissars in charge: i.e. a group of ethical experts. 
 This chapter investigates these claims and shows the relation between the rise of 
health ethics and research ethics committees actually should be understood the other 
way around: in the late twentieth century the practice of ethics by committee, origi-
nally designed as a tool of internal control over medical research, became a battle-
ground for Dutch ethicists to flesh out their professional identity and public position 
in a democratic society. To do so, section I of this chapter first traces the emergence 
of Dutch health ethics as a new field of study in the 1970s and 1980s. Sections II and 
III, in turn, detail the growing criticism on the identity and function of ‘health ethi-
cists’ in the Netherlands in the late 1980s, with special attention for the way in which 
research ethics committees were used by both advocates and critics of the health eth-
ics movement to substantiate their claims on the sort of function these experts would 
fulfil in the modern Dutch health care system. Section IV, finally, examines how the 
Dutch political use for ethical expertise in the 1990s disciplined the ethics discipline 
in the late twentieth century and revisits how this reflects on the current public gov-
ernance of human experimentation in the Netherlands. 
 
The rise of a (new) group of ethical experts 
 
 In the 1970s and 1980s a new sub- or interdiscipline emerged in the Netherlands: 
a field of study with its own professorial chairs, journals, textbook, and research insti-
tutes that collectively came to be known as ‘health ethics’. Not everyone commenting 
on this development in the late twentieth century agreed this new term did justice to 
the movement that was emerging under the flag of ‘health ethics’ in this period; some 
preferred to call it biomedical or bio-ethics, others persisted that it should continue to 
                                                 
4 See the introductory chapter to this PhD-thesis for a more detailed discussion of this counter narrative 
for the United States and Great Britain. See chapter 2 for the Netherlands. Main references are: Stark, 
Behind Closed Doors; Schrag, Ethical Imperialism; Hedgecoe, ‘“A form of Practical Machinery”’; 
Wilson, The making of British bioethics. 
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use the older term medical ethics.5 Yet, most agreed by the end of the century that the 
term had gained general currency in the Netherlands to refer to a new field of study 
that closely resembled the international bioethics movement. 
 The emergence of health ethics in these decades is often explained as the ‘breaking 
of the bulwark’ of the artsenstand by a group of critical outsiders convinced that the 
monopoly of the old medical profession on medical ethics had to be broken.6 Medical 
ethics, the health ethicist Heleen Dupuis wrote in the 1988 Dutch Handboek gezond-
heidsethiek (Textbook health ethics), used to be “ethics of and for the profession”. Yet 
thanks to the rise of the mondige patient and a “storming of the gates of ‘the Bulwark 
of the know-it-alls’ by the ethicist and jurist” in the 1960s, “medical ethics has [now] 
become everyone’s business”.7 This narrative of origin is partly true. Health ethics did 
emerge in the Netherlands as an alternative to an older medical ethics tradition that 
predominantly had addressed the role and responsibility of physicians. Likewise, eth-
icists and jurists did play a considerable part in the formation of this new paradigm, 
although the contribution of caregivers, policy officials, and other contributors should 
not be underestimated (for both, see chapter 3). However, to understand the rise of 
health ethics solely as an emancipatory movement from ‘the medical bulwark’ ignores 
that this development was closely related to the rise of ethics itself as a standalone 
academic discipline in the second half of the twentieth century, which did not neces-
sarily aim to democratize older ethics traditions (medical or otherwise), but to find a 
new way to speak with expert authority on difficult ethical issues. 
 How so? Until roughly the 1960s in the Netherlands, ethics, as an academic field of 
study, had largely been the terrain of theologians, who, if they taught classes in ethics 
at all, usually had done so in terms of moral theology.8 It depended on the theologian 
what type of ethics would be taught. Orthodox theology professors, for instance, were 
only permitted to teach the zeden (mores) strictly according to the Scripture.9 A Mod-
ern Theologist like Izaäk Jan de Bussy, however, a professor of ‘ethics and philosophy 
of religion’ at the Municipal University of Amsterdam from 1892 to 1916, taught stu-
dents that no objective foundation existed for moral judgements and that moral be-
liefs therefore had to be studied as the product of their historical and social context 
                                                 
5 See: De Beaufort, Medische experimenten met mensen; Hans Achterhuis, ‘Schaarste en moraal’, in 
Intermediair Vol. 25 (1989), pp. 41-43, p. 41; Henk ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis. Ethiek in de 
medische praktijk (Lochem: Uitgeversmaatschappij De Tijdstroom, 1990); Ten Have, Ter Meulen & 
Van Leeuwen, Medisch Ethiek. 
6 Jaspers, ‘Controversial issues’; Kater, Disciplines met dadendrang; M. Hilhorst, ‘Klimaatverandering 
in de medische ethiek’, in B. Musschenga et al., Ethiek in Nederland. Van 1900 tot 1970 en daarna 
(Budel: Damon, 2010), pp. 181-205; M. Hilhorst, ‘Medische ethiek: onnodige misverstanden’, in Tijd-
schrift voor Beleid, Politiek en Maatschappij Vol. 26 (1999), pp. 292-300. For a discussion of interna-
tional literature on this topic, see the introduction of this PhD-thesis. 
7 M. Dupuis, ‘Ontwikkelingen in de medische ethiek. Van artsencode naar ethiek in de gezondheids-
zorg’, in I.D. de Beaufort & H.M. Dupuis (red.), Handboek Gezondheidsethiek (Assen/Maastricht: Van 
Gorcum, 1988), pp. 21-28, p. 25. 
8 See: H.A. Krop, ‘De babylonische ballingschap der ethiek. C.W. Opzoomer (1821-1892) en Spinoza’, 
in M. Verkerk (ed.), Filosofie, ethiek en praktijk. Liber amicorum voor Koo van der Wal (Rotterdam, 
2000), pp. 43-54; H.A. Krop, ‘Laat de universiteit meer dan een vakschool zijn. Het pleidooi voor de 
Centrale Interfaculteit’, in L.J. Dorsman & P.J. Knegtmans (eds.), Universitaire Vormingsidealen. De 
Nederlandse universiteiten sedert 1876 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2006), pp. 39-53. 
9 Frits de Lange, ‘Tweeërlei ethiek. Of: hoe de gereformeerde ethiek zichzelf overbodig maakte’, in 
Ethiek in Nederland, pp. 77-104.  
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(De Bussy was a follower of sociologists like Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl and Simmel).10 At 
Catholic seminaries and Catholic University of Nijmegen (1923), in turn, priests-to-be 
were trained to argue concrete cases with ‘reasonable moral arguments’ and to study 
the proper relationship between Church codes and national law (knowledge and skills 
they needed to take confessions from their future parishioners).11 
 To be sure, ethics was occasionally taught by professors of other disciplines as well 
in this period. From 1815 to 1876, for instance, Dutch students who hoped to enter a 
theology faculty had needed to obtain a testimonial in “wijsgerige zedekunde” (moral 
philosophy) from the faculty of letters and philosophy, a class usually taught by a pro-
fessor in speculative philosophy. However, after the Dutch government revoked this 
requirement in 1876, the number of students in the Netherlands studying moral phi-
losophy underwent a sharp decline, leaving it to the individual interests of professors 
to include ethics in their philosophy classes. Thus, from 1890 to 1928, experimental 
psychologist Gerardus Heymans did teach ethics classes at the Groningen philosophy 
faculty to explain why “moral people” were more likely to get married than “immoral 
people” (an ‘observation’ which would explain the moral growth of the human species 
as a whole).12 Heymans was an exception, however. By and large until the 1960s, eth-
ics professors were only appointed at theology faculties in the Netherlands, while the 
term ethicist was mostly reserved for Church authorities (not academics). 
 This changed radically in the late twentieth century. First, between 1967 and 1973, 
three Dutch philosophy faculties realized chairs in ‘philosophical ethics’.13 At Utrecht 
University, in the meanwhile, the chair of Johannes de Graaf (see chapter 3) in ‘ethics 
and the encyclopaedia of theology’ at the theology faculty was changed to one in ‘Eth-
ics, including philosophical ethics and the encyclopaedia of theology’ at the theology 
and philosophy faculty.14 In the decades thereafter, all other Dutch universities real-
ized ethics chairs at their philosophy faculties as well, with most establishing addi-
tional chairs in applied ethics at other faculties. Ethics professors also continued to be 
appointed at theology faculties. Many of these, however, increasingly started to argue 
that ethics had to be studied autonomously from theology and debated “with ethical 
not theological arguments” (see below).15 In the 1970s and 1980s, this amalgam of 
scholars began to communicate with each other in newly founded ethics societies and 
journals, and increasingly identified as ethicists. While the field was now considered 
more closely related to philosophy than theology, most practitioners argued that the 
field had to be understood as an interdiscipline that was defined by its object of study 
(ethics) and tackled with a specific body of literature and skill-set. Thus, in the 1990s, 
when academics were pressured by the Dutch government to organise themselves in 
national research schools, ethicists realized a Research School Ethics that stood sepa-
rate from the Research School Philosophy and the School for Theology and Religion.16 
Ethics, the message was, was now an academic field in its own right. 
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 In a 2010 article on the rise of philosophical ethics in Dutch academia in the 1960s 
and 1970s, historians of philosophy Henri Krop and Koo van der Wal argue that this 
development was closely related to the broader societal activism of this period. Where 
philosophers in the early twentieth century had, if they took on ethical topics at all, 
mainly limited themselves to meta-ethical inquiries into the epistemic status of moral 
judgements and intuitions, philosophers of the 1960s felt compelled to engage with 
real-life moral problems. Due to the advent of the Cold War, polluting effects of pesti-
cides, and growing world food shortages (to name just a few problems), more theoret-
ical philosophical approaches increasingly came to be considered irrelevant and dis-
dainful. If philosophy wished to make a real difference in the world, it had to be will-
ing to take on ‘actual moral problems’.17 According to ethicist Bert Musschenga, simi-
lar concerns held for theologians who started to identify as ethicists in the 1960s and 
1970s. Hence, Musschenga maintains, the emergence of a Dutch ethics discipline had 
its roots in the “turn to practical reality” in these decades. Spurred on by stormy de-
velopments in medical science and technology, Dutch theologians became willing to 
take on ethically contentious issues with a case-oriented approach. Instead of locating 
moral truths in the Bible or other religious texts, they started to evaluate ethical cases 
by taking their particular context and participants into account.18 
 In both these origin accounts, the threat of techno-scientific advancement played a 
formative role in the rise of a Dutch ethics discipline after the mid-twentieth century. 
And, indeed, when reading publications both of philosophers (e.g. Lolle Nauta) and 
theologians (e.g. Herman Heering) of the late 1960s and early 1970s, their preoccupa-
tion with the dark sides of science and technology stands out.19 Yet, in most of these 
texts, especially those written by theologians, a second reason for the need for ethical 
reflection can be detected as well. In Heering’s 1969 Ethiek der voorlopigheid (Provi-
sional ethics), for instance, which was soon to become a standard text in the fledgling 
Dutch ethics movement, the Remonstrant theologian wrote right after emphasizing 
the need to investigate if “everything that is technologically possible should also oc-
cur”): “The government by-God’s-grace has been replaced with a democratic order in 
which everyone is supposed to bear co-responsibility. The entire sacred confirmation 
of morality is broken, orders and judgements are disputed and reviewed”.20 Likewise, 
in his 1969 booklet on medical ethics, Catholic theologian Paul Sporken wrote: “Ever 
increasing is the group of believers, who wish to have a say in ethical statements and 
who no longer accept these are imposed from above, isolated from communal opin-
ions”.21 Thus, ethical reflection also had become urgent anno 1969 because traditional 
moral truths were increasingly questioned in a secularizing society. 
 Sporken, in particular, was convinced that this growing plurality of voices in Dutch 
society demanded a more secular approach to formulating new (medical) ethics. The 
Church had to learn to accept, the Catholic scholar wrote, that: 
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Understanding the ethical demands of humanity is not a monopoly of the Chris-
tian community of faith. […] A Christian ethics only deserves the name in so far 
that it is willing and open to listen to the revelation and salvation of God wherev-
er it can be heard, where true humanity can be found”.22  
 
In fact, even though Christian ethics was open to all people, it was best not even to 
use the adjective Christian anymore, as it might put off a more secular readership. “It 
is explicitly not my intention”, Sporken hastened to write, “to sell this Introduction to 
medical ethics as theological ethics or moral theology”.23 An ethicist was at work here, 
not a theologian. Also Heering, who did invoke the term theological ethics, favoured 
an approach to ethical reflection that took place in dialogue with others. Moral truths 
were not to be located in Biblical commandments, but in human beings themselves.24 
That did not mean, however, that the two theologians—or ethicists—felt that everyone 
stood on an equal footing in ethical deliberations. Ethicists did have a certain type of 
expertise. They could function, for instance, Sporken explained in a 1970 talk held for 
the General Assembly of the KNMG, “as a luminary [voordenker] when it comes to 
thinking together”. Ethicists’ intention was not to claim jurisdiction over medical eth-
ics, the theologian added reassuringly, but they could light the way in getting a grip 
on the difficult ethical problems caused by techno-scientific advancement: “The ethi-
cist may offer a helping hand to physicians from his profession”.25 
 To solidify this professional identity of the fledgling Dutch ethics movement, Heer-
ing in 1970 sent an invitation to all ethics teachers at Dutch universities and colleges 
for a meeting on Saturday 7 March in Utrecht. In 1964, Heering had been closely in-
volved in the establishment of the Societas Ethica, an international and interdenomi-
national ethics society, and now wished to install a Dutch ethics society as well. “Be-
cause more and more is asked of ethics”, Heering wrote in his letter, “this contact and 
deliberation is increasingly wanted and needed”.26 All ethics teachers were therefore 
invited to talk about “the place of ethics (philosophical ethics and moral theology)” in 
Dutch universities, about the appropriate “division of labour” between ethicists, and 
about the “joint study and discussion of foundational as well as practical ethics ques-
tions”. In addition, Heering hoped to discuss how Dutch ethicists could ensure that 
they were consulted by the government when ‘legal articles with clear moral aspects’ 
were drafted.27 At the meeting, Heering again emphasized the need for ethicists (i.e. 
not theologians) to meet regularly: “Developments in academia and society force us 
to. Ethics can no longer be practiced in isolation. Scholarly ethics is now confronted 
more than ever with concrete issues”.28 Those present agreed. On 7 March 1970, the 
Dutch Society of Ethicists was founded, with the theologian (and now also or even 
primarily ethicist) Herman Heering as its first chairman. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., Voorlopige diagnose, pp. 21-22. 
23 Ibid., p. 25. 
24 Heering favoured a situation ethics. See: Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics. The New Morality (Phila-
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 At this and other occasions, Dutch theologians like Heering busied a strong rheto-
ric of public demand: the swift changes in Dutch society necessitated the organisation 
of ethicists; called for their involvement in policy and legislative proposals; demand-
ed that they would secure a better position in Dutch academia. Heering et al. did (or 
could) not invoke many actual public cries to substantiate this apparent need for eth-
icists, but they seemed sure nonetheless that they could fulfil a key role in the binding 
of society in a time in which traditional authority was waning while moral problems 
were quickly growing in size due to the ever growing complexity of modern life. And, 
to be fair, they also increasingly began to be called upon to fulfil this role in the early 
1970s. Especially in Dutch medical circles, theologians like Heering and Sporken be-
came welcome guests in this period to help tackle the crisis of medical ethics that had 
developed in the Dutch medical profession after the mid-1960s (see chapter 3). They 
were invited to publish in journals like Medisch Contact, asked to speak at general 
assemblies of the KNMG, and nominated to participate in expert advisory bodies like 
the Health Council. In 1970, the KNMG even announced that it would start inviting 
experts from the disciplines of law, sociology, psychology, and theology to write es-
says on medical ethics that it regularly wished to send to its members (see chapter 3). 
Hence, at least the upper echelons of the Dutch medical profession appeared quite 
willing in the early 1970s to have a new type of experts function as “luminaries” in the 
adaption of medical ethics to life in the modern Dutch society. 
 
*** 
 
 In 1974, Sporken was appointed at the medical faculty of the State University of 
Limburg (later Maastricht University) as the first Dutch professor of medical ethics.29 
In 1977, he introduced the term ‘health ethics’ in his book Ethiek en gezondheidszorg 
(Ethics and health care). The old medical ethics, the theologian-cum-ethicist argued, 
had been designed to govern the individual doctor-patient relationship. Yet, the mod-
ern health care system had become a complex network of caregivers who all depend-
ed on one another to provide good care. In addition, health and disease had acquired 
important social layers: all patients and caregivers were now embedded in tight knit-
ted social structures and formed by their environment. Hence, a new ethics of health 
care had to be developed that no longer just focused on the responsibilities of doctors, 
but “that describes and analyses health care in all her various aspects including the 
ethical norms that exist or are imagined therein, that clarifies the images of man and 
society that lie at the root of these norms, and that critically assesses this underlying 
vision on its humanitarian character”.30 In doing so, ethicists could help ensure that 
medicine remained a human(e) practice in an era dominated by science. 
 In 1977, also the Dutch Health Council introduced the term ‘health ethics’. In 1975, 
it had quietly disbanded its Committee Medical Ethics after it had proven difficult to 
formulate an overarching ethics framework for “medical practice in a modern society” 
(see chapter 3). Yet, in 1977, the Council President nonetheless decided to install a 
Standing Committee Health Ethics that could “signal questions and developments in 
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health ethics that should be studied by ad hoc committees”, and “coordinate how var-
ious Council committees approach health ethics facets”.31 This new name, committee 
member Henk Leenen (see chapter 3) stated approvingly at the first meeting, allowed 
them to include the social dimension of health care and to discuss the responsibilities 
of the government in providing citizens with good health care instead of only the doc-
tor-patient relationship (which the jurist referred to as medical ethics).32 Initially, the 
Standing Committee seated four physicians, two jurists, and two ethicists—lecturer in 
theologian ethics Theo Beemer and the upcoming ethicist Heleen Dupuis, who had 
recently finished her PhD-thesis with Heering on the notion of mondigheid as a basic 
ethical principle of modern society.33 A little while later, Sporken joined the commit-
tee as well. The interdisciplinary composition was considered crucial for the workings 
of the committee.34 Yet, the ethicists were attributed a leading role. As its secretary (a 
physician) stated in 1981, without their input discussions were likely to “break down 
due to dilettantism, casuistry, and side-tracking”.35 The ethical experts had to ensure 
that ethical deliberations took place systematically and methodically. 
 In 1984, an independent Institute for Health Ethics was established in Maastricht. 
In 1979, a Dutch conference had been organized on the ethics of human experimenta-
tion with the help of two renowned American bioethics institutes.36 At this meeting, 
the director of one of these centres, the Dutch-born obstetrician André Hellegers, had 
held a passionate speech about the need to realize a similar institute in the Nether-
lands as well.37 With some help of the State University of Limburg, this led in 1984 to 
the Institute for Health Ethics. The Institute, its founders believed, would function as 
a “palace of light” in the Netherlands, “a place where the light can shine on questions 
on life and health” that would help the Dutch people “to see what they are doing with 
their lives, world, and future”, in the expectation that “people who are able to see will 
not be blind to the light”.38 More practically, it wished to offer training courses and 
write reports on issues relating to health ethics. Thus, in 1984, the Institute started to 
train members of research ethics committees how to justly evaluate human research 
proposals. That same year, it was asked by the Health Council to write “a thesis that 
describes the philosophical background of the terms ‘value of human life’ and ‘quality 
of life’, and that gives a definition practical enough to be useful to answer requests for 
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advice”.39 The Institute’s conception of ethical expertise, which was interspersed with 
Enlightenment rhetoric, was similar to the conception formulated by Sporken in the 
early 1970s: in a society in which traditional moral authorities were no longer accept-
ed, ethicists could function as luminaries in thinking about ethics. Its staff, the Insti-
tute’s chairman (and former Minister of Health) Louis Stuyt stated in 1986, had been 
chosen to “form a selection of our ‘secular pluralist society’”—a term he took from the 
book The Foundations of Bioethics from the philosopher Tristram Engelhardt, which 
famously states that “in a secular pluralist society, health care policy requires a moral 
lingua franca, a general moral perspective that transcends particular moral and reli-
gious commitments”.40 The ethicists working at the Institute for Health Ethics, Stuyt 
explained, would labour to provide this moral lingua franca.41 
 Other expert institutes followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988, a Cen-
tre for Bioethics and Health Law was established at Utrecht University and, in 1993, a 
Dutch Society for Bioethics was inaugurated.42 In the same years, a number of Dutch 
journals dedicated to health and bio-ethics were founded as well, of which the most 
prominent was the Tijdschrift voor geneeskunde en ethiek (Journal for medicine and 
ethics) that saw the light in 1991.43 In 1986, Heleen Dupuis was appointed as profes-
sor medical ethics at the medical faculty of Leiden University. In 1991, Inez de Beau-
fort, who had defended a PhD-thesis on the ethics of medical experiments with hu-
mans in 1985 (see chapter 5), was inaugurated as professor of health ethics at Rotter-
dam University. In the years thereafter, most other Dutch universities realized chairs 
in medical ethics or health ethics at their medical faculties as well.44 
 With this growing professional success, health ethics was increasingly recognized 
as a mature field of study in the Netherlands, although it continued to be understood 
by most of its practitioners as a subfield of the general academic practice of ethics. As 
Inez de Beaufort wrote in 1985: “What is biomedical or health ethics? Put shortly: it is 
the application of ‘normal’ ethics, the philosophical reflection on norms and values, 
on moral problems in and around health ethics”.45 From this it followed, De Beaufort 
wrote, that physicians could not lay jurisdictional claims on health ethics on the basis 
of their profession. Their practical experience in seeing patients was valuable, but did 
not make them “mini-philosophers”.46 In 1988, the ethicist repeated this message in 
the Handboek gezondheidsethiek (Textbook health ethics) that she and Dupuis had 
edited together. Forty authors had contributed to the Handboek, of which seventeen 
identified as ethicist (many of whom had originally studied theology), six were jurists, 
nine were physicians, and eight had other disciplinary identities (including psycholo-
gy and economy).47 This versatile approach was chosen because it corresponded to 
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the “daily reality of health care”, the two ethicists explained. Nonetheless, it had to be 
clear that professional ethicists took the lead in moral thinking. As De Beaufort and 
Dupuis also wrote in the introduction of the Handboek: 
 
Well, people could now say, everyone is thus actually an ethicist? Of course al-
most all human beings are morally thinking and acting beings. And ethics should 
not be an esoteric chunk of knowledge that is only available to a handful of ‘ex-
perts’ who have mastered a secret language. Yet, to call everyone with a moral 
‘private practice’ an ‘ethicist’ would be the same thing to call everyone who man-
ages a household wallet an ‘economist’ and everyone who regularly flicks through 
a medical family-encyclopaedia a ‘medical practitioner’.48 
 
According to the two editors, ethics was a profession with a specific skillset. Ethicists, 
they argued, (1) offered terminological clarity, (2) mapped moral problems, and (3) 
applied normative theories to these problems to propose solutions. What was more, 
when done successfully, ethicists were able of tackling the growth of moral problems 
in modern society. “The starting point of this book”, the preface stated, is that “Ethics 
can help, and certainly indicate in concrete terms what direction has to be taken to 
address and solve a problem”.49 Hence, the Handboek “not only provides insight into 
the most important moral problems in health care by giving an overview of them, but 
also assists in how to tackle them”.50 By 1988, in other words, two of the most promi-
nent Dutch (health) ethicists had growing confident enough of the status of their field 
to assert it was indispensable for a morally healthy health care system. Not consulting 
ethicists, it seemed, increasingly had to be considered unprofessional. 
 
Storming the bulwark of the ethical know-it-alls 
 
 By the late 1980s, health ethics was snowballing in the Netherlands: institutes and 
professorships were being established; journals and textbooks were realized; scholars 
who identified as professional health ethicists were turning into widely known public 
commentators on all sorts of technological and scientific innovations. Heleen Dupuis, 
in particular, gained national fame in this period as an expert commentator on ethical 
problems in health care and the biomedical sciences. Whether it concerned the public 
discussion of euthanasia, aids, genetics, physical examinations, or the care of the el-
derly, Dupuis was interviewed and quoted by media from across the ideological spec-
trum.51 The ethicist did not shy away from giving clear opinions on these issues. “It is 
criminal to endlessly prolong the life of hopeless coma patients”, one paper would cite 
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Dupuis.52 “Aids-test may also be held without the permission of the patient”, another 
would quote her.53 “Triple abortion [in a woman expecting quintuplets] was humane 
and prudent”, a third would reference Dupuis.54 She was frequently invited to speak 
on television, served as the chairperson to the Dutch Society for Voluntary Euthana-
sia (NVVE), and participated in many a government advisory body.55 
 In the same period that health ethics truly started blossoming as an academic dis-
cipline, however, criticism also started to grow in the Netherlands on the intellectual 
aspirations and societal function of health ethics. At times, these critiques came from 
medical professionals, as it did in 1990 when epidemiologist Jan Vandenbroucke ar-
gued in the Dutch Journal in Medicine that the health ethics field was an obstacle for 
the increase of medical knowledge in the Netherlands—a commentary he stated many 
medical colleagues off the record agreed with (see chapter 5). Yet, the most scathing 
on the record criticism of health ethics in the Netherlands in the late 1980s came not 
from caregivers or medical researchers, but from philosophers, who vehemently disa-
greed with the intellectual claims and institutional functioning of health ethicists. The 
role these ethicists envisioned themselves to fulfil in a so-called “secular pluralist so-
ciety”, these philosophers started to argue, was detrimental not only to the academic 
study of ethics, but to the democratic functioning of society as a whole. 
 
*** 
 
 The core of these philosophical critiques was directed at a specific approach to bio- 
or health ethics that had grown popular in the late 1980s and that facetiously came to 
be called ‘the Georgetown mantra’, after the place where it was first proposed in the 
1970s. This mantra, also called principlism, is an approach to ethics which revolves 
around four principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. These 
principles, its advocates argue, are compatible with most religious, cultural, intellec-
tual, and other outlooks on life and can therefore function as the moral lingua franca 
of a pluralist society.56 In the Netherlands, this approach became known in the 1980s 
as ‘an ethics of minimum morality’. Every person, the theologian-cum-ethicist Harry 
Kuitert explained in the 1988 Handboek Gezondheidsethiek, has their own ‘compre-
hensive moral system’ that originates from and is nurtured by their social background 
and personal experiences.57 Yet, in order to peacefully coexist with those who adhere 
to a different moral system, actions of people should be able to be justified by “a min-
imum morality that […] posits those basic principles on which coexistence is based as 
inevitable obligations”.58 While such basic principles were general, in applying them 
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to particular cases they became guiding notions to find ethical solutions that should 
be acceptable to all members of a pluralist society. Thus, in her 1985 PhD-thesis, De 
Beaufort proposed such a normative framework for medical experiments on humans 
with the Georgetown-mantra. “These are abstract principles”, De Beaufort explained, 
“but they become more concrete owing to the fact that people can base reasons on 
them to justify their decisions”.59 Subsequently, she defended the need for informed 
consent (autonomy), appropriate safeguards (non-maleficence), experiments (benefi-
cence), etcetera, with the four principles. This approach allowed governments to take 
action, De Beaufort claimed, but left ‘broad moral beliefs’ to people’s individual con-
science. In so doing, principlism could bind a pluralist society together without undu-
ly infringing upon the wide variety of moral beliefs existent in it. 
 One of the first explicit critiques on this approach in the Netherlands was voiced at 
the 1987 winter’s meeting of the Dutch Society of Ethicists by philosopher and theo-
logian Paul van Tongeren, who was at the time a professor of ‘philosophy in relation 
to the Catholic tradition’ at Leiden University (in 1990, he took up a position of pro-
fessor in moral philosophy at the Catholic University of Nijmegen). According to Van 
Tongeren, moral philosophy essentially was a form of hermeneutics: an “art of inter-
preting or explaining what announces itself as meaningful to us, but that for whatever 
reason is distant, so that it has to be transposed and explained”. The academic study 
of ethics thus consisted of “bridging this distance, so the meanings we suspect or just 
faintly discern [to exist] may occur in full form to us again”.60 This, however, the Lei-
den professor argued, was everything that the applied ethics tradition that had grown 
dominant in recent years was not. Ethicists who used the Georgetown-mantra hardly 
investigated “that what can be heard” in moral instances: they just assumed they al-
ready knew what was being said in order to apply their supposedly universal princi-
ples. In doing so, Van Tongeren felt, applied ethicists failed to truly understand what 
was as stake in such instances, making them likely to repeat the very conditions that 
had initially brought forth these problems in their solutions for them. 
 A year later, another Dutch philosopher drew a similar conclusion in his (scathing) 
review of the recently published Handboek gezondheidsethiek. This philosopher was 
Hans Achterhuis, known nationally as the author of the 1979 bestseller De markt van 
welzijn en geluk (The market of wellbeing and happiness) in which he argued that the 
growth of the welfare services in the post war era had led to an enormous dependence 
on them.61 The textbook, Achterhuis argued in his review, constituted a “specific lan-
guage game in which terms like mondigheid, self-determination, and choice take cen-
tre stage”.62 Although this language game was presented as a moral lingua franca, in 
reality it was a highly liberal discourse that displaced other ways of thinking and talk-
ing about health care, such as more historically and sociologically informed critiques 
of the modern health care system by critical thinkers like Ivan Illich and Michel Fou-
cault. The authors of the Handboek simply accepted, for instance, that a core ethical 
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problem of the modern health care system was the ‘scarcity’ of medical goods or the 
costs of health care for society as a whole, without analysing what a term like scarcity 
means and what function it fulfils in modern capitalist societies.63 In other words, like 
Van Tongeren, Achterhuis accused health ethicists of reproducing the problems they 
believed to solve by ignoring the fundamental question how some issues and not oth-
ers come to be socially recognized as ethical problems. Health ethics, the philosopher 
concluded, could hardly be called a reflexive academic field of study. 
 The critiques of Van Tongeren and Achterhuis marked the beginning of a storm of 
denunciations of the field of health ethics by Dutch philosophers in the late 1980s. In 
1990, for instance, physician and philosopher Henk ten Have dedicated his full inau-
gural lecture as ‘professor of philosophy related to the Catholic outlook on life’ at the 
State University of Limburg to the misconceptions on which he believed Dutch health 
ethics was based.64 Health ethicists like Dupuis, Ten Have observed, were becoming 
increasingly popular in the media and government advisory bodies. “Apparently our 
society has a need for such spokespersons, who offer orientation, directions, a sense 
of security for confusing and difficult situations that we do not know what to make of 
ourselves”. Still, the philosopher asked, “what really happens to ethics when she lets 
herself get seduced to fulfil this role?”.65 Ethics then became a form of moral engi-
neering, a term Ten Have borrowed from American bioethicist Arthur Caplan.66 Like 
engineers, health ethicists would try to surgically dissect and fix moral problems by 
simplifying moral choices and designing standardized pathways for them. Like engi-
neers, they would be preoccupied with spectacular technological problems and have a 
desire for homogeneity to streamline ethical decision-making in health care.67 “How-
ever complex a case may be, however difficult the decision is to deal with”, Ten Have 
claimed, “the ethicist aims to offer certainty and solutions” by appealing to principles 
that could easily be translated into policies, rules, and regulations.68 
 But what problems did this approach solve, really? In a book, Ten Have recounted 
something that had struck him when taking a bioethics course in the United States in 
the 1980s. “At the same moment an elaborate plea was being held in the course room 
for the prime importance of individual freedom and respect for autonomy, outside in 
the public park a few dozen beggars could be discerned who possessed nothing more 
than a plastic bag or grocery trolley”.69 Why, the philosopher asked, did bioethicists 
write article after article about the importance of informed consent, while they could 
hardly be heard about the relation between economic inequality and life expectancy? 
The reason was, Ten Have felt, because bioethics had created a profile for itself in the 
1960s as a modern ‘neutral’ alternative to older religious perspectives on medicine. In 
                                                 
63 See also: Hans Achterhuis, Het rijk van de schaarste. Van Thomas Hobbes tot Michel Foucault 
(Baarn: Ambo, 1988).  
64 Henk ten Have, Ethiek tussen alliantie en dissidentie (Maastricht: Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, 1990); 
Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis; Henk ten Have & Gerrit Kimsma, Geneeskunde tussen droom 
en drama. Voortplanting, ethiek en vooruitgang (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1987). 
65 Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis, Preface. 
66 See: Arthur Caplan, ‘Applying Morality to Advances in Biomedicine: Can and should this be 
Done?’, in W.B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Engelhardt, S.F. Spicker & J.M. White (eds.), New Knowledge 
in the Biomedical Sciences (Springer: Dordrecht, 1982), pp. 155-168. 
67 Ten Have, Ethiek tussen Alliantie en Dissidentie, p. 18. 
68 Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis, p. 20. 
69 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
· chapter 6 · 
· 208 · 
to particular cases they became guiding notions to find ethical solutions that should 
be acceptable to all members of a pluralist society. Thus, in her 1985 PhD-thesis, De 
Beaufort proposed such a normative framework for medical experiments on humans 
with the Georgetown-mantra. “These are abstract principles”, De Beaufort explained, 
“but they become more concrete owing to the fact that people can base reasons on 
them to justify their decisions”.59 Subsequently, she defended the need for informed 
consent (autonomy), appropriate safeguards (non-maleficence), experiments (benefi-
cence), etcetera, with the four principles. This approach allowed governments to take 
action, De Beaufort claimed, but left ‘broad moral beliefs’ to people’s individual con-
science. In so doing, principlism could bind a pluralist society together without undu-
ly infringing upon the wide variety of moral beliefs existent in it. 
 One of the first explicit critiques on this approach in the Netherlands was voiced at 
the 1987 winter’s meeting of the Dutch Society of Ethicists by philosopher and theo-
logian Paul van Tongeren, who was at the time a professor of ‘philosophy in relation 
to the Catholic tradition’ at Leiden University (in 1990, he took up a position of pro-
fessor in moral philosophy at the Catholic University of Nijmegen). According to Van 
Tongeren, moral philosophy essentially was a form of hermeneutics: an “art of inter-
preting or explaining what announces itself as meaningful to us, but that for whatever 
reason is distant, so that it has to be transposed and explained”. The academic study 
of ethics thus consisted of “bridging this distance, so the meanings we suspect or just 
faintly discern [to exist] may occur in full form to us again”.60 This, however, the Lei-
den professor argued, was everything that the applied ethics tradition that had grown 
dominant in recent years was not. Ethicists who used the Georgetown-mantra hardly 
investigated “that what can be heard” in moral instances: they just assumed they al-
ready knew what was being said in order to apply their supposedly universal princi-
ples. In doing so, Van Tongeren felt, applied ethicists failed to truly understand what 
was as stake in such instances, making them likely to repeat the very conditions that 
had initially brought forth these problems in their solutions for them. 
 A year later, another Dutch philosopher drew a similar conclusion in his (scathing) 
review of the recently published Handboek gezondheidsethiek. This philosopher was 
Hans Achterhuis, known nationally as the author of the 1979 bestseller De markt van 
welzijn en geluk (The market of wellbeing and happiness) in which he argued that the 
growth of the welfare services in the post war era had led to an enormous dependence 
on them.61 The textbook, Achterhuis argued in his review, constituted a “specific lan-
guage game in which terms like mondigheid, self-determination, and choice take cen-
tre stage”.62 Although this language game was presented as a moral lingua franca, in 
reality it was a highly liberal discourse that displaced other ways of thinking and talk-
ing about health care, such as more historically and sociologically informed critiques 
of the modern health care system by critical thinkers like Ivan Illich and Michel Fou-
cault. The authors of the Handboek simply accepted, for instance, that a core ethical 
                                                 
59 De Beaufort, Ethiek en medische experimenten met mensen, p. 7. 
60 P. van Tongeren, ‘Ethiek en praktijk’, in Filosofie en praktijk Vol. 9 (1988), pp. 113-127, p. 114. 
61 “The welfare worker produces the needs of his clients”, Achterhuis famously stated after Croatian-
Austrian philosopher Ivan Illich, and contributed to the medicalization of society, often to iatrogenic 
effect. Hans Achterhuis, De markt van welzijn en geluk. Een kritiek van de andragogie (Baarn: Ambo, 
1979); Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis. The expropriation of health (London: Calder and Boyars, 1975).  
62 Achterhuis, ‘Schaarste en moraal’, p. 41. 
· the governing function of ethical experts · 
 · 209 · 
problem of the modern health care system was the ‘scarcity’ of medical goods or the 
costs of health care for society as a whole, without analysing what a term like scarcity 
means and what function it fulfils in modern capitalist societies.63 In other words, like 
Van Tongeren, Achterhuis accused health ethicists of reproducing the problems they 
believed to solve by ignoring the fundamental question how some issues and not oth-
ers come to be socially recognized as ethical problems. Health ethics, the philosopher 
concluded, could hardly be called a reflexive academic field of study. 
 The critiques of Van Tongeren and Achterhuis marked the beginning of a storm of 
denunciations of the field of health ethics by Dutch philosophers in the late 1980s. In 
1990, for instance, physician and philosopher Henk ten Have dedicated his full inau-
gural lecture as ‘professor of philosophy related to the Catholic outlook on life’ at the 
State University of Limburg to the misconceptions on which he believed Dutch health 
ethics was based.64 Health ethicists like Dupuis, Ten Have observed, were becoming 
increasingly popular in the media and government advisory bodies. “Apparently our 
society has a need for such spokespersons, who offer orientation, directions, a sense 
of security for confusing and difficult situations that we do not know what to make of 
ourselves”. Still, the philosopher asked, “what really happens to ethics when she lets 
herself get seduced to fulfil this role?”.65 Ethics then became a form of moral engi-
neering, a term Ten Have borrowed from American bioethicist Arthur Caplan.66 Like 
engineers, health ethicists would try to surgically dissect and fix moral problems by 
simplifying moral choices and designing standardized pathways for them. Like engi-
neers, they would be preoccupied with spectacular technological problems and have a 
desire for homogeneity to streamline ethical decision-making in health care.67 “How-
ever complex a case may be, however difficult the decision is to deal with”, Ten Have 
claimed, “the ethicist aims to offer certainty and solutions” by appealing to principles 
that could easily be translated into policies, rules, and regulations.68 
 But what problems did this approach solve, really? In a book, Ten Have recounted 
something that had struck him when taking a bioethics course in the United States in 
the 1980s. “At the same moment an elaborate plea was being held in the course room 
for the prime importance of individual freedom and respect for autonomy, outside in 
the public park a few dozen beggars could be discerned who possessed nothing more 
than a plastic bag or grocery trolley”.69 Why, the philosopher asked, did bioethicists 
write article after article about the importance of informed consent, while they could 
hardly be heard about the relation between economic inequality and life expectancy? 
The reason was, Ten Have felt, because bioethics had created a profile for itself in the 
1960s as a modern ‘neutral’ alternative to older religious perspectives on medicine. In 
                                                 
63 See also: Hans Achterhuis, Het rijk van de schaarste. Van Thomas Hobbes tot Michel Foucault 
(Baarn: Ambo, 1988).  
64 Henk ten Have, Ethiek tussen alliantie en dissidentie (Maastricht: Rijksuniversiteit Limburg, 1990); 
Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis; Henk ten Have & Gerrit Kimsma, Geneeskunde tussen droom 
en drama. Voortplanting, ethiek en vooruitgang (Kampen: Kok Agora, 1987). 
65 Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis, Preface. 
66 See: Arthur Caplan, ‘Applying Morality to Advances in Biomedicine: Can and should this be 
Done?’, in W.B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Engelhardt, S.F. Spicker & J.M. White (eds.), New Knowledge 
in the Biomedical Sciences (Springer: Dordrecht, 1982), pp. 155-168. 
67 Ten Have, Ethiek tussen Alliantie en Dissidentie, p. 18. 
68 Ten Have, Een hippocratische erfenis, p. 20. 
69 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
· chapter 6 · 
· 210 · 
this quest for a more secular ethics, principles like autonomy and non-maleficence 
had been presented as the only sensible “moral Esperanto” of a pluralist society. Con-
sequently, only specific types of issues came to be understood as moral problems (i.e. 
issues concerned with the position of the individual patient in health care) while oth-
ers were neglected or designated as ‘political’: a matter of weighing interests or count-
ing heads (true ethical problems, in contrast, preceded the political process and could 
be resolved by arguing reasonably). In this same vein, ethicists could present them-
selves as neutral mediators; the ones who spoke the moral lingua franca of a pluralist 
society and who could broker a consensus in an otherwise chaotic world.70 
 The grievance of these philosophers with health ethics in part concerned the feeble 
justification of its intellectual claims. On what epistemic foundations did principles of 
autonomy and non-maleficence rest? What tools did ethicists possess to consistently 
and unambiguously apply them to individual cases? And did these principles not just 
function as catch-all terms, abstract enough to make any moral argument one wanted 
to? The Georgetown mantra, in short, would function as the emperor’s new clothes, 
with doctors and policymakers as the emperor, ethicists as the shrewd weavers, and 
philosophers, of course, as the only child sane or daring enough to point out the em-
peror was in fact naked. To a large extent, however, the grievance of philosophers like 
Van Tongeren, Achterhuis, and Ten Have also lay with the governance role they be-
lieved health ethicists to fulfil in health care and the way in which their dominance in 
public discourse would push other societal perspectives on the moral permissibility of 
new sciences and technologies to the margins of the political spectrum. 
 In 1993, this view was articulated by the philosopher Hub Zwart (a student of Paul 
van Tongeren) in a PhD-thesis that detailed how health ethicists sought to reach “eth-
ical consensus in a pluralistic society”.71 Health ethicists, Zwart maintained, typically 
acknowledged that their claims rested on a feeble intellectual foundation. Their point 
was not that an ethics of minimum morality produced truth claims, but that it could 
rest on a reasonable consensus among participants of moral deliberations, which was 
all that could realistically be expected in a pluralist society. Health ethicists thus ad-
vocated a predominantly procedural approach to ethics. As long as people were guar-
anteed their right to speak and willing to utilize this right in a reasonable manner, i.e. 
by participating in conversations, sustaining their opinions with arguments, and lis-
tening to others, the minimum morality needed for peaceful coexistence would even-
tually surface in moral deliberations. The deliberation process itself was primary, not 
its outcome.72 However, Zwart argued, while this doctrine was presented as a neutral 
procedure, it was in reality an attempt to pass off liberal ethics as the only ethic suita-
ble for a pluralist society. By constantly using the threat that all other ethical perspec-
tives might result in conflict and warfare, adepts of ethics of minimum morality effec-
tively labelled these perspectives as threats to peaceful coexistence.73 Despite their lip 
service to pluralism, in other words, advocates of the Georgetown-mantra dismissed 
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the riches of a pluralist society. “The liberal perspective [on moral discussion]”, Zwart 
wrote, is “de jure broadminded, but de facto restricted”.74 Ethicists’ supposed ability 
to ‘broker consensus’ was in practice an instrument of social control.75 
 
*** 
 
 Notably, the example that most of these philosophers used to illuminate their crit-
icism on the health ethics discourse was the ethics and governance of human experi-
mentation. In his 1987 lecture, for instance, Van Tongeren used the example to eluci-
date his point on the need for hermeneutic ethics. Ethicists, the philosopher argued, 
should not explain the permissibility of human experimentation in terms of informed 
consent and the realization of appropriate safeguards. They had to explore more fun-
damental questions as to why a society would invest in a practice like human experi-
mentation and how this activity relates to “what we really are after in life”: what sort 
of function do human experiments fulfil in our lives and how does this function relate 
to our convictions of what it means to live a good life? As such, ethicists could help to 
shape people’s moral sensibilities about a practice like human experimentation and 
make them reflect on whether it should be an accepted and integral part of the society 
they hoped to live in. Ethicists could not, Van Tongeren continued emphatically, de-
cide in concrete cases of human experimentation whether or not these were ethically 
permissible on the basis of a limited number of abstract principles. 
 Similarly, in his denunciation of the role of ethical engineer, Ten Have invoked the 
example of the Dutch jurist Lucas Bergkamp who had stated in 1989 that variation 
and inconsistency in research ethics committees were the most important problems 
that the governance of human experimentation in the Netherlands had to deal with 
(see chapter 5). This longing for streamlined decision-making procedures and a con-
comitant “homogenization of all differences”, Ten Have argued, was typical for the 
health ethics movement. While ethics committees could in his opinion not just adopt 
any ethical norm they wanted to, “strict uniformity and the more or less mandatory 
imposition of external standards is fatal for all moral deliberation on the desirability 
and acceptability of [research] proposals”. If this was the case, “no reason exists any-
more to speak of medical-ethics committees” (they were just juridical committees).76 
Hence, what ethicists should do was not to participate in research ethics committees 
as engineers who could help to ensure streamlined decision-making processes, but to 
“help make the normative dimension of health care practices explicit”, including the 
elements that might not be considered morally problematic yet by the participants in 
committee deliberations. Their expertise did not consist of making issues managea-
ble, but “to help shape a moral community that better understands itself” through an 
exploration of the norms, values, and perceptions of life that underlie the practice of 
human experimentation (Ten Have very much agreed with and actively recommend-
ed Van Tongeren’s hermeneutic approach to ethics).77 
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and acceptability of [research] proposals”. If this was the case, “no reason exists any-
more to speak of medical-ethics committees” (they were just juridical committees).76 
Hence, what ethicists should do was not to participate in research ethics committees 
as engineers who could help to ensure streamlined decision-making processes, but to 
“help make the normative dimension of health care practices explicit”, including the 
elements that might not be considered morally problematic yet by the participants in 
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 If ethicists did not take up this more hermeneutic role in the research ethics com-
mittees they participated in, Ten Have warned, the danger existed that their member-
ship would allow biomedical researchers to shirk their ethical responsibility. A pro-
fessor in obstetrics, for instance, had recently stated that an experiment with a new 
abortion pill did not present any ethical problems, because it had been approved by 
an ethics committee.78 This, Ten Have maintained, was a clear example of how a pro-
cedural approach to ethics became an obstacle for substantial reflection on difficult 
cases: “Once procedures are agreed-upon, they obtain, in accordance with the model 
of law, an alibi-function. Ethics as a process of continuous reflection on medical ac-
tion is therewith halted”.79 Ten Have strongly disagreed with Vandenbroucke, there-
fore, that health ethics formed an obstacle to medical innovation. Quite the contrary, 
health ethicists’ endorsement of a procedural approach to ethics by and large facili-
tated the growth of the biomedical enterprise. After all, as long as human experi-
ments could be justified with the Georgetown-mantra, they were given a green light 
in the health ethics discourse. In effect, reflections that might consider their place in 
medicine or society were effectively relegated to the realm of ‘broad moral beliefs’, 
meaning they were beyond the purview of the minimum morality of a pluralist society 
and could thus not be taken into account in the deliberations of research ethics com-
mittees.80 As such, Ten Have concluded, health ethicists made sure that the machin-
eries of the biomedical research establishment kept operating smoothly. 
 Another scholar who expressed this point of view in the early 1990s was Gerard de 
Vries, a Dutch philosopher of science and technology who published a series of pieces 
in this period on the governing function of health ethics in the Netherlands.81 Accord-
ing to De Vries, health ethicists liked to think of themselves as bearers of Enlighten-
ment who had come to bring reason and resolution: “The ethicist sets himself up as a 
spokesperson for rationality and promises to show us the way. […] What once an-
nounced itself as a tragedy turns out to be a [mere] conflict for which a rational solu-
tion exists”.82 De Vries, to put it mildly, was sceptical of this ability. For one thing, he 
argued, the preferred analytical categories of health ethicists (i.e. autonomy, benefi-
cence, etcetera) were deeply inadequate to make sense of, let alone disentangle, the 
complex network that constituted the late modern biomedical landscape: the categor-
ical distinction between wilful humans and lifeless technologies, the narrow frame of 
rights and duties, the fiction of autonomous patients—they all fell painfully short to 
make sense of the jumble of structures and practices that had come to determine the 
biomedical enterprise in the twentieth century. Really, “how is it possible”, De Vries 
charged cynically, “that ethicists have succeeded, in spite of the inadequate tools they 
deliver, to build a blossoming practice for themselves?”.83 
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 To answer his own question, also De Vries brought up the ethics and governance 
of human experimentation in the late twentieth century. In the early twentieth centu-
ry still, De Vries argued, fairly innocent medical experiments with human beings had 
frequently caused an outcry, not just among vocal critics of the artsenstand, but also 
among members of the artsenstand itself. The dominant medical ethics tradition was 
just not compatible with it, since the Hippocratic adage primum non nocere did not 
permit experimental interventions that were not in the interest of individual patients. 
Since World War II, however, this tradition had increasingly been adapted to form a 
framework in which medical experiments with human beings could explicitly be justi-
fied. Medical ethics was made compatible with, and thereby normalized, the conduct 
of human experiments. Sure, after the growing social criticism in the 1960s, ‘outsid-
ers’ had been increasingly allowed to participate in the evaluation of medical experi-
ments with humans. Yet, their participation was contingent on their acceptance of the 
new medical ethics: they had to admit that, in principle, such experiments were per-
mitted and necessary. They had to be reasonable, after all. 
 According to De Vries, the functioning of research ethics committees proved how 
“routines have come into existence [in health care] that meet the classic requirements 
of modern, bureaucratic organisations, formulated by the sociologist Weber: compe-
tencies are strictly regulated, intercourse takes place in writing, judgement is in prin-
ciple impersonal”. This bureaucratic framework had great advantages for all involved, 
it gave legal protection to researchers, to research participants, to those who financed 
research studies, to hospital administrations, etcetera. It even “provides ethics with a 
well-functioning memory”, with new cases being able to be compared to older ones, 
with research ethics committees being able to compare notes. Yet, it also ensured, De 
Vries remarked sarcastically, that ethicists (and other reviewers) did not even have to 
think anymore. They only had to follow procedure. “If the forms are not filled in cor-
rectly”, the dictum now was, “the medical ethicist cannot do his job”.84 
 Hence, the philosopher concluded, Dutch health ethics was not successful because 
its norms and skills provided a rational check on the activities of caregivers and bio-
medical researchers. It was successful, because it had adapted its norms and skills to 
fit the bureaucratization of medicine in the twentieth century. It provided the status 
quo with the necessary legitimization of dominant activities like human experimenta-
tion without having to open up the debate to more critical voices. Health ethicists, in 
short, had become indispensable greasers for technoscientific machineries. In doing 
so, De Vries warned, they undermined the democratic decision-making processes of 
Dutch society. Under the flag of ethics, moral issues were increasingly depoliticized: 
manoeuvred outside of the political arena to be ‘solved’ technocratically by a group of 
anointed ethical experts.85 Already in 1987, Van Tongeren had raised a similar point 
in his lecture for the Dutch Society of Ethicists. If moral problems had become diffi-
cult to solve in a pluralist society, he had argued, the solution was not to defuse them 
by having a group of ethical experts draw up some sort of minimum morality: “I see 
no other possibility than that rules are drawn up in the political and legal arenas, re-
alizing that they are ethically provisional or inevitably without ethical legitimization”. 
“Such rules”, Van Tongeren had pressed, “are achieved by counting heads or reaching 
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compromises”.86 They could not be found in the toolbox of ethical experts, who had to 
know better than to try and “give a political compromise the pretence of ethical legit-
imization”.87 Ethicists were just no problem-solving engineers. 
 
The determined rebuttal of ‘the ethical engineers’ 
 
 Not surprisingly, prominent representatives of the Dutch health ethics movement 
did not quite agree with the critical assessments of these philosophers of their field of 
study. In 1991, for instance, Heleen Dupuis wrote a review of Ten Have’s book for the 
Dutch Journal of Medicine in which she insisted that the newly appointed philosophy 
professor must have completely lost sight of reality. His portrayal of health ethics, she 
argued, was so off the mark that it could not even be called a caricature; he had just 
gotten it wrong in every possible way.88 She also scorched the alternative approach to 
health or medical ethics proposed by Ten Have (see above). Firstly, the role of ethicist 
as envisioned by Ten Have was described so inadequately that it was completely use-
less. And, secondly, his description of ethicists as critical thinkers was just a summary 
of what they did already. “One wonders in what world Ten Have lives”, Dupuis ended 
her review, “that he dares to present something that already exists and has since long 
become standard practice as his discovery and as something new”. 
 In 1991, the ethicist Frans Jacobs, who had obtained his PhD in 1985 on the topic 
of how a liberal ethics is the only ethics that meets the demands of a pluralist society, 
responded to the criticism of Paul van Tongeren on the applied ethics tradition in the 
Netherlands.89 Jacobs started off by admitting that the appearance of many ethicists 
in the media in recent years resembled a role that vicars had used to fulfil, i.e., the act 
of “passing normative judgements from an authoritative position” (Jacobs specifically 
invoked ‘Mrs. Dupuis’ as an example).90 This was annoying, he conceded, and not a 
role that ethicists could legitimately fulfil. Yet, the haughty dismissal of Van Tongeren 
of the applied ethics tradition was equally annoying. And not just that, it was possibly 
dangerous as well. Van Tongeren’s notion of hermeneutic ethics assumed that if ethi-
cists just listened carefully they could hear what was ‘authentically’ being said, even if 
the average person could not discern these distant whispers. Adopting this position, 
Jacobs charged, was also acting like a priest, only one that was paternalistic and pos-
sibly intolerant of outlooks on life that a hermeneuticist believed to be “inauthentic”. 
An ethics of minimum morality, Jacobs countered instead, was not formulated out of 
some sort of intellectual laziness, but to accommodate for moral beliefs that differed 
from those of the dominant cultural group in a society. This was an incredibly diffi-
cult assignment, yet one essential to develop an ethical framework for peaceful coex-
istence that did not subsume to intolerance. For Van Tongeren to simply brush this 
aside was to threaten the possibility for peaceful coexistence. 
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 Now more than ever, Jacobs continued, society was in need of such a framework. 
Pollution, nuclear energy, the arms race—they were all examples of the life threaten-
ing consequences of technoscientific advancement. These potentially volatile circum-
stances demanded moral guidance, guidance that could no longer be offered by Chris-
tianity in a secularizing society. Applied ethics, Jacobs maintained therefore, found 
its right to exist in this demand. Society simply needed scholars who could ask mean-
ingful questions and guide moral thinking about these developments. Dupuis and De 
Beaufort strongly agreed with this perception of the added value of (health) ethics. 
Already in her 1985 dissertation, De Beaufort had stated that she firmly believed that 
ethics, as an academic discipline, should serve to formulate answers to the urgent and 
complex moral questions that society currently faced. “In this she finds her ultimate 
justification”, De Beaufort contended, “otherwise she is just an academic pastime”.91 
In their 1988 textbook, Dupuis and De Beaufort repeated this point. While armchair 
philosophers might keep their hands clean by sitting in their ivory towers and savour-
ing their intellectual analyses, applied ethicists made an actual difference in the world 
by getting their hands dirty in taking on real-life moral problems.  
 In 1992, the applied ethicist Frans Brom offered another fiery defence of the active 
involvement of ethicists in the resolution of real-life moral problems. Brom worked at 
the Utrecht Centre for Bio-ethics and Health Law, but was contracted by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality to participate in the development of policies 
for advanced sciences and technologies. Based on his experience, he had become con-
vinced that ethicists had an important contribution to make in the realization of poli-
cies that were both morally and socially acceptable. They provided conceptual clarity, 
pointed out elements that were not yet considered problematic by policymakers, and 
brought up ethical viewpoints they believed were unjustly ignored. Ethicists were no 
engineers, Brom argued, they did not replace genuine moral deliberations with tech-
nocratic solutions, but acted as mediators to ensure that participants in these deliber-
ations correctly understood one another.92 Scholars who assumed that the political 
solutions of ethical dilemmas could only ever be reached by weighing interests were 
wrong. By carefully examining the moral presuppositions of these dilemmas, ethicists 
allowed policymakers to “pursue better, because more rational, policies”.93 That they 
might subsequently be used to politically legitimize these policies was not their fault. 
If anything, ethicists willing to take a seat at the policy table could correct those who 
unjustly sought to surround policy with an academic aura. After all, the ideas of arm-
chair scholars could just as easily be used by policymakers, making it all too easy to 
duck responsibility by shouting that any involvement in policy made academics com-
plicit with it.94 In order to speak truth to power, intellectuals actually had to speak to 
those in power, which was not done from a tall ivory tower. 
 
*** 
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 The core message of all these rebuttals was that professional ethicists did have an 
important public function to fulfil in a pluralist democracy and that, given the many 
ethical problems that society faced, their refusal to contribute to the solution of these 
problems was unwarranted and irresponsible. Philosopher or ethicist, neither had the 
luxury to rummage around the halls of academia and twiddle their thumbs as long as 
a societal need existed for their reasoned input. “A world threatened with extinction 
clings to the life buoy of applied ethics”, Jacobs wrote in 1991, “which is thereby saved 
from extinction caused by irrelevance and sterility”.95 Yet, an important part of the 
critiques of philosophers like De Vries and Ten Have was not just the public function-
ing of ethicists, but the feeble foundations of their moral claims. Even if the ethical 
problems faced by modern societies were substantial, why would the judgements of 
ethicists be more relevant than those of the average citizen? 
 The most systematic answer to this question was offered in 1991 by the upcoming 
ethicist Theo van Willigenburg in his PhD-thesis Inside the Ethical Expert, which he 
wrote as a fellow of the Utrecht Centre for Bio-ethics and Health Law.96 In 1996, he 
would become a medical ethics professor at the University of Amsterdam and in 1999 
an ethics professor at the philosophy faculty in Rotterdam, where he served as dean 
as well (before being dismissed in 2005).97 Yet, in the early 1990s, he was already one 
of the most visible faces in the applied ethics field in the Netherlands. In his 1991 the-
sis, Van Willigenburg explicitly rejected the Georgetown-approach to the analysis and 
possible solution of moral cases. The idea that moral judgements about real-life ethi-
cal problems could be reached by applying moral rules or principles, the ethicist ar-
gued, was logically problematic. After all, before an ethicist could know which princi-
ples to apply, (s)he first had to qualify the case as being of a certain moral ‘kind’, e.g., 
a problem in which the autonomy of individuals was at stake or in which the principle 
of beneficence might apply. As only the principles themselves could provide this sort 
of indication, principlism basically was a form of circular reasoning.98 
 Rather than dismissing applied ethics, however, Van Willigenburg proposed what 
he called a case-oriented approach to moral reasoning about particular cases. When 
people encountered situations that they experienced to be morally problematic, the 
ethicist wrote, this uneasiness often was not invoked by recognizing that the situation 
violated a general principle, but by a moral intuition; a direct and immediate reaction 
to a particular event. “Moral intuitions make us recognize (at least some of) the moral 
dimensions of a case”, Van Willigenburg stated, “and thus interpret a case as being of 
a certain kind”.99 This ‘intuiting’ was nothing else than interpreting an issue accord-
ing to specific moral patterns that organized how people perceived the world around 
them. Moral glasses that made them see certain things and not others. These patterns 
could differ per community and individual and, importantly, change or dissolve upon 
careful reflection. Yet, according to Van Willigenburg, “satisfying interpretative grids” 
could be found for specific moral problems by collecting enough real and hypothetical 
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cases to allow for their comparison and by generating patterns from them to allow for 
the satisfactory ‘intuiting’ of future cases.100 Hence, rather than a deductive approach 
to applied ethics (i.e. principlism), Van Willigenburg proposed an inductive approach 
involving the production and application of ‘statistical regularities’. 
 Notably, like the Dutch philosophers who had started to criticize the applied ethics 
tradition in the late 1980s, also Van Willigenburg appealed to the recent ethics and 
governance of human experimentation to explain his perspective on moral reasoning, 
only to make the exact opposite point as these philosophers had done. The current 
functioning of research ethics committees, the ethicist argued, provided an excellent 
example of the way in which systematic inductive moral reasoning worked. One rea-
son was the “broad consensus among all parties concerned (hospital administrations, 
physicians, patients organisations, medical researchers and pharmaceutical industry) 
about the moral issues at stake in human experimentation”. While these parties could 
disagree among the value of importance of some issues, Van Willigenburg argued, all 
underscored authoritative international codes and declarations stating the core prin-
ciples of human experimentation, meaning that these documents already offered an 
important interpretative grid for intuiting the moral permissibility of cases of human 
experimentation.101 A second reason was that research ethics committees had exten-
sive experience in the moral evaluation of practical cases. Contrary to what some be-
lieved, Van Willigenburg stated, the moral reasoning process in these committees did 
not proceed deductively through an application of moral principles. Instead, commit-
tees typically deliberated by invoking cases they had previously dealt with, revisiting 
the arguments and concerns that had been put forward in those instances. Principles 
played a role, e.g., by setting the parameters within which discussions took place, but 
“Fine-graded assessment in moral thinking is performed by a process of comparison 
of the problem case to other real and hypothetical cases”.102 This modus operandi of 
research ethics committees, Van Willigenburg explained, was a perfect institutional-
ized example of how moral reasoning worked in practice. 
 To be sure, the robustness of this approach to moral reasoning depended on the 
number and variety of cases uploaded into the collective memory of a research ethics 
committee. Imagine, Van Willigenburg wrote, that an expert system (a computer sys-
tem emulating the decision-making abilities of human experts) was able to mimic this 
process of going back and forth between past and present cases by building an exten-
sive catalogue of older cases and generating a set of morally relevant dimensions from 
them (Van Willigenburg imagined a fourteen-dimensional grid that included, among 
other things, the scientific relevance of experiments, the quality of subjects’ consent, 
the likeness of risks, etcetera). As long as enough old cases were fed to the expert sys-
tem, it had to be able to generate an algorithm for qualifying and weighing the moral 
dimensions of new cases and reach fine-graded decisions about them (until, due to 
technological advancement or changing socio-cultural ideas, a moral consensus could 
no longer be assumed to exist about human experimentation, which would require a 
recalibration of the morally relevant dimensions of this practice).103 
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 Although Van Willigenburg emphasized that his imagined expert system only had 
heuristic value, his thought experiment served to explain how the moral reasoning 
processes of research ethics committees could function if their so-called ‘hard disk’ 
was filled with enough past cases and if they possessed the ‘software’ needed to ex-
tract the morally relevant dimensions of older cases to qualify and weigh new ones. 
This, Van Willigenburg argued, was basically what ethical experts did. Moral thinking 
essentially was “a pattern-driven multi-dimensional process”. To some extent, every 
person was capable of doing this. Yet, due to the fact that professional ethicists could 
busy themselves full-time with moral issues, the patterns at their disposal tended to 
be larger and more fine-graded. “The large repertoire of interpretative patterns stored 
as part of the expertise of the ethical practitioner” Van Willigenburg stated, made him 
or her more “sensitive to the new (type of) problem, which means that (s)he is able to 
respond more promptly and accurately to the important cues in the case”.104 This ex-
pert ability did not mean ethicists’ judgements were objectively better than those of 
laypeople. An objective yardstick to measure the accuracy of ethical judgements did 
not exist. Still, the conclusions of professional ethicists went beyond mere opinions or 
beliefs. First, because their ‘hard drive’ was filled with a wide knowledge of past cases 
(in addition to a sufficient understanding of ethical theories and principles). Second, 
because their ‘software’—their skills in moral reasoning—allowed them to extract the 
morally relevant dimensions of past cases and explain in a consistent manner how 
these applied to new cases. “Depending upon the quality of the reasoning process 
underlying a moral conclusion”, Van Willigenburg concluded from this, “one is justi-
fied in holding that one does not just ‘believe’, but that one ‘knows’”.105 This knowing 
was what distinguished the ethical expert from laypersons. 
 For Van Willigenburg, the ability to combine knowledge of past cases with the skill 
of consistently going back and forth between new and older cases was the main and 
perhaps only expertise that ethicists really had. Ethical expertise, Van Willigenburg 
wrote in response to Ten Have, consisted not of “a kind of ‘Greenpeace-like’ activism 
[…] against the dominant ‘technocratic’ ideology in modern medicine”.106 Ethicists’ 
contribution was intellectual, not political. Thus, if ethicists were asked to take part in 
a research ethics committee, their role was not “to put into the pillory the ‘pernicious 
power’ of the pharmaceutical industry” but to assist in thinking through the research 
proposal under examination with their knowledge of past cases and ability to argue 
them consistently.107 Similarly, if they were asked to think along with scientists about 
the permissibility of specific animal experiments, their task was not to start a crusade 
against all research involving animals. “Ethical practitioners need to be critical”, Van 
Willigenburg pressed, “not as activists or reformers, but as experts who take their 
discipline seriously as a discipline of reason”.108 Doing so was not selling out, it was 
the only role that ethical experts could sensibly fulfil. 
 
*** 
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 In the early 1990s, these two diverging views on the ability and function of ‘ethical 
experts’ were increasingly experienced as a true ‘factional struggle’ over the identity 
of the Dutch ethics profession. In 1993, at a conference organised by the Utrecht Cen-
tre for Bio-ethics and Health Law, Van Willigenburg and Van Tongeren again crossed 
swords on the contribution ethicists could really make to “the manner in which moral 
issues are addressed by policymakers, […], physicians, and other caregivers”.109 Van 
Willigenburg opened the debate by stating that he had decided to appropriate the title 
‘ethical engineer’. In recent years, he argued, the term engineer had frequently been 
thrown at applied ethicists to demean their activities. Like plumbers, applied ethicists 
would be in the business of mindlessly repairing leakages without investigating what 
might be their cause. Besides being an unjustly negative portrayal of plumbers, Van 
Willigenburg argued, this also incorrectly described what ‘ethical engineers’ did. Eth-
ical engineering meant nothing else than to take a careful step-by-step approach to 
considering the many aspects of moral problems and to put these into thought and 
word in an orderly manner to enable well-considered ethical decisions to be made. It 
meant coaching participants in moral deliberations to make valid arguments and “en-
sure a necessary argumentative hygiene” in the decision-making process.110 Hence, an 
ethical engineer was “someone with their own specific expertise in making concrete 
moral problems manageable by systematically reflecting upon them”.111  
 Critics of this approach, Van Willigenburg continued, argued the ethical engineer 
was not critical enough; that (s)he did not ask fundamental philosophical questions. 
Apparently, the ethicist stated cynically, moral questions about the care for the elder-
ly could only be answered by pondering about human existence and what it means to 
be old. “I find such an approach wicked”, Van Willigenburg countered, “It tries to find 
answers with far-reaching reflection on a philosophical-theoretical level, while we live 
in a time in which it is very naïve to assume that philosophy (as metaphysics or a phi-
losophy of life) can still give answers to ‘fundamental’ issues as ‘how we should look 
at existence’”.112 Such thinkers, he continued, wanted to tackle a dilemma like wheth-
er traffic victims may be used as organ donors by exploring how this question in and 
of itself betrays a mechanical vision on life. They wanted to make all sorts of historical 
connections and think up cultural criticisms. Yet, in doing so, they never got around 
to answering the actual question. Perhaps, Van Willigenburg suggested delicately, it 
was time for these critics to get out of their comfy armchairs and, instead of reading 
another book, take up an internship in a hospital or government office to help inves-
tigate dilemmas as people experienced them and struggled with in reality. Perhaps it 
was time for these critics to start making a difference in the world. 
 Van Tongeren’s response was equally forbidding. Van Willigenburg’s perspective 
on ethics, the philosopher felt, bespoke an “almost shocking anti-intellectualism”.113 
The applied ethicist’s dismissal of asking overly difficult questions and reading books 
could only be a “commercial mask” to win over “no-nonsense managers” to hire ethi-
cists, Van Tongeren surmised, for it had little to do anymore with any actual academ-
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ic study. The questions Van Willigenburg discarded as wicked and naïve, those were 
philosophical investigations: questions that made people reflect on life to understand 
how certain modes of thinking organized their existence and to consider whether al-
ternative modes of existence were desirable and possible. Van Tongeren had no prin-
ciple objection to the type of engineering that the applied ethicist was so enthusiastic 
about. Yet, he continued, “Whatever it is that Van Willigenburg is doing, it is not phi-
losophy anymore. And, as far as ethics is a philosophical discipline, it cannot be eth-
ics anymore either”.114 Instead, it was some sort of organisational management that 
philosophy should stay far from. For, if the engineer would become the core identity 
of ethicists and when (not if) this fad had run its course in a few years’ time, “the baby 
will be thrown out with the bathwater”.115 In the long run, Van Tongeren warned, the 
sort of ethics promoted by scholars like Van Willigenburg was sure to bring about the 
demise of moral philosophy as an academic discipline. 
 This struggle over the professional identity and political function of Dutch (health) 
ethics was by no means resolved at conferences in the early 1990s.116 For most of the 
decade, the hermeneutic perspective kept on being denoted as the Nijmegen school of 
ethics (after the institutional affiliations of Van Tongeren, Zwart, and later also Ten 
Have), while the applied ethics perspective was referred to as the Utrecht school (af-
ter its Centre for Bio-ethics and Health Law). In 1994, when national research schools 
started to emerge in the Netherlands (see above), the Nijmegen group joined the Re-
search School Philosophy, while the Utrecht group joined the Research School Ethics. 
To be sure, other academic approaches to health ethics circulated as well in the Neth-
erlands in this period. Scholars like De Vries, for instance, who identified neither with 
the hermeneutic nor with the applied ethics perspective, joined the Research School 
of Science, Technology and Modern Culture, which brought together scholars in the 
area of Science, Technology and Society studies.117 And from the mid-1990s onwards, 
the ethics of care became quite popular in the Netherlands—a normative approach to 
ethics that opposed the dominance of notions like autonomy and non-maleficence in 
the Dutch health ethics discourse and instead introduced terms like dependence, vul-
nerability, and mutual responsibility.118 Still, by 1997, the scholarly dispute between 
the ‘Nijmegen’ and ‘Utrecht’ ethicists continued to be understood as one of the most 
dominant fracture lines in the Dutch academic practice of ethics.119 
 Hence, when viewed solely from the angle of academic debate, the factional strug-
gle between these two schools of thought reached a standstill in the Netherlands in 
the late twentieth century. Members of neither camp could convince their opponents 
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of the intellectual soundness and practical merits of their point of view. When viewed 
from a broader political and institutional perspective, however, one of the two schools 
made more headway than the other in the 1990s. For although this was an academic 
debate, it was heavily influenced by the growing political involvement with the ethics 
of science, medicine, and health in this decade. In fact, as the last section of this chap-
ter shows, like the rise of research ethics committees in the 1970s and 1980s favoured 
a particular way of knowing in the biomedical sciences (see chapter 2), the expanding 
regulatory role of the Dutch state in ethically contentious medical (research) practices 
in the 1990s favoured a certain conception of ethical expertise, especially in the pub-
lic governance of a practice like human experimentation. 
 
The Dutch political use for ethical experts 
 
 In 1988, a Dutch government policy report on ‘the limits of care’ included a short, 
but intriguing statement: “Ethics”, page 15 announced matter-of-factly, “is in”.120 The 
report was part of a series of policy documents in the 1980s on the organisation of the 
Dutch health care system and listed five types of boundaries that the incumbent gov-
ernment, the second Lubbers cabinet, had to deal with in the upcoming years.121 The 
second of these was the “boundary between what may and what may not be consid-
ered ethically permissible”.122 Because the individual increasingly occupied a central 
place in Dutch society, page 15 read, and because technological advancement increas-
ingly made all sorts of health interventions possible, “the interest for medical ethics, 
or better put health ethics, is growing”. “Ethical reflection […] on what is good and 
evil, on what is permitted and what is unacceptable […] can rejoice in growing public 
and political attention”.123 Ethics, in the Netherlands, was en vogue. 
 Page 15 also noted a second development that had taken place in the last few dec-
ades. Despite the individualization of Dutch society, “it is increasingly becoming clear 
that it is a task for all of us, and then particularly for the government, to weigh the 
interests of groups of patients against each other when necessary”.124 The Dutch state, 
it seemed, was increasingly called upon to take a hands-on approach in the govern-
ance of ethically contentious issues in the fields of science, technology, and health. In 
the past, the 1988 report explained, the government had often refrained from taking a 
stance in this type of ethical issues, thereby endlessly postponing the development of 
public policies for them. But while “this sometimes seems morally defensible, it can 
also lead to ill-fated compromises or more seriously to indecisiveness, hidden selec-
tions, or veiled priorities”.125 The second Lubbers cabinet was determined, therefore, 
to take a more active stance in the governance of health ethics. 
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ic study. The questions Van Willigenburg discarded as wicked and naïve, those were 
philosophical investigations: questions that made people reflect on life to understand 
how certain modes of thinking organized their existence and to consider whether al-
ternative modes of existence were desirable and possible. Van Tongeren had no prin-
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 Hence, when viewed solely from the angle of academic debate, the factional strug-
gle between these two schools of thought reached a standstill in the Netherlands in 
the late twentieth century. Members of neither camp could convince their opponents 
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 Already in January 1988, Minister Elco Brinkman (of the Christian-democratic 
party CDA) and State Secretary Dick Dees (of the conservative-liberal party VVD, see 
chapters 4 and 5) of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture had sent a memo to 
Dutch parliament with “an inventory of medical-ethical themes” and discussion of the 
role of the government in dealing with them.126 More and more often, the two states-
men explained, the question was asked whether the far-reaching technical possibili-
ties in medical science did justice to the interests of individuals in health care, and to 
the interests of society more generally. Protecting these interests was an important 
duty for a government—Hence, the memo. Yet, Brinkman and Dees had not included 
any concrete policy measures in their letter. The time, the two wrote, ‘was not yet ripe 
for it’. Instead, the government had “to closely follow the advancing medical technol-
ogy” and “to introduce legislation and regulation” only when needed, thereby keeping 
in mind that enough room was left to the “self-regulating activities of the profession”. 
Also the second Lubbers administration was, after all, a government operating under 
the motto ‘more market, less government” (see chapter 5).127 
 This conclusion had provoked a disappointed response in Dutch parliament, also 
among the parties supporting the government. A member of the Christian-democratic 
party, for instance, strongly disagreed that the time was not yet ripe for government 
policy and declared that he did not believe in ‘the self-regulating activities of the pro-
fession’. A member of the conservative-liberals, in turn, pressed the government to 
start developing policy on this terrain. A member of the orthodox-Protestant party, in 
the meanwhile, stated the memo proved the absolute impotence of the government in 
dealing with medical ethics. Unanimously, Dutch parliament pressed the two states-
men to “provide guidelines and set borders”, an issue they kept on addressing in the 
months thereafter.128 In 1989, the Christian-democrats again raised the concern that 
the government was not doing enough on the terrain of health ethics. Issues of ethical 
concern in health care were now only discussed in local ethics committees, they com-
plained, and often only reactively, when problems had already exacerbated and were 
in need of immediate resolution. “We call this laundering after the fact’”, the Chris-
tian-democrats argued, “It is practicing ethics on an incidental basis”. Instead of “be-
ing a slave to such developments”, government and parliament had to take responsi-
bility and start anticipating them. “Medical technology should not determine ethics, it 
should be the other way around”.129 A few months later, a representative of the con-
servative-liberals voiced the same concern: “Scientific developments are now going so 
fast that politics is constantly behind the times”. A permanent state committee had to 
be established, therefore, to “keep a finger on the pulse” of such developments and to 
allow the government to react immediately when necessary.130 
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 In all these political initiatives, the need for government interference with ethically 
contentious issues in the field of medicine, health, and science was justified along two 
familiar lines. One, the speed and ferocity with which new technological and scientific 
developments announced themselves in the late modern era demanded government 
attention, as these presented large and, importantly, unprecedented ethical problems 
to society. Two, in a pluralist and increasingly secular democracy, older authorities 
and institutional structures for handling such problems—such as the Church, profes-
sions, or the famous pillars that would have organized Dutch society along ideologi-
cal-religious lines until at least the 1960s (see chapter 3)—could no longer offer solu-
tions that were accepted by the majority of the Dutch population.131 Instead, citizens 
now looked to the state to settle ethical conflicts with official regulations, a role which 
consecutive Dutch governments increasingly felt compelled to take up in the 1980s 
and 1990s, despite the growing popularity of liberal and market-based approaches to 
the governance of health care, the sciences, and other sectors.132 
 The million-dollar question was, however, how the government could take up this 
role. In 1988, Brinkman and Dees had proposed to let experts fulfil a substantial role 
in informing parliament and public about developments in medicine and ethics, and 
only to realize regulations when this was absolutely needed. In doing so, the two had 
envisioned a leading role for the Health Council’s Standing Committee Health Ethics 
(see above). As this Committee “concerns itself with continuous reflection on the eth-
ical and juridical aspects of medical developments”, Brinkman and Dees argued, it 
could conduct crucial ‘pre-work’ in the ethical thinking about medicine and health.133 
The government would then only take an official position on how to handle ethically 
contentious issues after these reports had been debated in parliament.134 Dutch par-
liament, however, had not responded too enthusiastically to this proposal of the two 
statesmen. If the Health Council was to take on this role, the Christian-democrats had 
stated in the House of Representatives, the Standing Committee Health Ethics really 
had to include laypeople in its midst.135 After all, a committee consisting only of ex-
perts could not draw up reports on ethical dilemmas that included the opinions of all 
people in Dutch society. Similarly, two of the Protestant parties that took up a seat in 
the Senate had expressed concern that the expert composition of the Health Council 
did not do justice to the various religious-ideological viewpoints present in Dutch 
society.136 The conservative-liberals, in turn, had objected that the power to make 
ethical decisions should ultimately befall politicians, not experts.137 
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 The concern that an expert body like the Health Council might hamper democratic 
decision-making processes about ethical issues was voiced repeatedly in the Nether-
lands in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1990, for instance, sociologist Pim Fortuyn 
(who would later become one of the most famous politicians the Netherlands has ever 
known) pointed out in a policy report on the functioning of government advisory bod-
ies that the Health Council in recent years increasingly had started to include ethical 
opinions in its reports—something it did not have a mandate for. “The Council should 
limit itself to preparing scientifically-funded opinions”, Fortuyn argued, “and refrain 
from taking a stand on political, social, and ethical issues”.138 Similar concerns were 
voiced in Dutch parliament. In 1991, during a parliamentary debate about “the ethical 
aspects of scientific and technological research”, the Christian-democrats criticized 
the function of the Health Council in political dealings with issues of ethical concern. 
The dominant role of the advisory body in coming up with policy solutions for medi-
cal ethics dilemmas, the government party stated, had the effect that the initial fram-
ing of these issues took place by elite groups behind closed doors, generating a small 
circuit of insiders who frequently participated in the same committees and who were 
prone to propose similar solutions each time, to the detriment of a broader social and 
political debate.139 The Labour Party, since 1989 a coalition partner of the Christian-
democrats, agreed. Citing Achterhuis and Van Tongeren, its representative pondered 
in parliament: “How do we prevent that discussions are only held by ‘experts’? With 
experts, I think first of all of so-called ethicists”.140 The problem with these experts, 
this representative felt, was that they typically had a “narrow understanding of ethics” 
that was too easily used to justify new technological developments and explain away 
societal concerns. “I think we should prevent ethics committees to function in such a 
way that they legitimize research just because a few people have looked at it”. “As 
Achterhuis says, these committees too often function as a problematic buffer between 
the controversial practices of scientists and societal critiques”.141 
 Such sceptical views on the public functioning of ethics (advisory) committees and 
ethical experts were popular among Dutch politicians in the early 1990s. Achterhuis 
and Van Tongeren were invoked in parliamentary debates, as were Ten Have and De 
Vries.142 The government indeed had to prevent that ethics was used as “a greaser to 
get society to accept [scientific] insights”, Minister of Education, Culture, and Scienc-
es Jo Ritzen promised parliament in 1991. Scientific studies always had to be “socially 
and humanly relevant” and possible ethical concerns had to be carefully considered in 
a broad societal setting before a study could be executed, not when its outcomes were 
forced upon society as a fait accompli.143 To do so, the influence of ‘average citizens’ 
had to be increased in favour of the technocratic opinions of ethical experts. Hence, if 
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philosophers like Achterhuis had one influence on Dutch politics in the early 1990s, it 
was that any form of political interference of ethicists with ‘policy and ethics’ came to 
be eyed with suspicion (not just a specific academic approach to ethics). As the con-
servative-liberal Senator Dian van Leeuwen-Schut worded it sharply in 1993 by citing 
De Vries: “Ethicists are intellectuals, not policymakers. Political decisions have to be 
made in the political arena. […] It cannot be the case that ethicists tell policymakers 
already at the start of the ride what decisions have to be reached”.144 
 
*** 
 
 These critical views on the role of ethical expertise in democratic decision-making, 
however, were not shared by all Dutch politicians and policymakers, especially not as 
the decade progressed. In 1991, for instance, the physician and soon to be Minister of 
Health Els Borst (see chapter 5), wrote an article for the Tijdschrift voor geneeskunde 
en ethiek in which she voiced a rather different point of view. Borst, who was at the 
time vice-President of the Dutch Health Council, strongly disagreed that the advisory 
body should refrain from including ethical opinions in its policy reports. Of course, 
she wrote, a scientific advisory body like the Health Council could never have the last 
word on ethically contentious issues. This had to be left to elected officials. The prob-
lem was, however, that “many debates in the Netherlands about the ethical aspects of 
gene therapy, embryo research, and prenatal diagnostics are neither here nor there 
because participants do not have the right facts”. Thus, the input of experts was need-
ed, as “ignorance and intense emotions just are no good ingredients to reach a mean-
ingful moral consensus”. This did not just hold for the technical side of new biomedi-
cal developments: “For good debates in- and outside of parliament […] some prelimi-
nary work in the field of health ethics (and law) is indispensable as well”. Ethical ex-
perts, Borst maintained in repetition of the Handboek gezondheidsethiek, were capa-
ble of raising the level of debate by offering terminological clarity and mapping moral 
problems. In doing so, they created “the possibility for well-informed societal discus-
sions and a proper consideration by government and parliament”.145 
 In 1993, a similar viewpoint was articulated by J.H.W. Kits Nieuwenkamp, senior 
policy official at the Ministry of Welfare, Public Health and Culture, in an article on 
the treatment of ethical issues in Dutch policy circles. “Ethics”, Nieuwenkamp wrote, 
“is not just practiced by ethicists, but by everyone who concerns himself with this sort 
of issues. Ethics is thus also practiced by policy officials and politicians”. Nonetheless, 
she added quickly, “The ethics practiced by these individuals, who are usually laypeo-
ple, would soon get bogged down if they would not be assisted by professional ethi-
cists, who have the tools needed to investigate moral issues in a way that systematic 
reflection truly takes place and that substantiated policy choices become possible”.146 
At the Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture, this insight was increasingly realized. 
The State Secretary, for instance, had started to organize meetings in which policy 
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 The concern that an expert body like the Health Council might hamper democratic 
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had to be increased in favour of the technocratic opinions of ethical experts. Hence, if 
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philosophers like Achterhuis had one influence on Dutch politics in the early 1990s, it 
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officials discussed ethical issues under leadership of professional ethicists. In addi-
tion, they were stimulated to stay in close contact with ethicists at seminars, in hall-
ways of conferences, and in government advisory bodies. A new idea, she continued, 
was to also start hiring ethicists at Ministries. She knew that the ethicist Frans Brom 
already worked as consultant at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
to help develop public policies (see above) and, if it was up to her, her own Ministry 
would follow suit. “The ethicist”, Nieuwenkamp concluded enthusiastically by citing 
Van Willigenburg, “facilitates the policymaker, as it were”.147 
 That year, also State Secretary Hans Simons of the Ministry of Welfare, Health and 
Culture (see chapter 5) suggested that, despite the present unpopularity of ethicists in 
Dutch political circles, good reasons existed nonetheless to include them in the poli-
cymaking process. As Simons said in his reply to the demand by Van Leeuwen-Schut 
that the role of ethicists in policy circles immediately had to be rolled back: 
 
In itself, this [demand] is correct, but a surprising development has occurred. In 
the domain of government control we aspire to a smaller role for the government 
and for good reasons. […] Yet, in the domain of issues of medical ethics we are 
witnessing an opposite trend. As medical technologies and their implications 
grow, a sharper need crops up for legislation in the domain of medical ethics.148 
     
While this response in no way directly addressed the concern of Van Leeuwen-Schut, 
it provides a clue as to why statespersons would be interested in including ethicists in 
policymaking. In a time that the government was increasingly called upon to resolve 
ethical issues, the input of those who concerned themselves professionally with such 
issues became an alluring route to explore for politicians, even if this went against the 
grain of popular opinion. This, at least, was the suspicion of Labour Senator Joop van 
den Berg, who remarked in a 1993 article on the ‘Place and task of parliament in ethi-
cal discussions’, that the Dutch political system as it had developed in the twentieth 
century just was not equipped to deal with difficult ethical issues. “In the age of pil-
larization […] a culture of decision-making developed with an interest in restricting 
the political agenda. […] To ensure its stability and acceptance, the political arena did 
best to abstain from highly charged normative issues”.149 Thus, in a time that Dutch 
society, including its political system, had been segregated along religious-ideological 
‘pillars’, ethical issues that ran across these pillars had preferably not been discussed 
in parliament, while in instances that it really could not avoid dealing with them, ex-
perts had been called in to prepare a position that the government could adopt. This 
approach had allowed politicians to defend decisions by deferring to expert opinions 
rather than ideological arguments and to thereby depoliticize the treatment of ethical 
issues. Despite the recent de-pillorization of Dutch society, Van den Berg argued, this 
pacifying approach to policymaking had remained popular in the country. Dutch poli-
ticians just did not know how to handle ethical issues any other way.150 
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 Indeed, despite the critical attitude towards ethical experts of Dutch politicians in 
the early 1990s, four Dutch Ministries were found willing in this period to co-finance 
a “stimulation programme for policy-relevant ethical research” with the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), that had academics help develop poli-
cies for ‘the many large and unprecedented ethical problems’ that Dutch society faced 
in an era of swift technoscientific advancement.151 With a budget of over nine million 
guilders, this programme subsidized 67 ‘ethics and policy projects’ in the 1990s, giv-
ing a swath of young scholars the opportunity to obtain a PhD in ethics.152 Although it 
offered room for both fundamental and applied ethics studies, the latter proved much 
more popular, as these were more likely to engage with concrete policy questions.153 
According to ethicist Musschenga, one of the directors of the stimulation programme, 
this measure had the effect that especially the applied ethics field grew in the Nether-
lands in the 1990s, in contrast to the hermeneutic approach to ethics.154 
 After 1994, this trend was reinforced with the coming to power of the ‘Purple Coa-
lition’, the first Dutch government since 1918 in which no confessional party took part 
(see chapter 5). In the early 1990s, most political parties in Dutch parliament had, at 
one point or another, cautioned for the inclusion of ethicists in policymaking process-
es. Most often, however, this criticism had been voiced by confessional parties, which 
were concerned that a reliance on ethical expertise favoured liberal-progressive view-
points on the permissibility of practices like IVF, euthanasia, or the use of legally in-
capacitated people as research subjects. The participation of laypeople, they hoped, 
would make sure that all religious-ideological viewpoints in Dutch society were rep-
resented in government advisory committees and ethics committees. The Purple Coa-
lition, however, brought together three secular parties—the social-democratic Labour 
Party, the conservative-liberal VVD, and the progressive social-liberal D66 (see chap-
ter 5)—and favoured ‘a managerial approach’ to government, i.e., rather than devel-
oping public policies with a specific ideology in mind, the government had to take a 
business-like approach to steering societal processes. Policy decisions had to follow 
from a pragmatic consideration of the situation at hand, not from pushing specific 
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political interests.155 This approach was epitomized in particular by D66, a party that 
had been established in the 1960s as a pragmatic alternative to religious-ideological 
approaches to politics. Public policy, the party maintained, should be problem-based 
(i.e. follow from a consideration of specific problems) and had to be justified with 
reasonable rather than religious-ideological arguments. While it defended a direct 
approach to democratic decision-making, this conviction went hand in hand with a 
belief in the enlightening impact of education: as long as citizens were well-informed, 
they could be expected to make reasonable choices when called upon to do so.156 Ex-
perts fulfilled a key role in this philosophy. Rather than representing the interests of 
specific groups, they would be trained to ‘objectively’ analyse problems and ‘neutrally’ 
present public policies to those responsible for them: i.e. politicians. 
 One of the most iconic members of D66 in the 1990s was the physician Els Borst, 
who served as Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport for almost eight years under the 
Purple Coalition (see chapter 5). Borst, as the previous chapter has argued, was not a 
big fan of the participation of laypeople in the development of health care policy. The 
very definition of laypeople, she maintained, was that they lacked the expertise neces-
sary to engage meaningfully with complex issues. Plus, in a pluralist and individual-
ized society, they could hardly be said to represent specific social groups. Experts, in 
contrast, did have an important contribution to make. After all, without their input 
“ignorance and intense emotions would rule” in the political arena when deliberating 
difficult ethical issues. Hence, in her role as Minister of Health, Borst was only willing 
to admit that the pluralistic moral viewpoints present in Dutch society would be fairly 
presented by ethical experts in the various oversight committees that she planned to 
realize for the public governance of various medical (research) practices. The partici-
pation of laypeople, as was repeatedly requested by confessional parties in parliament 
in this period, was decidedly rejected by Borst (see chapter 5). 
 In this approach to the governance of ethically contentious issues, Borst favoured 
a particular conception of ethical expertise. “A good ethicist is trained in careful rea-
soning and clear analysis”, she would state in parliamentary debates over the contri-
bution of ethicists to (research) ethics committees, “It is a certain way of thinking”—
“If you have a strong personal opinion which prevents you from ever considering pros 
and cons, you should not take up a seat in such committees” (see chapter 5).157 Borst’s 
understanding of ethicists was similar to that of Van Willigenburg. Like the ethicist, 
she located ethical expertise in the ability to take a step-by-step approach to moral 
problems, to order these carefully and to enable well-considered ethical decisions to 
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be made. ‘Good ethicists’, Borst said in parliament, could guide moral deliberations. 
Similarly, like Van Willigenburg, Borst emphasized that ethicists could not act as ac-
tivists or reformers, but only as experts in the discipline of reason, able “to take away 
from their feelings and personal beliefs to just make an objective judgement”.158 Ethi-
cists did not have strong moral opinions themselves, but mediated those of others—
enabling a proper consideration of ethical issues by those responsible for moral deci-
sions (see chapter 5). They were luminaries in ethical thinking, capable to transcend 
particular moral and religious commitments and to bring these together. Ethicists, in 
short, spoke the moral lingua franca needed in a pluralist society. 
 As the previous chapter explained, Borst also advocated this approach to ethics in 
political debates over the constellation of euthanasia committees. In discussions over 
the installation of animal experimentation committees, she voiced a similar opinion. 
Since the passing of these various pieces of legislation in the late 1990s, the inclusion 
of appropriate ethical expertise has been an official requirement for the accreditation 
of all these review bodies. What is more, since 2014, the Central Committee on Re-
search Involving Human Subjects demands that ethicists may only participate in re-
search ethics committees if they hold a degree in theology, philosophy, humanism, or 
ethics; have “demonstrable knowledge of health ethics, proven by a dissertation and 
relevant recent publications in peer reviewed journals”; and have at least three years 
of work experience in health ethics in the five years leading up to taking up a commit-
tee seat.159 Today, 23 of these accredited committees seating at least one ethicist are 
active in the Netherlands. In addition, five euthanasia committees exist and about 25 
animal research committees are active throughout the country.160  
 Hence, since the late 1990s, Dutch law guarantees professional ethicists a spot in 
the public governance of a number of ethically contentious medical (research) prac-
tices—a feat quite exceptional for a humanities discipline. This not only ensures that 
the expertise of ethicists is brought to bear in discussing difficult ethical cases, it also 
provides an incentive for medical (research) centres to hire ethicists to support their 
medical and scientific staff. At the same time, however, these legal requirements also 
favour a specific type of ethical expertise. Although none mention what type of ethical 
expertise is suitable for participating in ethics committees, their practical functioning 
is, at least in theory, a better fit for the applied ethicist than the hermeneutic philoso-
pher. The ethical evaluation of human research protocols, for instance, focuses on the 
protection of research subjects within the confines of the Dutch law. Hence, commit-
tees are in principle not permitted to reject studies because they would unjustly profit 
Big Pharma or harm the environment (see chapter 5).161 As Van Willigenburg put it in 
1991: “The task that the ethical consultant takes up sometimes excludes certain forms 
of criticism”.162 Yet, this was precisely why scholars like Van Tongeren and Ten Have 
had been convinced that ethicists should not take up a seat in ethics committees. For 
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political interests.155 This approach was epitomized in particular by D66, a party that 
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be made. ‘Good ethicists’, Borst said in parliament, could guide moral deliberations. 
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ethicists unwilling to accept the role of consultant, in other words, not much of a role 
is left in these various public review bodies. In that sense, De Vries was right in 1993, 
that rather than that health ethics disciplined the medical discipline in the twentieth 
century, the bureaucratization of medicine and growing interference of public author-
ities in this period has contributed to the disciplining the ethics discipline. 
 
*** 
 
 In the last decades, the practice of ethics by committee, in which individual cases 
of specific medical (research) practices are ethically evaluated by a group of carefully 
selected experts according to a predetermined set of norms and rules, has continued 
to be treated as a typical implication of the health or bio-ethics movement of the late 
twentieth century, both in the Netherlands and internationally, and both by scientific 
researchers and humanities scholars. When scientists make themselves heard, it fre-
quently is to complain that ethicists needlessly halt scientific progress with their ob-
session over rigid principles and ‘red tape’, as Vandenbroucke did in 1991.163 Humani-
ties scholars, on the other hand, have continued to state that health or bio-ethics pre-
dominantly functions as a greaser for technoscientific machineries. Today, this type 
of criticism voiced by philosophers in the late 1980s also has become popular among 
historians who claim that research ethics committees are an obvious example of how 
professional bioethics shields the old research establishment from more critical socie-
tal voices (see the introductory chapter to this PhD-thesis).164 
 One can wonder, however, to what extent this finger pointing is grounded in reali-
ty. For one thing, as previous chapters have shown, it royally overplays the involve-
ment of (bio)ethicists in the realization of oversight mechanisms for human experi-
mentation. While they arose around the same time, the two have very distinct narra-
tives of origin that were, at least in the Netherlands, only knitted together toward the 
end of the twentieth century. For another, it attributes much more power to ethicists 
than they have ever had in the governance of human experimentation, certainly in the 
Netherlands. Hence, even if they ended up acting like Commissars in the oversight of 
human research studies, they remain just one voice among a larger group of experts 
of which the vast majority still comes from the biomedical sciences. Plus, as chapter 5 
also alluded to, by the early 2000s, Heleen Dupuis, famous doyen of the Dutch health 
ethics movement, was just as frustrated about the way in which the WMO forced local 
research ethics committees into “bureaucratic straightjackets” as her critics had been. 
The WMO would have replaced moral pathos by “managerial arrogance and a mania 
for organisation”. While she meant something different with this than De Vries had 
done when he claimed that the bureaucratization of medicine had produced ethicists 
who did not have to think anymore, both shared an uneasiness over the standardiza-
tion of ethical discourse and decision-making in the practice of ethics by committee, a 
frustration they shared in turn with researchers like Vandenbroucke. 
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 Most importantly, however, the narrow focus on professional health ethics ignores 
the role played by the Dutch government in bringing about this “ethics bureaucracy” 
in the governance of human experimentation. In 1982, the Central Council for Public 
Health had proposed to speak of the ethical evaluation of protocols because the stipu-
lation of too detailed legal norms could stifle a practice that was continuously devel-
oping. It was perfectly fine to include laypeople in this process, as long as they acted 
‘reasonable’ and were accompanied by experts with a thorough understanding of the 
protocols under examination (see chapter 4). However, over the course of the 1980s, 
voices sprang up in the Netherlands to state that detailed juridical rules were needed 
to ensure uniform decision-making procedures. If the government wanted to exercise 
public control over human research, it had to make very clear what was and was not 
permitted. Without exception, all Dutch administrations in the late twentieth century 
favoured this type of expert approach to the practice of ethics by committee. Whereas 
professionals could be expected to consistently assess protocols according to agreed-
upon rules, laypeople—the unruly “all and sundry”—would infuse unpredictable and 
thus uncontrollable elements into the review process (see chapter 5). 
 In adopting this policy perspective, the Dutch government never gave a substantial 
defence of why ethicists should be included in the evaluation of human research pro-
tocols. Only in the late 1990s, when it became clear that Dutch parliament would not 
pass the WMO without an assurance that the plurality of viewpoints in Dutch society 
would be brought to bear in the evaluation of protocols, were ethicists brought onto 
the stage as ‘obvious mediators’ between expert and democratic forms of governance. 
In claiming this, the Dutch government made eager use of a specific approach to ethi-
cal reflection that had become popular in the 1970s and 1980s, and actively furthered 
one way of knowing in the ethics discipline above others. Still, it has to be pointed out 
that despite this ‘advantageous professional push’, the Dutch government more than 
anything else has payed lip service to the applied ethics tradition with regulations like 
the WMO. Under this law, ethicists who take up a seat in Dutch research ethics com-
mittees remain, even if they want to, hardly able to fulfil the once imagined role of 
“luminaries” who speak the moral lingua franca of a pluralist society. For only their 
physical presence was ensured in 1998—by a government that had a specific use for 
ethicists in a time when Dutch citizens increasingly looked to the state to resolve ethi-
cal issues, and that wanted to claim democratic control over human experimentation 
without actually needing to have society participate in its governance. 
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In the evening of July 22, 1964, famous American comedy writer Allan Sherman per-
formed his new song parody of Prokofiev’s Peter and the Wolf for a buoyant audience 
in Boston’s Tanglewood Music Center. The parody, that was live broadcasted, relates 
the story of the young composer Peter, who has just finished creating a beautiful new 
melody, but who, as a resident of communist Russia, needs to have it approved by the 
Commissars of music prior to its release. The Commissars, who of course all lack Pe-
ter’s talent, demand his song to sound more like existing tunes: Tchaikovsky’s Swan 
Lake, Beethoven’s Fifth, Brahms’ Lullaby. After a while, Peter slinks off, battered and 
disillusioned, with a song stamped ‘not approved’ and time in the Clink to rethink his 
sins. Luckily, all turns out well in the end, as a savvy recording company owner hears 
Peter whistling his song, recognizes its potential, and, thence, “In spite of the number 
one Chief Commissar, Peter [became] bigger than Ringo Starr”. 
 Since 1964, Peter and the Commissar has gained fame as a celebration of American 
individualism and free-market capitalism that reigned supreme during the Cold War. 
It offers, of course, a stylized repudiation of the Soviet Union’s political order. Yet, as 
Sherman also rhymes, “Now the Commissar in this story is Russia, but that is just for 
purposes of discussion. One finds this type no matter where one lives, we call them 
junior executives”. For the thing is, the comedy writer points out: 
 
[…] These people on committees, they sit there all day 
And they each put in a colour, and it comes out grey 
Grey is a nice colour, but not if you have ever seen 
Orange or red or yellow or blue or green 
And we have all heard the saying, which is true as well as witty 
That a camel is a horse designed by a committee.1 
 
Today, the saying [design] by committee has gained general usage in the English lan-
guage to refer to a defective trait of bureaucratic decision-making: a lack of vision and 
originality that would stifle innovation. In the sciences, certainly, this practice of ‘new 
Marxism’ has often been argued to inhibit any form of ‘true progress’. 
 
*** 
 
After World War II, the Netherlands was one of the first nations in which the prac-
tice of ethics by committee was proposed as a sensible governance tool for the over-
sight of research studies with human subjects—or, to use the correct historical term, 
“tests upon human beings”. In the future, the national Dutch Health Council wrote to 
the government in 1955, medical tests which entailed more than average risk would 
have to be reviewed first by an advisory committee seating physicians to determine if 
such interventions were permitted. Still, research ethics committees only sprang up 
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in the 1980s in the Netherlands and a Dutch law regulating the practice was not real-
ized until 1998—more than 40 years after that first policy report had appeared and 
well after most other Western countries had put similar regulations in place. This ‘lag’ 
was not for lack of trying. After 1955, government advisory bodies published numer-
ous reports on the topic and after the 1970s Dutch parliament regularly pressured the 
government to make haste with proper legislation. This had the effect that policy de-
liberations on the governance of human experimentation by means of research ethics 
committees spanned about half a century in the Netherlands, revealing clear shifts in 
collective thinking about the position of medical science in Dutch society. 
 
The changing historical function of ethics by committee 
 
As it turns out, research ethics committees originally were imagined in the Nether-
lands to capture and steer two transformations taking place in this period: the chang-
ing role of science in “modern medicine”, and the changing position of medicine and 
medical science in “modern Dutch society” (with the adjective modern functioning as 
a prominent actor’s category to signal that times had changed and that different gov-
ernance solutions therefore had to be provided for the proper regulation of a scien-
tific practice like human experimentation). Chapters 1 and 2 examine this first shift. 
In the 1950s, pressured by ongoing antivivisectionist complaints about the corrupting 
effects of the ‘experimental tradition in modern medicine’, a group of Dutch elite phy-
sicians came to argue that human experimentation was an integral part of medicine, 
and the realization of medical progress via experimentation a moral obligation for all 
Dutch citizens. Of course, tests could only take place if strict conditions had been sat-
isfied, but a certain amount of risk just could not be avoided. According to this group, 
the practice of ethics by committee could keep such necessary risks at a minimum. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, another group of Dutch elite physicians started to claim that, in 
order for medicine to progress in the country, more and better human research stud-
ies had to be conducted. Again, such experiments had to satisfy basic ethical rules to 
be permitted, but ethics committees were imagined to function primarily as epistemic 
filters: mechanisms capable of sifting out methodologically good from bad research, 
that could simultaneously alleviate what they stated to be misguided concerns among 
the average Dutch physician about the permissibility of such studies. 
These attempts to accommodate for and stimulate the changing position of science 
in Dutch medicine went hand in hand with the formulation of a governance ideal that 
advocated more internal control over medical research and practice, i.e., the elite of 
the profession had to keep the average practitioner in check to ensure they acted in 
accordance with the principles of ‘modern medicine’. The best experts had to partici-
pate in committees that would function as beacons for the periphery to turn to and, if 
needed, operate as a form of border control to safeguard the proper conduct of hu-
man research studies. For an important part, this governance ideal was proposed to 
gain the upper hand in a long-time epistemic struggle over the appropriate place of 
the experimental tradition in ‘modern medicine and society’. In the 1950s, the Health 
Council proposed more elite control to restore public trust in the artsenstand and 
protect its experimental tradition from what it argued were undue attacks from criti-
cal outside forces like the antivivisectionists. In the 1960s and 1970s, elite control was 
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increasingly deemed necessary to keep the ‘unruly periphery’ of the profession itself 
in check. In this process, attention shifted from keeping disruptive forces out of med-
icine to regulating the conduct of practitioners within the discipline, which had the 
effect that a different role started to be formulated for the Dutch state in governing 
medicine. Whereas elite physicians like Jean Jacques Brutel de la Rivière had main-
tained in the immediate post-war era that the profession should be free from all state 
intervention, a new generation of experts like Frans Nelemans started to claim in the 
1960s that the Dutch medical elite should utilize the hard power of the state to realize 
their epistemic ideals of ‘rational therapeutics’. Still, both generations were convinced 
that an intimate understanding of and familiarity with the rules of ‘modern medical 
science’ were required to make informed ethical judgements in medicine. Hence, any 
control mechanism for human experimentation, whether put in place by the state or 
not, always had to be wielded by members of the profession itself. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, an alternative governance ideal was formulated for 
human experimentation to accommodate for a second transformation taking place in 
these decades: the changing position of medicine and medical science in Dutch socie-
ty. Chapters 3 and 4 examine this second shift. In the 1960s, a crisis had sprung up in 
the artsenstand about whether its existing ethics tradition still fitted “life in modern 
society”, that was dominated by technological inventions, by an increase of scale in 
organisations, and by changing social bonds more broadly. When this crisis connect-
ed in the late 1960s to a larger rebellion against traditional authority, multiple groups 
came to argue that ‘medicine in modern society’ required new modes of governance. 
For patients to direct their own lives, vertical relations of dependence and subordina-
tion had to be replaced by horizontal relations of consultation and participation. In 
the late 1970s, the practice of ethics by committee was enveloped by this movement 
and reframed as a necessary form of external control over medical research. Profes-
sional identity was argued to result in groupthink: as physicians were only trained to 
act as members of the artsenstand would, they were unable to fairly assess the con-
duct of colleagues. Ethics committees, therefore, had to consist predominantly of lay-
people, who by virtue of not belonging to the biomedical in-group, were much better 
suited to objectively assess the permissibility of human experiments. 
To be sure, this perception of research ethics committees, which was quite popular 
among social activists in the late 1970s, was never really picked up upon in relevant 
Dutch policy circles. Behind the closed doors of government advisory bodies, thera-
peutic reformers like Erik Noach and Dick van Bekkum, who had since long advocat-
ed more internal control over human research studies in the Netherlands, successful-
ly pushed for an oversight system led by experts. A few laypeople could participate as 
society-representatives, but they had to accept that human experimentation in prin-
ciple was necessary and permitted, and conduct themselves ‘in a reasonable manner’. 
Plus, they ideally would be chosen via a co-optation procedure, meaning that the ex-
perts who already held a committee seat would decide which laypeople were suitable 
to take part. Still, in the Dutch public domain, two distinct governance ideals for re-
search ethics committees had come to vie for affection in the early 1980s: one empha-
sizing the need for more expert control and one emphasizing the need for more con-
trol by those whose identity consisted primarily of not being experts.  
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in the 1980s in the Netherlands and a Dutch law regulating the practice was not real-
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ing role of science in “modern medicine”, and the changing position of medicine and 
medical science in “modern Dutch society” (with the adjective modern functioning as 
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ernance solutions therefore had to be provided for the proper regulation of a scien-
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In the 1950s, pressured by ongoing antivivisectionist complaints about the corrupting 
effects of the ‘experimental tradition in modern medicine’, a group of Dutch elite phy-
sicians came to argue that human experimentation was an integral part of medicine, 
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gain the upper hand in a long-time epistemic struggle over the appropriate place of 
the experimental tradition in ‘modern medicine and society’. In the 1950s, the Health 
Council proposed more elite control to restore public trust in the artsenstand and 
protect its experimental tradition from what it argued were undue attacks from criti-
cal outside forces like the antivivisectionists. In the 1960s and 1970s, elite control was 
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and reframed as a necessary form of external control over medical research. Profes-
sional identity was argued to result in groupthink: as physicians were only trained to 
act as members of the artsenstand would, they were unable to fairly assess the con-
duct of colleagues. Ethics committees, therefore, had to consist predominantly of lay-
people, who by virtue of not belonging to the biomedical in-group, were much better 
suited to objectively assess the permissibility of human experiments. 
To be sure, this perception of research ethics committees, which was quite popular 
among social activists in the late 1970s, was never really picked up upon in relevant 
Dutch policy circles. Behind the closed doors of government advisory bodies, thera-
peutic reformers like Erik Noach and Dick van Bekkum, who had since long advocat-
ed more internal control over human research studies in the Netherlands, successful-
ly pushed for an oversight system led by experts. A few laypeople could participate as 
society-representatives, but they had to accept that human experimentation in prin-
ciple was necessary and permitted, and conduct themselves ‘in a reasonable manner’. 
Plus, they ideally would be chosen via a co-optation procedure, meaning that the ex-
perts who already held a committee seat would decide which laypeople were suitable 
to take part. Still, in the Dutch public domain, two distinct governance ideals for re-
search ethics committees had come to vie for affection in the early 1980s: one empha-
sizing the need for more expert control and one emphasizing the need for more con-
trol by those whose identity consisted primarily of not being experts.  
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Chapter 5 shows how this conflict was resolved in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 
1990s, a period that research ethics committees began to spring up in greater num-
bers in the country. So-called society-representatives hardly ever participated in these 
committees and influential commentators on the governance of human experimenta-
tion (often lawyers and ethicists) increasingly came to argue that the participation of 
laypeople was potentially dangerous: the influx of the unruly “all and sundry” made it 
hard for review boards to operate consistently, which would be required to guarantee 
fair and objective decision-making. In Dutch parliament, the participation of laypeo-
ple remained more popular, especially among confessional parties which feared that 
the dominance of experts would marginalize those viewpoints they held dear. Conse-
quently, public control was increasingly argued necessary not to counterbalance the 
groupthink of the medical in-group, but to ensure that the plurality of viewpoints in a 
democracy was fairly represented in committees overseeing contentious medical re-
search practices. In the late 1990s, Minister of Health Els Borst rhetorically resolved 
this dilemma by postulating professional ethicists as ideal mediators between expert 
and democratic modes of governance. In moral deliberations, these experts would be 
capable of neutrally presenting all ideological-religious opinions in a pluralist society, 
thereby enabling “well-rounded and objective decisions” to be made. 
 
The accompanying change in the locus of ethical authority 
 
As part of this twofold transformation, two related changes took place in the way in 
which ‘ethics’ was understood to function in the Dutch governance of medicine. First, 
the locus of attributed ethical authority changed. In the 1950s, still, the old vocational 
identity of the artsenstand had reigned supreme in Dutch discussions of medical eth-
ics. Medical-ethical expertise, the argument went, was mostly tacit and only acquired 
via full immersion in the discipline. Only members of the in-group possessed a honed 
moral compass to sense what was ethically just in medical situations.2 From this self-
professed epistemic ideal, it followed that the governance of medicine was also first 
and foremost a professional affair. As only the lived experience of a physician meant 
that one understood the ethically right thing to do in medicine, the input of outsiders 
was potentially dangerous. In the 1960s and 1970s, this ideal of exclusive professional 
objectivity came under attack from various anti-establishment movements. By virtue 
of being a thinking subject, everyone would have access to (medical) ethics. The pro-
fessional identity of physicians, in fact, would be an obstacle for grasping the ethically 
right thing to do in medicine. In this context, the outsider’s perspective of laypeople 
came to be thought of as more objective than that of the medical in-group.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, as chapter 6 shows, new epistemic ideals were formulated 
that aimed to do away with all perspectival views on morality. In a pluralist democra-
cy, a general moral perspective that transcended all cultural identities had to be for-
mulated for the public governance of ethically contentious issues to prevent violent 
conflict. Inclusive deliberation procedures were imagined to result in explicit or even 
propositional ethical statements: general rules accessible to all members of a demo-
cratic society that in turn could be applied to individual cases to determine what was 
                                                 
2 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Harry Collins & Robert Evans, 
Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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ethically just. The idea became popular that more objective moral decisions could be 
reached by ‘an escape from perspective’. This moral lingua franca (or ‘view from no-
where’, as the philosopher Thomas Nagel once put it) would ensure more impersonal 
and therefore more objective decision-making in a pluralist society.3 
 Ironically, on the back of this new epistemic ideal, the locus of attributed ethical 
authority again changed in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s—at least in policy 
circles concerned with the governance of medical research involving humans. Even if 
a moral lingua franca could be formulated for a pluralist society, a growing consorti-
um of public commentators and policymakers came to argue, some could be expected 
to master this language better than others. A new notion of ‘disciplinary objectivity’ 
arose, in which the ethical viewpoints of professional ethicists were taken to be more 
trustworthy than those of laypeople. Even though elected officials were said to remain 
responsible for ethical decisions at the level of government, they could be expected to 
make more rational decisions with the help of ethical luminaries. 
 
The accompanying adaptation of the Dutch ethics discourse 
 
Often, this first change in the way ethics was understood to function in the Dutch 
governance of medicine is explained by and justified with the changing societal role of 
medicine and medical science in the second half of the twentieth century. In an age of 
growing medical powers and egalitarian social structures, the once uncontrolled free-
dom of physicians to do as they please really had to be reeled in. Yet, around roughly 
the same time, a second change in the function of ethics in governing medical science 
was realized that seemingly had the opposite effect. After World War II, the existing 
Dutch medical ethics discourse was actively adapted to accommodate for and stimu-
late the conduct of human experimentation. Traditional medical ethics, with its em-
phasis on primum non nocere and primacy of the personal bond between doctor and 
patient was argued to no longer suit modern medicine. Therapeutic reformers started 
a lobby to convince physicians that their concerns to have patients participate in con-
trolled trials were often unfounded and at times even unethical. To enable a rational 
therapeutics to emerge, after all, everybody—doctor and patient alike—had to partici-
pate in experimental investigations. Hence, even if the professional powers of indi-
vidual researchers might need reeling in, the freedom of the profession as a whole to 
conduct more research studies had to expand. A moral need existed for human exper-
imentation, which meant that ethics had to be formulated that enabled researchers to 
take some risks with individuals to benefit society as a whole. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the popularity of this utilitarian logic in Dutch policy circles 
was hardly hampered by the emergence of a patients’ rights frame in the 1960s and 
1970s. Although this new framework brought about a more critical assessment of the 
individual researcher-subject relationship, it did little for a more critical assessment 
of the societal position of biomedical research as a whole (despite the hopes of more 
‘radical commentators’ like Rudi van den Hoofdakker). Generally speaking, in policy 
dealings with medical ethics in the Netherlands in this period, state interference was 
directed toward regulating the procedures by which patients and physicians should 
                                                 
3 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
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objectivity came under attack from various anti-establishment movements. By virtue 
of being a thinking subject, everyone would have access to (medical) ethics. The pro-
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came to be thought of as more objective than that of the medical in-group.  
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ethically just. The idea became popular that more objective moral decisions could be 
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therapeutics to emerge, after all, everybody—doctor and patient alike—had to partici-
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imentation, which meant that ethics had to be formulated that enabled researchers to 
take some risks with individuals to benefit society as a whole. 
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make difficult ethical decisions and left alone the actual content of such decisions. In 
political debates over the permissibility over scientific research, also in case of human 
experimentation, the same logic was used. Even when undesirable research studies 
were proposed, as in the case of criminologist Wouter Buikhuisen in 1978, the Dutch 
government maintained that an open society should guarantee ‘freedom of inquiry’. 
Similarly, in parliamentary discussions on the public governance of human experi-
mentation in the late 1990s, Minister of Health Els Borst decided that participants in 
research ethics committees were not permitted to question the societal position of the 
pharmaceutical industry or the negative environmental effects of studies. Reviewers 
could only consider the permissibility of proposals from a patients rights’ perspective. 
In instances such as these, science was formulated to constitute a societal good that 
should proceed free from political interference as much as possible. A government 
could only set the basic parameters in which a scientific practice like human experi-
mentation could take place, not meddle with its actual content. 
 
The disciplining effects of ethics by committee 
 
Still, it is far from the truth to state that the Dutch government in the second half of 
the twentieth century acted in an epistemically neutral manner toward the conduct of 
human experimentation in medicine. In the 1950s, it helped to protect experimental 
medicine from social critics like the antivivisectionists who claimed that all of modern 
medicine constituted an unethical experiment by supporting the view that the exper-
imental tradition in and of itself was sound and that only excesses had to be prevent-
ed (for which the patients’ rights regime later proved suitable). In the 1970s, it initial-
ly refused to support research ethics committees as these might hamper experimental 
studies; and in the 1980s and 1990s, it lent its support to the idea that research ethics 
committees should function as filters which can halt proposals that do not live up to 
agreed-upon standards of methodological quality. In effect of these policies, a specific 
type of human experimentation had by the end of the century become much more 
ingrained in Dutch society than it had ever been, with a government actively promot-
ing certain ways of peering into the world and not others. Indeed, since the effectua-
tion of the WMO in 1998, epistemic perspectives that do not fall in line with the dom-
inant paradigms of good science can legally be halted in the Netherlands on grounds 
that it is unethical to submit human research subjects to studies that, due to a flawed 
research design, will never yield valid results. In combination with the demand that 
all reviewers have to agree that human research is in and of itself necessary and per-
mitted (i.e. they cannot reject it altogether), the Dutch practice of ethics by committee 
purposefully has been made to function as a mechanism of exclusion for more radical 
perspectives on the value and validity of human experimentation. 
It is important to point out that this function of the practice of ethics by committee 
is not the result of some hushed up Machiavellian power play on behalf of a medical 
in-group who hoped to protect a scientific practice of which it secretly knew it could 
not stand the light of day. That ethics committees should function as epistemic filters 
was publicly and repeatedly defended by multiple generations of self-appointed ther-
apeutic reformers who were convinced that only this way the Dutch state would be 
able to protect citizens from dubious research activities. Sure, reformers such as Ne-
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lemans strategically used their multiple professional identities to realize these ideals, 
i.e., pushing the government to further one way of knowing in their role as policy ad-
visor, while presenting this growing state interference as an abstract external force in 
their academic work.4 When called upon, however, reformers usually were quite will-
ing to defend why they believed it was good for the state to provide leading experts in 
the field with hard power to steer the conduct of the average practitioner. 
In this same vein, it also has to be made explicit that despite the frequent rhetorical 
positioning of science as a republic of equals in which “freedom of inquiry” remains 
one of the highest goods, this political ideal hardly does justice to some of the most 
dominant control mechanisms through which the late modern science system has 
been designed to function.5 While it has become somewhat popular today among sci-
entists to complain that ‘ethics by committee’ has brought a form of New Marxism to 
the once free republic of science, the practice was invented not so long ago by their 
very own predecessors to enable scientific progress. Because for these therapeutic 
reformers, the crisis they believed modern medicine was facing was not primarily one 
of individual researchers who failed to abide to clear ethical rules, but one of scientific 
knowledge and how it could be generated and used in medicine.6 To prevent medical 
science from descending into chaos or being corrupted by undue influences, a num-
ber of gatekeepers just had to police the borders of the field.7 Hence, that committees 
strictly had to peruse research designs was not an unintended consequence of design 
by committee in a bureaucracy full of red tape, it was a built-in mechanism to enforce 
a specific epistemic perspective in Dutch clinical research and practice. 
Chapter 6 has argued that the disciplining effect which these developments had on 
the fledgling Dutch ethics discipline in the late twentieth century was an unintended 
outcome of the realization of public oversight mechanisms for human research stud-
ies in the country. While the applied ethics tradition by the late 1990s had acquired 
more political traction in the Netherlands than ethicists advocating a hermeneutic or 
constructivist approach, the practice of ethics by committee as instituted by the WMO 
in 1998 was never intended to prioritize a specific epistemic perspective in the Dutch 
ethics discipline. It was just that the politicians responsible for the WMO had particu-
lar use for the expertise promoted by applied ethics in a time that citizens increasing-
ly looked to the state to handle contentious issues in the governance of science, tech-
nology, and health—i.e. that ethics was en vogue—while they did not want to admit to 
undue political influence on these terrains. The notion that ethicists were capable of 
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mitted (i.e. they cannot reject it altogether), the Dutch practice of ethics by committee 
purposefully has been made to function as a mechanism of exclusion for more radical 
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lemans strategically used their multiple professional identities to realize these ideals, 
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formulating a general moral perspective transcending particular viewpoints appealed 
to politicians like Els Borst, who were pressured to ensure that all ethical opinions in 
a pluralist society were fairly represented in the review of protocols but who saw little 
use for the participation of laypeople or ‘society-representatives’ in the public govern-
ance of science: ethics review was to proceed in an orderly manner and had to be pro-
tected from the disorderly input of the unruly ‘all and sundry’. 
 
‘Objective judgements’ and appropriate political control 
 
This leaves the question on what sort of input and participants the judgements of 
research ethics committees today are supposed to rest in the Netherlands. In 1998, to 
convince Dutch parliament of her vision for the practice of ethics by committee, Borst 
stated confidently that an orderly review system could be realized as long as review-
ers “just make an objective judgement”. This statement harbours the belief that objec-
tive decision-making about ethical issues in the sciences is not only possible, but may 
even proceed scientifically itself. As long as certain experts are brought in and certain 
methods are followed, objective judgements surely can be reached. Yet, historians of 
science know objectivity to be a fickle concept, that has not always dominated conver-
sations of how knowledge is acquired or judgement is passed, and that, even since it 
has, has been subject to change through time and space.8 In the history of ethics re-
view described in this PhD-thesis, this is no different. In every instance that ethics by 
committee was proposed as a suitable tool for the oversight of human experiments in 
the Netherlands, objectivity played a crucial role—in that only those considered capa-
ble of passing an objective judgement on the permissibility of protocols could partici-
pate in their review. But what it meant to pass an objective judgement, and who could 
reasonably be expected to pass it, shifted substantially in the latter half of the twenti-
eth century, with strong implications for the forms of oversight that were felt appro-
priate for human research. Hence, in tracing the historical evolvement of these objec-
tivities, it becomes possible to identify the various subject positions that in the second 
half of the twentieth century have been imagined capable of standing guard over hu-
man research in the Netherlands, and identify the changing ways in which the Dutch 
political order has sought to control this practice in this period.9 
Originally, in the 1950s, when the practice of ethics “by committee” was first pro-
posed in the Netherlands, the communal review of risky medical tests upon humans 
was meant to alleviate two concerns about the ability of individual physicians to ob-
jectively assess the permissibility of these studies. The first was a moral concern: due 
to a growing pressure for physicians to advance their careers with scientific research, 
the temptations to engage in tests that did not primarily benefit the wellbeing of their 
patients were becoming too strong. The individual physician came to be thought of as 
too involved to be able to impartially—and thus objectively—determine if risky inter-
ventions could be justified. The second was an epistemic concern: due to the growing 
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specialization of medical knowledge, it had to be doubted whether the average physi-
cian was still capable of conducting studies that would truly bring about medical pro-
gress, which, under the banner ‘only good science is ethical science’, was understood 
to be a moral concern as well. The peripheral members of the profession increasingly 
had to be considered incapable to accurately—and thus objectively—assess the scien-
tific value of research studies. Together, this layered mistrust in the objective capaci-
ties of individual medical researchers led to formulating the need to install commit-
tees that would seat experts who were not directly involved in the study under review, 
but who were still competent enough to determine its scientific worth. 
That these expert reviewers had to be impartial with regard to the study under con-
sideration did not mean at the time that they also had to be socially or physically dis-
tant from research settings. Erik Noach, in fact, in all his thinking about research eth-
ics committees in the 1960s and 1970s, repeatedly emphasized that it was essential 
for reviewers to be intimately familiar with the local context in which an experiment 
was conducted. Only this closeness allowed them to truly assess if a researcher had 
the right motives for conducting a study and if the right facilities were in place for the 
study to proceed responsibly. Only immersion, in short, enabled an informed—and 
thus objective—assessment of the permissibility of an experiment.  
In the 1980s, however, with the mushrooming of research ethics committees in the 
Netherlands, this notion came under pressure. Increasingly, individual groups of re-
viewers came to be eyed with suspicion. After all, how could someone who was physi-
cally distant from the research setting ascertain if local committees were actually im-
partial and accurate in reviewing protocols? “Variation and inconsistency”, the jurist 
Lucas Bergkamp worded this suspicion in 1989, were the biggest problems which the 
Dutch system of ethics by committee had to deal with. Only standardized procedures 
would be able to squash these individual idiosyncrasies, and only this would ensure a 
consistent—and thus objective—assessment of research protocols. 
Initially, these new objectivities were primarily intended to overcome drawbacks of 
the growth of the medical science system in the twentieth century, i.e., the increase of 
scale had undermined older rules of trust in determining if an individual researcher 
or local group of reviewers was impartial and accurate. Unfamiliarity demanded new 
ways to assess the ability to be objective and thus new modes to govern the conduct of 
researchers and reviewers. Communal structures and procedures would enable this 
strengthening of internal control.10 Yet, in this same period, key changes took place in 
the broader societal appraisal of the Dutch medical science system as well, and soon 
the practice of ethics by committee became imbued with another register of objectivi-
ties that served to assert external control over medical research.  
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In the 1950s, still, only members of an artsenstand free from state interference had 
been argued capable of reaching uncorrupted—and thus objective—judgements about 
the permissibility of medical tests upon humans. By the 1970s, however, the trained 
judgement of the medical in-group had come to be suspected to muddy rather than to 
clarify the vision of physicians. Hence, medical outsiders came to be considered more 
uncorrupted—and thus more objective. In effect, ethics by committee was reimagined 
as a public control mechanism which had to be yielded by ordinary citizens to realize 
truly participatory decision-making structures in health care.  
Yet, also this notion of objectivity did not last. In the 1980s, laypeople themselves 
became an object of distrust, not only because they would not understand enough of 
science to pass informed judgements upon it, but also because they represented just 
one of the many opinions present in a pluralist society, making participation of a few 
of them circumspect. Hence, the assessment of protocols had to become devoid of all 
perspectives; aperspectival as it were—and thereby more objective.11 
In Dutch policy circles in the late twentieth century, this political desire to realize 
aperspectival review procedures for the conduct of human experimentation was wed 
to the earlier notion that consistent review procedures were needed to ensure objec-
tive decision-making in the practice of ethics by committee. As long as reviewers were 
capable of parting with their own personal beliefs to place themselves in the point of 
view required by the review process—i.e. “to just make an objective judgement”—they 
would succeed in consistently applying the carefully designed procedures for the ade-
quate assessment of protocols, which would in turn enable a full escape from perspec-
tive. Put differently, regardless of the colours put in by the people on committees, the 
end result would turn out grey—which was exactly what was needed to ascertain that 
decision-making about ethical issues proceeded impartially. If reviewers just followed 
procedures, no social group or moral perspective would unduly profit from the public 
governance of human experimentation in a pluralist democracy. 
This conception of objective ethical decision-making permitted the Dutch govern-
ment in the late twentieth century to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, 
it enabled the state to assert that it did not leave medical researchers to their own 
devices—an autonomy they had proven incapable of handling, was irresponsible with 
regard to the amount of power they held, and did not fit a democratic order anyway. 
Physicians and scientists would have to learn to accept that they did not only have to 
justify their actions to colleagues and perhaps patients, but to the general Dutch pub-
lic (by means of the government) as well. Medicine and science were a part of society 
and could thus be subjected to public scrutiny. Yet, at the same time, the suggestion 
that this scrutiny would proceed ‘objectively’ enabled the Dutch government to assert 
that it infringed neither upon personal beliefs in a pluralist society nor upon the free-
dom of inquiry that befitted an open society. After all, any state had to avoid acting as 
a “master of morality”, as the boundaries between democratic and dictatorial govern-
ance were notoriously fluid. Hence, ethics review was not about bringing researchers 
under full societal control, only about holding them publicly accountable.12 Research-
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ers would have to submit protocols to publicly authorized review bodies, yet the deci-
sion if these could be executed would not result from unruly deliberations but from a 
fair application of uniform procedures by appointed administrators. The government 
itself, in fact, was to refrain from any further interference in the practice. Decisions 
were made only by neutral—and thus objective—reviewers. 
 
The political use for experts in democratic societies 
 
It is a conception of the public governance of human research studies that relies on 
a crafty understanding of the subject position of experts in the practice of ethics by 
committee. Just as in Van Willigenburg’s imagined computer system, the reliance on 
standard protocols serves to negate judgements of individual experts, with all of their 
circumspect qualities. Yet, in order to attain the level of consistency required by the 
review procedure, only those with extensive training, i.e. experts, are considered ca-
pable of ensuring that the correct judgements are in fact reached. According to histo-
rian of science Theodore Porter, this dependence on standardized procedures admin-
istrated by trained bureaucrats has become a typical feature of large-scale liberal de-
mocracies in the late twentieth century. According to Porter, in political cultures in 
which politicians are themselves constantly pressured to account for their actions, 
those in charge tend to justify policies with an appeal to “the rule of rule” rather than 
to explicit moral arguments. Referring to rules and procedures allows one to deflect 
claims of arbitrariness and bias and is a perfect way of “making decisions without 
seeming to decide”. This perception is reinforced by the fact that only those skilled in 
the application of rules may legitimately exercise this judgement. Trained bureau-
crats know better than to let personal beliefs speak through in the evaluation of pro-
tocols. They are in the business of following procedure, meaning that any other bu-
reaucrat, as long as they are properly trained, can be expected to reach the same con-
clusion. This combination of procedural with expert decision-making, Porter argues, 
has become “especially compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a 
popular election, or divine right” in modern democracies. It is the sort of objectivity 
that “lends authority to officials who have very little of their own”.13 
Of course, the legal rules by which human research is regulated in the Netherlands 
have been subject to extensive consideration in Dutch parliament, who has ultimately 
used its legislative powers to pass the WMO. Hence, the contemporary governance of 
human experimentation in the Netherlands is the result of a careful democratic pro-
cess, in which Dutch citizens by means of their government set the terms under which 
the practice may take place. Experts only administrate these rules and may do so only 
in government approved ways. Still, looking back on the Dutch history of governing 
human experimentation, the extent to which politicians have relied on expert advice 
to decide what policies are best is striking. Whether it was one of the Health Council 
committees of the 1950s and 1970s, the Central Council committee of the early 1980s, 
or the ad-hoc committee on research with the legally incapacitated in the mid-1990s, 
all permitted experts to set the frame in which human research would be debated in 
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to decide what policies are best is striking. Whether it was one of the Health Council 
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or the ad-hoc committee on research with the legally incapacitated in the mid-1990s, 
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parliament and what type of policies could be considered suitable for its regulation. 
What is more, in all these years, the responsible Dutch statespersons not only seemed 
perfectly happy with this expert-driven approach to the definition of public problems, 
they actively appeared to invoke expert authority when challenged to take up a nor-
mative stance on the permissibility of human research studies, thereby allowing them 
to depoliticize the issues at hand. This or that policy decision did not just follow from 
the opinion of politicians, it had been officially advised by experts. 
One politician who particularly favoured this approach to policymaking was Minis-
ter of Health Els Borst, responsible for the eventual effectuation of the WMO. Accord-
ing to the former medical director and vice-President of the Health Council, the input 
of experts was needed in public policy as ‘ignorance and intense emotions’ (which she 
believed followed from a lack of expert input) prevented reaching meaningful consen-
sus about medicine and health. For those familiar with the history of Dutch politics, a 
certain irony may be noted in this faith in experts. Today, Els Borst remains one of 
the most iconic faces of the liberal-progressive party D66 that was established in the 
1960s with the aim to democratize the existing Dutch political order, which would be 
dominated by the ‘closed castes’ of the pillorized Dutch society. It was time, D66 felt, 
that citizens of a modern nation got to speak for themselves. Yet, by the 1990s, D66-
politicians like Els Borst were happy to assign the authority to speak to another elite, 
i.e. experts, who only two decades earlier had been framed as one of those traditional 
authorities that egalitarian societies had to rally against. Previous chapters have sug-
gested that this reliance on experts by politicians might well be a Dutch phenomenon 
that, with a history of coalition governments, is known for its compromise-based and 
related expertocratic approach to government. Hence, the role of experts may differ 
from countries such as the United States which have a two-party system comprised of 
representatives that have local constituents to satisfy. More research with attention to 
national context is needed in this regard, not just in the domain of ethics review, but 
in the general realization of public control mechanisms in the late twentieth century 
that have intended to hold physicians and scientists to account.14 
In the Netherlands, this demand for accountability in the conduct of research with 
human subjects eventually has resulted in a carefully constructed public bureaucracy 
of ethics that is dominated by the rule of expert consensus and built around two (and 
only two) premises: for protocols to be permitted they (1) have to be methodologically 
sound, and (2) contain sufficient safeguards to protect the rights and safety of partic-
ipating research subjects. Subsequently, if the right procedures have been consistent-
ly followed and the correct rules justly applied, judgements are considered objective. 
In those instances, no undue perspectives are taken to have corrupted the review pro-
cess, implicating that the decision has democratic approval even if no actual demo-
cratic process was involved in evaluating the protocol. Only trained administrators 
authorized to act on behalf of the government can participate in passing these judge-
ments. Nonetheless, just to be sure, ethical experts have been elevated to function as 
fulcrums between expert and democratic governance modes for human experimenta-
tion. That is, in theory—when the practice is debated in parliament. 
                                                 
14 Further research studies comparing ‘discourses of accountability’ in governing medicine and health 
care in the late twentieth century across Europe and the United States are currently developed by 
Prof.dr. Frank Huisman of Utrecht University and Prof.dr. Nancy Tomes of Stony Brook University. 
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In the past as well in the present, the at times inflexible and inefficient elements of 
this bureaucracy have been blamed on the (bio)ethics profession that arose alongside 
of the practice of ethics by committee in the latter half of the twentieth century. Moti-
vated by a false sense of moral righteousness, these ‘Commissars’ would have brought 
about a tangle of red tape in the governance of the medical sciences, frustrating scien-
tific innovation. Yet, simultaneously, and just as loudly, (bio)ethicists have been ac-
cused of functioning as a lubricant for the medical research establishment that allows 
those in charge to push through any scientific innovation without too much societal 
resistance. Of course, it is crucial for any discipline to exercise reflexivity with regard 
to its professional functioning, and thus also to critically consider its role in certain 
forms of governance in favour of others. In the Netherlands as well as in other coun-
tries, this reflection does take place from time to time, to which this PhD-thesis has 
attempted to contribute some much needed historical reflection on the political func-
tioning of Dutch ethicists that goes beyond the idea that professional ethics emerged 
in the 1960s and 1970s “to break the bulwark of the know-it-alls”.15  
Still, for those who want to criticize ethics by committee as a frustrating example of 
design by committee that either stifles or shields scientific innovation, it seems more 
prudent to point to the manoeuvring of a specific political order in the late twentieth 
century than to the mythical dominance of a new ethics discipline that, at least in the 
Netherlands, has never inhabited more than a few positions of power. This political 
order wished to assert that it properly dealt with contentious issues in the domains of 
science, technology, and health—without having to admit to undue interference with 
the freedom of inquiry of scientists in an open society, and without actually having to 
include a plurality of societal voices in deciding what is just in these domains. Ethics 
by committee, then, became nothing but a managerial tool for holding researchers to 
account that could surely be wielded objectively—permitting science to progress and 
citizens to sleep sound. That is, of course, those epistemic perspectives that are found 
to fit the moulds of “authoritative science”, and those citizens “reasonable enough” to 
understand that these moulds are both necessary and permitted. 
                                                 
15 For a fairly recent reflection by Dutch ethicists on their professional and political functioning, see: 
Mariëtte van der Hoven, Lieke van der Scheer & Dick Willems (eds.), Ethiek in discussie. Prak-
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Dit proefschrift beschrijft de opkomst van systematische ethische toetsing van medi-
sche experimenten met mensen in Nederland in de tweede helft van de twintigste 
eeuw en analyseert deze ontwikkeling tegen de achtergrond van de veranderende 
maatschappelijke positie van de geneeskunde en medische wetenschap in deze perio-
de. Sinds 1998 is het illegaal in Nederland om medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
met menselijke proefpersonen te verrichten zonder dat toestemming is verkregen van 
zogeheten medisch-ethische toetsingscommissies, internationaal bekend als research 
ethics committees. Met deze ontwikkeling volgde Nederland een internationale trend: 
in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw werd in veel Westerse landen toestemming 
van research ethics committees verplicht voor medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
met mensen. Deze ontwikkeling was en is echter niet onomstreden. Of het weten-
schappelijk beroep op deze wijze ‘gedisciplineerd’ mag worden en wie precies door de 
overheid in staat mag worden gesteld om ethische oordelen te vellen over de toelaat-
baarheid van wetenschappelijke experimenten blijven onderwerpen van debat onder 
wetenschappers, beleidsmakers en een breder maatschappelijk publiek. 
 Geschiedenis vervult een belangrijke functie in deze debatten. De vermeende nood-
zaak van systematische ethische toetsing wordt bijvoorbeeld vaak verdedigd met his-
torische argumenten. Schandalen en machtsmisbruik uit het verleden zouden uitwij-
zen dat medische wetenschappers nu eenmaal sociale controle behoeven. Daarnaast 
zou systematische ethische toetsing passen bij een bredere democratiseringsbeweging 
in de jaren zestig en zeventig die de professionele autonomie van deskundigen aan 
banden heeft gelegd ten behoeve van het patiëntrecht en democratische controleme-
chanismen in de geneeskunde. Geschiedenis wordt echter ook ingezet om te beweren 
dat systematische ethische toetsing eerder een vijgenbladfunctie vervult in de heden-
daagse wetenschap: de routinematig opererende commissies zouden zijn ingesteld in 
de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw als een verdedigingslinie tegenover meer radi-
cale kritiek op het maatschappelijk functioneren van de geneeskunde en wetenschap. 
Deze instrumentele rol van geschiedenis maakt zorgvuldig historisch onderzoek be-
langrijk. Afhankelijk van het geboden historische kader zal het hedendaagse functio-
neren van systematische ethische toetsing namelijk anders begrepen worden.  
De geschiedenis van systematische ethische toetsing biedt daarnaast ook belangrij-
ke inzichten in de veranderende maatschappelijke rol en positie van de geneeskunde 
en medische wetenschap in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw. Het uitvoeren van 
medische experimenten met mensen is al zo oud als de geneeskunde zelf. Toch wordt 
pas sinds de jaren zestig en zeventig van de twintigste eeuw de noodzaak gevoeld om 
deze praktijk te onderwerpen aan geformaliseerde vormen van gemeenschappelijke 
controle. Dit proefschrift stelt daarom de vragen waarom het verlangen naar systema-
tische ethische toetsing van medische experimenten met mensen opkwam in Neder-
land na 1950; op welke wijze deze nieuwe praktijk vorm moest geven aan het verlan-
gen om de geneeskunde en medische wetenschap in goede banen te leiden; wat dit “in 
goede banen leiden” door de jaren heen precies ging betekenen en voor wie; en welke 
culturele noties over de rol en positie van de geneeskunde en medische wetenschap in 
de Nederlandse maatschappij ten grondslag lagen aan deze veranderingen. 
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land na 1950; op welke wijze deze nieuwe praktijk vorm moest geven aan het verlan-
gen om de geneeskunde en medische wetenschap in goede banen te leiden; wat dit “in 
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 Hoofdstuk 1 toont aan dat de eerste blauwdruk in Nederland voor de systematische 
ethische toetsing van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek met mensen (of, zoals het 
toen nog genoemd werd, medische proeven op mensen) in 1955 ontworpen werd door 
de Nederlandse Gezondheidsraad. In 1953 was dit adviesorgaan ingeschakeld door de 
toenmalige Staatssecretaris van Volksgezondheid om een rapport te schrijven over de 
toelaatbaarheid van proeven op mensen in Nederland, in een reactie op aanhoudende 
beschuldigingen van de nationale antivivisectiebeweging dat sociaal zwakkere patiën-
ten in Nederland regelmatig als proefdieren gebruikt werden. De Gezondheidsraad-
commissie die werd samengesteld om dit rapport te schrijven, bestond exclusief uit 
eminente Nederlandse artsen. Deze groep concludeerde in 1955 dat misstanden op 
dit gebied inderdaad wel eens voorkwamen en dat maatregelen nodig waren om zulks 
in de toekomst te voorkomen. Nieuwe ethische richtlijnen en systematische gemeen-
schappelijke toetsing van deze regels werden hiervoor de oplossing geacht. Echter, de 
verzamelde artsen benadrukten ook dat proeven op mensen absoluut noodzakelijk 
waren voor de voortgang van de geneeskunde. De Nederlandse staat had daarom een 
plicht deze wetenschappelijke praktijk te beschermen tegen onheuse beschuldigingen 
als die van de antivivisectionisten. Het nemen van enig risico met individuele patiën-
ten moest bovendien aanvaard worden als onvermijdelijk en als een morele plicht 
voor zowel artsen als patiënten. Tot slot waren de artsen ervan overtuigd dat de over-
heid zich noch mocht bemoeien met het stellen van inhoudelijke eisen aan de genees-
kunde noch met de systematische toetsing van ethische regels. De Tweede Wereld-
oorlog had immers uitgewezen dat een staat zich verre moest houden van enige be-
moeienis met het medische beroep en dat sociale controle op de geneeskunde om die 
reden slechts intern uitgeoefend mocht worden: door artsen, voor artsen. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 legt uit waarom de Nederlandse Gezondheidsraad begin jaren zeven-
tig de nationale overheid nogmaals adviseerde om het doen van medische experimen-
ten met mensen te onderwerpen aan systematische ethische toetsing. De aanleiding 
voor dit rapport waren Tweede Kamervragen uit 1968 waarin de groeiende populari-
teit van een nieuwe vorm van medisch experimenteren aan de kaak werd gesteld: i.e. 
gerandomiseerde klinische proeven waarbij de helft van de deelnemende patiënten in 
plaats van een geneesmiddel een placebo toegediend kreeg (waar zij niet altijd van op 
de hoogte waren). De Gezondheidsraadcommissie die verantwoordelijk was voor dit 
rapport bestond voornamelijk uit farmacologen en internisten, die gezamenlijk van 
mening waren dat conflicterende belangen bij dit soort onderzoeken systematische 
ethische toetsing noodzakelijk maakte. Echter, de commissie benadrukte ook dat een 
dergelijk systeem goede klinische wetenschap diende te beschermen en te bevorderen 
in Nederland. Het grootste ethische probleem op dit gebied, zo beargumenteerden de 
bijeengebrachte farmacologen en internisten, was niet de veiligheid van deelnemende 
‘proefpersonen’, maar een gebrek aan methodologisch verantwoorde klinische expe-
rimenten. In Nederland kwamen elk jaar medicijnen op de markt waarvan de effecti-
viteit niet voldoende bewezen was volgens de regels van de moderne klinische weten-
schap, wat betekende dat scharen van patiënten behandeld werden met medicaties 
waarvan niet duidelijk was of ze de genezing daadwerkelijk bevorderden. Deze irrati-
onaliteit was het echte ethische probleem en systematische ethische toetsing van kli-
nische experimenten met mensen diende er dan ook vooral om voor dit probleem een 
oplossing te bieden. Ethische toetsingscommissies moesten daarom bestaan uit des-
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kundigen op het gebied van de klinische wetenschap (farmacologen, statistici en in-
ternisten), die tot taak hadden om de kwaliteit van klinisch onderzoek te controleren 
en te bevorderen en om zorgen weg te nemen bij artsen die uit ethisch conservatisme 
weigerden mee te werken aan gerandomiseerde klinische proeven. Op deze wijze zou 
systematische ethische toetsing klinisch onderzoek zowel verbeteren als intensiveren 
in Nederland. De Gezondheidsraad beval de overheid aan dit soort toetsing wettelijk 
verplicht te stellen, maar benadrukte ook dat haar rol beperkt diende worden tot het 
machtigen van deskundigen voor deze inspectietaak. Meer overheidsbemoeienis kon 
immers wetenschappelijke vooruitgang belemmeren en was daarom af te raden. Soci-
ale controle op de geneeskunde bleef een taak van artsen, voor artsen. 
 Omdat de Nederlandse overheid begin jaren zeventig weinig heil zag in het verder 
reguleren van de klinische wetenschap werd het Gezondheidsraadrapport pas gepu-
bliceerd in 1981. Hoofdstuk 3 legt uit dat tegen die tijd echter het culturele klimaat in 
Nederland met betrekking tot sociale controle op de geneeskunde en wetenschap was 
veranderd. Waar in de eerste decennia na de Tweede Wereldoorlog veel vertrouwen 
had bestaan in het zelfregulerend karakter van de medische professie, ontstond rond 
1960 een gevoel van crisis onder Nederlandse artsen over de houdbaarheid van hun 
beroepsethiek. Ingrijpende technologische innovaties wierpen nieuwe vragen op om-
trent leven en dood, de spectaculaire groei van het medisch bedrijf maakte dat artsen 
collega’s steeds minder goed kenden, en veranderende maatschappelijke verhoudin-
gen zorgden ervoor dat patiënten steeds meer eisen leken te stellen aan het medisch 
handelen. Deze zorgen maakten de medische ethiek in de jaren zestig tot een populair 
onderwerp van debat, zowel binnen als buiten de medische professie.  
Deze ontwikkelingen hadden tot gevolg dat de Nederlandse overheid in 1970 vroeg 
aan de Gezondheidsraad om nieuwe medische ethiek te formuleren die paste bij ‘het 
leven in de moderne samenleving’. De daartoe ingestelde Gezondheidsraadcommissie 
Medische Ethiek besloot uit te gaan van het patiëntrecht. In de toekomst zouden de 
rechten en plichten van patiënten en artsen het fundament worden van de medische 
ethiek. Hoofdstuk 3 betoogt dat deze keuze niet vanzelfsprekend was. In de ‘crisis in 
de medische ethiek’ van de jaren 1960 had een meer radicale sociale kritiek over de 
moderne samenleving en haar vervreemdende maatschappelijke structuren namelijk 
de boventoon gevoerd. De Gezondheidsraadcommissie Medische Ethiek werd echter 
gedomineerd door juristen die sterk inzetten op het patiëntrecht en door artsen die in 
een dergelijke benadering een verdedigingsmechanisme zagen tegen al te grote over-
heidsbemoeienis met het therapeutisch handelen. In de jaren zeventig werd het pati-
entrecht steeds populairder in Nederland, wat in 1978 resulteerde in de instelling van 
een grote Commissie Rechten van de Patiënt bij de Centrale Raad voor de Volksge-
zondheid. De commissie bestond uit juristen, artsen, ambtenaren en vertegenwoordi-
gers van patiëntenorganisaties. De bedoeling was dat zij tezamen recht zouden doen 
aan de idealen van de participatieve democratie: in de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg 
zouden verticale relaties van afhankelijkheid en ondergeschiktheid voortaan vervan-
gen worden door horizontale relaties van consultatie en participatie. 
 Hoofstuk 4 maakt duidelijk hoe, in tegenstelling tot landen als de Verenigde Staten 
en Groot-Brittannië, onrust over twijfelachtige experimenten met mensen in Neder-
land geen rol van betekenis speelde in deze maatschappelijke omwenteling. Pas eind 
jaren zeventig ontstond vrij plotseling breed aandacht voor de ethische problematiek 
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van proeven op mensen. Twee incidenten vormden de aanleiding voor deze aandacht: 
de aankondiging dat een Nederlandse criminoloog onderzoek wilde gaan doen naar 
de biologische oorzaken van criminaliteit en de ontdekking dat een huisarts al jaren 
twijfelachtige mensproeven deed in een verzorgingstehuis voor mensen met een ver-
standelijke beperking. In reactie op deze schandalen drong de Nederlandse overheid 
erop aan bij de Commissie Rechten van de Patiënt dat het ook een advies schreef over 
de regulering van proeven op mensen. Invloedrijke publieke commentatoren betoog-
den dat ethische toetsingscommissies in de toekomst hadden te bestaan uit ‘medische 
buitenstaanders’ die maatschappelijke controle uitoefenden op de medische weten-
schap. Zulke externe controle was noodzakelijk omdat artsen en wetenschappers on-
mogelijk objectief het eigen handelen zouden kunnen beoordelen. De werkgroep die 
werd ingesteld om deze problematiek te bestuderen was het eens met deze zienswijze. 
Ze benadrukte in haar rapport uit 1982 dat ethische toetsing van medische weten-
schap noodzakelijk was in een moderne samenleving om openheid en transparantie 
te kunnen garanderen. Het patiëntrecht moest bevorderd worden en leken moesten 
deelnemen aan ethische toetsingscommissies als vertegenwoordigers van de samen-
leving ter bevordering van ‘horizontale relaties van participatie en consultatie’ in de 
wetenschap. Experimenten deed men met mensen, niet op mensen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 besluit met de opmerking dat een verschil bestond tussen de manier 
waarop de werkgroep zich voor de schermen hardmaakte voor het patiëntrecht en 
achter de schermen betoogde dat goede wetenschap in Nederland beschermd en be-
vorderd moest worden. Het patiëntrecht mocht de medische wetenschap niet wezen-
lijk beknotten en systematische ethische toetsing diende ook om het publiek vertrou-
wen in experimenten met mensen te herstellen. Bovendien zouden alleen leken die 
redelijk genoeg waren om te erkennen dat dit soort onderzoek belangrijk en noodza-
kelijk was, deel mogen nemen aan toetsingscommissies. Zittende deskundigen moch-
ten daarom kiezen welke leken konden deelnemen als maatschappijvertegenwoordi-
gers. Niettemin bestond begin jaren tachtig onder Nederlandse politici veel sympa-
thie voor het ideaal van externe controle en het voorstel van de Commissie Rechten 
van de Patiënt verkreeg dan ook de voorkeur boven eerdere voorstellen voor meer 
interne controle van de Gezondheidsraad. In 1983 besloot de Nederlandse overheid 
om het voorstel van de Commissie Rechten van de Patiënt uit te voeren. 
Hoofdstuk 5 legt uit hoe dit voorstel medio jaren tachtig onder vuur kwam te liggen 
ten gevolge van de opkomst van een neoliberaal klimaat dat huiverig stond tegenover 
meer overheidsregulatie, wat leidde tot veel vertraging in de realisatie van een Neder-
lands wetsvoorstel voor medische experimenten met mensen. Onder druk van inter-
nationale tijdschriften en onderzoekfinanciers kwamen in deze periode toch veel ethi-
sche toetsingscommissies tot stand in Nederland. Er bestond echter weinig duidelijk-
heid over wie precies deelnamen in dit soort commissies en of beoordelaars in staat 
en bereid waren serieuze ethische oordelen te vellen. De samenstelling en het functi-
oneren van ethische toetsingscommissies werden hierdoor eind jaren tachtig onder-
werp van zorg in Nederland. Gebrek aan uniformiteit en consistentie zou het belang-
rijkste probleem zijn in het systematisch ethisch toetsen van experimenten met men-
sen en alleen standaardisering van deze praktijk zou dit probleem op kunnen lossen. 
Maatschappelijke controle door leken werd steeds vaker van de hand gewezen ten 
gunste van deskundige controle door goed getrainde professionals. 
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Pas in 1997 besprak de Tweede Kamer voor het eerst een wetsvoorstel ter regule-
ring van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek met mensen in Nederland. Systemati-
sche ethische toetsing door daartoe ingestelde toetsingscommissies vormde de rug-
gengraat van dit voorstel, maar de zittende overheid—het tweede kabinet Paars—had 
besloten alleen deskundigen te laten deelnemen in commissies. Met name de confes-
sionele partijen in het parlement (die geen van alle deelnamen aan de regering) uitten 
grote zorgen over het feit dat leken buiten de ethische toetsing van experimenten met 
mensen werden gehouden. Wetenschappers, zo betoogden zij, hadden vaker dan ge-
middeld liberale opvattingen over de toelaatbaarheid van experimenten, ook die waar 
maatschappelijk weinig consensus over bestond, zoals onderzoek met foetussen, em-
bryo’s of wilsonbekwame mensen. De participatie van leken was nodig om te verzeke-
ren dat ook alternatieve opvattingen uit de pluriforme Nederlandse samenleving ge-
hoor zouden vinden in de toetsingscommissies. De Minister van Volksgezondheid Els 
Borst zag weinig heil in lekendeelname. Als voormalig medisch directeur en vicevoor-
zitter van de Gezondheidsraad was ze van mening dat alleen deskundige toetsing zou 
leiden tot uniforme en onafhankelijke ethische oordelen over de toelaatbaarheid van 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Ze merkte echter op in parlementaire debatten dat het 
wetsvoorstel voorzag in de deelname van ethici in de verschillende toetsingscommis-
sies, wier expertise bestond uit het objectief inzichtelijk maken van de meningen en 
argumenten die konden bestaan in een pluriforme samenleving over specifieke ethi-
sche dilemma’s. Deze professionals, zo betoogde Borst, vormden daarmee het ideale 
scharnierpunt tussen deskundige en democratische toetsing. 
Hoofdstuk 6 onderwerpt deze uitspraken van de Minister van Volksgezondheid aan 
nadere inspectie. De professionele en politieke functie van ethici was niet onomstre-
den in Nederland aan het eind van de twintigste eeuw. De discipline was pas ontstaan 
in de jaren zestig en zeventig en discussie was blijven bestaan over wat nu precies de 
identiteit en rol was van een ethicus, met name onder leden van de beroepsgroep zelf. 
Critici betoogden dat deskundigheid in het vellen van ethische oordelen epistemolo-
gisch onmogelijk was en dat ethici om die reden geen professionele rol konden ver-
vullen in het uitdenken en uitvoeren van beleid ter oplossing van ethisch gevoelige 
kwesties. Voorstanders betoogden dat ethici wel bijzondere deskundigheid hadden op 
dit gebied en met zorgvuldige analyses van ethische dilemma’s juist in staat waren 
overheidsbeleid rationeler en beter te maken. De systematische toetsing van weten-
schappelijk onderzoek met mensen speelde een belangrijke rol in deze methodestrijd. 
De participatie van ethici in toetsingscommissies was voor tegenstanders een typisch 
voorbeeld van de rol die ethici niet moesten vervullen: ze hadden professioneel niks 
toe te voegen aan het toepassen van regels op specifieke onderzoeksvoorstellen, maar 
verleenden met hun participatie wel morele legitimiteit aan de overheid en medische 
wetenschap. Voor voorstanders was de manier waarop toetsingscommissies functio-
neerden een mooi voorbeeld van hoe systematische ethische analyses onder begelei-
ding van ethisch deskundigen een praktijk moreel beter konden maken. 
De opkomst van ethische toetsingscommissies in de tweede helft van de twintigste 
eeuw wordt vaak toegeschreven aan de gelijktijdige opkomst van de ethiek discipline 
in deze periode. Deze ‘buitenstaanders’ zouden politici en een breder maatschappelijk 
publiek ervan overtuigd hebben dat de medische wetenschap onderworpen diende te 
worden aan regels en procedures die voortvloeiden uit deze nieuwe discipline. Dit 
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van proeven op mensen. Twee incidenten vormden de aanleiding voor deze aandacht: 
de aankondiging dat een Nederlandse criminoloog onderzoek wilde gaan doen naar 
de biologische oorzaken van criminaliteit en de ontdekking dat een huisarts al jaren 
twijfelachtige mensproeven deed in een verzorgingstehuis voor mensen met een ver-
standelijke beperking. In reactie op deze schandalen drong de Nederlandse overheid 
erop aan bij de Commissie Rechten van de Patiënt dat het ook een advies schreef over 
de regulering van proeven op mensen. Invloedrijke publieke commentatoren betoog-
den dat ethische toetsingscommissies in de toekomst hadden te bestaan uit ‘medische 
buitenstaanders’ die maatschappelijke controle uitoefenden op de medische weten-
schap. Zulke externe controle was noodzakelijk omdat artsen en wetenschappers on-
mogelijk objectief het eigen handelen zouden kunnen beoordelen. De werkgroep die 
werd ingesteld om deze problematiek te bestuderen was het eens met deze zienswijze. 
Ze benadrukte in haar rapport uit 1982 dat ethische toetsing van medische weten-
schap noodzakelijk was in een moderne samenleving om openheid en transparantie 
te kunnen garanderen. Het patiëntrecht moest bevorderd worden en leken moesten 
deelnemen aan ethische toetsingscommissies als vertegenwoordigers van de samen-
leving ter bevordering van ‘horizontale relaties van participatie en consultatie’ in de 
wetenschap. Experimenten deed men met mensen, niet op mensen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 besluit met de opmerking dat een verschil bestond tussen de manier 
waarop de werkgroep zich voor de schermen hardmaakte voor het patiëntrecht en 
achter de schermen betoogde dat goede wetenschap in Nederland beschermd en be-
vorderd moest worden. Het patiëntrecht mocht de medische wetenschap niet wezen-
lijk beknotten en systematische ethische toetsing diende ook om het publiek vertrou-
wen in experimenten met mensen te herstellen. Bovendien zouden alleen leken die 
redelijk genoeg waren om te erkennen dat dit soort onderzoek belangrijk en noodza-
kelijk was, deel mogen nemen aan toetsingscommissies. Zittende deskundigen moch-
ten daarom kiezen welke leken konden deelnemen als maatschappijvertegenwoordi-
gers. Niettemin bestond begin jaren tachtig onder Nederlandse politici veel sympa-
thie voor het ideaal van externe controle en het voorstel van de Commissie Rechten 
van de Patiënt verkreeg dan ook de voorkeur boven eerdere voorstellen voor meer 
interne controle van de Gezondheidsraad. In 1983 besloot de Nederlandse overheid 
om het voorstel van de Commissie Rechten van de Patiënt uit te voeren. 
Hoofdstuk 5 legt uit hoe dit voorstel medio jaren tachtig onder vuur kwam te liggen 
ten gevolge van de opkomst van een neoliberaal klimaat dat huiverig stond tegenover 
meer overheidsregulatie, wat leidde tot veel vertraging in de realisatie van een Neder-
lands wetsvoorstel voor medische experimenten met mensen. Onder druk van inter-
nationale tijdschriften en onderzoekfinanciers kwamen in deze periode toch veel ethi-
sche toetsingscommissies tot stand in Nederland. Er bestond echter weinig duidelijk-
heid over wie precies deelnamen in dit soort commissies en of beoordelaars in staat 
en bereid waren serieuze ethische oordelen te vellen. De samenstelling en het functi-
oneren van ethische toetsingscommissies werden hierdoor eind jaren tachtig onder-
werp van zorg in Nederland. Gebrek aan uniformiteit en consistentie zou het belang-
rijkste probleem zijn in het systematisch ethisch toetsen van experimenten met men-
sen en alleen standaardisering van deze praktijk zou dit probleem op kunnen lossen. 
Maatschappelijke controle door leken werd steeds vaker van de hand gewezen ten 
gunste van deskundige controle door goed getrainde professionals. 
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proefschrift toont echter aan dat ethici in Nederland lange tijd een marginale rol ver-
vulden in de realisatie en promotie van systematische ethische toetsing van medisch-
wetenschappelijk onderzoek met mensen. Pas eind jaren tachtig kregen zij een meer 
centrale rol in deze praktijk. Hoofdstuk 6 betoogt dat het veranderende politieke kli-
maat in Nederland aan het einde van de twintigste eeuw hier een belangrijke functie 
in vervulde. Politici merkten in deze periode dat burgers steeds vaker van de staat 
verlangden dat zij ethische problemen oploste. Morele vraagstukken werden niet lan-
ger toevertrouwd aan geestelijk leiders, professionele elites of andere ‘morele des-
kundigen”; de overheid werd verondersteld formele regels en procedures te bepalen. 
Politici constateerden echter ook dat het Nederlandse parlementaire bestel geen ro-
buuste traditie kende voor democratische afhandeling van zulke vraagstukken. Ten 
tijde van de verzuiling was een cultuur van besluitvorming ontwikkeld die belang had 
bij beperking van de politieke agenda en die liever wegbleef bij sterk normatief gela-
den kwesties. Ook na de ontzuiling was deze cultuur van depolitisering dominant 
gebleven. Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat bewindslieden als Els Borst aan het einde van de 
twintigste eeuw inderdaad liever een beroep deden op deskundigen om overheidsbe-
leid voor ethisch gevoelige kwesties op te stellen en uit te voeren dan dat zij dit over-
lieten aan leken of maatschappijvertegenwoordigers. Dit zorgde ervoor dat met name 
ethici die zich comfortabel voelden in een dergelijke politieke rol in de jaren negentig 
konden rekenen op overheidssubsidies en beleidsinvloed. Zo had het verplicht stellen 
van systematische ethische toetsing van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek eerder 
invloed op de ethiek discipline in Nederland dan andersom. 
Gezamenlijk laten de hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift zien dat de opkomst van sys-
tematische ethische toetsing van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek in Nederland 
tot doel had om twee transformaties in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw te rea-
liseren en in goede banen te leiden: (1) de veranderende rol van de wetenschap in de 
geneeskunde en (2) de veranderende positie van de geneeskunde en medische weten-
schap in de Nederlandse maatschappij. Het idee van systematische ethische toetsing 
kwam op in de jaren vijftig en zestig om een bepaalde epistemologische traditie in de 
medische wetenschap te beschermen en bevorderen in Nederland. In de jaren zeven-
tig werden medisch-ethische toetsingscommissies steeds vaker voorgesteld als orga-
nen die maatschappelijke controle op de medische wetenschap dienden te realiseren. 
Uiteindelijk besloot de Nederlandse overheid dat ethische toetsingscommissies voor-
al dienden te fungeren als administratieve organen die de toelaatbaarheid van weten-
schappelijk onderzoek met mensen hadden te toetsen aan door de overheid opgestel-
de rechtsregels en procedures. Deze transitie ging samen met een veranderend begrip 
van objectiviteit en morele autoriteit in de Nederlandse medische ethiek. Waar tot de 
jaren zestig uitsluitend artsen in staat werden geacht objectieve morele oordelen te 
kunnen vellen over de toelaatbaarheid van medische proeven op mensen, en in de 
jaren zeventig betoogd werd dat juist ‘medische buitenstaanders’ objectiever konden 
oordelen over de toelaatbaarheid van wetenschappelijke studies, ging in de jaren 
tachtig en negentig het idee heersen dat objectieve ethische oordelen slechts door 
uniforme procedures en getrainde bureaucraten bereikt konden worden. 
Ondanks de toenemende nadruk op de maatschappelijke controle van wetenschap 
in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw bleef de ethische toetsing van medisch-
wetenschappelijk onderzoek in Nederland dus voornamelijk een zaak van deskundi-
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gen, al veranderende het type expert dat in staat werd geacht objectieve ethische oor-
delen te vellen wel. Deze politieke functie van deskundigen stond de Nederlandse 
overheid toe te beweren dat dat ze publieke controle uitoefende op de medische we-
tenschap zonder dat ze directe inmenging met ethisch gevoelige kwesties op dit ter-
rein hoefde toe te geven; een vorm van depolitisering die retorisch zowel paste bij het 
ideaal van een pluralistische samenleving als het ideaal van vrije wetenschapsbeoefe-
ning in een open maatschappij. Dit proefschrift toont echter aan dat de keuzes van de 
Nederlandse overheid in de regulering van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek met 
mensen wel degelijk specifieke normatieve praktijken in de geneeskunde en medische 
wetenschap bevorderd hebben. De wijze waarop systematische ethische toetsing van 
medische proeven op mensen uiteindelijk vorm heeft gekregen in Nederland, maakt 
dat deze praktijk tegenwoordig meer dan ooit geaccepteerd wordt als een integraal 
onderdeel van de geneeskunde en dat deskundigen met specifieke epistemologische 
ideeën over hoe de effectiviteit van geneeskundige interventies bewezen dient te wor-
den meer macht hebben om deze op te leggen aan de beroepsgroep en Nederlandse 
samenleving. Ook bevordert dit systeem bepaalde vormen van ethiekbeoefening aan 
de Nederlandse universiteiten en onderzoekscentra en houdt ze meer ‘radicale’ maat-
schappelijke kritiek op de toelaatbaarheid van medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek 
met mensen op deze wijze vaak effectief buiten de deur.  
Met de bovenstaande conclusies draagt dit proefschrift bij aan een aantal recente 
studies die vraagtekens stellen bij het lange tijd dominante historische narratief dat 
research ethics committees opkwamen in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw om 
de medische wetenschap in te dammen en meer democratische controle uit te oefe-
nen op het handelen van artsen en wetenschappers. Daarnaast biedt dit proefschrift 
nieuwe inzichten in de radicaal veranderende wijzen waarop artsen en wetenschap-
pers in de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw verantwoording hebben moeten afleg-
gen voor hun professionele handelen; welke veranderende culturele opvattingen over 
de juiste maatschappelijke positie van de geneeskunde en medische wetenschap hier-
aan ten grondslag hebben gelegen; wat voor invloed dit heeft gehad op de organisatie 
en praktijk van het medisch-wetenschappelijk bedrijf; en tot slot, wat de regulatieve 
rol van de (medische) ethiek is geweest in deze ontwikkelingen. 
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This appendix considers the “knowledge valorisation” of this PhD-thesis. In 2015, I 
had an interesting experience as a participant in a panel of the History of Science So-
ciety organized by the Joint Caucus on Socially Engaged Philosophers and Historians 
of Science in San Francisco. The other panellists came from the United States, Aus-
tralia, Mexico, and Taiwan. I started my contribution by talking about the emphasis 
in the Netherlands on ‘knowledge valorisation’ and how this informed my work. Al-
ready after a minute or so, however, an audience member raised her hand to ask if I 
could explain what I precisely meant with this strange word “valorisation”. The term, 
it turns out, was hardly familiar to American academics. Indeed, judging from online 
word searches, ‘valorisation’ still seems to be a term that is used predominantly in the 
Netherlands to denote “the process of creating value from knowledge suitable and/or 
available for social and/or economic use and by making knowledge suitable for trans-
lation into competitive products, services, processes and new commercial activities” 
(the definition of the Dutch National Valorisation Committee in 2011).  
As a historian of science, it is worthwhile to point out that this Dutch emphasis on 
knowledge valorisation (and therefore also this valorisation addendum) rests upon a 
specific understanding of the social role and position of scholarship that is historical-
ly neither self-evident nor uncontested. For while scholars in most historical periods 
have either claimed or been asked to justify why their work is important, the recent 
Dutch emphasis on societal use comes forth out of specific government policies that 
were designed in the early twenty-first century to optimize ‘the return on investment’ 
of public research funds. After all, although it is frequently emphasized by politicians 
and policymakers that valorisation should be understood as “making one’s research 
relevant to society” (a statement so general that it is hard to disagree with), the eco-
nomic origins of the term shine through in the definition provided by the Dutch Na-
tional Valorisation Committee, i.e., scholars in receipt of public funds and resources 
should specify the yields their research will deliver. And the more specific the product 
can be defined, the better the valorisation has succeeded.  
The other panellists asked me in 2015 if it was not sufficient to explain that the 
funds invested in my PhD-trajectory served to develop my academic skills, which I 
would need later in my career to teach and produce further knowledge. I have talked 
about this argument with numerous Dutch academics since. Although most are sym-
pathetic towards it, almost all doubt whether it will be accepted in a valorisation ad-
dendum as the sole reason for granting a PhD-scholarship. Of course, it is important 
for any scholar (PhD-scholar or not) to consider the relevance of their research. Yet, I 
do feel it is equally important to point out that the definition of valorisation used by 
the National Valorisation Committee and the requirement to let PhD-candidates de-
fend their work in such terms are indicative of a worrisome trend in the Netherlands 
in which PhD-trajectories are increasingly commodified as ready-to-wear projects 
that may yield a predefined set of deliverables (‘high impact publications’, ‘large data 
sets’, ‘competitive products’, ‘commercial activities’), rather than that they are under-
stood as modest stepping stones towards durable academic careers. 
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Having said this, this PhD-thesis has argued that careful historical research of the 
reasons behind the emergence of research ethics committees is needed because histo-
ry fulfils an important role in the present-day governance of human experimentation. 
The past is used to offer up moral signposts that are to nudge research and reviewers 
in certain directions and to stay clear of others; it is used to justify the existence of 
strict oversight regimes for human subject research; and it is brought to bear to frame 
the political function that research ethics today fulfil in the public oversight of human 
research studies. Hence, careful historical research is an important check on the cur-
rent system of research ethics governance, to ensure that certain historical events and 
their political implications are not misunderstood—or worse, misused by calculating 
political actors to push through the policy measures they desire. For this reason, my 
research results are of interest to all those concerned with the contemporary govern-
ance of human subjects research, and particularly to those in policy. 
In addition, this PhD-thesis addresses practitioners of health care and the biomed-
ical sciences. Especially among members of these groups, it has become popular to 
complain that the practice of ethics by committee was forced on them in the second 
half of the twentieth century by ‘zealous medical outsiders’ who brought a bureaucra-
cy of ethics into existence that is itself unethical. Yet, this PhD-thesis shows that, at 
least in the Netherlands, the practice was invented by quintessential medical insiders 
to force the therapeutic progress they desired on Dutch health care. Hence, that eth-
ics committees strictly had to peruse research designs was not an unintended conse-
quence of design by committee in a bureaucracy with red tape; it was a built-in mech-
anism to enforce a specific epistemic perspective on Dutch clinical research and prac-
tice. This forgotten function of the practice of ethics by committee is of interest to the 
larger science community as well. Although regulative institutions like research ethics 
committees are not often subject to elaborate scrutiny by science scholars, they have 
become obligatory passage points in the present-day infrastructure of science: locus 
of control that scientists first have to pass through before they can conduct research 
with human beings. Careful scrutiny of such institutions is needed to understand bet-
ter how they have come to distribute prestige and power in international science sys-
tems in the late twentieth century, and have thus become crucial apparatus for decid-
ing what and who counts as authoritative in the sciences today. 
Finally, this PhD-thesis contributes to both public and political debates about how 
democratic societies wish to handle ethically contentious issues in science, technolo-
gy, and health. It does so in two ways. First, by exploring the changing ways in which 
the governance of medical experiments with human beings has been dealt with in the 
Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century, its chapters offer up multiple 
alternative vistas for governing human experimentation that may function as touch-
stones and points of reflection for the contemporary governance of ethically conten-
tious issues in science, technology, and health. Second, this PhD-thesis recovers what 
went into the configuration of ethics by committee as it did in the Netherlands, and 
makes explicit which cultural conceptions of the role of medicine and medical science 
in society underlie this governance practice. In doing so, it shows that the Dutch gov-
ernment has typically sought to handle ethically contentious issues in science, tech-
nology, and health in the late twentieth century with an expertocratic approach both 
to the definition and to the resolution of public problems in these fields.  
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Professional ethicists, this PhD-thesis argues, came to fulfil a specific political 
function for the Dutch government in the late twentieth century in its quest to depo-
liticise ethically contentious issues in science, technology, and health. Particularly the 
latter chapters of this PhD-thesis may therefore be used by ethics practitioners as well 
in reflection of their professional and political roles in certain forms of governance in 
favour of others. In the Netherlands as well as in other countries, such reflection does 
take place from time to time, to which this PhD-thesis contributes some much needed 
historical reflection on the professional and political functioning of ethicists that goes 
beyond the idea that the discipline emerged in the second half of the twentieth centu-
ry purely to hold physicians and (biomedical) researchers to account. 
These findings have been disseminated at academic conferences, including talks at 
conferences of the European Association for the History of Medicine and Health and 
the Society for the Social History of Medicine. In addition, I have given multiple lec-
tures on the subject for large student audiences at both humanities and medical fac-
ulties, and I have given multiple talks at associations for medical professionals, in-
cluding a lecture for an audience of over 200 physicians at the Nederlandse Internis-
tendagen (Dutch Days for Internists). In 2016, I spoke at a public event in the Rode 
Hoed in Amsterdam on the topic of ‘victims of medicine’, and in 2018, my PhD-thesis 
will form the starting point of a two-day workshop on the governance of medicine and 
science in the late modern period that will include both international experts on this 
topic and relevant Dutch stakeholders, including medical practitioners, policymakers, 
and professional ethicists. My PhD-thesis has resulted in several publications as well, 
including peer-reviewed articles in Studium, the journal of the Belgian-Dutch Society 
for the History of Science and Universities, and the Dutch Journal of Medicine, which 
is delivered weekly to the majority of Dutch physicians in the Netherlands. In the past 
years, I have also written multiple blog posts on the topic of my PhD-thesis for Shells 
& Pebbles, a popular online forum for the history of the sciences.  
Finally, in 2016, I initiated and contributed to the first ever Isis Viewpoint on The 
History Manifesto and its implications for the history of science. In 2014, this highly 
influential manifest of authors Jo Guldi and David Armitage warned that history as a 
discipline was marginalising itself in politics and society (or, to invoke a Dutch word, 
could hardly boost any ‘knowledge valorisation’ anymore). The Editor of Isis H. Floris 
Cohen and I invited thirteen historians of science from all over the world to consider 
what—if any—implications The History Manifesto should have for professional histo-
rians of science, and asked Guldi and Armitage to comment upon their thoughts. In 
2018, it remains the most downloaded collection of papers that has been published in 
Isis. While this Viewpoint is not directly a product of my PhD-grant, my development 
as an academic during my PhD-trajectory greatly influenced it. It is perhaps the piece 
of ‘knowledge valorisation’ that I am most proud of. For although I am critical of the 
idea that academics find their worth in “making knowledge suitable for translation 
into competitive products, services, processes and new commercial activities”, I do 
believe it is highly important for academics to critically reflect on their professional 
roles and responsibilities. If this counts as a form of ‘knowledge valorisation’ as well, 
my work in the past years hopefully may be found as “relevant to society”. 
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